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PREFACE 
In  mid- 1 977 Papua New Guinea conducted its first national elections since 
independence . In the five years which had elapsed since the preceding general 
election of 1972, the political context had changed dramatically . In 1 972 
Papua New Guinea was still an Australian colony. The elections of that year , 
however, produced a national coalition government led by Mr .  Michael Somare, 
which successfully steered the country first to self-government in December 
1 973 , and then to independence in September 1 975 . The coalition government , 
on assuming office , had immediately commenced negotiations with Australia 
for a rapid transfer of powers , and had addressed a wide range of economic and 
social policy issues . In 1 972 the then House of Assembly had established an all­
party Constitutional Planning Committee to devise an autochthonous con­
stitution . Within three years the transfer of power had been completed and a 
liberal democratic constitution based on a parliamentary system of govern­
ment had been adopted . On 16 September 1 975 , the Governor-General , Sir 
John Guise, declared Papua New Guinea an independent sovereign state. 
The politics of decolonization of that period were characterised by a consi­
derable degree of tension . Initially a substantial section of the community had 
opposed a rapid transition to independence . The proposals of the consti­
tutional planners had created rifts within the political leadership .  The two 
separatist movements in Bougainville and Papua had seriously threatened the 
fragile unity of the new state on the eve of independence by unilaterally 
declaring their own independence from the rest of the country . These tensions,  
however , were to a large extent accommodated, and the Somare-led coalition 
government continued in office until the June-July elections of 1 977. This 
volume does not include a survey of the final decolonization period but the 
following texts provide useful analyses of those years : D. Woolford : Papua 
New Guinea-Initiation and Independence, University of Queensland Press , 
1 976; J .  Griffin,  H .  Nelson and S. Firth : Papua New Guinea: A Political 
History, Heineman, Australia, 1 979; A. Amarshi ,  K. Good, R. Mortimer : 
Development and Dependency - The Political Economy of Papua New 
Guinea, Oxford University Press , Melbourne, 1 979; J .  Goldring: The 
Constitution of Papua New Guinea, Law Book Co . ,  Sydney, 1 978.  
The 1 977 election studies presented in this volume are the product of a 
research project co-ordinated by the Department of Political and Administrat­
ive Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea. The participants included 
staff and students from various departments of UPNG, and field researchers 
from a variety of overseas universities . The original intention of the project 
was for a comprehensive survey of the elections within the evolving political 
economy of Papua New Guinea . However a limited budget, teaching commit­
ments and a high turnover of academics at UPNG reduced the project to one 
of selected studies in various parts of the country . An election seminar was 
held at UPNG immediately after the poll, but unfortunately many of the field 
reports were not prepared for subsequent publication . A list of these reports 
appears at the end of this volume and the manuscripts, together with a copy of  
the tape of the seminar , are deposited in  the UPNG library . 
The volume is organised in the following manner: chapter one provides a 
brief overview of the elections; chapters two to four examine three electorates 
in the Papuan region; chapters five to ten examine the elections in parts of the 
Highlands region; chapters eleven to fourteen cover parts of the New Guinea 
coastal region ; and chapters fifteen and sixteen provide short surveys of two 
vi 
Preface vii 
electorates in the New Guinea islands region. It is hoped that this volume com­
plements those of the 1 964, 1968 and 1 972 general elections: D .G .  Bettison, 
C.A.  Hughes , P .W. van der Veur (eds . ) :  The Papua New Guinea Elections 
1964, ANU Canberra 1 964; A .L .  Epstein, R .S .  Parker , Marie Reay (eds . ) :  The 
Politics of Dependence: Papua New Guinea 1968, ANU Press, Canberra, 
197 1 ; D. Stone (ed . ) :  Prelude to Self-Government: Electoral Politics in Papua 
New Guinea 1972, UPNG and ANU, Canberra, 1 976. 
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Chapter 1 
THE 1977 NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA: AN 
OVERVIEW. 
David Hegarty 
Introduction 
The first national elections since independence dominated political affairs in 
Papua New Guinea throughout most of 1 977. Campaigning had commenced 
in the early part of the year, polling had been conducted over a three-week 
period in June and July and the government was formed in the first session of 
the new Parliament in August . The outcome of the election was the formation 
of a coalition government led by Pangu Party leader, Michael Somare who 
again became Prime Minister ,  and by Peoples' Progress Party leader, Julius 
Chan, who became deputy Prime Minister . Somare, first as Chief Minister and 
after independence as Prime Minister,  had led a multi party coalition since 
1 972. On this occasion Pangu and the Peoples' Progress Party had sufficient 
members in Parliament to form a two-party government. The United Party, 
which had been the major opposition party since 1 972, again filled the 
opposition benches , although this time with depleted ranks and its 
organisation in considerable disarray . 
Immediately after the completion of the count in early July, a period of 
uncertainty prevailed , similar to that following the poll in 1972. Despite the 
increased impact which parties had made in this election , their lack of  nation­
wide, mass support , produced a post-election situation in which the loyalties 
and affiliations of many winning candidates were not known with any 
certainty. This precipitated an intense period of lobbying by parties for the 
support of newly-elected, independent MPs. 
To most observers it appeared that Pangu and the Peoples' Progress Party 
(PPP) would have the required numtier - at least 55 in a Parliament of 109 -
to form the government . The United Party (UP), however, in a bid to wrest 
power from the incumbents ,  proposed that a "National Alliance" led by 
former Governor-General, Sir John Guise ,  with UP leader Sir Tei Abal as his 
deputy and incorporating the members of the United, National and Country 
parties , Papua Besena and other independents, had sufficient numbers to 
govem.1 A small and hastily formed group known as the "Alliance for 
Progress and Regional Development" (APRD) led by John Kaputin and Fr . 
John Momis which claimed the support of most New Guinea I slands MP' s  as 
well as the support of the Bougainville and East New Britain Provincial 
Governments ,  attempted to play a "balance - of - power" role between the 
two bigger blocs . When the numbers were ultimately tested in the vote for 
Prime Minister in Parliament on 9 August, Mr.  So mare decisively defeated Sir 
John by 69 votes to 36. 2 The "National Alliance" had seriously miscalculated 
its strength and neither the "balancing" role nor the claimed numerical 
support materialized for the APRD . 
Prime Minister Somare, exercising politician 's  license, exuberantly claimed 
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that voters had given his coalition a mandate to continue governing . But 
elections in Papua New Guinea are not about " mandates" in the sense that 
they are tests of public opinion on government performance and policy issues . 
Elections remain essentially electorate-level contests between competing clan 
candidates and personalities , with the government being pulled together after­
ward in the legislative arena. To say also that the government had been 
"returned" is also, in a sense, somewhat misleading. The turnover of 
politicians was high; 35 of the 91 who sought re-election being returned, with 9 
of the 1 8  ministers in the former government losing their seats . 
Pre-Election Climate 
The elections were held in the wake of PNG's  independence; a constitutional 
independence which had been achieved rapidly but smoothly. 3 Independence 
had been attained in 1 975 without struggle, with only sporadic mobilization 
against the colonial regime, and with little change to the political institutions 
and policies laid down by the colonial power . Despite an initial period of 
enthusiasm by the first Somare government for re-orienting the �olonial 
system, the structure of the economy, characterised by a high degree of foreign 
ownership and by a heavy dependence on aid and foreign capital , remained 
basically unaltered. 4 Considerable social differentiation, however, had become 
apparent during the transitional period.  The small politico-bureaucratic elite 
which had aspired to independence inherited command of the colonial state 
apparatus . 5  In rural PNG a rich peasantry had emerged and a class of 
"middlemen" , (coffee buyers , traders , truckers) , had rapidly moved into 
business . 6  The basic social cleavages in society were not , however, class based . 
Emerging class interests were transcended by clan and ethnic linkages . 
Loyalties remained essentially parochial although the tendencies to regional­
ism noted throughout the transition period, exemplified in the Bougainville 
secessionist and Papuan separatist movements ,  had begun to solidify .  
Regional economic inequalities generated during the colonial period persisted 
after independence . 
The Somare coalition government had managed the transition period 
capably, and in the first 1 8  months or so since independence the economic and 
political climate remained generally favourable to it . The first six months of 
1 977 during which the election campaigns were conducted were no exception. 
The economy had been buoyed not only by the guarantee of continued 
Australian aid (c. $200m 1 977), but by relatively high commodity prices 
(especially those of coffee and cocoa) which maintained an upward trend until 
mid-way through the year (See Table 1 ) .  The return from the sale of these 
commodities benefitted planters , both expatriate and national , national 
middlemen, and much flowed back to small producers .7 A number of 
development corporations involved in crop production and processing 
declared substantial profits . The cost-of-living, based on what many 
considered to be an out-dated consumer price index, rose in the December 
quarter of 1 976, but in fact fell in the March quarter of 1 977. Price control on 
certain items; the maintenance of a hard currency strategy; and a revaluation 
of the Kina against the Australian dollar by 1 3 %  in December 1 976 accounted 
for the fall in the Consumer Price Index . The hard currency strategy, however, 
had not attracted foreign investment : in fact , disinvestment had occurred . 
There was a slight fall in the enumerated labour force and a drop in real wages , 
but neither appeared to have had short-term political repercussions .  The Inter­
national Monetary Fund had commented favourably on the stability and 
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management of the economy and PNG's  credit was obviously reasonably good 
with international lending agencies . 
Table 1 Export Commodity Prices in PNG Currency 
COMMODITY 
Cocoa 
Copra 
Coffee 
Tea 
Rubber 
(Copper 
* 1971-74 figures 
OJo SMALL-HOLDER 
PRODUCTION* 
35 
40 
75 
25 
3 
AVERAGE AVERAGE 
PRICE PRICE 
MARCH 1 976 MARCH 1 977 
K9 l 0 per tonne 
K l  30 per tonne 
K l .46 per kilo 
K0. 95 per kilo 
K0.6 1 5 per kilo 
Kl .6 per kilo 
K2,006 per tonne 
K230 per tonne 
K4. 56 per kilo 
K2. 57 per kilo 
KO. 777 per kilo 
K l .2 per kilo) 
Source: Bank of PNG: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, March 1977. 
In broad areas of public policy and of bureaucratic and political 
management the government had performed satisfactorily. Despite some 
deterioration in standards, particularly in the delivery of health services , 
public services and infrastructural development were generally maintained at 
pre-independence levels .  In 1 976 Parliament had adopted, without dissent, a 
"National Development Strategy" drawn up by the Central Planning Office 
which called for a promotion of economic growth through increased agri­
cultural productivity and the exploitation of natural resource projects 
(particularly in minerals ,  fisheries, and timber) .8 The Director of the 
Central Planning Office, Charles Lepani , had earlier in the year argued that 
economic dependency was a fact of life in PNG's  small and open economy and 
that the government had few options other than to continue its reliance on aid 
and investment capital .9 Since the collapse in 1 975 of the small " Nationalist 
Pressure Group' ' which had formed in Parliament during the Constitutional 
debates , the government had encountered little opposition on its economic 
strategy . The government had also strengthered its relationships with the 
major economic pressure groups . In April 1 977 it had defused a potential 
conflict with the powerful Public Service Association by negotiating a three­
year "pay deal" in which public service salaries were to be adjusted each six 
months in line with rises in the CPI,  and in which long service leave credits 
were made commensurate with those in the private sector .10 The Employers 
Federation and Chamber of Commerce had also, by this time, established 
working relationship with the government . Throughout the campaign period 
neither economic stategy nor the general question of dependence became an 
election issue . 
The policy area which aroused some consternation prior to the poll was that 
of foreign affairs , and particularly that of PNG's  relations with Indonesia. 
PNG's  foreign policy, labelled "Universalism" and popularly described as 
" friends to all-enemies to none" , was premised on a reluctance to offend 
other nations and consequently to avoid international conflict situations . With 
regard to the border between PNG and the Indonesian province of Irian J aya 
and to the small Irianese liberation movement operating around that border, 
the government had maintained a strictly conventional stance . The border was 
subject to an agreement negotiated between two sovereign states , and the 
Irianese guerrilla operations were a matter of Indonesian domestic concern . 
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However, considerable opinion within the PNG elite was sympathetic to the 
"Melanesian brothers" cause in I rian Jaya and to the flow of refugees into 
PNG from that province . In January, 1 977 , Mr Somare visited Djakarta and 
discussed with President Soeharto the border situation. On his return he 
denied any agreement with Indonesia that ' '  I rian J ayans hostile to Indonesia' ' 
would be repatriated . 1 1  In May shortly after the Indonesian elections, about 
300 lrianese were reported to have crossed the border into the Western 
Province, and it was alleged that a West Sepik villager had been shot by 
I ndonesian soldiers . 1 2 The government announced that it would send the 
refugees back and disclaimed any knowledge on the situation across the 
border. This brought angry reactions from journalists who were refused access 
to the border and from Paul Langro, shadow Minister for Foreign Relations, 
whose electorate is the West Sepik .  Langro alleged that a deal had been made 
permitting "hot pursuit" of guerrillas . Mr. Somare appealed on the radio for 
people not to "panic" over the border problems.  Although the issue did not 
translate into any electoral significance (Langro, however, lost his seat but for 
unrelated reasons) , it is bound to be a continuing source of friction in PNG 
politics . 1 3 
Government policy which had undoubted appeal and which had begun 
to generate popular support was that of the introduction of Provincial 
Governments (PG) . In February the Constitution had been amended to 
include provision for provincial-level governments for each of the 1 9  
provinces. The government ' s  prime motive for introducing a two-tier system 
was to placate the demands of the Bougainville secessionists ,  but momentum 
had build up, particularly through the efforts of the Constitutional Planning 
Committee in the early 1 970' s ,  for decentralisation. By mid- 1 977,  six PGs were 
in existence and the government was in process of devising appropriate 
implementation strategies . Many structural ,  financial and legal problems were 
anticipated in the conversion to a two-tier governmental system, but ,  
electorally, the establishment of PGs was an obvious "plus" for the Somare 
government . Astute candidates in the election were quick to see the advantages 
of association with their PG . While PGs generally did not have much impact 
on these elections, over time, the changed power structure is bound to affect 
future electoral outcomes . 
In the years since independence political tension within the elite had been 
frequent , but it was not of the magnitude of turbulence which characterised 
the years prior to 1 975 . The "Nationalist Pressure Group" which had formed 
to lobby the Constitutional Planning Committee 's  proposals through 
Parliament , had dissolved . Fr Momis, the CPC leader and his Bougainvillean 
colleague, Raphael Bele, had resigned their seats in 1 976 in protest at the 
central government ' s  handling of the Bougainville issue . The secessionists , 
however , appeared placated by the introduction of Provincial Government . 
Papua Besena' s  unilateral declaration of ind,ependence in March 1 975 had 
amounted only to a symbolic protest , but its representatives ,  Josephine 
Abaijah and James Mopio remained in Parliament . Early in 1 976 Prime 
Minister Somare had dismissed two National Party ministers, lambakey Okuk 
(Transport) and Thomas Kavali (Lands) over their accusation that Somare had 
been "dictatorial" in his approach to portfolio allocations .  In the final session 
of the 1 975-77 National Parliament held in February-March, the attention of 
most MPs was focussed on their campaigns .  Tore Lokoloko, the UP member 
for Kerema, was elected to succeed Sir John Guise as Governor General; Sir 
John having resigned to re-enter the political arena. Former Minister, Okuk , 
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who had attempted to rally a " Highlands bloc" of MPs,  provided most of the 
criticism from the opposition benches . Perhaps surprisingly the political party 
concept again came in for criticism by MPs from a variety of viewpoints . 1 4 
Most , however, emphasised the "divisive" nature of par!Y politics . 
Public awareness of the impending election varied throughout the country . 
In  some parts people only realised that an election was being held when the 
polling team arrived, but the overall turnoPt of voters (62 per cent) was 
consistent with previous elections . The pro-government Post-Courier gave the 
campaigning wide coverage and the elections attracted considerable interest 
from foreign embassy staff, with the Australian High Commission being 
particularly interested in the outcome. For a time early in the year it appeared 
that the UP had a chance of winning power - an impression supported by a 
seeming indifference to Pangu, of public criticism of ministerial performance, 
and of disillusionment among Port Moresby-based public servants with a 
' ' tired government' ' .  On a short tour of parts of the country prior to polling it 
appeared, to this writer at least , that the popularity of Somare was 
widespread; the UP leadership was divided; no substantial criticism of the 
government had crystallised; and that the advantages of incumbency in terms 
of patronage would enable the governing parties to attract a larger number of 
the uncommitted candidates (should they win) than would the opposition. 
The Electoral Act had been amended for these elections . First-past-the-post 
voting replaced the optional preferential system, and absentee voters were now 
required to vote in their place of residence. The voting age remained at 1 8 , 
although candidates had to be at least 25 years of age . Approximately one and 
a half million people were eligible to vote, but voting was not compulsory . 
Electoral boundaries had been revised providing for 89 Open seats (an increase 
of nine) based roughly on a population of 30,000 . The twenty Provincial seats 
based on the old administrative divisions and now Provinces , were retained . 
The Papuan region was allocated 24 seats ; the Highlands region, 39; the New 
Guinea coastal region, 29; and the New Guinea islands , 1 7 . 
Polling was delayed from May to June largely as a result of the Electoral 
Commission's  difficulties in compiling the rolls . Few census patrols had been 
conducted in the intervening years and, as James Mileng, the Electoral 
Commissioner , correctly pointed out, Parliament itself contributed to the 
delay by rejecting the proposed boundary distribution earlier in the year . 
Polling was conducted quite smoothly despite the omission of candidates' 
photographs from ballot papers in all but 19 electorates . 
Candidates and Campaigns 
A total of 88 1 candidates stood for the 1 09 seats (6 1 1  candidates for 100 
seats in 1 972) and they included about 80 public servants some of whom had 
held senior positions. The socio-economic characteristics of candidates 
differed somewhat from those of previous elections. In part these differences 
reflect the social differentiation occurring in PNG . These elections saw the 
demise of the older-style "big-men" and the rise of the "new men" drawn 
from the rural and urban elites . The bulk of candidates tended to be 
"businessmen" of some sort , or to have had a corporation or salaried income 
as a base (some, in fact , had all three) . As well general education levels among 
candidates were higher than in the past . The tenor of the campaigns varied 
considerably but in many electorates there was an awareness among the 
candidates at least that power , privilege, and access to government resources 
was at stake now that the colonial "referee" had departed . This was the first 
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national election to be conducted on a "first-part-the-post" system and there 
was obviously a greater awareness among candidates of the "arithmetic" of 
the electorate. Candidates and party organisers, particularly in the Highlands , 
calculated clan voting strengths and in many instances vote-splitting tactics 
were employed whereby a candidate would persuade (often with financial 
incentives) other-clan candidates to run ,  thus reducing the chances of their 
opponents .  There was also wider recognition that a financial resource base and 
organisation was necessary for success which led many to actively seek out 
party endorsement . Provincial electorate candidates in some cases linked 
themselves with Open candidates and campaigned for each other : a method 
which proved strikingly successful for Fr. Momis and his "ticket" on 
Bougainville. Many Ministers as would be expected sought maximum publicity 
for the various activities (official openings,  etc .)  and some like Boyamo Sali , 
Minister for Primary Industry, were in a position to regularly announce 
increases in commodity export prices and to propose small resource projects 
(e .g.  forests) in their electorates . The amounts of money spent on campaigns 
increased dramatically. In the Chimbu for example the three leading 
Provincial electorate candidates - Okuk , Kale and Nilkare - each spent an 
estimated K20,000 or more . Expenditures for all candidates are difficult to 
assess but most winners probably spent in excess of K4,000 on their 
campaigns .  In contrast however , in areas where early political mobilization 
had occurred, expenditure appeared considerably lower . The successful 
Mataungans (although they may be an exception) probably had individual 
expenditures of less than Kl ,OOO. 
Political Parties 
In the intervening years between elections party organizations had generally 
atrophied . None had attempted to build a mass base and such organisation as 
existed was dominated by a core of leaders and officials in Port Moresby . The 
only significant development had been their entry into business - usually real 
estate - with the aim of generating an on-going source of funds. The lack of 
grass-roots organization meant that parties pre-selected candidates in an ad 
hoe manner with party officials attempting to "spot" likely winners with large 
clan bases . Parties , however, had a more significant impact on these elections 
than in the past. Pangu , PPP and UP endorsed 295 candidates ( 1 44 of 6 1 1 in 
1 972) and had reached private "agreements" with many others should they 
win . Party "labels" were more widely known throughout and although the 
concept of parties had not penetrated to the villages many candidates were 
aware of their significance both in terms of the financial support they could 
offer and their linkage role at the national parliamentary level. There were 
more direct contests between endorsed party candidates than occurred in 1 972; 
the "fear" of party attachment noted in previous elections having largely 
dissipated . Disputants in local level conflicts on occasions adopted national 
party labels - a feature not uncharacteristic of polities without a developed 
party system . 
In the months prior to the elections all parties produced platforms which 
reflected a clear convergence of ideology and policy . 15 They were bland 
documents all emphasising rural development programmes ; foreign invest­
ment to stimulate industry and mineral resource projects;  extension of road 
and transport infrastructure; more education; law and order ; and the main­
tenance of stable government . Despite claims by Pangu officials after the 
elections that policy differences with the PPP had to be ironed out , the only 
discernible di fferences appeared to be Pangu 's  slightly more cautious 
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approach to foreign investment (e .g .  investment "which truly benefits the 
people" , compared with the PPP's  "appropriate incentives" and returns for 
investors and "reasonable royalties" for the people) . The PPP was also less 
emphatic about decentralization and it urged PNG' s active co-operation with 
ASEAN . The UP platform was little different in substance but was critical of 
the government on a number of points urging changes in the Electoral Act ; a 
four-year parliamentary term; a Royal Commission into the public service; 
abolition of political appointments to the public service; a re-organization of 
the Education Department; and lower-cost embassies . One novel suggestion , 
that is for the UP, was for the establishment of state farms. Papua Besena' s  
brief platform was interesting for the fact that no  mention was made of  
separation from New Guinea although i t  was implicit in  advertisements .  
Besena had three slogans : " Justice" the thrust of which was connected with 
the return of alienated land; " Integrity" , a critique of governmental and 
ministerial extravagance; and "Development" which tended to emphasize the 
problems of urban Port Moresby . The Country Party produced a Ten-Point 
Plan which was actually a regurgitation of the government's Eight Point Plan 
of 1 973 . 
"Sanap Wantaim Somare". (Stand with or support Somare) . Pangu' s  
campaign was premised o n  the popularity o f  the Prime Minister. The Prime 
Minister and his organisers toured the country rejuvenating branches where 
they had once existed and endorsing candidates whose chances looked good. 
Policy issues were rarely discussed although some play was made of the 
symbolic achievements of the government: self-government, independence, 
Air Niugini, and the new currency . Pangu endorsed 82 candidates and made a 
determined push into the Highlands . Advertisements in the Port-Courier urged 
those who desired Somare to remain as Prime Minister to vote for Pangu 
candidates . In complete contrast to Pangu's campaign expenditure in 1 972, its 
1 977 campaign cost in excess of K200,000, financed largely by expatriate 
business interests and by a mortgage on party-owned real estate. 16 
Papa Bilong Kina na Toea. (Father of PNG's  currency) . Although less 
explicitly based on the personality of its leader the PPP's  image and appeal 
nevertheless derived from Julius Chan's  reputation as the most able minister in 
the government . His ability to organise a tightly-knit , disciplined party and his 
power to dispense patronage was an obvious factor in attracting candidates , 
particularly for the many public servants who sought PPP endorsement . Chan 
toured extensively and candidates were equipped with loud hailers , cassette 
recorders with messages from the leader, and pamphlets . The estimated cost of 
the PPP campaign was K l 00,000. The party maintained its slogan of " strong, 
stable, progressive government' '  but again candidates concerned themselves 
with local issues . The PPP endorsed 68 candidates concentrating mainly on the 
New Guinea Islands' and mainland Provinces and other select areas such as 
the Southern Highlands and Milne Bay .  
"Taim nau - sensim gavman - makim United Party". (It ' s  time - change 
the government - vote United Party) . Throughout much of the campaign 
period there was some enthusiasm about the UP' s  chances . Despite the lack of 
overt policy differences the UP appeared to have acquired a "radical" wing in 
the form of young educated candidates critical of government and who had 
had no previous attachment to the planter-inspired UP. Sir Tei campaigned 
extensively throughout the country in support of his candidates . One ploy 
thought to be effective was to publicize the alleged K43 million discrepancy in 
government spending . 1 7 
But the parliamentary wing of UP for some time had been seriously divided 
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into at least three camps . Members tended to group themselves around either 
Sir Tei or his deputy Paul Langro with smaller support for Anton Parao. At 
the UP's convention at Lae in March , Parao and an Engan, Kakarya, were 
expelled from the party. The divisions arose over a dispute between Sir Tei and 
Parao (which resulted in a court decision that Parao pay K l 0,000 in 
defamation costs) and over dissatisfaction with Sir Tei ' s  leadership . Party 
dissidents suggested that Sir Tei lacked the ability and confidence to become 
Prime Minister and he was less interested in providing an alternative to the 
government than in supporting it . Sir Tei ' s  campaign was , in fact , rather 
curious .  He often publicly expressed satisfaction with Somare' s  leadership and 
declared relatively unqualified support for the government . The power 
struggle within the party was obvious for often immediately after Sir Tei had 
spoken Okuk would then roundly condemn the "Somare - Chan regime" . 
Party backbenchers had become discontented with their opposition role. " Mi 
les long askim kwestin" (I 'm tired of (simply) asking questions) , was a 
common complaint . A complaint which signified not necessarily a desire for 
the UP to win but for the MP to be in government led by whichever party. In 
addition the UP had to cope with members like Angmai Bilas (Madang) who 
declared his support for Somare as Prime Minister but urged voters to vote for 
him as a UP man . 
Once self-government and independence had become non-issues there was 
little left for the UP to oppose . The expatriate backers of the party in 1 972 had 
either withdrawn from overt politics or switched their financial support to 
Pangu. The UP campaign cost an estimated Kl 00,000 but unlike the other 
parties it had some di fficulty in raising finance . It endorsed 1 45 candidates 
permitting multiple endorsements in Highlands seats - a strategy designed to 
net as many winners as possible. 
HPapua Dainai, Mauri Dainai, Tano Dainai". (For Papua, our way of life, 
our country) . Papua Besena was hopeful of winning 14 or more seats in 
Papua. Its campaign was built around Josephine Abaijah ' s  appeal to a 
specifically Papuan sentiment and identity, but organisationally it was even 
less viable than the other parties . An attempt by Besena candidates and 
sympathisers to formalize the movement by adopting a constitution was 
thwarted by Miss Abaijah . She insists that Papua Besena is a "movement" 
and her attitude to its leadership and organisation is decidedly charismatic . In 
a Post-Courier article she wrote: 
"The basic organisational structure of Papua Besena is not based on that of a foreign 
political party in a Westminister system of government . It is based on an old and very 
efficient traditional Papuan social structure of "fission and fusion" or coming 
together and drawing apart as each circumstance arises . 
If a person wants to establish some Papua Besena organistation or conduct some 
Papua Besena activity he can call it any name he likes and the leaders of Papua 
Besena will support it . 
Papua Besena comes together . If the organisation happens to become a power base 
of individual (sic) or for promoting interests or activities contrary to the principles of 
Papua Besena then we draw apart . Nobody is injured, nobody is hurt and nobody is 
disgraced . . . . .  . 
It is a strict policy of Papua Besena that leadership must arise where it will 
throughout Papuan society and leaders must never be appointed . Leadership may 
assert itself in any form in any situation . "  18 
In the event Besena ran a low-key campaign and fielded a "collection" of 
candidates although some refused "endorsement" .  
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The Mataungan Association, revived for the East New Britain PG elections 
in May, overcame a split in its leadership and ran its three incumbent MP's -
Kaputin, Kereku, and Tammur . Kaputin was not initially re-endorsed but later 
regained his place on the ticket. Mathungan (and particularly Kaputin's) 
chances were enhanced by the announcements of K 1 28,000 profit  for its 
business arm, the New Guinea Development Corporation, and a loss of 
K200,000 for its rival , the New Guinea Islands Produce Company . 19 
Country Party candidates campaigned almost exclusively in the Eastern 
Highlands , while the National Party by time of the elections had all but 
dissolved . 
Results and Coalition Formation 
The composition of the new Parliament was substantially different from that 
of the old . Education levels of MPs was generally higher with 3 8  per cent 
having at least completed secondary schooling compared with 1 9  per cent in 
1 972. The number of MPs with no formal schooling fell from 25 per cent to 1 3  
per cent . The average age o f  MPs was also lower with 50 per cent falling i n  the 
age range of 26-35 compared with 42 per cent in that age bracket in the 
previous Parliament . A core of party stalwarts were returned but many 
incumbents were dumped heavily . Of the 91 MPs who sought re-election only 
35 were returned reflecting in large part Members ' loss of touch with their 
electorates and their inability to deliver the goods and ,  in lesser part , the 
redistribution and the new voting system . The number of expatriates (now 
naturalized citizens) in Parliament declined from nine to three. 
There were some significant individual results . Michael Somare won his East 
Sepik Provincial seat collecting a massive 870/o of the vote.  Julius Chan , 
thought at one stage to be in trouble, polled 560/o of the vote in Namatani . Sir 
Tei Abal , also considered to be under pressure won with 490Jo in Wabag. Two 
senior Pangu men Barry Holloway (Eastern Highlands) and Boyamo Sali 
(Morobe) opposed by two of the young " new men" of the UP, Kimoro Vira 
and Utula Samana, won with votes of 640Jo and 690/o respectively . In 
Bougainville Fr . Momis defeated Leo Hannett by 520/o of the vote to 3 3 0/o ,  and 
his "ticket" which had the tacit support of the PG won the other three seats . 
Former Foreign Minister, Sir Maori Kiki , committed political suicide by 
contesting against Josephine Abaijah who outpolled him by two to one. John 
Middleton (Sumkar) an influential UP frontbencher managed only 240Jo of the 
vote . Sinake Giregire, UP leader , lost his seat with l 90Jo of the vote . A number 
of incumbents met very heavy defeat . Ninkama Bomai (Gumine) , for example, 
a member of all previous Parliaments polled only 60/o in his electorate . Three 
of the nine women candidates , Miss Abaijah, Mrs . Rooney (Manus) and Mrs . 
Clowes (Middle Fly) were successful .  
The post-election scene, however, belonged to the parties and their leaders . 
In the lobbying for power which followed the counting Pangu and PPP 
operated from a position of strength. Of the 109 winners, 76 had been 
endorsed by parties or movements and 48 of them were aligned with the 
coalition . Somare and Chan reaffirmed their partnership agreeing that Chan 
should become Deputy Prime Minister and that portfolios would be 
distributed , 6 PPP , 9 Pangu and 3 for Pangu-independents . 20 The maj or 
problem as they saw it was to obtain wide regional representation in the 
Ministry . Pangu toyed with the idea of a "grand coalition" and, in fact , 
offered Sir Tei two ministries provided he delivered 14 MP's to the 
government . The UP rejected this and when the "National Alliance" was 
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announced with Sir John Guise as its leader the division hardened . Somare was 
particularly antagonistic to Guise having campaigned against him in Milne 
Bay. Guise, however, extracted a statement from Chan to the effect that he 
(Guise) was a great national leader . The entry of the Alliance for Progress and 
Regional Development onto the scene posed two problems for Pangu : it 
tended to reinforce regionalist sentiment ; and it appeared to split Fr . Momis ,  
whom Pangu was anxious to have in the cabinet , from the coalition . Momis, 
however, was wary of Guise' s intention to hold the Provincial A ff airs 
portfolio himself, and when both he and Kaputin realised the numbers were 
with the coalition decided to support it . 
The vote for the Prime Ministership on 9 August revealed the following 
support for Somare and Guise : 
Table 2 Vote for the Prime Ministership 
Soma re 
Pangu 
PPP 
Independents 
United Party 
Total 
38 
1 9  
1 0  
2 
69 
Guise 
United Party 
Independents 
Papua Besena 
Total 
25 
5 
6 
36 
The independents voting for Somare included the four Bougainvilleans ,  two 
Mataungans,  two United Party members who crossed the floor, and four 
Western Highlands MP's who decided to j oin the coalition . The independents 
voting for Guise included Guise himself, Okuk , Pondros , Edimani and Mrs .  
Clowes . The three-non-voters were Dibela (Speaker) , Kaputin who abstained , 
and Urekit who was absent . 
Party strengths in the new Parliament (adjusted figures to include all 1 09 
seats) were calculated as folows:  
Table 3 Party Strengths in New Parliament 
Government 
Pangu 
PPP 
Independents 
Total 
38  
20 
1 1  
69 
Opposition 
United Party 
Independents 
Papua Besena 
Total 
27 
6 
7 
40 
The following Table (Table IV) shows basic party strengths and government 
- opposition support at three times over the past five years: April 1 972,  when 
the National Coalition was formed; March 1977, the last session of 
Parliament; and August , 1 977,  the first session of the new Parliament. The 
Table of course does not reveal the fluidity of voting particularly in the pre­
independence period when the government came close to defeat nor does it 
show the personalities who switched parties during the life of  old Parliament. 
Party strength figures are based on calculations by party and legislative 
officials .  Members crossed the floor in both directions on many issues . 
National Elections I 977 - overview 1 1  
Table 4 
Government - Opposition Support by Parties, 1972-77 
APRIL 1 972 MARCH 1 �7 AUGUST 1 �7 
( 1 00 seats) ( 102 seats) ( 1 09 seats) 
Government 
Pangu 24 25 38  
PPP 1 0  1 6  20 
Independent 1 2  7 9 
MA 3 3 2(3) 
National(!> 7 3 _(4) 
(Total Government) (54) (54) (69) 
Opposition 
United 42 32 27 
Country<2> 1 0  1 (5) 
National 3 1 (6) 
Independent 1 1 4 
Papua Besena 1 2 7 
(Total Opposition) (46) (48) (40) 
Notes : (I) National Party split early in 1976 with the expulsion of Okuk and Kavali from the 
Ministry. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Country Party was formed in May, 1974. 
Kaputin ,  still MA, abstained from voting in election for PM, but supported the 
government. 
Kavali , once leader of National party, now described himself as "pro-Pangu 
independent' '  
Pondros 
Okuk 
The most obvious result of these elections has been the rise in strength of the 
two major governing parties and the decline of the United Party. The 
explanation for this can be reduced to five factors ; ( 1 )  the favourable political 
and economic climate which has prevailed since the government took office in 
1 972; (2) the notion among MP' s  that being "with the government" is 
essential to access to goods, services and rewards;  (3) the absence of a credible 
alternative; (4) the popularity of Somare and Chan (i . e .  the personality 
factor) ; and (5) sound patronage politicking by those two leaders . 
The regional representation of the government was now quite wide - the 
only Provinces in which it had minimal support were Enga, National Capital , 
and Central . Pangu, in addition to its support bases in Morobe and East 
Sepik, improved its membership in West Sepik , Madang, Chimbu and, quite 
strikingly in the Eastern Highlands . With the two Mataungans,  Tammur and 
Kereku, and Kavali and three Western Highland MP's joining Pangu as pro­
Pangu independents its strength was considerable . Pangu , however , lost ground 
in Papua notably with the loss of three Ministers - Kiki , Rea and Taureka . 
The PPP improved its membership in the Papuan Provinces of Milne Bay and 
Western and gained surprising support from the Southern Highlands where 
Chan had assiduously cultivated Area Authority members . 
The United Party lost ground in Madang, West Sepik,  Chimbu and the 
Eastern and Southern Highlands . It was now more obviously a Highlands based 
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party . Papua Besena won all but two of the eight seats in the National Capital 
and Central Provinces , but, despite considerable support , failed to make 
electoral ground in the rest of Papua. 
The new government settled into office quickly and announced that , since it 
had received popular endorsement , there would be no change in its approach 
to policy . That approach had been essentially one of ' 'managing' '  an inherited 
political and economic framework rather than "reforming" it . The one major 
departure made since independence was that of decentralisation which 
received considerable impetus late in 1 977 with the appointment of Fr . Momis 
to that portfolio . The institutional stresses likely to flow from the full 
elaboration of this policy are bound to occupy bureaucrats and politicians well 
into the next decade . In an attempt to foster unity and a broader support base 
Prime Minister Somare appointed at least one Minister to his cabinet from 
each province . That move taken together with the government ' s  substantially 
increased maj ority , however, did not necessarily increase its security in 
office . The fluidity of parliamentary alliances , the potential for personality 
disputes and conflict over particular policies , together with pressures arising 
from the condition of economic dependence, lent a degree of fragility to an 
apparently stable, liberal democratic system . 
The 1977 Election Study 
The study of an election in a rapidly changing socio-political environment 
cannot provide a comprehensive view of a country 's  power structure and 
political system. It can, however, offer insights into the nature and character 
of the political process . The following chapters in this volume concentrate 
largely on electoral behaviour in various part of PNG, but they also illustrate 
some of the more general features of PNG politics . In particular they provide 
indicators of the country's  evolving political style . 
The rise of political party activity at the parliamentary level provided 
something of a focus for most participants in the study. The parties which 
contested the elections emerged essentially as parliamentary factions in the late 
1 960' s  and early 1 970' s .  With the partial exception of Pangu , none had 
developed a mass base of popular support nor had they developed a 
substantial extra-parliamentary organisation . Within Parliament, few parties 
could exercise discipline over their supporters and the switching of sides by 
individual MPs was a frequent phenomenon . Six months prior to these 
elections all parties established an electoral machine of some sort , raised 
finance, and attempted to pre-select candidates . 
There is little doubt that parties had had some impact on the election in that 
the ' names' of parties were more widely known throughout the community, 
party endorsement was sought by candidates , and in some electorates the 
contest was conducted between clearly identified party candidates (Ballard eh 
9) . Party endorsement , however , was often more one of convenience than of 
commitment to a philosophy, platform, or leader. Some candidates developed 
a rudimentary form of organisation by using komiti, or electoral agents ,  to 
foster support , but the commitment of these komiti was directed largely to the 
candidate and not the party . 
Most of the studies in this volume show that parties had very little impact at 
all on the voter . Goode (eh 7) , in his study of a "village view" of the election , 
shows that neither parties nor national issues were of concern to the voters . 
Goode suggests that villagers evaluate candidates in terms of the language 
group to which they belong; residential proximity; maturity; political and 
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educational experience; kinship linkage� ; the place and ongm o f  the 
candidate' s  wife or wives; and their perceived honesty and integrity . Most of 
these findings are supported by other studies and are borne out by the tables in 
the chapters by Standish (eh 5) and Rooney (eh 1 6) ,  which show the location of 
voting support for candidates . There was some evidence that secondary 
associations,  for example development associations, were useful as vote 
mobilising agencies ( lsana eh 1 5) ,  but, in general , elections remain very much 
local level contests between candidates who draw their voting support from 
clan or personal loyalties (Westermark eh 8) . 
A partial exception to this pattern is perhaps found in the urban areas with 
more heterogeneous populations (Premdas and Steves eh 2, Adams eh 1 1 ) .  
Premdas and Steeves argue that , in one Port Moresby electorate, the  contest 
was essentially one of competing party candidates ,  but obviously personality 
and other linkage factors were of considerable importance to the outcome. On 
present indications PNG's  multi-party " system" is likely to continue to 
operate in weak and spasmodic fashion, although the party which attempts to 
build an electoral base in the intervening years between elections could reap 
considerable benefit. 
The prize of political office attracted a field of 88 1 candidates which 
represented a 440Jo increase over the number contesting in 1 972. This increase 
was largely due to the fact that , with independence, political power was at 
stake, and the fact that the first-past-the-post voting system gave candidates 
with a reasonably strong clan base a chance of winning . Candidates generally 
had attained higher levels of education and more importantly had demon­
strated some skills in the "modern" economic sector . Candidates often em­
phasised that they were men of "bisnis" and many of the field reports 
indicated that voters were impressed by this claim . Good and Donaldson (eh 6) 
provide a interesting exception to this pattern . In  their chapter which focusses 
more broadly on the political economy of the Eastern Highlands than on the 
electoral contests ,  they note that the more successful rural businessmen ( ' ' rural 
capitalists") declined to enter the political fray . The attitude of these men is 
summed up in the pidgin expression : "Maski ,  mi no laik dispela kain pilai -
bisnis tasol' ' .  (Forget (politics) , I don't  like this game - business interests are 
sufficient) . 
A better-than-average economic base and a "modern" image, however, was 
no sure guarantee of success . The roots of local-level politics , of inter-and 
intra-clan disputes , of relative status ,  of social obligations met or unmet and 
of personal jealousies , run deep, posing considerable hazards for candidates . 
In  an unpublished field report on the Baiyer-Mul electorate in the Western 
Highlands , Absalom Paypowa described the situation confronting a candidate 
with a potentially strong support base .2 1  This candidate faced problems within 
his extended family particularly over his step-brothers' claim to their father ' s  
land.  The unpopularity of h is  two elder brothers , one of whom had been a 
village court magistrate and the other president of the local government 
council , also posed problems in his campaign . In the event the candidate ran 
second to another from a more populous part of the electorate, re-inforcing 
the general point that , despite intra-clan tensions ,  a candidate nevertheless 
carries the weight of his kin . 
Styles of campaigning varied throughout the country , from the frenetic 
barnstorming approach by Okuk in the highly volatile Simbu Province 
(Standish eh 5) to the quieter , consensual , grass-roots approach by many 
candidates in the lowlands and islands (Townsend and Wamma eh 1 2, 
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Nyameye eh 1 3) ,  Winnett and May (eh 14, Rooney eh 1 6). In  areas where 
pre-independence mobilisation had occurred as in the Gazelle Peninsula, 
Bougainville and the Central Province of Papua, leaders of those movements 
were well known and all polled well . For example the Mataungan Association 
returned its three MPs, the Bougainville secession movement (despite the 
schism between Hannett and Momis) made a clean sweep of all four seats , and 
in the Central Province Papua Besena captured seven of the nine seats 
(Premdas and Steeves eh 3), and was later to win an eighth in a by-election. In 
areas where previous mobilization had not occurred, candidates who covered 
much of their electorates and who " showed their face" to voters scored more 
heavily than others (Jackson eh 4) . 
I ssues were rarely canvassed by candidates ,  nor was it expected of them by 
voters . Voters were more concerned to " see the face" of the candidate and to 
attempt to judge his character rather than be harangued by candidates and be 
drawn into discussions of policies . While we have noted the importance of a 
loyal clan base to electoral success , patronage, in the form of money, gifts, 
feasts , beer , etc . ,  which incurs at least some temporary obligations on the 
"clients" or recipients of such favours , is  an increasingly important method of 
securing support . Standish ' s  chapter (eh 5),  in particular, highlights this mode 
of vote mobilisation which may well become a standard pattern in future 
elections . 
One recurring theme in the studies is the question of the legitimacy or 
acceptability of both the electoral process and the representative system . Since 
1 964 national elections have been conducted fairly, democratically, and in 
accordance with constitutional requirements .  22 Voters ' experience with 
national elections has been consolidated by elections for local government 
councils and more recently for provincial governments .  In this election Courts 
of Disputed Returns deliberated on nine challenges to the results and upheld 
five, ordering a re-election in each of those cases . The courts were particularly 
concerned to disqualify candidates who, in their opinion, had exercised 
"undue influence" (for example, threats of imprisonment or fines made by 
candidates to their constituents) over the voters . 
Significantly, voting turnout was high in all electorates , with an overal l 
turnout of 62 per cent . Given the absence of compulsory voting and the often 
difficult terrain over which polls are conducted, this figure appears to indicate 
a broad acceptance of the electoral process .  But there are three points raised 
in the study which tend to take the gloss off this picture (Standish eh 5 ,  Sillitoe 
Ch 1 0, Townsend and Wamma eh 1 2) .  In Simbu, Standish notes , many losing 
candidates refused to accept the outcome of the ballot and the post-election 
scene was quite acrimonious.  Such behaviour, he suggests , could lead not only 
to disenchantment with the system, but to possible intimidatory tactices , both 
of voters and polling officials,  in future elections . Sillitoe makes the point that 
in less developed regions an election is something of a ritual , and voters 
generally have little understanding of either the role of an MP or of the 
connection between the election , the work of an MP and the Parliament in 
Port Moresby. Townsend and Wamma note a degree of disenchantment , 
indifference, and even anger towards elections and politics : " em i samting 
belong ol taun man tasol' ' .  
The high turnover o f  incumbents in PNG elections also reflects both on the 
legitimacy of the political process and on voters ' expectations . In these 
elections 35 of the 91 MPs who re-contested were successful, compared with 38  
of 73 in  1 972, and 23 of 46 in 1 968 . While i t  may be considered by some that 
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unstable voting patterns and a consequent loss of continuity in parliamentary 
experience represents something of a legitimacy crisis , others might well 
consider that a turnover of 60 per cent of incumbents represents a continuing 
interest and awareness on the part of voters . Many voters' expectations of 
their MPs appear to be geared toward "distributive" politics.  In most parts of 
the country voters do expect some return or delivery of goods from their MPs. 
All of the studies highlight the question uppermost in voters' minds : "What 
has he done for us? " With the apparent decline in a government "presence" in 
rural electorates since the mid- l 970' s it could be expected that sitting MPs will 
be under even greater pressure to "deliver" over the next five years and a style 
of "pork-barrel" politics can be expected to increase in the legislature . As 
well ,  when Provincial Governments become fully operational the fear of 
redundancy by national MPs might also enhance this legislative style.  
There are, however , some important exceptions to these "distributive" ex­
pectations. The only Province in which all sitting MPs were returned was East 
New Britain where none of the incumbents had overtly reminded constituents 
of the material benefits procured through their individual effort . In 
Bougainville where all incumbents were unseated the explanation lies in the 
question of secession and not in the delivery of goods . All incumbents there 
were perceived to have been " soft" on the issue of Bougainville ' s  secession , 
and were replaced by members who had played a major role in the secession 
movement . In the West Sepik ,  however, the only other province in which all 
incumbents were defeated,  it does appear that failure to service the electorate 
was a significant factor. One further point is relevant here . Politicians 
themselves often argue that being ' ' in government' '  enhances their chances of 
greater access to patronage and spoils , and,  hopefully , of re-election . In 1 977,  
50 per cent of  government supporters and 60 per cent of opposition supporters 
in the outgoing parliament were defeated . 
Finally, a note on the voting system . The use of the first-part-the-post voting 
system in these elections had implications both for the representative nature of 
Parliament and for the style of political campaigning . First-past-the-post­
voting replaced the optional preferential system used in previous elections on 
the grounds that it was simpler , and that in these earlier elections the leading 
candidate was defeated through the distribution of preferences in only a small 
minority of cases ( 1 1 in 1 968 , 16 in 1 972) . The 1 977 results ,  however, revealed 
that seven of the 1 09 seats were won by candidates obtaining less than 20 per 
cent of the valid vote, and overall ,  42 seats were won by candidates with less 
than 30 per cent of the vote . None of the election studies yield evidence of 
voter disenchantment with this lack of "representativeness ,"  but some point 
to other consequences of first-past-the-post voting . The most important was 
that first-past-the-post led to vote-splitting tactics which in turn heightened 
tension between clans and groups and in some cases polarized electorates to 
the point of violent conflict . Although more a feature of Highlands electorates 
than other parts of the country, this situation contrasted markedly with 
campaigning styles in previous elections where opposing candidates often 
toured their electorates together urging voters to cast preferences .  A 
continuation of such aggressive campaigning in future elections could well 
weaken the credibility of the electoral system . 
In summary, the 1 977 elections were characterised by as much continuity 
as change . Political parties remained relatively weak , non-integrative in­
stitutions .  The separatist movements, while still somewhat ambivalent about 
remaining in the new state, contested the elections and obtained a strong 
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minority voice in Parliament . The relative affluence of the candidates and 
elected MPs indicated a further consolidation of the political elite , yet entry 
into that elite remained relatively open . The resources and strategies employed 
by candidates in their campaigns were geared primarily toward mobilizing a 
clan or ethnic vote; the effect being that the elections provided only a 
temporary form of political participation for the populace at large . The voters' 
response to both candidates and the system as a whole was pragmatic and 
characterised by materialist expectations . An attitude persisted among voters 
that the "government" was still somewhat remote and that , in being 
entertained by candidates and in casting a vote, they were participating in a 
kind of political "game" . Their willingness to play that "game" , however, 
indicated in some ways a continuing acceptance , rather than salience , of the 
electoral system. The great issues of nation-building raised in the early 1 970' s 
both by the government and the Constitutional Planning Committee, and the 
underlying relationships between the economy, underdevelopment and future 
political stability were of little moment in the electoral contest . 
The study of the 1 968 national elections by Epstein et al , was oriented 
toward a search for indications of the emergence of specifically " national" 
politics , and of the evolution of ideas and behaviour away from dependence 
toward autonomy. 23 In the 1 972 election study, Stone suggested that the 
' ' turning point' ' in that evolutionary process had been reached with the 
formation of  the first indigenous , national coalition government . 24 Politics 
became national , in fact , through the mobilising activities in 1973 and 1 974 
of the Constitutional Planning Committee,  with the adoption of the Con­
stitution, and with the attainment of independence itself in September 1 975 . 
The study of the 1 977 elections revealed something of the pattern of post­
colonial politics in this new state. That pattern and style of politics is 
essentially non-ideological , materialist and non-coercive. Cleavages and 
tensions within the political fabric are approached and resolved, temporarily 
at least , through accommodation . Candidates , voters , and political leaders 
alike, all appeared willing to make use of the liberal-democratic forms and 
institutions adopted at independence . 
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Chapter 2 
PARTIES AND THE ELECTIONS : A 
CASE STUDY OF THE MORESBY 
NORTH-EAST OPEN ELECTORATE 
Ralph R .  Premdas 
& 
Jeffrey S .  Steeves 
Since World War II  most colonies in Africa and Asia achieved their 
independence through the mechanism of a political party . Manned by west­
ernised elites , "the parties of independence" mobili sed mass support pres­
suring the imperial powers to relinquish control to an indigenous government . 1  
A review of their record as agents for delivering the rewards o f  modernization 
and promoting national unity shows a mixed performance . Generally, these 
parties , at first mass-based and democratic , resorted to political repression of 
their opponents ,  neglected their foundation grassroots ,  and virtually became 
the symbols of ethnic favoritism, corruption , and divisiveness .2 Their mantle 
of legitimacy was quickly dissipated as they resorted to varieties of authori­
tarian rule under pressure of coping simultaneously with increased popular 
demands for higher standards of living, but with a weak and under-developed 
economic base to meet these needs . Within ten years, many of the liberated 
Third World Countries would have proceeded full circle moving from colonial 
domination by alien power to dictatorial repression by an indigenous elite. 
Soon thereafter another stage was attained . The military seized power 
inaugurating a cycle of civi lian and military exchanges in controlling the 
government . 
This picture is not exactly uniform for every case , but points generally to a 
pattern of Third World politics in which the promise of plenty and popular 
participation by an independence movement spearheaded by a mass based 
party progressively deteriorates into a form of government in which political 
instability , disunity, and repression are its most evident characteri stics . Even 
where the military seizes power , it may in time sponsor its own party to restore 
a semblance legitimate civilian democratic rule while preserving its role as final 
arbiter in the resolution of political conflicts. In this event , the party apparatus 
is  viewed cynically as a democratic expedient to link the will of the people with 
uncontroversial decisions of government . However, the perverse use of the 
party institution to promote elitist power does not negate the potential of 
political parties , where they are massbased and democratically composed , to 
mobilise popular sentiment for national development and un ity . 3 It  is in th is  
mystique that countries which have come late to the anti-colonial liberation 
process ,  such as Papua New Guinea , continue to be obsessed with parties and 
political development.  The full cycle of party evolution from a force for 
national independence, unity, and modernization , to an agent of repression 
and disunity is practically ignored . The emergence of a full-fledged party 
system for the liberation newcomers is viewed positively. 
In the late 1 960s when the first meaningful impulse towards national 
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autonomy gained a glimmer of  hope in  Papua New Guinea (PNG) , much 
political discussion surrounded the emergence of parties both as a sign of 
political maturity and an agent of accelerated political change .4 After ten years 
of experimentation, a fairly stable competitive party system emerged at the 
national level in PNG. The Australians who as late as the mid 1 960s had 
anticipated that PNG would not attain full sovereignty until the end of the 
century were pressured by the U .N .  Trusteeship Council and an embryonic 
nationalist group to speed up the process of devolving decision-making to the 
indigenous people. 5 From a tardy and reluctant start , the Australians almost 
abruptly relinquished control so that by the end of 1 973 internal self­
government was granted and full independence followed two years later in 
September , 1 975 .6 
The parties that emerged to facilitate this speedy process had a history of 
five years or less.  By the 1 972 elections ,  they had assumed a minimal organ­
izational form at the national and headquarters level , but generally failed to 
penetrate to the grassroots .  The Papua New Guinean political elites were for 
the most part locally educated unlike their foreign-educated African and Asian 
counterparts .  The country' s 700 linguistic groups remained mostly village­
based, parochial , i lliterate, and unaware of the political transformation 
occurring in their name. Without an experienced leadership and adequately 
developed party system, linkages between PNG's  nearly three million citizens 
and the new national government were weak , sporadic, or absent . In most 
regions, where the party was introduced, it was viewed as an object of distrust . 
Conservative expatriate planters and businessmen fostered an atmosphere of 
fear regarding political parties associating them in the popular mind with 
cargo cults ,  anarchy, communism, and the mass departure of Europeans . 
In PNG , as the prospect of early self-government appeared inevitable ,  7 
public and official discussion of party development became frequent. Fears 
were expressed that without a stable party system supported by a significant 
part of the population, the objectives of national unity, mobilization , and 
modernization would not eventuate. Many political observers felt that it was 
important that parties develop and become embedded as a functional part of 
the parliamentary apparatus that was quickly being transferred to the country . 
To indigenous leaders and expatriate administrators alike the development of 
parties , party competition , and party government was viewed as crucial for a 
stable and democratic future . To them, little thought was given to the fate and 
function of parties in the older liberated African and Asian countries . Great 
hope was attached to the salutary effects attributed to the evolution of a 
competitive party system, national in scope, as a means of promoting national 
unity and modernization . Not any kind of party system was desired, certainly 
not one based on ethnic cleavages and parochial interests . 8 PNG ' s  ethnic 
fragmentation stood as a chief obstacle of development . A party system 
anchored among a broad cross-section of the populace could integrate the 
state and establish a vital pre-condition for economic development.  
Up until the 1977 general elections in PNG , only half of the expectations 
regarding the emergence of the particular type of party system had evolved . 
That half was a competitive, fairly stable party system mainly expressed at the 
national level . What was still to be achieved was the component that dealt with 
a multi-ethnic cross-section membership so that the parties could project a 
national image and recruit supporters for reasons other than ethnic , linguistic, 
or regional sentiments .  Previous elections in PNG have provided an arena for 
parties to test their sources of support . The record of all the parties to date had 
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been distressing in this regard . Generally, they obtained support from a 
population that responded most sensitively to the ethnic and regional 
affiliation of candidates .9 The party itself had proven itself an insi3nificant 
determinant of voter preference . This was so inspite of the fact that the 
major parties claimed multi-ethnic support , advocated regionally balanced 
programs , and assiduously attempted to project a cross-national image . 
The results of the general elections of 1977,  the first since independence, 
confirmed the general pattern that primordial factors determine voter 
preference . 10 Party and programmatic factors continue to play a negligible 
role. Unless the other half of the party formula is met , it would seem that 
parties might not be able to fulfil the critical function of promoting national 
unity . I f  that is so , then the government faces frustrations emanating from 
challenges to its authority. Its legitimacy as a representative of a cross-section 
of the people will be in doubt . From this eventuality, in turn , will be generated 
attempts at non-cooperation, regional fragmentation, secession etc .  Much of 
this has already started in PNG . 1 1  Scarce funds vitally needed for economic 
development are being expended on maintaining basic political order . This is 
only the first step in the direction that points to a deterioration in the evolution 
of the political system where increasingly frustrated decision-makers turn to 
authoritarian methods to preserve political stability and their power . The 
competitive multi-party system may itself fall prey to these events being 
blamed for instigating agitation and causing disunity. A one-party system 
dominated by one group may replace it altering the character of the political 
system. The role of the party thereafter is  likely to be less integrative 
succumbing to ethnic or regional favoritism, repression , and neglect of the 
party grassroots .  The rest of the cycle is  familiar . 
In PNG, the prevailing competitive multi-party system has not yet been 
altered in favor of a one-party system although calls for the abolition of party 
competition in the name of facilitating national consensus-building have been 
frequent . 1 2 We hold no brief in support of either a one-party or multi-party 
system . Both systems can be based on primordial cleavages such as race, 
religion , or ethnicity, thereby promoting disunity and waste of resources . 
What is required is a party system - one, two, or multi - which elicits support 
for economic and achievement factors drawing on a membership that cuts 
across divisive primordial lines organizing and mobilizing cross-nation support 
for its programs. We believe that we have found in PNG a single most 
important case in the 1977 elections where a multi-party contest based 
essentially on non-primordial programs occurred . The electorate in question is 
the Moresby North-East electorate. We believe that an analysis of this case 
shows that in PNG an election was fought out for the first time by political 
parties in which votes were cast because of economic and performance factors . 
In this case, we shall show the sorts of social and economic conditions that 
must prevail before non-ethnic party competition can occur. We do not believe 
that the conditions that we point to are the only ones for such an eventuality . 
But the factors at play clearly suggest that a party system based on pragmatic 
appeals can emerge in PNG, if only in a number of electorates . The lessons to 
be learnt and insights to be gained from this case may be instructive for public 
policy. If taken seriously, they can conceivably provide an optimistic 
beginning in the construction of conditions for a party system that can serve 
national unity. 
The Emergence of a Party System in PNG 
In PNG, popularly-based political parties emerged as a consequence of the 
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liberalization of the franchise . In 1 964, the first national general elections were 
held under universal adult suffrage . Parties , however, did not develop up to 
this point; the 1 964 elections were contested by individual independent 
candidates from constituency to constituency. In this very unusual party less 
situation, political responsibility at the legislative level was difficult to 
establish . The newly elected indigenous members of the House of Assembly, 
although most were illiterate and did not speak English, soon realised that 
some sort of parliamentary grouping was necessary to bring coherence and 
order to parliamentary politics . Also, since a number of these legislators would 
return to their electorates to seek re-election, the need was felt for an extra 
parliamentary device to link activities in the House of Assembly with various 
interests in their constituencies . Several attempts were made to form both 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties but they all failed partly 
because of the inexperience of the initiators and partly because of the 
determined efforts by certain conservative expatriate elements to discourage 
the formation of parties since they perceived them as hastening the stages 
towards self-government . It was not until 1 967 in anticipation of the 1 968 
elections that the first successful attempt would be launched by a combination 
of indigenous persons and sympathetic expatriates to form a popularly based 
party . This was the Pangu Pati which was led by Maori Kiki, Michael Somare, 
Tony Voutas , among others . The Pangu Pati was bold, for it demanded early 
self-government with a target date explicitly stated . The Pangu Pati won 
several seats in the House of Assembly and maintained a cohesive vocal 
presence in the backbenches . Its main opponent called themselves the 
Independent Members Group, refusing to use the label "party" as its 
collective designation . 
Internal divisions and conflicting interests within the Independent Members' 
Group led to its disintegration . From it sprang three groups in 1 97 1  each 
calling itself a party . The maj or splinter was called the United Party composed 
of the most conservative elements and based largely in the New Guinea 
Highlands . A second small progressive splinter group emerged calling itself the 
Peoples' Progress Party, while the smallest splinter called itself the National 
Party . 
Hence, in the 1972 elections, PNG had for the first time a number of 
political parties which entered the electoral race. The outcome was astounding. 
While party label or affiliation was rarely displayed during the electoral 
contest , when the elected candidates met in Port Moresby all but a tiny 
handful associated themselves with one of the four parties . To be sure, many 
for the first time adopted a party label however loosely, but many more had 
party sympathies all along . However, no single party commanded a majority . 
The United Party had the largest bloc and took it for granted that it would 
form the next government . This however was monumental miscalculation 
since while its leaders bickered among themselves about the form of the next 
government, the Pangu Pati , Peoples' Progress Party , the National Party , and 
a number of independents decided to coalesce and form the next government . 
From the 1 972 elections, then, emerged a rudimentary party system and a 
party government . The governing coalition was led by Pangu' s  Leader Michael 
Somare assisted by Julius Chan, leader of the PPP, Thomas Kavali leader of 
the National Party, and Dr . J oho Guise, leader of a small group of indepen­
dent legislators . The Opposition was the United Party led at first by Tei Abal, 
then subsequently by Mathias Toliman . For nearly five years , the coalition 
parties survived as a stabilising element in PNG politics . In the meanwhile, the 
country successfully weathered through two critical phases : first self-
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government in December 1 973 ,  and independence in September 1 975 . 
In the context of our discussion , it is important to underline that while 
parties and party government became a fact of PNG life, the party system was 
weakly anchored by grassroots support . None of the parties had more than 
skeletal staff at headquarters in Port Moresby during the 1 972- 1 977 period . 
Just as significantly, each of the party was associated with a particular regional 
grouping . The Pangu Pati was associated with the East Sepik and Morobe 
Provinces ; it was called a coastal party. The PPP was associated with the New 
Guinea islands and Madang; it was also called a coastal party. The National 
Party was viewed as radical splinter from the Highlands-baser! United Party. 
At the grassroots , no one took the parties seriously. Candidates competed 
against each other as individuals from di fferent clans or linguistic groups . 
Generally, they concealed or de-emphasized their party affiliation or 
sympathy . Parties played a minimal supportive role in their campaigns .  The 
determinants of voter preference were the following factors with the first the 
most overwhelming in significance: -
( 1 )  primordial sentiments such a s  common clan , tribal , o r  linguistic 
affiliation; 
(2) personal status , reputation, and record; 
(3) secondary affiliations such as common church , association group, trade 
unions, or political parties . 
In effect , a candidate' s prospect of victory depended substantially on his 
membership in a large tribe or linguistic group. This however did not mean 
that personal reputation or secondary affiliation were at all times insignificant 
factors . They would qualify the first factor depending on the person in 
question and the area of the country . Stated differently, the three factors were 
intermixed as determinants of voter preference, with the second and third 
factors playing a smaller or a larger role, but rarely of such proportions as to 
overtake the significance of the fi rst factor. In turn, this Jed to a strategy of 
political campaigning that emphasized primary group solidarity. In this sense, 
the elections underscored if not accentuated linguistic, clan , and regional 
differences in PNG . 
Without doubt , this pattern of voting preference derived from two facts : 
( 1 )  a population that was mostly rural and village based ; and 
(2) the topographical , social and cultural fragmentation of PNG society. 
It seemed that so long as these factors prevailed , the chances of secondary 
factors strongly influencing voting preference would not alter . 
The Urban Setting 
The PNG urban setting has been changing however . Large numbers of 
persons have been gravitating to towns requiring new ethnic groupings to be 
formed and allowing a greater play of secondary factors in their lives . Even 
though urban migrants tended to congregate in settlements constituted of their 
own wantoks, their clustering with strangers with whom they shared closely 
contiguous territory, a common work place, unions , churches , and political 
parties , required them to consider a wider range of complex factors in sorting 
out a formula that best promoted their security. 
The movement to urban areas has involved three di fferent groups of people: 
( 1 )  Papua New Guineans who served as public servants ,  trainees in schools, 
institutes , colleges , universities ; 
(2) recruits for plantations, and missions ;  and 
(3) voluntary migrants who moved to towns looking for jobs . 
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In a city such as Port Moresby, these different groups lived in different 
residential areas with persons from the first category occupying suburbs with 
schools ,  water, electricity, and urban amenities . 1 3 The second group lived 
neither in villages nor towns, but tended eventually to join the third group. It is 
the third group of migrants who moved to the fringes of the cities and towns, 
and established squatter settlements . They generally found some sort of work 
in factories , and in homes as domestics and gardeners . 
The city imposed its own requirements for survival . Its social setting was 
much more complex than the rural environment . Individuals in squatter settle­
ments tended even if they lived in wantok groupings , to participate in a wider 
range of activities than in the village. They discovered other critera for friend­
ships and neighbours . In the case of civil servants ,  generally they lived in 
government-owned houses which were not allocated on a primordial affilia­
tion basis .  As trained and educated people ,  they lived and worked in offices 
which were mixed ethnically. For them , while they maintained wantok links , 
they were influenced in their behavior by secondary affiliations more than any 
other group. Ethnically mixed marriages were many, and long periods of 
separation from villages accentuated the role of secondary factors in friend­
ships and associations . We posit that it is these factors which were at play in 
making the electoral contest in the North East electorate unique . 
Structure of the Moresby North East Open Electorate 
Since the general elections of 1 964, Moresby has been progressively divided 
into a single constituency to four constitutencies reflecting dramatic popula­
ation increases .  Today, it has one regional and three open electorates . The 
three open electorates constitute the regional constituency . Each of the three 
open constituencies (Moresby North-East; Moresby South; and Moresby 
North-West) is different from the other . We shall begin our study of the 
North-East electorate by describing its physical , demographic, and social 
structure . 
The population of Port Moresby is approximately 1 20,000 . The city began 
on the Ela coast in the vicinity of the Motuan and Koitabu villages where a 
nucleus of administrative buildings and facilities of the capital city was 
established . Over the years especially in the 1 960s , the city would expand 
towards its immediate hinterland across a ridge of hills into open and valley 
spaces . The original site had the advantage of being contiguous to a port and a 
population centre . However, as the scope of activities increased beyond the 
task of elementary administration, new areas were needed for industrial and 
housing settlements . The inward hinterland thrust progressively deepened 
facilitated by the construction of new highways and a new air port . More civil 
servants and more businesses meant mor�· laud and houses were required . 
These could not be obtained without dismantling the vi llages of the traditional 
coastal dwellers . The inward thrust was therefore necessary . From it sprung up 
a city sprawling beyond the coastal ridge into new suburban settlements each 
with its housing facilities, shops , roads,  etc . 
From the inward drive, the North-East electorate would derive its unique 
character very much unlike the coastal areas in population composition and 
physical facilities . The elements which constitute Moresby North-East can be 
divided into six categories . 
( 1 )  Residential areas including the suburbs of Boroko, Gordons, Taurama, 
and Korobosea ; 
(2) Industrial and Commercial sites primari ly in Gordons and Boroko; 
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(3) I nstitutional facilities including Bomana College; Taurama Hospital ; 
C . I . S .  College; High Schools and Primary Schools;  Training facilities ; 
churches etc; 
(4) Recreation areas including rugby, cricket and football fields; swimming 
pools ; theatres; clubs etc; 
(5) Urban settlements - at 9 mile quarry; 6 mile; Gordonia; Korobosea No. 
2; and 
(6) One traditional village at Korobosea. 
Most of this area was occupied by the first four categories . The urban 
settlements were relatively small in this constituency tucked away at the edges 
of the electorate as semi-isolated islands away from the main residential, 
industrial , and institutional facilities . There is only one very small traditional 
village at Korobosea . 
Table I gives a graphic description of the ethnic, occupational and class 
categories who occupy this electorate. Several features stand out : -
(a) Professionally, this electorate is dominated by  Papua New Guinea and 
expatriate salaried civil servants . Boroko and Gordons were two sprawling 
residential settlements originally established to accomodate civil servants who 
staff the headquarters of the Government . Over half of PNG's  50,000 civil 
servants live in Port Moresby . Boroko, Gordons, Korobosea, and Taurama 
are major residential areas for civil servants including the highest 
concentration of expatriate advisers and experts . Many of the highest paid 
senior ranking Papua New Guineans live in Boroko and Gordons . 
Large numbers of private wage and salaried persons also reside in the North­
East electorate ranging from domestic house boys and gardeners to clerks , 
typists , and junior executives . Some of these people live in domestic quarters 
and private housing facilities set up by their employers . Most , however , are 
likely to live in the traditional villages , urban settlements ,  and lower covenant 
houses found in the other two electorates . 
(b) Ethnically, this is a very mixed area drawing its constituents from all 
parts of PNG reflecting the government ' s  recruitment procedures . In terms of 
the two components , Papua and New Guinea, the Moresby North-East elec­
torate is the only electorate in Papua with a majority of New Guineans, about 
600Jo of the total . This unusual situation resulted from the fact that with the 
exception of the Koitabus living in the traditional village, Korobosea No. 1 ,  
everyone living in this electorate was born outside the electorate many of 
whom coming from New Guinea as civil servants ,  workers and urban 
migrants . This demographic distribution has resulted in three of the six 
candidates being New Guineans and three Papuans .  Apart from the squatter 
settlements in the electorate, the people in this electorate are residentially 
mixed . 
In the squatter settlements, Table I gives a description of their preponderant 
ethnic origins.  Noteworthy is that about half or more of these settlers are from 
New Guinea from such places as Chimbu , Eastern Highlands and Morobe. As 
in other urban areas in PNG, people from one region or province cluster 
together in a wantok security community. However , it is significant to note 
that most of these settlers who cluster together, apart from their close 
kinsmen, would not have known each other or come from the same language 
group. The urban drift has created new ethnic boundaries and solidarity 
groups . In turn , this has meant that their cohesiveness is not as tight as in their 
original village setting . This has allowed secondary factors such as church, 
union , and factory associations to modify in important ways the demands of 
primordially-based group loyalty . 
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Table 1 
Ethnic and Class Breakdown of Port Moresby Communities 
AREA S ETHNIC CA TEGOR Y CLA SS CA TEGOR Y 
1 .  Residential Areas: 
a) Boroko 1 .  Expatriates 1 .  Public servants 
b) Korobosea 2. Mixture of Papua 2. Business owners 
c) Gordons New Guineans 3 .  Private Sector-
salaried workers 
4. Wage earners 
(live-in domestics) 
2 .  Traditional Village: 
Korobosea No. I Koitabus 1 .  Wage earners 
2 .  Gardeners 
3 .  Unemployed 
3 .  Settlements: 
- 9 Mile Gulf 1 .  Unemployed 
Goilalas 2 .  House boys 
3 .  Gardeners for 
- 6 Mile Chim bus 3 .  expatriates 
Goilalas 4. Gardeners -
Moro beans cash cropping 
Southern Highlanders 5 .  Wage 
workers at 
7 Mile Goilalas factories , 
industrial sites 
Gordonia Chim bus 6. Plantation 
Eastern Highlanders workers at 
Sogeri , Brown 
10 Mile Keremas River; quarry , 
workers , Rouna 
Korobosea Central District 7 .  Shop-boys ; 
No . 2 bar , cinema and 
hotel workers;  
- Small 8 .  Market vendors 
Settlements Gulf 9. Fisher people 
- Erima Papuans 
(c) Finally, note must be taken of the salient point that most of these people 
are permanent residents who may visit their villages from time to time but who 
plan to make Moresby their home . The variety of complex secondary forces in 
the city has the effect of creating a person unlike the villager whose political 
and social horizons are strongly delimited by village-based primordial attach­
ments . In the city, new national symbols are espoused; new groups are formed; 
new interests evolve. Children of the migrants develop a new identity and are 
cast in different roles . In  effect , while practically everyone in the Moresby 
North-East electorate has been born in a village outside the electorate, their 
living in a city over a long period of time would modify and even re-cast their 
orientations and attachments to new symbols and associations. The impact 
this would have on political choice would make the Moresby North-East elec­
torate almost unique in PNG . 
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The Candidates 
Six candidates competed for the North-East electorate . Three were born in 
New Guinea; three in Papua. All six candidates were openly or covertly sup­
ported by a major political party or movement . Their backgrounds reveal that 
each has had professional training in some occupation . They were all well 
educated , informed , and organizationally-minded . Each had a fairly clear idea 
as to the ethnic and occupational structure of the electorate, and while each 
felt that some sort of primordial factor may mobilise votes for him or her, 
each knew that secondary and reputation factors would play the critical part 
in determining the outcome. Accordingly, the strategy and techniques of cam­
paigning as well as programs had to be tailored to meet the special constraints 
and requirements of the electorate . Emphatically, each candidate realised that 
the mixed ethnic nature of the electorate and its unusual educational levels 
required that appeals for support be based on reasoned arguments, political 
affiliation , and organizational capability. In turn , this meant that the political 
party gained in ascendancy as a critical variable determining the outcome. We 
shall examine each candidate individually. 
Patterson Lowa: was born in West New Britain. He was 34 years old . He was 
married , had one son, and was brought up the United Church . He spoke 
English , Pidgin,  and his tok pies . Professionally, Lowa was trained as a 
soldier . He attended the Army Staff College in Victoria, Australia . He was one 
of the two highest ranking officers in PNG Defence Force at the time of inde­
pendence . He had attained the status of lieutenant colonel and was in competi­
tion with another candidate for the position of Commander of the Defence 
Force. Upon not being awarded that position, he resigned from the Defence 
Force . He held a number of administrntive positions in the private sector 
immediately thereafter . In 1 977 he joined the Prime Minister ' s  personal staff 
until April when he resigned to campaign for his election . 
When Lowa left the military , it was clear that he was one of the few admini­
stratively well-trained citizens in PNG . He had offers to enter into politics , but 
did not succumb until 1 977 when he joined the Pangu Pati . He rose very 
swiftly to its top echelons . For the 1 977 general elections,  partly because of his 
organizational skills, he was appointed to the critical position of campaign 
manager fo1 the Pangu Pati . He had also declared his candidacy for the North­
East electorate. Hence, with little experience in politics, he has had to handle 
two very demanding tasks simultaneously. 
When asked where his votes were likely to come from, Lowa replied that he 
saw the battle of the North-East electorate as primarily a party contest . As the 
Pangu candidate , he expected to receive votes from Pangu supporters and 
sympathizers . Because of Pangu 's  record in leading the country to independ­
ence, maintaining political stability, and expanding and localizing the public 
service , he expected to get most of his votes from public servants .  He also 
expected to win votes from police officers and businessmen from whom he had 
received much encouragement . He had also emphasized that he expected votes 
from the squatter settlements; the Goilala Association in particular had 
expressed support for him.  
Lowa felt that he had no program apart from Pangu's .  He expected to 
receive some support from his party mainly in the form of money, pamphlets, 
T-shirts ,  etc . ,  but the greater part of his expenses would have to be defrayed 
from personal funds . He estimated that he would spend about K2 ,000. He saw 
Harry Hoerler , the United Party candidate , as his main opponent , but still 
expected to win . 
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Harry Hoerter: was born in Vunapope , East New Britain.  He was 34 years 
old. He was mixed-raced, married and had three children . He was Catholic 
and spoke English , Pidgin and German. At the time of the elections, Hoerler 
was a small businessman engaged in providing truck-lift waterfront services , 
but was trained and experienced mainly as a ship-master . He had spent much 
of his work experience on ships as a stevedore foreman and supervisor . In 
1 960, he took a linesman course, and obtained a captain's  diploma in 1 963 . 
Prior to his election debut in the 1 977 general elections, he had never run for 
an elective public office . 
Hoerler was the endorsed United Party candidate for the North-East 
electorate . Because of the predominance of New Guineans in this electorate, 
the United Party felt it had a good chance of winning. This is not because it 
expected all New Guineans to vote for it , but rather because the ethnic mix in 
the population gave everyone a fair chance . As a mixed-race person Hoerler 
himself would have been at a loss to tap a " natural" group for support apart 
from other likeminded mixed-race people. The battle, then, for Hoerler was 
one in which his chances strongly revolved around the popularity of the United 
Party among voters . Hoerler' s  given reason for running was to re-instate 
honesty in government . He strongly believed in the capitalist system and 
foreign investment . The United Party payed his candidate ' s  deposit , allocated 
him some funds ,  provided about a third of his posters, and paid for his 
advertisement in the newspapers . He had expected to spend up to K5,000 if 
necessary most of this coming from personal funds . He felt Lowa was his 
strongest opponent , but still expected to win. 
Goasa Damena: was born in Papa Village , in the Central Province. He was 
41 years old . He was married , had five children, and a regular United Church 
medical doctor. He obtained his medical degree from the Fij i School of 
Medicine and did post-graduate research in Waikato, New Zealand.  Until a 
year prior to the elections when he entered private practice , Dr. Damena 
worked with the public service . He has had some experience in politics before 
entering the contest for the North-East electorate . He served as a local govern­
ment councillor for twenty-five years and was a village court magistrate and 
land mediator . He was deputy - president and then President of the powerful 
Public Service Association for PNG in 1 976. 
Damena ran as an independent candidate after refusing the endorsement of 
the secessionist Papua Besena movement to be its official representative . Dr. 
Damena is recognised as one of the major leaders in Papua Besena although he 
is personally not for secession but for Papuan regional autonomy.  He felt that 
running as an independent candidate would increase his prospects of winning a 
seat . Because of his earlier prominence in the Public Service Association and 
the high incidence of civil servants in the electorate, many observers felt that 
he was the most likely candidate to win . Damena himself expected over­
whelming public service support from private professional people such as 
nurses , doctors,  teachers etc .  But privately , he had also expected the votes of 
Papuans . He i s  a Koitabu and expected the votes of the small Koitabu village 
at Korobosea . He decided to run because he was unhappy with the 
performance of the coalition government . He felt that there was a lack of 
educated people in Parliament and that a society was being erected in which 
inequality increased while foreigners controlled the economy. He was also 
strongly against the uncontrolled urban drift in PNG . Damena received no 
financial assistance from Papua Besena which gave none of its overt or covert 
candidates any form of financial support . He expected to spend Kl ,800 for the 
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campaign , most of it his own money. He felt that Lahui Tau was his strongest 
opponent . 
Lahui Tau: was originally from Tubuseria village, Central Province . He was 
36 years old . He was married , had six children, and belonged to the United 
Church . He spoke English , Motu, and Pidgin. Tau was a small businessman . 
He had completed his Queensland Junior Certificate and worked as a 
journalist for six years . Tau , however , is known more for his involvement in 
the trade union movement among waterside workers and teachers.  He served 
for one year as secretary of the PNG Teachers ' Association . He had had more 
political experience than any other the candidates competing in his electorate . 
At the time of the elections, he was a city councillor from Boroko and was 
Chairman of the Bavaroko Community School Board of Management . 
Tau , like Damena, was a very prominent member within the Papua Besena 
leadership hierarchy . He, however , chose to run as an independent candidate 
so as to maximise his chances of winning. He expected support from public 
servants , union workers , teachers , and parents of school children in 
recognition of his service . He expected a concentration of his votes to come 
from Boroko, his city council constituency . He chose to run because of his 
political experience . He advocated free primary education . He paid for his 
own campaign expenses expecting to spend about K500. He said that Fide Bale 
was his main opponent but expected to win . 
Fide Bale: was born in Finschafen, Morobe Province . She was 38  years old . 
She was married to an Australian and had four children . She was a Lutheran 
and spoke English and Pidgin .  Mrs . Bale was a business woman engaged in 
running two small food catering restaurants . However, she was a pro­
fessionally trained teacher . She obtained a teaching diploma from Port 
Moresby Teacher's College in 1 960 and taught for several years as a school 
teacher . She did not hold an elective public post previously, but had extensive 
experience in the Y.W.C .A. where she was a member of the Board of 
Directors , and in the Lutheran Church . 
Mrs . Bale was the endorsed PPP candidate . Because of the reputation of the 
PPP for its efficiency in the coalition government , she expected to receive the 
votes of PPP supporters and sympathizers, particularly public servants . As a 
woman, Mrs . Bale expected the women' s  vote, a politically unorganized bloc 
of unknown solidarity or preference. As a business person , she also 
anticipated support from businessmen . She stressed the neglect of women and 
advocated equality . She also expected support from teachers and Lutherans. 
She mentioned the possibility of obtaining the votes from the Morobe people 
many of whom worked as house boys and lived at the 6 Mile urban 
settlements .  She chose to run because she said that she was from a politically­
minded family and wanted to get a women' s  point of view represented in 
parliament . She received a variety of assistance from the PPP including 
pamphlets,  T-shirts, campaign buttons , advertisement in the newspaper , a 
bull-horn , a cassette-tape recorder etc . She expected to spend about K600 of  
her own funds . She felt that Goasa Damena was her chief opponent but 
expected to win .  
Gilbert Kose : was born in  the Gulf Province . He was 34 years old . He was 
married , had four children, and belonged to the Catholic Church . He spoke 
English,  Pidgin ,  and Motu . Professionally, he was a Health Education Officer . 
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He received a medical assistant certificate and a diploma in health. He took 
further training in Sydney in middle management . He had worked as a public 
servant for twelve years and had held several high administrative positions 
such as secretary for a Minister of State, and assistant to a Minister of 
Education . He was also previously the administrative director for the PNG 
Arts Festival . He had never had elective public office . 
Kose was a covert Pangu endorsed candidate . However, it seemed that his 
candidacy was sponsored as a means to facilitate victory for other openly 
endorsed Pangu candidates in the North-East Open and the Regional . Because 
Kose was a Papuan from the Gulf, he was capable of diverting Papuan votes 
that might go to Damena in the Open and Abaijah in the regional , thereby 
enabling the Pangu candidates , Lowa and Kiki,  to increase their margin over 
their Papua Besena opponents . This was a speculative and unproductive 
strategy that had to be altered late in the campaign as will be explained later . 
Pangu provided financial and other support for Kose . He received his 
candidate' s  deposit from Pangu as well as pamphlets,  and finance . Kose had 
expected that his campaign would cost about K2,000 to K5 ,000. 
The Campaigns 
By studying the campaign strategy and techniques of each candidate , several 
points became clear to us .  First , it provided operational proof of how each 
candidate perceived his electorate' s social structure and its needs. Second, it 
pointed to the ranking each candidate gave to primordial , secondary, and 
reputation factors in persuading voters how to make their choice . Finally, it 
suggested conditions under which new adaptations in campaign strategy were 
made depending upon the changes and characteristics within an electorate . We 
shall describe briefly below the role of organizational and party factors in 
structuring political choice in the Moresby North-East open electorate . 
The campaign conducted by all the candidates quickly revealed that two 
kinds of strategy were required reflecting the two general residential patterns 
that existed within the North-East electorate. The first type of strategy can be 
called traditional and was directed at the squatter settlements . Here, people 
with little education, income, and skills lived ; they tended to cluster in wantok 
communities . The strategy that each candidate used here was to find an in­
fluential leader who would serve as a "contact point" to penetrate a wantok 
group. I f  the community in question was of the same ethnic or regional affilia­
tion as the candidate, then he or she found such a person easily accessible.  For 
example, Gilbert Kose was from the Gulf Province, while a substantial 
segment of the 9-Mile settlement was also from the same area . Kose had been 
able to gain easy access to leaders and extract many promises from this com­
munity . It is important to note that Kose worked indirectly to get the votes of 
this community . I f  another candidate from another province or ethnic group 
wanted to penetrate the 9-Mile settlement, he/ she also used the same general 
indirect approach via a community leader except in this case a different kind of 
criteria was used to select the community leader . For example,  if Lahui Tau 
wanted to persuade 9-Mile settlement voters to case their ballots in his favour, 
he might use as his contact point a union worker or a city council ward 
committee representative or a school teacher of some prominence to speak to 
the community on his behalf. In a traditional village situation , if Kose faced 
Tau , the chances would be excellent that Kose would practically sweep the 
community . However , in Moresby where the occupational and interest 
structure of the 9-Mile community was likely to be very different from that of 
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a traditional Gulf village, the chances were that a number of residents would 
respond to the appeals of a unionist such as Tau or pro-woman candidate such 
as Bale . But , on balance, one would still expect that Kose would get most 
votes , but that he would have to face challenges to maintain the tenacity of his 
primordial appeal . 
The second type of campaign strategy appealed to secondary and reputation 
factors and invoked reason and issues to get at voters . The voters in question 
would be the residents in government and company provided houses . They 
would be civil servants and private sector white and blue collar workers living 
mainly in Gordons and Boroko. Here the technique was to resort to a 
combination of house to house persuasion ; to mass meetings; to pamphlets; 
and to the media. To be sure , a candidate might search for a wantok 
connection, but mostly he would rely on his campaign organization to 
distribute pamphlets and approach people from house to house explaining the 
candidate's program , expounding on the issues etc . 
Of all the candidates , Patterson Lowa excelled in the second strategy. He 
mobilised a large campaign committee of Pangu activists who went from 
house to house campaigning for him . The Pangu label was intensely used . 
Pamphlets carrying the picture of Lowa and the message of Pangu were 
distributed in practically every home. In conjunction with this technique , the 
Pangu Pati frequently ran advertisements on the radio and press to convince 
the voter that Somare and Pangu were best for PNG's  future. Mass meetings 
were held at various points where people gathered such as shopping centers , 
markets , and community centres . Voluntary associations or their officers were 
enlisted where possible. As the election grew nearer, all these activities 
intensified . The resources of Pangu showed its superiority to the candidates 
who had little financial support from their organizations . On polling day, the 
Pangu organization mobilised large numbers of activists including a sizable 
segment of volunteers from the University of PNG, and a large number of 
trucks,  cars , buses etc . , to carry voters to polling booths.  
The display of Pangu's  organizational strength was only matched by Harry 
Hoerler who , like Lowa , depended upon the United Party to provide 
personnel to distribute pamphlets , make house to house calls, and mobilise 
large numbers of volunteers and vehicles during the last few days before 
elections . Hoerler ' s  campaign in particular was distinctive for its massive use 
of pamphlets . Like Lowa , he sought the endorsement of as many secondary 
associations and community groups as possible to strengthen his candidacy. 
He also held numerous meetings at markets,  shopping .centres etc . 
Fide Bale's campaign had the support of the PPP, the party that had the 
reputation for cohesiveness and organizational capability. The PPP provided 
an infra-structure of contacts and volunteer personnel for campaigning . 
Unlike Lowa and Hoerler, however, Bale campaigned mostly part-time and in 
a subdued way. To be sure , Bale had assembled a large campaign committee 
drawn from everywhere in the electorate. They were very active as evinced 
from the number of posters and pamphlets distributed, but one got the feeling 
during the campaign that Bale felt somewhat overwhelmed by the massive 
effort overtly displayed by Lowa and Hoerler. Moreover, Bale soon 
discovered that her candidacy based on equality for women received much less 
support from women than she had expected . She indicated that in the squatter 
settlements , more men came to greet her and listen to her .  She held fewer 
public meetings that Lowa and Hoerler , spent less on the media campaign, and 
emphasized small group meetings . Partly this stemmed from the fact that she 
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budgeted much less than Lowa and Hoerler, and found i t  much easier to 
communicate to smaller groups of people. 
Goasa Damena surprised everyone by running a barely visible campaign . He 
did mobilise a small group of persons to serve as contact points , but together 
his campaign organization was small and rarely met as a group. He confidently 
expected to receive the votes of civil servants on the basis of his Public Service 
Association Presidency; but he did little direct house to house campaigning for 
their votes . One suspected too that his Papua Besena connections which he 
deliberately attempted to conceal from the electorate did not escape the eyes of 
many public servants , many of  whom were familiar with politics in Moresby. 
Damena found it necessary to resort to his Papuan sources for scrutineers and 
other forms of help . He had hoped to get most of the votes from Boroko, his 
city council constituency and that his opponents would split up the Gordons and 
settlements vote leaving him with a slender winning plurality . He had also 
expected to receive most of the votes from Korobosea village . Without much 
funds , Tau depended on personal reputation and less party organization 
support for votes . It seemed that he did uti lize the Papua Besena affiliation 
covertly where it stood to his advantage . It is quite conceivable that for Tau 
and Damena their Papua Besena connections served more against them than 
for them. 
Gilbert Kose concentrated overwhelmingly on his Kerema Papuan connec­
tions and a few pamphlets to win . His campaign was not convincing . Towards 
the end of the campaign as Hoerler and Bale intensified their campaign , he 
switched his appeal asking his supporters to vote for Lowa. 
An overview of the campaign showed three salient points .  First , organi­
zation and resources were critical to the outcome. Since Papua Besena gave 
only its reputation and volunteer personnel to Damena and Tau , but no 
financial support , it was easily outmatched by the candidates from the estab­
lished parties that did provide a variety of resources for the campaign . Second,  
the campaign was very difficult for all the candidates since, unlike the village 
where ethnicity and other primordial factors decisively determined voting 
preference, the residential occupational and mixed ethnic structure of the 
North-East electorate made the outcome extremely hazardous to predict . 
Indeed, these researchers found an amazing dispersal of predictions among 
experts ,  commentators , and citizens about the outcome. Only Gilbert Kose 
was hardly heard of and given little chance of winning . Finally , the .quantity of 
posters , pamphlets,  and media materials disseminated in this electorate had 
been astounding. We could not find anything comparable to it elsewhere . This 
may very well suggest that secondary and reputation factors were perceived by 
the candidates as more salient to the outcome than primordial characteristics . 
A comment must be made on the issues . Each of the candidates defined the 
issues differently, but throughout the campaign issues seemed less significant 
than the party affiliation and reputation of the candidate. Three candidates 
Lowa, Hoerler , and Bale emphasized their party connection in all their posters 
and speeches . While Lowa talked about the problems of housing and the 
squatter settlements in the Moresby North-East electorate, the greatest pro­
minence was given to the record of the Pangu Pati in steering the country to in­
dependence and establishing political stability . Practically, the same sort of 
emphasis was placed in the campaign by Fide Bale who played up the 
reputation of the PPP and Julius Chan for efficiency in the coalition govern­
ment . Hoerler did essentially the same except that his campaign message was 
to associate unemployment, corruption, and economic stagnation with the co-
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alition partners . Hoerler had the periodic campaign services of the United 
Party Leader, Sir Tei Abal , whose picture appeared on several of Hoerler' s 
pamphlets showing the two people smiling and shaking hands . Similarly, 
Michael Somare and Julius Chan appeared for their candidates in the North­
East electorate. In effect, particularly for Lowa, Bale , and Hoerler, the contest 
was between the record of the coalition government (although Lowa and Bale 
campaigned separately) on one hand and the criticisms of the opposition 
United Party on the other . 
Goasa Damena and Lahui Tau, although they sought to downplay their 
Papua Beseqa connections in an electorate which had more New Guineans 
than Papuans, emphasized their own record and reputation . They were caught 
in a situation in which they were tempted to covertly appeal to Papuan votes , 
while overtly seeking the votes of everyone including the New Guineans .  But 
they did have very good personal and reputation records which it seemed 
served to attract a cross-section of votes from public servants and others , but 
not enough to obtain the winning plurality . In other Moresby electorates 
where the ethnic residential , and occupational structure were very different , 
Papua Besena candidates openly and proudly declared their affiliation to the 
movement . In the Moresby North-East Open, however , this was a decided dis­
advantage . Tau and Damena emphasized their reputation, record, and experi­
ence, but not their primordial attachment . They severely criticised the co­
alition government and emphasized local issues dealing with unemployment , 
squatter settlements ,  inequality etc . ,  but they did not openly invoke the label 
of their movement in the same manner as Lowa, Bale, and Hoerler . In 
summary, all the candidates with the possible exception of Kose, used 
secondary and reputation factors to persuade voters to cast their ballots in 
favor of them in the Moresby North-East Open electorate. 
The Results 
In analysing the results of practically all the electorates in PNG, clear 
patterns of voter preference reflecting a close association between the ethnicity 
of a candidate and the sources of his support is evident . It is relatively easy to 
cross-check this observation since the population is dispersed in rural areas 
and villages to which candidates can be easily traced . By examining the results 
in ballot boxes from different clusters of villages , one can show a pattern of 
voting that underlines the role of ethnic and regional factors in determining 
voter preference . 
In  examining the results of the Moresby North-East open electorate, we 
shall attempt to find out if similar voting patterns exist . Clearly however the 
structure of the North-East electorate is very different from that of a typical 
traditional village . It is more complex and a wider range of forces is operative 
in the individual ' s  life moulding new interests and recasting the calculus of his 
political preference. We shall examine the results , theri, partly with an eye to 
extracting any features suggestive of primordial influences. We shall not auto­
matically infer that their absence from the data signifies that they do not play a 
part in determining voter preference . That is not our point . We believe that 
they are still operative today, but in a hierarchy of determinants,  they are 
relegated to a lower or secondary role . While the election data cannot be 
conclusive, we believe that our knowledge and familarity with the electorate, 
enriched by numerous interviews and discussion with candidates and con­
stituents ,  can support our general conclusions indicating a pattern of change 
away from the village. First , we shall give the general results making some 
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broad observations on  election administration and trends . Second, we  shall 
present a breakdown of the results describing how the votes were cast from 
area to area, and the possible implications these may have . 
(a) Overview of the General Results 
The results of the elections for the Moresby North-East Open electorate 
were as follows: -
Table 2 Election Results 
Candidates 
1 .  Gilbert Kose (pro-Pangu) 
2. Fide Bale (PPP) 
3. Goasa Damena (lnd.-PB) 
4. Harry Hoerler (UP) 
5. Lahui Tau (lnd. -PB) 
6. Patterson Lowa (Pangu) 
Informal 
Total 
Votes 
382 
5 17 
6 14  
705 
643 
1 ,423 
463 
4,747 
The victor was Pangu' s  Patterson Lowa. Although his total votes were over 
700 more than his closest rival , Lowa' s total constituted only 29.90Jo of the 
number of votes cast . Lowa apart, the other candidates ran fairly close to each 
other with no one losing his or her deposit . Voting turnout was about 370Jo 
although three days were allocated for voting . This was about 200Jo less than 
the average constituency in PNG . Several possible reasons account for the low 
turnout . First,  the campaign was allowed to continue during polling. This 
meant that all the candidates , their trucks , loudhailers , scrutineers , crowds of 
cheerleaders etc . tended to cluster and clutter around the polling booths 
especially in the two high density population areas , Boroko and Gordons .  The 
results show that out of 4757 votes cast 2089 came from Gordons , that is, 500Jo 
of the votes were concentrated here . Boroko was next with a total of 947 votes 
cast or about 200Jo of the total . Together, Gordons and Boroko provided 
about 700Jo of the total votes cast . For practically all of the three days , the two 
polling booths at Gordons and Boroko were so cluttered, particularly at 
Boroko, as to discourage voting participation . Second, to compound the first 
factor, citizens who were not pre-registered to vote were allowed to cast their 
ballot in a slow process that involved filling out a long form and making a 
declaration of oath indicating that one was resident within the electorate. As it 
happened, it seemed that over 300Jo of the voters fell into the unregistered 
category. The upshot was the creation of long slow-moving lines which meshed 
with the cluttering that occurred outside the polling booths .  The typical voter 
had to spend three to four hours and sometimes longer to cast a ballot . 
Women voters in particular were intimidated by the obstreperous crowds , the 
noise , and the pushing and jostling that occurred . In addition,  many workers 
who were given time off to vote felt that it was more profitable to use a half a 
day as holiday instead of having of face the long lines . Exactly who were the 
determined voters is unclear . The low voting turnout could have influenced the 
outcome. However, given Lowa's  lead , it is doubtful that an uncluttered and 
well-organized polling booth would have upset his victory. 
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(b) Polling Booth Breakdo wn of the Results 
Table 3 Polling Booth Results 
A REA KOSE BA LE DA MENA HOERLER TA U L O WA INF. 
1 .  YWCA 1 1  1 8  3 1  9 56 73 27 
2. Boroko 52 1 3 5  1 3 1  1 99 1 5 1  279 1 5 3  
3 .  C.A.A.  9 60 8 30 26 1 66 0 
4. Gordons 1 89 1 80 287 374 293 59 1 1 55 
5 .  9-Mile 49 49 4 3 25 36 45 
6 .  Bomana 1 9  2 1  6 35 34 83 3 1  
7 .  Taurama Hos .  1 8  1 8  3 9  35 18 69 1 6  
8 .  Bavaroko 8 1 9  48 1 1  25 60 1 0  
9 .  Erima 26 1 6  5 5  9 1 5  27 26 
1 0 .  Postal 1 1 5 0 0 1 9  0 
Total 382 5 1 7 6 1 4  705 643 1 42 3  492 
Total New Guinea candidate votes : 5 1 7  + 1 423 = 2645 
4757 - 492 = 620Jo 
Total Pangu + PPP votes : 382 + 5 1 7  + 1 423 = 2322 
4265 = 540Jo 
TO TA L 
225 
947 
299 
2089 
2 1 1 
229 
2 1 3  
1 8 1  
1 74 
26 
4757 
Two preliminary points should be made at the outset . First , while most 
persons voted in their polling-booth area, a number of persons voted in other 
places away from their area of residence . Particularly, this was possible among 
unregistered voters who could make claims that they lived elsewhere . Indeed , 
we are certain that the ease with which an unregistered person was allowed to 
make a declaration of oath facilitated some double voting, or even voting by 
persons from outside the electorate.  Second , since most of the population was 
concentrated in Boroko and Gordons,  given the ethnic mixes and the 
deployment of only two polling booths for these areas, it was impossible to 
identify precisely what sort of person voted for which candidate . We were 
able, however , to make some educated speculation of a pattern in a few polling 
booth areas with which a particular settlement was most closely contiguous . 
The polling booth breakdowns display the following : -
1 .  Lowa obtained the highest votes in all the polling booth areas except 9-mile 
and Erima . His highest plurali ty came from Gordons where he obtained more 
than 200 than his closest rival , Hoerler . Gordons ,  an ethnically mixed and 
civil-servant dominated area, gave Lowa his biggest bloc of votes . Lowa did 
not do as well in Boroko, but again he outstripped his closest rival , Hoerler, by 
over 80 votes . Overall , the Lowa vote was impressive for it clearly showed that 
even in polling booth areas that others considered their stronghold such as 
Tau's  claimed strength in Boroko, Damena' s  claimed strength at Taurama 
Hospital and Bale's claimed strength at C.A.A. (that includes the 6-mile settle­
ment of Morobeans) , he outvoted everyone. 
2. Hoerler ' s  vote of 705 was the closest to Lowa ' s  total . Hoerler, l ike Lowa , a 
New Guinean , but a mixed-race without primordial attachments, probably 
demonstrated just as well the role of secondary , particularly the party, factor 
in determining voter preference. Hoerler came in second in three polling booth 
areas namely Gordons, Boroko, and Bomana. 
3. The votes by Bale, Tau , and Damena were very close . Bale did very well at 
9-mile where she might have gotten her 49 votes from Morobeans in that area . 
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That is a small figure as a part of her total of 5 1 7 ,  most of which was obtained 
in Gordons and Boroko. It is possible that her good showing in these two areas 
reflected preferences of civil servants and business people for the PPP . 
Damena and Tau' s  vote also came from Gordons and Boroko. It is difficult to 
quite sort out their sources; one can only infer them from the structure of these 
areas reflecting mixed ethnicity, civil servants ,  professionals etc . One can 
legitimately expect Damena in particular to have picked up most of his votes 
from his civil service connections .  
4. Finally, what discernible role did primordial factors play in any of the 
polling booth areas? We think that the 9-mile area which was mainly Kerema 
and voted strongly for Kose, and the Erima village, largely Papuan and voted 
strongly for Damena, were the main areas in which some qualified evidence 
suggested the preponderant play of ethnicity as a voter determinant. Yet in 
these two areas the collective vote of the other candidates outnumbered that of 
the candidate with the primordial connection. 
Overall , then, the results in our opinion show that the pattern of voter 
determinants was very different from that of a traditional village . We are 
confident that secondary and reputation factors were pre-eminent . We would 
argue that the showing of Lowa of the Pangu Pati which was the senior 
partner in the governing coalition and Hoerler of the opposition United Party, 
indicate that the struggle in the Moresby North-East Open electorate was 
predominantly a party contest . 
Conclusion 
The North-East Open electorate is unique in PNG, for among the 1 09 con­
stituencies it is the only one in which party competition based primarily on 
secondary appeals has emerged. Clearly, a party system that is based on ethnic 
or regional appeals is likely to be dysfunctional for national unity . But for a 
viable alternative system to exist , a particular electorate with a specific social 
structure must emerge . In such an electorate the secondary role of primordial 
attachments would facilitate subdued competition . As well , partisan conflict 
would be less likely to be about absolute cultural and ethnic symbols on which 
compromises and rational arguments are difficult to attain. 
The fact that only one electorate out of 1 09 fulfils that pre-requisite for a 
viable competitive party system and that it took over ten years of party experi­
mentation for it to emerge is not very encouraging . PNG' s rate of urbanization 
is very high at about 10 to 1 2% .  Migrants however congregate in ethnic 
residential clusters as have already happened in other parts of PNG and in the 
Third World . The North-East electorate is almost artificial . It is new, planned , 
and contiguous to the headquarters of the Central Government drawing to it a 
specific kind of population . The problem in PNG is for the creation of elector­
ates that facilitate a party system based on secondary appeals so as to promote 
unity . The future in this regard is not too bright . Sooner or later , as the urban 
agglomerations grow, unplanned cities with discrete ethnic clusters would pre­
dominate. It would be difficult for anything but an ethnically - based party 
system to emerge in this situation . What will happen next is not encouraging . 
Editor' s  Note: Damena lifter successfully challenged the declaration of the 
Poll on the grounds that Lowa had not satisfied the two-year residential 
qualification enabling him to stand for Moresby North-east . In  a by-election 
held in July 1 978 Damena defeated Kiki . Pangu split its vote when it endorsed 
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Kiki against Lowa . Lowa stood as an independent . 
Table 4 1978 By-election Results 
NOTES 
Dam en a 
Kiki 
Boyce 
Hoerler 
Lowa 
Bale 
Godwin 
Informal 
Total 
1 03 1  
1003 
842 
769 
525 
1 66 
82 
386 
4742 
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Chapter 3 
SECESSIONISTS VERSUS CENTRAL 
AUTHORITY : 
PAPUA BESENA IN THE ELECTIONS 
Ralph R. Premdas 
& 
Jeffrey S .  Steeves 
The multi-ethnic social structure typically found in most Third World 
countries has bedevilled the quest for national unity . 1  Challenges to the 
authority of the central government have come from sub-state ethnonation­
alist movements which demand the right to govern themselves . They invoke 
the same sacred principle of self-determination utilised by leaders of the new 
nation vis-a-vis their overseas imperial masters . Invariably, the national 
indigenous leaders of the newly independent state replied that unity must be 
preserved at all cost denying to secessionists the right to a separate sovereign 
existence. 2  The integrity of the state was held paramount to the claims of sub­
national units for self-determination . Regional , ethnic, or tribal fragmentation 
had to be avoided and discouraged . 
The internal ethnonationalist movements were frequently challenged for 
their authenticity in representing the best interests of their constituents . 
Their leaders were likely to be charged with being power hungry, intent on pro­
moting their own selfish interests . Hence, initial exchanges between the central 
government and separatists revolved around each other 's  legitimacy to repre­
sent their respective populations.  Each side, however , would assert the right to 
pursue its objective justifying its course of action on popular edorsement . The 
question of their relative popular strength might never had the opportunity to 
be ascertained peacefully before violence was applied to resolve the disparate 
claims to legitimacy made by each side. Even if they agreed to a peaceful 
referendum, they were likely to disagree as to the population that should vote 
on it. The central government generally insisted that the referendum be 
conducted among all citizens of the country to determine the fate of the sub­
nationalist unit .  The separatists on the other hand were likely to counter by 
demanding that only their own regional or ethnic unit vote on deciding their 
destiny . The stalemate, however , was not likely to be resolved through debate. 
But on occasions in certain countries an unintended event such as a general 
election might arise providing a convenient arena for the contestants to 
confront each other peacefully. Normally, each side would not explicitly 
declare that the contest provided the opportunity in which its relative popular 
strength over the issue of national unity would be tested . Enough ambiguity 
would be left in the meaning of the outcome so that a defeat or victory could 
be equally interpreted by each side as either related or unrelated to the issue of 
secession . 
In Papua New Guinea , where the central government has been challenged by 
a Papuan separatist movement, the cycle of assertion and counter-assertion 
delineated above had reached a stalemate with no compromise in sight . How-
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ever, the general elections of 1 977 ,  provided an arena for the two entities to 
face each other . Neither side publicly conceded that the electoral contest was a 
referendum on the right of a group to secede and establish its own govern­
ment. But each side mounted its best candidate and effort in the struggle. 
This paper attempts an inquiry into the strength, sources of siipport , and 
means of mobilization of the Papuan secessionist movement as displayed in 
the general elections of 1 977 .  Although support for Papua Besena (as the 
secessionist movement was known) was thought to be strong both in the 
National Capital District and the surrounding Central Province, our research 
focussed only on the four electorates in Port Moresby . 
Background to Papua Besen a.  
Papua New Guinea became independent as a single country on September 
16 , 1 975 . Prior to this time, Papua and New Guinea were legally two separate 
entities . Papua was an Australian colony having been acquired by the 
Australian Commonwealth in 1 906. New Guinea was formerly a German 
colony, but was lost to Australia during WW I when it became a Mandated 
Territory under the League of Nations .  After WW I I ,  New Guinea continued 
under Australian control , this time as a U .N .  Trust Territory . In 1 949, Australia 
formally unified the two countries under a single administrative system called 
the Territory of Papua and New Guinea . On the occasion of the 1949 admini­
strative union , Australian representatives reassured the Trusteeship Council 
that ' 'when the inhabitants of the two territories had attained a certain degree 
of development, they would be free to choose the form of government which 
suited them and , in particular, would be free to decide whether they wished the 
administrative union to continue . . . or whether they wished to become 
independent . "3 
The manner in which Australia administered Papua and New Guinea until 
WW II provides ample evidence that the two countries were separate. Papua 
had a different government from New Guinea, each with its own admini­
strator , and there was little contact between their people .4 The lingua franca 
for many Papuans was Police Motu, while it was Pidgin for New Guineans .  
Papuans were regarded as proto - Australian citizens ,  while New Guineans 
were Australian Protected Persons . During WW I I ,  separate infantry 
battalions were maintained for Papuans and New Guineans respectively. But 
after 1949, notwithstanding their undertaking to the U.N.  Trusteeship 
Council ,  the Australian purpose,  viewed through their administrative acts ,  
pointed to a determination to forge a new nation out of the two entities . From 
time to time, Papuan nationalists such as Oala Oala Rarua, Ebia Olewale, and 
John Guise expressed fear for Papua' s  future, especially when comparisons 
were made between the greater economic progress made in New Guinea . In 
1 97 1 ,  these sentiments were vigorously articulated when the final report on the 
Select Committee on Constitutional Development was tabled in the House of 
Assembly . Papuan legislators complained of the economic discrimination 
against their electorates and successfully passed a resolution in the House of 
Assembly in June 1 97 1  demanding that the status of Papua not be altered 
without the consent of the Papuan people or their representatives . 5 
In the 1 972 general elections , Josephine Abaijah ,  an unusually well­
educated Papuan woman from Milne Bay Province, appeared on the political 
scene running successfully for a seat in the parliament,  basing her campaign on 
a platform demanding "a fair go for Papua" and "Papua for Papuans" . She 
was the only Papuan representative in the House of Assembly to vigorously 
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assert the rights of Papuans to remain Australian citizens until they "were 
ready to take over the independent government of their own country' ' .  6 
Abaijah quickly emerged as the chief spokesperson for the Papuan cause . On 
June 3 ,  1973 , she formed a movement called "Papua Besena" meaning 
" Papuan Tribe or Nation" to encompass, represent , and promote the objec­
tives of Papuan nationalists . 7 Said Abaijah : "The aim of the Papuan 
Movement is that Papua should remain a separate country legally as it is at the 
present and Papua should form an independent Papuan Nation governed by 
the Papuan people. "8 In particular , Abaijah and her sympathizers feared that 
when Papua became integrated with New Guinea as a separate sovereign 
nation , the latter through its superior numbers and resources , would dominate 
the former reducing it to an internal colony . To the Papua Besena leader, 
colonial control by New Guinea would be worse than Australian colonialism . 
She envisaged Papua being converted ' ' into a baby farm to provide temporary 
labor for the political and economic development of New Guinea . '  '9 The 
struggle then is deemed to be anti-colonial in character . Abaijah emphasized 
this point : "The aim of Papua Besena is to wipe out all forms of colonialism in 
Papua - white colonialism and black colonialism - to achieve a free and 
independent Papuan people . ' '  10 On March 1 6, 1 976, Papua Besena unilaterally 
declared Papua's independence from Australia. The action was taken in 
anticipation of a united Papua New Guinea's  independence scheduled a few 
months later so as to symbolically pre-empt Papua from inclusion in nation­
wide celebrations.  
Papua Besena asserts its  claims to a separate identity on both primordial and 
non-primordial grounds . The primordial bases are language and cultural 
values . I ronically, it is on these foundations that Papuan ethnonationalism is 
weakest , for internally, Papua has a diverse population. The linguistjc base is 
Police Motu , a language group which only extends to a substantial minority of 
Papuans .  Most of the Motu speakers are found in and around Port Moresby, 
in the Central , Milne Bay, and Gulf Provinces . Together , Motu speakers 
constitute only about 220/o of the Papuan population . 1 1  The second primordial 
bas� is cultural values by which I mean both a separate way of li fe (from which 
a "we-ness" dimension is derived) plus fear of another group' s  values (from 
which a "they-ness" aspect is imparted) . The "we-they" dimension in values 
contributes to cultural distinctiveness and provides the catalytic force for 
group solidarity. Abaijah stimulates Papuan group solidarity by invoking con­
trasting stereotypes held by Papuans of New Guineas who are regarded as 
barbaric and belligerent . 1 2 On the other hand, Papuans are described as 
civilised and peaceful .  However , based on objective data , the separatist leader 
has seriously distorted many widely accepted facts .  Anthropologists regard 
Papuans and New Guineans as Melanesians who share a common complex of 
cultural values and orientations .  A hypothesis that probably goes a long way 
towards explaining Papua Besena' s success in making many Papuans believe 
that they are culturally different from New Guineans, however , is that often 
stereotyping is used a group defence mechanism . 1 3 Specifically, internal 
migration has led to dramatic population increases in Port Moresby where, 
traditionally, large numbers of Motu-speaking Papuans live. Many of these 
migrants are New Guinea Highlanders who came to town without a job, 
without their families , and without a fixed place to sleep . Consequently, 
Motuan villagers faced job competition from highlanders , their women were 
occasionally assaulted or raped , and their land illegally occupied by High­
landers . New Guinea - Papuan conflict, then , ostensibly has an objective 
basis . 
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The non-primordial basis on which Papua Besena asserts i t s  case for self -
determination is the economic neglect of Papua by Australian colonialism. 
Abaijah articulates the economic argument thus:  "Australia' s colonial rule of 
Papua was noted for indi fference , neglect , and lack of political and economic 
development . The main achievement of Australia in Papua was to produce in 
the Papua people a servility and ignorance which Australia, in turn, success­
fully used to further its own material aims and to avoid its responsibilities to 
Papua" . 1 4 The economic injustice arguments have provided the main impetus 
initially for the successes scored by Papua Besena. But once the movement had 
gathered momemtum and a widespread following, its collective psychological 
aspect assumed a li fe of its own and substantially freed its strength and 
credibility from the supportive bases that originally gave it its justification . 
Prime Minister Michael Somare has conceded that Papua was neglected . 
However , his government has disclaimed any responsibility for Papua's  
economic difficulties and has appealed instead to the separatists to  give him 
the opportunity to correct the colonial wrongs. He has offered provincial 
autonomy to them as well as economic programs to offset Papua' s  relative 
economic backwardness vis-a-vis New Guinea. In turn , he expects the demand 
for secession to be dropped . On this score many Papuan nationalists are 
ambivalent. Abaijah however refuses to accede to any compromises short of 
full independence for Papua. The Prime Minister in frustration has referred to 
the separatists leader as "mentally-ill" and sought to belittle the strength of 
the movement by calling it a liklik lain (a small group) . 1 5 Papua Besena on the 
other hand proceeded to challenge the government' s  authority by mounting 
pedodic demonstrations and participating in local elections. In the latter area, 
the secessionists have stunned the government . In 1 974, in Port Moresby, the 
City Council fell under the control of an overwhelming Papua Besen a 
majority. On February 25 , 1 975 ,  the council voted to support independence 
for Papua. In February 1 976, in an important by-election for the Central Pro­
vincial seat in Papua, the Papua Besena candidate resoundingly defeated the 
President of Somare 's  own party, the Pangu Pati . Since these events,  the 
government and Papua Besena have exchanged heated words regarding their 
performance , support , and legitimacy. Papua Besena appeared to have gained 
increased support , but no one knew its exact or even approximate strength . 
Further , its cohesiveness , leadership, and mobilization capabilities were all 
unknown factors . Similarly , the government ' s  claim to superior support was 
untested . The general election of 1 977 as it occurred in the capital city , which 
is perhaps Papua Besena' s area of strongest support , provided a rare 
opportunity to answer some of these questions .  
Port Moresby and the General Elections 
a) Port Moresby 
The city of Port Moresby is the capital of Papua New Guinea . It contains 
the headquarters of the central government and is the centre of national 
decision-making for nearly three million people distributed over 1 78 ,260 
square miles of national territory . Most of the country' s  50,000 public servants 
live among Moresby's  nearly 120,000 people . Indeed, the economy of the city 
is dominated by government administrative activities ; some 40% of total 
employment is directly provided by the government . 1 6 The headquarters of 
most of PNG large private firms, financial institutions and insurance 
companies are located in the capital . Commercial and manufacturing activities 
in the country are concentrated almost equally in the two largest cities , Port 
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Moresby and Lae . However , most of the private commercial enterprises in 
Moresby are in foreign hands . Food needs of civil servants and wage earners 
are only met partially by local sources such as local markets selling fresh 
vegetables , fish , and fruits . About 25 % of Moresby' s  food requirements are 
imported primarily from Australia and New Zealand . Finally, no account of 
the M oresby economy, however brief, should fail to mention that it is the main 
producer of trained and professional personnel . The country 's  major training 
institutions are within the capital city including the University of Papua New 
Guinea (UPNG) , the medical and dental colleges, the Administrative College , 
a Teachers' College etc . The army and Police headquarters are also here. 
Together, these institutions add to the complexity of the city as a challenging 
place to live. 1 7  
Until World War II ,  Moresby has been a small,  sleepy administrative town 
with less than 5 ,000 people. After the war, Moresby and PNG' s strategic value 
to Australia was underscored . The country was slated to receive unprecedented 
attention in aid and development grants . In 1 95 1 -52,  aid was $ 10 million ; in 
1 955-56, about $ 1 5  million; but these figures grew astronomically in the late 
1 960s to $ 1 35 million in 1 967-68 , and to over $200 million in 1 969-70. 
Accompanying the increases in aid was expansion of the public service. The 
population of Moresby skyrocketed as an integral part of the rapid growth , 
since most of the aid , trade, and expanded supply of Australian skilled 
personnel had to be channelled through the capital city. In 1 954, Moresby's  
population was 1 5 ,688 including 1 2,000 indigenous people and 3 ,688 
expatriates . In 1 961 , it grew to a total of 24,357 ;  by 1 966, it was 41 , 376 and in 
1 97 1 ,  it was 76,506. 1 8  By 1 977, it had reached about 1 20,000. Apart from sheer 
numbers , the composition had shifted decisively to a city populated over­
whelmingly by indigenous Melanesians with expatriates reduced to a small 
minority. 
The impact of these events was the inexorable physical expansion of the city 
and its facilities. From a small town that occupied a thin coastal belt , the 
urban area expanded inland across a ridge of hills into the flatlands of the 
Boroko and June Valley . From this inland thrust, partly dictated by the 
unavailability of native traditional land on the coast, emerged a sprawling city 
with planned residential suburbs, squatter settlements, industrial sites , and 
commercial centers . The traditional Motu and Koitabu villages which 
preceded the existence of the city site were incorporated within the city limits. 
From these new settlement patterns,  new forces would be released stratifying 
the city into different and opposing elements giving a peculiar cast to its 
politics . We provide a sketch of the chief components in the structure of the 
city . These materials are essential to an understanding of the 1 977 elections in 
which the secessionists campaigned to assert their strength . 
b) Migrants and Urban Settlements 
Initially, the movement of indigenous people to urban areas in PNG was 
controlled by a system of labour indenture . Consequently, the few towns that 
existed prior to 1949 were small and preponderantly European in structure. 
But thereafter as rules of urban residence were relaxed , roads built and the 
public service expanded , voluntary movement replaced indentured recruit­
ment . What was a trickle in the fifties and early sixties turned into a flood 
between 1 966 and 197 1 .  In Moresby the annual migration rate in that period 
was about 17% almost doubling the population from about 41 ,000 in 1 966 to 
about 75 , 100 in 1 97 1 . 1 9 The first migrants came from the contiguous Papuan 
Gulf and Central provinces . They were mainly single males who had acquired 
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skills during the war. They came looking for wage employment . Most lived on 
native traditional land with permission of the owners.  Then they came in 
successive waves from Morobe Province the Goilala Sub-District , the New 
Guinea Highlands, and the Sepik .  In all, however , the migration was 
overwhelmingly from the Papuan provinces . Even when the New Guineans 
came to Moresby in large numbers from the mid sixties to the early 1 970s, they 
did not constitute more than 9 . 1 OJo of the migrant population . 20 The total New 
Guinea migrant population, including the Highlanders, did not exceed 25 0Jo of 
the total . The Gulf province in Papua was the main source of migrants 
providing by 1 97 1  about 570Jo of the total in Moresby. While many of the 
migrants built their own houses on traditional Motu and Koitabu land with 
permission of the owners,  many others " squatted" illegally on both 
government and traditional native land . We shall refer to the places where 
migrants built their houses , with or without permission , as "urban" or 
"squatter settlements" . 
The number of urban settlements has increased steadily in Moresby . In 
1 950, there were 1 4; in 1 964, about 1 8; in 1 970 about 40; today about 42 to 45 . 
All settlements exhibit a certain consistency in residential ethnic segregation . 
Generally, migrants cluster close to their wantoks who are people from their 
own provinces or even village. A large settlement is  a mosaic of ethnic group 
- clusters based on home area origins.  2 1  Small settlements tend to be con­
stituted predominantly of one kind of people. All settlements are male 
dominated , but over the years , many migrants have come to regard Moresby 
as their home bringing increasingly their wives and children . Overall ,  living 
conditions in the settlements are still the worst in Moresby with a high unem­
ployment rate ranging from 25 to 350Jo . Finally, note must be taken of one 
salient fact to migrant politics . Papuan-dominated migrant settlements share 
with the traditional native villagers of Moresby deep hostility to New Guinean 
Highlanders . 
c) Traditional Villages 
When the first Europeans arrived in the Moresby area, they met the native 
Motu and Koitabu people who inhabited villages along the coast. The Motu 
and Koitabu , although belonging to different language groups, have inter­
married and peacefully co-existed . The original town limits excluded the 
villages . Native land was brought under Administratioµ. control so that private 
sales were prohibited . The Motu and Koitabu people were among the first to 
benefit from the schools established by the missionaries . When the public 
service expanded after World War I I ,  they were the first to be recrui ted 
because of their acquisition of westernised ways and skills . By 1 966, only 
about 160Jo of the total indigenous population in Moresby lived in the 
traditional villages which had been incorporated as part of the city . Today, 
despite the fact that many villagers live in government and business-provided 
houses in inland residential areas, the villages remain vibrant areas of 
traditional li fe.  They assert a separate socio-cultural identity that sets them 
apart from the rest of the city. They are militantly anti - New Guinean and 
provide solid support for Papua Besena. 
d) Residential Suburbs 
Whenever one discusses the sprawling physical spread that characteri ses 
Port Moresby today, one is usually thinking of the planned residential areas . 
At first , Europeans lived at Ela and at Paga and Tuaguba hills which were 
racially segregated enclaves . When the forces of change were released after 
World War I I ,  new residential areas had to be found to accommodate the in-
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creased number of civil servants and wage earners . Economic expansion drove 
the city inland . Residential suburbs were erected at Boroko in the early fifties, 
but their inadequacy led to expansion to Hohola, then to Gordons,  Waigani , 
Gerehu, and Tokarara. Each suburb was planned with modern municipal 
services making them among the best furnished housing facilities in PNG . 
When the Housing Commission was established in 1 967 , it initiated a system 
of mixed racial and ethnic -residential patterns .  The first inland settlement at 
Boroko was mainly European, but as localization proceeded briskly in the 
public service , the residential areas would be occupied predominantly by 
Papua New Guineans . Today, the residential areas are ethnically and racially 
integrated accommodating Papua New Guineans who are fairly well-educated 
and well-off as compared with most of their countrymen who continue to live 
in subsistence villages . When the government headquarters were transferred in 
1 975 to Waigani from the coast , this event triggered off a signi ficant 
movement of facilities and auxilliary businesses from the old coastal town area 
to the inland valleys . Industrial areas have been establi shed at 6 - mile and 
Gordons estate, although some industrial activities continue at Badi li , 
Newtown , and old Peninsular Moresby . The city centre had shifted inland 
leaving the traditional villages , a large number of squatter settlements , and a 
few industrial and residential areas on the coast . 
e) The Moresby Electorates 
From 1 964 to 1 977 , the electorates in Moresby had changed consistently for 
the general elections . In 1 964, a separate Moresby electorate did not even exist . 
In 1 968 , as the city's population increased , one seat was allocated to it . In 
1972 , the number grew to two seats as the population continued its rapid 
growth; simultaneously, the boundaries of the city limits expanded as far 
north to the Laloki River; east to Pari village; and west to Barune including the 
government marine establishment at Napa Napa. By 1 977,  while the city 
boundaries remained essentially the same, the Capital District Province was 
created so that Moresby was given its own provincial seat . Further , the city 
now with over 100,000 people, was divided into three open seats , giving it a 
total of four seats in Parliament . The Moresby Open electorates were: ( 1 )  The 
North-East open; (2) The South Open; and (3) The North-West open . 
Other changes in the Electcral Act for the 1 977 elections also affected the 
parameters of Moresby politics . During previous elections , the government 
undertook to register voters ; in 1 977 , voters had to register themselves . The 
Electoral Commission which had insisted that unregistered voters should onlv 
vote under unusual circumstances succumbed to political _pressure durin� the 
final week prior to the elections to relax this stringent rule . The consequence 
was that pandemonium literally prevailed at most Moresby polling stations 
where large numbers of  unregistered voters sought to exercise the franchise.  As 
well,  because of its greater simplicity, a first-past-the-post simple plurality 
system of voting was adopted, replacing the optional preferential system . 
Finally, 1 977 witnessed the discontinuation of the "absentee home district 
vote" under which a migrant voter could opt to cast his ballot either for 
candidates in the district of his birth or of his current residence . In 1 977 a voter 
was required to cast his ballot in the electorate where he had lived the previous 
six months . 
Papua Besen a 's Per/ ormance in each Electorate 
During the 1 977 elections for the first time each political party contested for 
seats in Moresby . They would each have to face a common foe of unknown 
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strength, the Papua Besena movement led by Josephine Abaijah . In this part, 
we examine the performance of Papua Besena' s candidates in each electorate 
to ascertain aspects of the movement' s  features such as organization, resources , 
cohesiveness,  mobilization, and sources of strength. We shall present each 
open electorate separately describing the structure of the electorate, the back­
ground of the Papua Besena candidate, the structure of the contest , and an 
analysis of the results . 
a) The South Open Electorate. This electorate has an estimated population 
of 29 ,267 . The number of registered voters was 1 6,663 including 1 3 ,965 males 
and 2,698 females . The most distinctive aspect of the South Open was the very 
high concentration of squatter settlements in it. Of the 42 to 45 such areas in 
the city, over three-fourths were found in this electorate .  Further, the South 
Open contained the main unplanned areas of the city. It is Papuan , dominated 
primarily by migrants who arrive everyday to join their urban wantoks in 
already overcrowded facilities . There were also four traditional villages in the 
South Open including Vabukori , Pari , Mahuru, and Kila Kila. Residential 
areas were at Paga and Tuaguba Hills, Newtown and Ela, the original places 
of European settlement . There were industrial areas at Badili , Newtown, and 
peninsular Moresby . The South Open faced the coastal sea and basically 
represented "the old city" where tne first administrative buildings , residential 
areas , industrial sites , and overcrowded migrant settlements were located . But 
as the city moved inland, large numbers of civil servants and wage earners 
would in turn migrate to the flat inland valleys leaving a heavy residue of 
poverty-striken migrants in the electorate . 
Eight candidates competed for the South Open seat . None was a New 
Guinean . One was a European, another a naturalized citizen from Irian Jaya , 
and the others were all Papuans. Three candidates were affiliated to a political 
party or movement ; the others were independents. The United Party' s 
candidate was the former city mayor, Oala Oala Rarua; the Pangu Pati ' s  
candidate was Bill Rudd; and Papua Besena' s endorsed candidate was Sevese 
Morea . The PPP had no candidate endorsed in this electorate .  We shall 
discuss the candidacy and performance of Morea since he was the Papua 
Besena nominee . 
Sevese Morea lived in Vabukori village and was 34 years old. He was a 
professional radio announcer , but simultaneously held a seat in the Port 
Moresby City Council where he rose to the position of Deputy Mayor . In the 
South Open, no doubt existed as to the identification of the Papua Besena 
candidate for Morea was widely known and hundreds of posters bearing both 
his photograph and Josephine Abaijah 's  were distributed and prominently dis­
played at public places throughout the electorate. However, since Papua 
Besena claimed that organizationally it was "amorphous" , "keeps no records, 
writes no names and does not divulge its membership' ' 22 some room existed for 
other candidates to declare that they were sympathetic to the movement 
hoping thereby to win votes for their electoral effort . Two such candidates 
existed in the South Open . Ravu Samuel, an independent candidate with 
strong church links to the urban settlements ,  said he was a Besena supporter . 
He, however , did not emphasize this point during his campaign; besides, he 
was absent from the electorate for most of the period immediately prior to 
polling . Oala Oala Rarua, the United Party candidate, was one of the Papuan 
nationalists in the early 1 9705 to have expressed openly his criticisms of 
economic neglect of Papua. He, however , stood for a united PNG within 
which Papuan aspirations were to be redressed . In 1 975 he was appointed 
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PNG's High Commissioner to Australia, but returned in early 1 977 to contest 
for a Moresby seat in the general elections . On his return , he sought to 
organize a Papua Besena meeting to endorse his candidacy for the South 
Open, but the meeting itself was challenged on the grounds that it had no 
authority to endorse Papua Besena candidates . Subsequently, Oala joined the 
United Party but throughout the campaign this fact was rarely prominently 
projected . 
Morea then had practically sole endorsement as the Papua Besena 
candidate . His financial resources were about Kl ,OOO most drawn from his 
own resources since Papua Besena had no central treasury to give any of its 
candidates financial support . However , Morea was able to call forth a large 
cadre of Besena activists to provide volunteer service campaigning on his 
behalf throughout the electorate . 
Morea' s  campaign organization was built essentially around community 
leaders and the City Council ' s  ward committee system . The squatter settle­
ments and traditional villages respond not to direct media appeals but through 
an indirect system of community leaders who interpret political events and 
advise entire communities how to cast their ballot . The City Council , con­
trolled by a Papua Besena maj ority, appointed throughout the electorate a 
network of ward committee representatives who, for a small salary, link the 
opinions, demands , and complaints of their respective areas to the activities of 
the City Counci l .  Many ward committee members were community leaders 
who Morea recruited to serve on his campaign organization. The City 
Counci l ' s  performance was impressive in the squatter settlements and tradi­
tional villages . Community leaders impressed upon residents that continued 
improvements required them to support Sevese Morea. To a substantial 
extent , this was an unnecessary appeal since Morea' s role in delivering services 
to these places was widely known throughout the electorate. Because most of 
residents in the villages and settlements were Papuans, this coincided with the 
primordial appeal of the secessionist movement . Morea, however, emphasized 
that they were not blindly casting their ballots for Papua Besena because they 
were Papuans ,  but because the movement , unlike the central government, re­
sponded to their needs . During the three days allocated for polling , Papua 
Besena' s supporters came out in large numbers providing massive expressive 
demonstrations displaying the movement 's strength and cohesiveness in the 
electorate. 
Table 1 gives a polling booth by polling booth breakdown of the results . The 
victor in the South Open was Morea. His total of 3 , 537 votes was overwhelm­
ing; even if one adds the votes of his two closest rivals, they would still fall 
short of Morea's  total by 700 votes . Morea obtained 36.  7% which is less than a 
maj ority of votes cast . However, in a contest involving eight candidates , his 
plurality must nevertheless be considered impressive . The polling booths were 
located at points where the results could substantially be identified with parti­
cular squatter settlements,  traditional villages , or planned residential arreas . 
Although there were eight polling booths, most of the votes were cast at 
Kaugere , Koki , and the District Office . At Koki and Kaugere alone, Morea 
had piled up a total of 2,000 out of his final score of 3 , 537 votes . At all the 
polling stations contiguous to squat ter settlements ,  Badi li , Koki , Kaugere . 
Sabama, Saraga, and Kila, the Besena candidate won handily . The 
movement ' s  support in these areas was overwhelming and undisputed . In the 
traditional villages , however, the results are mixed . Because of the location of 
the polling booths, only two village results at Pari and Vabukori were identifi-
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able . At Vabukori which was Morea's  village he won over 800Jo of the votes 
cast. However, at Pari where both Oala Oala Rama and Bill Rudd lived, 
Morea clearly lost heavily to these two candidates . Clearly, the traditional 
villages voted to support their own village candidates . At the residential areas , 
the results from the District Office were very striking . Here government civil 
servants and union wage workers predominated . Normally, this would be the 
sort of base that would support a Pangu Pati candidate. Bill Rudd, the Pangu 
candidate, won in this polling booth .  At Newtown and Ela Beach where 
residential areas were mixed with quarters for domestics and workers,  Morea 
won but not by as large margins as in the squatter areas . Finally, note must be 
taken of the Taurama polling station contiguous to the army barracks 
containing an ethnically mixed population . Here the secessionist candidate lost 
heavily . The evidence suggest , then, that at residential areas and at a barracks, 
where ethnically mixed communities exist and where public servants and wage 
earners predominate, the Papua Besena candidate did not do very well . Morea 
himself made little attempt to campaign among New Guineans especially in 
ethnically-mixed residential areas . 
b) The North- West Open Electorate 
This electorate had a population of 23 ,494, with 1 2,378 registered voters 
including 7 , 829 females . The North-West electorate was distinctive for its 
inclusion of both coastal villages and inland residential areas . It was almost 
like two separate worlds , one on the coast dominated by Motu villages and the 
other inland dominated by ethnically mixed civil servants , soldiers, and 
students living in planned residential areas , barracks, and dormitories . The 
traditional villages were Hanuabada, Bamni , and Tatana which together 
served as a counterweight against the inland population living in low-to­
medium covenant residential areas at Hohola, Waigani , Tokarara, and 
Gerehu.  There were also a few squatter settlements at June Valley, Morata, 
Badihagwa, and Gabi . Important institutional facilities in this electorate 
include the University of Papua New Guinea, the Administrative College , 
Murray Barracks ,  the Central Government Headquarters Buildings , the City 
Council ,  the PNG Arts Institute, and the Port Moresby Teachers' College. 
Ten candidates competed for the North-West Open seat . Eight were 
Papuans and two New Guineans .  All three of the established parties in PNG 
posted candidates . However , for Papua Besena, there was some confusion. 
There appeared to be two Papua Besena candidates , Patterson Kila, and 
Mah um Rama Rama. The former explicitly used the Besena label openly, but 
the latter, who is an established leader among pro-Papuan nationalists , ran as 
an independent . Investigation revealed that there was a significant split at the 
leadership level in the secessionist movement resulting in the formation of two 
opposing committees that individually arrogated to themselves the power to 
nominate Besena candidates . In some cases including the North-West Open , 
this cleavage came to public light , although this was not the case in all 
electorates where Besena candidates competed . The nominating committee 
established by Abaijah chose Patterson Kila to represent Papua Besena even 
though Mahum Rama Rarua was the most prominent Besena leader living in 
the North-West constituency . Rama could have stood as the candidate of the 
other Besena nominating committee , but chose instead to stand as an 
independent knowing full well that his public image is that of a major Papuan 
nationalist . Two reasons have been given for the Abaijah nominating 
committee by-passing Rama. First , he had recently suffered from prolonged 
illness so that his health was in doubt . Second, but more credible, was the fact 
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Table 1 Moresby South: Polling Booth Results 
Candidates Koki Kaugere Vabukori Sabama Pari Taurama Daugo Kil a Saraga Ela New District 
Beach Town H.Q.  
Toka 1 14 89 3 6 4 10  0 5 1 3 1  10 1 1 8 
Samuel 73 2 1 1 13  8 5 9 25 1 4  26 12 15 28 
Se aka 55 207 6 99 5 3 1  1 1 1  7 20 8 1 68 t'?j � Au 146 28 0 9 0 1 1 7 0 3 4 12 5 86 � -
Rumbiak 61 42 3 4 1 7 2 4 6 10 2 3 1  c � Morea 988 1 , 1 32 253 1 5 1  1 6  89 49 1 85 68 127 1 1 0 365 -
Rama 225 166 12 18 226 278 9 1 6  1 3  39 49 268 � 
Rudd 88 193 12 42 109 52 3 62 24 106 74 4 1 3  c ::::-: -
�· 
�· 
� a 
Papua Besena 49 
that Rama was very independent-minded , had his own personal · Besena base 
located in the Motu traditional villages , and advocated greater Papuan 
internal autonomy but not secession . As Lord Mayor of Port Moresby, he had 
the additional advantage of controlling the City Council .  Importantly, both 
Papuan nationalists , who were for outright secession , and those who 
advocated greater Papuan internal autonomy within a united PNG , together 
adhered to the Papua Besena label . Patterson Kila selected by the Abaijah 
committee was for secession. The elections demonstrated that the " secession 
versus greater autonomy' '  differences between Besena advocates went as far as 
an open fight with one group pitching its candidate against the other . 
Mahuru Rama Rama was born in Hanuabada village. He expected most of 
his votes to come from the traditional villages in Moresby which would 
provide a nucleus of support to build a winning plurality . He expected 
additional votes from the inland residential areas because he felt that as Mayor 
of Moresby he performed well in those areas . He, however , restricted most of 
his campaign activities to the traditional villages working on the strategy that 
the other candidates would so split the votes from the inland sector of the 
electorate that he would win by controlling the large bloc of votes from 
Hanuabada, Tatana, and Baruni . Patterson Kila was born in the Gulf 
Province but lived in Hohola. He expected few votes from the traditional 
villages which he considered as Rarua' s  preserve , but expected votes from the 
many Papuans who lived in the ethnically-mixed residential areas at Hohola, 
Tokarara, Waigani and Gerehu. He stood on a platform that advocated 
Papuan rights and secession, delivered his public speeches only in Motu, and 
did not expect New Guineans to support him. 
During the elections , Rama and Kila mounted separate campaign organ­
izations with the former drawing Besena volunteers primarily from the villages 
while the latter recruited them from the residential areas . The struggle then 
was as much among the various party candidates as between the competing 
Besena candidates . Until the final week before polling began, this division 
persisted . But then something very significant occurred . The Pangu Pati 
candidate, Gavera Rea, who was earlier regarded as "bound to lose" because 
he allegedly neglected the coastal segment of this electorate which voted him 
into office in 1 972, assembled a large volunteer organization that intensified its 
campaign throughout the electorate. Rea's  effort caused consternation among 
Besena supporters from both camps . The result was that Abaijah reached a 
partial accommodation with Rama and began campaigning for him . Kila's 
campaign which had failed to develop momentum was not eliminated 
however. But it became clear that the threat of a Pangu candidate winning a 
seat in one of Papua Besena's self-described strongholds was strong enough to 
lead Besena supporters and leaders from both camps to close ranks on the 
hustings against the common Pangu foe .  The massive mobilization of 
volunteers, trucks ,  and scrutineers displayed by Rea on the first day of polling 
caused a further consolidation of the two Besena organizations which pooled 
their resources on the two final days of polling urging voters to support Rarua 
first , or if the voter did not like Rama, to vote for Kila . Under threat , the 
Besena candidates and supporters practically coalesced and collaborated in 
their efforts .  They showed that while a leadership struggle existed , their 
common opponent was the Pangu Pati . 
Table II gives a polling booth by booth breakdown of the results.  The victor 
was Rarua, but an indication of the intensity of the electoral battle was the fact 
that he won over Pangu ' s  Rea by only 25 votes . Together, Rarua and Rea 
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Table 2 Moresby North west: Polling Booth Results 
Candidates Tatana Hanuabada Kanudi Hagara Gerehu Waigani Tokarara Hohola Elcom Na pa Murray 
Na pa Barracks 
Daure Gaigo 252 2 2 2 92 34 5 1 8  0 1 41 
Okona 1 0 0 1 33 19  0 5 2 0 30 
Rea 84 123 86 1 54 9 17  676 125 1 87 69 20 658 
Kil a 9 5 1 1  2 289 143 38 129 35 0 17 1  � Isorua 1 5  3 1 3  0 1 52 67 10 37 1 1  1 93 -
Rama 269 659 69 544 390 355 72 1 40 58 17  573 c 
Goava 15  106 8 58 1 38 32 1 5  22 8 3 1 1 0 � -
Bobby Gaigo 47 0 0 0 16  7 0 5 1 1 29 � Ivaraoa 6 3 1 1 57 46 10 45 5 0 1 1 7 --· -�· 
s· 
� a 
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Traditional Villages 
RARUA REA 
1 .  Hanuabada 659 1 23 
2 .  Tatana (and Baruni) 269 84 
3 .  Hagara 544 1 54 
4 .  Kanudi 69 86 
1 , 541 447 
DIFFERENCE 1 , 54 1 - 447 = 1 ,094 
Residental Settlements including Squatter Areas: 
RARUA REA 
1 .  Gerehu 390 9 1 7  
2 .  Waigani 355 676 
3 .  Tokarara 72 1 25 
4. Hohola 140 1 37 
5 .  Elcom 58 69 
6.  Napa Napa 17  20 
1 022 1 994 
DIFFERENCE 1 994 - 1022 = 972 
practically dominated the electoral contest . The polarised battle occurred in 
striking correspondence to the two geographical physical wings of the 
electorate represented on one hand by the coastal traditional villages and on 
the other by the inland residential settlements . Tables I I I  and IV il lustrate 
these points . 
Rarua' s margin of 1 ,094 votes in the vi llages was not substantially di fferent 
from Rea's  margin of 972 votes in the residential areas . At the polling booth at 
Murray Barracks ,  Rea scored 658 votes to 573 for Rarua closing the gap by 
almost a hundred votes . Clearly, Rarua' s  strength was concentrated in the tra­
ditional villages . He was born there but so was Rea . But Rea's  popularity had 
fallen enormously in his own village while Rarua, who directed funds from the 
City Council to be utili sed to improve roads , water supply , street lighting etc. 
in the villages , had both his pragmatic performance in distributing services as 
well as the Motu fear of New Guineans to capi talise on . Abaij ah was unable to 
redirect village votes from Rarua to Kila because of Rarua' s  personal strength. 
Finally, Rarua who did little campaigning in the inland residential areas , did 
obtain many votes there . It is quite possible that had Kila not run , most of his 
847 votes would have gone to Rarua making the margin of victory much more 
decisive . The results also demonstrated that in residential areas dominated by 
public servants and wage earners , Pangu was very strong . 
c) The North-East Electorate 
The authors have analysed this electorate in Chapter 2 of this volume . 
Moresby North-East had a population of 26 ,907 with 6,43 1 registered voters 
divided into 4 ,239 males and 2, 192 females . The occupational , class , and 
ethnic mixture in this electorate is unique . Professionally, the electorate is 
dominated by salaried civil servants and wage earners who live preponderantly 
at Gordons and Boroko.  Further , of all the Moresby electorates , only this one 
had a majority of New Guineans over Papuans . Clearly, Papua Besena 
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candidates would find in the electorate a fairly hostile environment for their 
electoral prospects . Six candidates competed for the North-East seat , three 
Papuans and three New Guineans .  All three major parties mounted candidates . 
The Pangu Pati placed Patterson Lowa, its campaign manager , while the 
United Party, feeling that the preponderance of New Guineans over Papuans 
offered an opportunity to win its first urban seat , entered Harry Hoerler , an 
articulate and aggressive mixed-race New Guinean . The PPP placed Fide Bale , 
an attractive Morobe woman who was previously a school teacher , but at the 
time of the elections a businesswoman . 
Papua Besena knew that the North-East electorate would be difficult . 
Unlike the other electorates that had large identifiable and sympathetic 
Papuan settlements the North-East was dominated by residential areas with 
educated and well-off people most of whom owed directly or indirectly their 
employment to the government . As in the North-West, Papua Besena faced 
problems in selecting a single representative. The upshot was that two highly 
regarded Besena leaders entered the race , but in a manoeuvre calculated to 
maximise their chances of winning , both declared that they were independent 
candidates . However , among most Papuans they were known. What they 
could not count on was that ethnicity in this electorate would be determinative 
of voter preference . Secondary associations such as clubs , neighborhood 
groups , sporting organizations , Parent-teachers' Associations , unions etc . -
all ethnically-mixed were likely to recast the interests and priorities of the voter 
rendering his choice of candidate less influenced by primordial factors as by 
criteria of performance, record, issues , economic interests ,  and the like. These 
facts also strongly influenced the type of campaign strategy and techniques 
that were employed in this electorate. Whereas in the traditional villages and 
squatter settlements it was necessary to recruit community leaders to obtain 
votes , in the ethnically-mixed residential areas , as were preponderantly found 
in the North-East electorate, effective appeals had to be based on the media 
and house-to-house campaign that emphasized one's  own performance, 
political affiliation, and record. 
The two covert Papua Besena candidates were Lahui Tau and Goasa 
Damena. Tau was an elected member of the City Council from Boroko .  He 
was an able trade unionist and served as chairman of the Bavoroko Com­
munity School Board . Tau expected votes to come from Boroko where he 
insisted that he was popular because of his service as a city councillor and a 
community leader, but ,  he also expected votes from Papuans particularly from 
those living at the Korobosea Koitabu Village, 9-Mile and Erima. Tau 
allocated only K500 to his campaign obtained from personal funds . Damena 
was a medical doctor who had worked as a public servant for several years . He 
had risen to the presidency of the Public Service Association, a fact that led 
many observers to predict that he would win . He expected the votes of most 
Papuans especially those who lived at Erima and Korobosea vi llage, but 
calculated that his victory plurality would come from public servants . He 
conducted a low-keyed campaign that budgetted for only Kl ,300 and was 
barely visible throughout the elections .  Neither Tau nor Damena utilised large 
campaign organizations or held public rallies . They ran highly personalised 
campaigns that linked their candidacy to the voters through a system of 
"contact points" .  But it was clear that the comparatively meagre financial and 
volunteer personnel resources that were available to Papua Besena in this 
electorate had to be split between Tau and Damena. 
Neither of the Besena candidates was prepared for the sort of systematic and 
Papua Besena 53 
vigorous campaign that came from Patterson Lowa and Harry Hoerl er . In 
particular Lowa, a highly trained ex-professional soldier who at one time was 
in a position to become head of the PNG Defence Force, mounted a massive 
mobilization of vehicles and volunteers that practically obliterated the 
visibility of Damena and Tau on polling day. Only Hoerler was capable of 
putting up a similar display of strength and then only at the polling booth at 
Boroko. Table 5 gives the polling booth breakdown of the results . 
The victor by a decisive margin was Pangu's Patterson Lowa. Although his 
votes were 7 1 6  more than his closest rival , the total constituted only 29 . 90/o of 
the votes cast . But Lowa' s victory was very significant for it was to be the only 
seat in Moresby that the Pangu Pati won defeating the Papua Besen a 
challenge. The sources of Lowa's votes attest to Papua Besena's archilles heel . 
The Gordon and Boroko polling booths which together provided 700/o of all 
votes cast gave Lowa his greatest support . These were ethnically-mixed 
residential areas with a high density of public servants and wage workers . An 
examination of the polling booth results in the South and North-West open 
would also show that in these residential areas the Papua Besena candidates 
performed badly . Lowa' s victory margin although concentrated at Boroko 
and Gordon' s ,  was spread over the entire electorate; he won at all but two of 
the polling booth areas . Equally noteworthy as Lowa's  victory was the fact 
that the United Party 's Harry Hoerler received the second highest votes . 
The total of Tau and Damena votes (6 1 4  + 643 = 257) was less than Lowa' s 
total of 1 ,423 and less than half of the combined votes of the New Guinea 
candidates . Overall ,  the votes were much more spread out among the 
candidates than in other Moresby electorates . The victory of Lowa would 
throw an important qualifier to the claims that Papua Besena held undisputed 
control over the capital . It seemed that where wage earners and salaried civil 
servants predominated so as to constitute a majority in an electorate, the 
Papua Besena cause had little chance of flourishing. 
Table 3 Moresby North-East: Polling Booth Results 
Area Kose Bale Dam en a Hoerl er Tau Lowa Informal Total 
YWCA 1 1  1 8  3 1  9 56 73 27 225 
Boroko 52 1 35 1 3 1  1 99 1 5 1  279 1 53 947 
C.A.A.  9 60 8 30 26 1 66 0 299 
Gord ons 1 89 1 80 287 374 293 59 1 1 55 2,089 
9-Mile 49 49 4 3 25 36 45 2 1 1 
Boman a 1 9  2 1  6 35 34 83 3 1  229 
Taurama 
Hospital 1 8  1 8  39  35 1 8  69 1 6  2 1 3  
Bavaroko 8 1 9  48 1 1  25 60 1 0  1 8 1  
Erima 26 1 6  55 9 1 5  27 0 1 74 
Postal 1 1 5 0 0 1 9  0 26 
Total : 382 5 1 7  6 14  705 643 1 423 492 4,757 
d) The National Capital Provincial Electorate 
This electorate consisted of the combined Moresby open electorates . In one of 
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the most suspenseful electoral battles during the 1 977 general elections, 
Josephine Abaijah , the acknowledged leader of the Papua Besena secessionist 
movement , faced Sir Maori Kiki , Deputy Prime Minister and the second most 
powerful person after Michael Somare in the Pangu Pati . Abaijah represented 
as much a challenge to the authority of the government to rule as to the 
integrity of the country to remain in one piece. Hence, beyond the mere 
mathematics of the electoral contest were larger symbolic issues which went to 
the fundamentals of the PNG political system. 
Five candidates competed for the regional seat . Two were independents 
while the remaining three were party or movement candidates . However it was 
clear that the battle was essentially a two way affair between Abaijah and Kiki . 
The remaining candidates would be eclipsed by this larger struggle. 
Unlike the other Moresby electorates where Papua Besena' s nominees were 
divided, in the regional Abaijah without equivocation was the movement ' s  
sole representative . Her stature had grown immensely over the preceding years 
so that an element of charisma surrounded her candidacy. She was still young 
in her late thirties and her consistent performance as a vocal advocate of 
Papuan rights rendered her a formidable figure. 
Abaijah ' s  strategy was simple. Her target was the Papuan population 
largely concentrated in the traditional Motu and Koitabu villages , and in the 
Papuan dominated squatter settlements located for the most part in the South 
open electorate. The strategy did not entail the neglect of Papuans who were 
civil servants living in the residential areas of the city. She did expect some 
votes from them, but felt that since they owed their livelihood to the 
government , their attachment to the movement would be qualified and 
diluted . The strength of Abaijah ' s  campaign was developed around a wide 
network of community leaders many of whom were linked to the City Counci l .  
Her campaign did not suffer from the same sorts of division in resources 
caused by the presence of two competing Papua Besena candidates runnning 
for the same seat . Practically all Besena candidates regardless of whether they 
belonged to one or the other nomination committee in the movement' s  
leadership endorsed and campaigned for Abaijah a s  the choice for the regional 
$eat . Since the voter had two ballots to cast one for as open candidate and one 
for a regional , the presence of only one conspicuous Besena candidate for the 
regional facilitated maximum mobiliz4tion of Besena sympathizers of all 
nuances to cast their ballot for Abaijah . What partly facilitiated this 
cohesiveness and mobilization was the fact that Abaijah de-emphasized the 
secession issue pointing mainly to the economic neglect of Papua. 
Sir Maori Kiki , a Papuan from the gulf Province, was one of the best known 
PNG nationalists . He was at the forefront in organizing the formation of the 
Pangu Pati that vigorously advocated the independence of PNG as a united 
country. In 1 972 when he won the Inland Moresby seat , he built his majority 
on the votes of wage earners , civil servants ,  and squatters from both Papua 
and New Guinea . But since 1 972, Kiki was charged with maj or national 
responsibilities of a fledgling government . He was responsible for Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, a portfolio that engaged most of his efforts on matters 
unrelated to the interests of his electorate . While Kiki was pre-occupied with 
matters specifically related to the transfer of independence status to PNG, the 
Papua Besena movement erected its credibility on criticisms of government 
neglect of Moresby. On that platform , Besena successfully captured a majority 
of seats in the City Council and exploited that base to demonstrate that it 
could best attend to the demands of the people for water, roads, electricity, 
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sewerage facilities , employment and housing opportunities etc . When Kiki 
came to the regional contest he faced a movement that was much more than 
symbolic rhetoric . It had delivered on its promises ; it had a pragmatic basis in 
performance. Nevertheless, allegations were made that the City Council tilted 
its budgetary allocations in favour of Papuan villages and settlements giving 
only peripheral attention to areas where New Guineans and expatriates 
resided . This accusation provided a wedge which the Kiki campaign would 
exploit suggesting to the electorate, particularly New Guineans, that a fair 
government representative of all interests could not be expected from a Papua 
Besena government . 
Kiki ' s  campaign was tied into the organizational efforts of the other Pangu 
candidates in the open electorates . It was well organized, extensively utilised 
the media, and plentifully supplied by financial and volunteer resources . Kiki 
realised that his best hopes were in concentrating on the residential settlements 
where civil servants and wage earners lived; the army barracks, and certain 
squatter settlements . Not much attention was given to the traditional Motuan 
villages . Outwardly , Kiki ' s  campaign appeared to have picked up sufficient 
momentum during the final days of the elections so that predictions of an 
Abaijah victory became tentative . 
Table 4 National Capital District Results 
CANDIDA TES 
John Banono 
Tom Kimala 
Ron Boyce 
Albert M .  Kiki 
Josephine Abaij ah 
VO TES 
1 ,693 
1 , 1 32 
393 
6, 19 1  
1 2 ,905 
Abaijah was the victor obtaining more than twice as many votes as Kiki . The 
results also show that the battle was essentially between Abaijah and Kiki . The 
polling booth results can be divided into four groups for analysis , namely 
those from: 
( 1 )  Urban settlements (2) traditional villages 
(3) residential housing areas and (4) the army barracks . 
Abaijah 's  largest margin of victory was obtained from polling booths located 
in the squatter settlements . 
Urban Settlements 
KIKI ABAIJAH 
1 .  Koki 293 1 ,447 
2 .  Kaugere 273 1 ,593 
3 .  Sabama 66 235 
4 .  Kila 76 1 87 
5 .  Sa raga 29 91  
6 .  9 Mile 1 1 3 33 
850 3 , 588 
DIFFERENCE 3 , 588 - 850 2, 738 votes 
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Abaijah' s  performance in the .squatter settlements over Kiki was only slightly 
better than her performance over him in the traditional villages . 
VILLA GES 
1 .  Tatana and Baruni 
2. Hanuabada 
3 .  Kanudi 
4. Hagara 
5. Vabukori 
6. Pari 
DIFFERENCE 
Traditional Villages 
KIKI 
68 
1 07 
77 
1 1 2 
38 
73 
477 
ABAIJAH 
558 
774 
1 1 1  
720 
1 96 
272 
2,63 1 
2,63 1 - 477 = 2, 1 54 
The group with the largest concentation of votes was the residential housing 
settlements . In a number of cases , the polling booths situated here drew upon 
squatter settlers who resided nearby. But , substantially, the votes cast at these 
polling stations were from residents in the planned housing settlements .  In 
these areas , Abaijah also defeated Kiki but her margin was considerably less 
than in the villages and squatter settlements .  The results suggest that not only 
did more Papuans in these areas vote for Abaijah than for Besena candidates 
in the open electorates , but that Abaijah herself was something of populist to 
whom much admiration was directed if only because of her persistence in 
criticising a central government that had allegedly become indifferent to the 
needs of Moresby electorates . However, this is not to suggest that Abaijah 
received any support from New Guineans ,  but that many Papuan civil servants 
and wage earners found in Kiki an object in which to cast a negative vote 
against the government . The results for the residential are as follows: -
Residential A reas 
KIKI ABAIJAH 
1 .  Gerehu 342 1 ,  143 
2. Waigani 640 647 
3 .  Tokarara 1 1 0 1 65 
4.  Hohola 1 67 425 
5 .  Elcom 65 1 36 
6. Newtown 95 1 63 
7 .  District Office 48 1 735 
8 .  Ela Beach 124 2 1 1 
9 .  Boroko 43 8 3 1 3  
10. Gord ons 695 760 
1 1 .  Bavoroko 86 62 
12 .  Taurama Hospital 1 00 73 
1 3 .  Erima 42 109 
TOTAL 3 ,91 5 4,942 
DIFFERENCE: 4,942 - 3 ,91 5 1 ,027 
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Before proceeding to the polling booths at the army barracks one significant 
point should be made. It is  that on an electorate by open electorate basis , Kiki 
lost to Abaijah in the South Open and North-West open, but won against her 
in the North-East open by a margin of 306 votes . Partly, this can be explained 
by the fact that in addition to a preponderance of residential areas found in the 
North-East was the equally significant point that the electorate had a majority 
of New Guinean voters .  Confronted with Abaijah who is anathema to New 
Guineans, conceivably they rallied together voting for Kiki . The results for the 
regional in the North-East electorate were as follows :-
Kiki/ A baijah Voting Support in the North-East Electorate 
POLLING PLA CE 
1 .  YWCA 
2. Boroko 
3.  CAA 
4. Gordons 
5. 9 Mile 
6. Bomana 
7. Taurama Hospital 
8. Bavoroko 
9.  Erima 
10 . Postal 
TOTAL 
DIFFERENCE: 
KIKI 
75 
438 
1 85 
695 
1 1 3 
95 
100 
86 
42 
2 1  
1 , 850 
ABAIJAH 
86 
3 1 3  
49 
760 
37 
53 
73 
62 
1 09 
4 
1 , 546 
1 ,850 - 1 , 546 = 304 
Finally, the polling booths at the soldiers' barracks were significant . Many 
analysts projected that Kiki,  the Minister of Defence, would carry these votes 
overwhelmingly . However, a more informed opinion would have pointed to 
the generally felt feelings among many soldiers that Kiki had mistreated their 
military commander and had allegedly paid more attention to his personal 
farm than to the needs and interests of the soldiers. One caveat should be 
inserted, however, about Abaijah ' s  victory at the barracks polling stations . I t  
is  that many soldiers did not vote and that many residents in areas contiguous 
to the barracks voted at the polling stations there . The results were : -
Military Barracks and Contiguous A reas 
PLA CES KIKI ABAIJAH 
1 .  Tau ram a 59 1 56 
2 .  Murray 506 1 ,052 
TOTAL 565 1 ,208 
DIFFERENCE: 1 ,208 - 565 643 
Summary and Conclusion 
The most striking aspect that emerged about Papua Besena during the 
elections was the leadership split that led to the formation of two separate 
nomination committees. The schism spilled over to other provinces where 
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Besena entered the elections .  This was especially conspicuous in the Rigo Open 
and the Kairuku-Hiri Open, both electorates belonging to the Central Province. 
To a certain extent the leadership division coincided with another significant 
point that the elections brought out ,  namely, the cleavage between supporters 
of secession versus advocates of increased Papuan autonomy within a larger 
PNG nationhood. Papua Besena supporters as a whole down-played the 
secessionist theme during the elections, but a significant majority of 
candidates in particular felt that it was ' ' too late' ' to pursue separation ,  
choosing to  demand that the Papuan provinces be  given maximum powers to 
govern their own internal affairs.  
Organizationally, the movement does seem "amorphous" ,  a fact that 
facilitated, but did not create, the public expression of the leadership split . The 
movement seemed to be highly decentralised in the sense that individual 
Besena leaders appeared to have their separate and discrete following in 
different parts of  Moresby and the Central Province. For example, Morea's  
supporters were highly localised within the South electorate, while Rama felt 
sufficently strong independently in the Motu villages of Hanuabada, Tatana, 
and Baruni , to challenge Josephine's  choice of a nominee for the North-West 
electorate . A local Besena leader evidently builds his support around his own 
village, clan , or ethnic group, then increases his following in geographically 
contiguous areas by utilizing secondary factors such as character ,  record, and 
performance. Both Morea and Rama anchored their nucleus of their support 
in their own village, then sought additional votes from other constituencies 
based on their city council performance. Perhaps, one of the reasons that 
accounted for Damena and Tau losing in the North-East electorate was the 
absence of a similar nucleus group of fairly equivalent strength of either 
Vabukori or Rarua' s  clan in Hanuabada. 
The single most powerful linkage that gave Papua Besena some overall or­
ganizational cohesiveness and purpose was the candidacy of Josephine 
Abaijah .  In the Central Province, the Papua Besena regional candidate, James 
Mopio, served a similar function for Papua Besena candidates in the Open 
electorates . When the Pangu Pati mobilised its huge campaign machine that 
practically overwhelmed all other candidates during polling days in Moresby, 
the combined effort of Abaijah and Mopio (who was so convinced of winning 
his own seat that he spent much of his time campaigning for other Besena 
candidates in the Capital) rallied the Besena troops to offer some opposition 
especially during the final day of polling . In effect , in the face of an attack 
from their arch adversary, the Pangu Pati , it appeared that Abaijah and 
Mopio were able to temporarily bridge the differences among Besena 
supporters and candidates for a concerted and cohesive counter-attack . The 
absence of external pressure, however , seems to provide the occasion for 
internal differences to surface splitting the cohesiveness and strength of the 
movement . 
The popularity of Papua Besena in Moresby derived from its control of the 
City Council . Each of the Besena candidates , especially Tau , Morea, and 
Rama, who were City Councillors, utilised ward committee representatives to 
campaign on their behalf. It was a most effective vehicle of persuasion since it 
simultaneously recruited prominent community leaders and pointed to the per­
formance and achievements of the candidates through the Besena-controlled 
City Council. The growth in popularity of Papua Besena could be attributed to 
this nexus - the linking of performance with symbolic appeal s .  
Finally, the sources of support for Papua Besena have been fairly clearly 
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delineated by these elections .  First there was no gainsaying the fact that , with 
rare exceptions, it was supported only by Papuans .  Second, not all Papuans in 
Moresby supported the movement. Had this been so, given that Moresby is 
very preponderantly (about 700Jo) a Papuan town, the Besena majorities 
should have been more decisive . It lost the North-East Open and barely won 
by 25 votes the North-West Open. It is now left for us to identify broadly 
Besena areas of support . Clearly, the Papua-dominated squatter settlements 
especially those in the South Open overwhelmingly supported Papua Besena . 
These are essentially poor areas with a high incidence of unemployment . We 
have no evidence to suggest that New Guinea residents in a similar socio­
economic category supported the separatists . Indeed, it is quite credible as 
suggested in the beginning of this paper that the Papuan squatters see their 
New Guinean counterparts as competitors for scarce jobs and services . The 
traditional villages, with the exception of Pari in the South Open but not in the 
Regional , gave overwhelming support also to Papua Besena. Here, the Motu 
and Koitabu villagers might have also reacted to the competition for j obs by 
New Guineans ,  but to this was added the problems associated with the loss of  
their traditional land either through illegal squatting or  through sale to 
accommodate the expansion of the city. Finally, the planned residential areas 
which were ethnically-mixed and dominated by civil servants and wage earn�:r:s 
threw up the most resistance to Papua Besena. In the North-East Open , these 
areas gave Kiki the edge over Abaijah; similarly in the North-West Open, these 
areas provided Rea with a counter-weight against the large majorities compiled 
by Rarua in the traditional village; in the South Open, Morea lost to Rudd in 
the major residential area represented by the District Office, although overall 
Morea won in the residential settlements but by slim margins . Abaijah on the 
other hand did much better than the Besena Open candidates in these same 
constituencies . What is clear is  that the residential areas are not unequivocally 
Besena or Pangu territory in the same decisive way the squatter settlements 
and traditional villages are the preserve of Besena. An important factor that 
must be inserted in this regard is that during the elections the PNG economy 
and Port Moresby in particular had continued to suffer from relative economic 
stagnation largely derived from the failure of enough foreign investment to 
enter the country . To control inflation, the government had applied a tight 
rein on the demand for wage and salary increases from workers and civil 
servants . Papua Besena hammered away very effectively at the economic per­
formance factors during the campaign, carefully under-playing its political 
secessionist aspirations .  Consequently, it is very difficult to gauge how much 
of the support Besena received, especially in the residential areas , was more a 
negative reaction against the economic policies of the government than an 
affirmation of the separatist movement ' s  platform. 
The 1 977 election in Moresby was not very decisive . To be sure , Papua 
Besena won three out of four seats conceding only one to Pangu . One of the 
three seats won was by only 26 votes. However, what is  undisputable is that 
Moresby, previously a Pangu stronghold , had practically fallen into Besena's 
hands via the outcome of the 1977 general elections and earlier via the outcome 
of the 1 974 city council elections .  On these grounds Besena can claim popular 
endorsement of its program. The government can counter with equal force 
that the results in 1 977 were not decisive, and just as significantly, since Papua 
Besena won by criticising the government' s  economic performance and under­
playing its separatist aspirations ,  the results could not be interpreted as a 
referendum on the national unity issue. Further, one of the three successful 
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Besena candidates , Rama, had indicated that he was against secession, but 
supported greater Papuan autonomy within a larger PNG nationhood. The 
latter position the government has now conceded in its devolution of powers to 
the provinces so that this new concession is likely to split the Papua Besena 
leadership further . It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that the 
movement had lost its momentum. Practical concessions may not be related to 
the needs of a movement founded on primordial and value premises . 
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Chapter 4 
ON THE PERIPHERY : 
NORTH FLY OPEN 
Richard Jackson 
This chapter concentrates on the North Fly Open electorate. However as a 
prologue one or two comments on the Western Province in general need to be 
made. 
The Province is easily the largest in Papua New Guinea with an area of 
37 , 700 square miles - bigger than the Benelux countries combined. The total 
population is a little over 70,000, of whom approximately 37 , 500 are over 
eighteen years of age. It would be interesting to know what the cost of 
collecting each vote is in such a thinly inhabited region. More importantly, the 
size of the province combined with its meagre population density made the 
Electoral Boundaries Commission' s  task of dividing it into reasonably 
representative electorates extremely difficult . 
Before this election, Western Province returned three members to 
Parliament , from two Open electorates (North Fly and South Fly) and one 
Regional . Theoretically , these electorates could have been retained without 
exceeding the maximum limits for Open electorate populations (36,470) set 
down by the Constitution. Moreover, the existing two Open electorates did 
conform well with the local populations'  perceptions of their province; that is,  
of two zones separated by thousands of square miles of uninhabited swamp 
grasslands . As will be seen later , it is perhaps just as well ,  however , that such a 
dichotomy was not further formalised . Certainly the division of Western 
Province into three Open electorates gives it rather more representation in the 
new Parliament than the national norm: one member per 1 7 ,  700 persons as 
opposed to one per 22,400 for PNG . One electorate, South Fly, has a 
population some way below the constitutionally established minimum, and the 
other two, Middle and North Fly, are only j ust above that minimum. 
In such a vast , thinly populated area the drawing of boundaries necessarily 
throws together very disparate groups and (less necessarily) divides culturally 
homogeneous or like groups. The Middle Fly electorate is especially odd in the 
former respect bringing together the peoples of the Aramia Valley and those of 
the Lake Murray/Suki areas, who are separated by vast , uninhabited tracts . 
This combination of disparate cultural groups was the reason for the only 
major objection to the EBC's  proposals for Western Province : that the Lake 
Murray and Nomad areas be removed from the Middle Fly to the North Fly 
"because of linguistic and customary ties" 1 • Had this objection been sustained 
the Middle Fly electorate would have been reduced to a size almost impossible 
to justify ,  fewer than 1 6,000 persons .  The objection was overruled because of 
this rather than because of any lack of intrinsic logic or truth in the objection . 
In the last Parliament all the representatives for the Province were Pangu 
supporters : Mr . Krenem Wonhenai (North Fly) , Mr . Naipuri Maina (Western 
Regional) and Mr. Ebia Olewale (South Fly) . As a result of the elections,  the 
Province was represented by two P .P .P .  members , one Pangu , and one 
United Party supporter . This should not be taken to mean that party politics 
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have a strong grip in the Province; far from it - in many areas the people were 
not even aware that an election was to be held until the election patrols arrived . 
Some might interpret the results as indicating a reverse for Pangu ; in my view, 
it should be viewed rather as a reverse for individuals . If Pangu did err it was 
in backing individuals who , well before the election date and right up to it, 
seemed likely losers . Probably the only party line which could be expected to 
gain a strong following in the Province would be that of Papua Besena. In 
1 974 there were definite signs that in this (arguably the least developed) area of 
the country, Ms. Abaijah ' s  arguments - if not her person - were receiving a 
favourable response in Dam and the coastal areas . It is a reflection of Mr.  
Olewale' s political skills that he not only managed to control this response, but 
effectively smothered Besena sentiments .  Further, in the elections, he retained 
his seat in a convincing fashion when many had predicted his defeat , and was 
the only sitting member in the Province to do so. Even so, one of the most 
interesting features of the election was the importance of the issue of secession; 
not, however , of Papua from PNG, but of North Fly from the rest of Western 
Province . Why? 
Dam has been the headquarters of Western Province for more than 80 
years . Its location as an administrative centre is far from ideal . I t  is almost 900 
km by river from the source of the Fly . However, since for over half a century 
most of the northern half of the Province was ignored by Konedobu, Dam's  
isolation from the north hardly mattered . Dam's  centrality as  a labour recruit­
ment centre for the Kiwai and other southern groups was sufficient. 
Occasional patrols ventured north of Lake Murray but in general the admini­
stration was content to leave the area to Dutch missionaries , Malay traders 
and , in some areas , to Dutch administration. The general opinion was summed 
up by one patrol officer " until muddy water assumes an economic import­
ance , I think we may as well become relegated (sic) to the fact that economic 
development in this area is virtually impossible"2 •  Kiunga Patrol Post was only 
established in 1 952 when oil companies entered the area (unsuccessfully) . Only 
when Indonesia took over Irian Jaya was any further interest shown. On this 
occasion a couple more patrol posts were built and two strategically located 
airstrips were sited at Kiunga and Ningerum. The area' s development was 
otherwise left to the missions, the French Canadian Montfort Catholic 
Mission and the Asia Pacific Christian Mission . 
The discovery of copper at Mt. Fubilan by Kennecott in 1 969 has rather 
changed matters . The giant copper finds in the supposedly uninhabited Star 
Mountains of Papua were , for a while , everybody' s idea of an economic 
saviour: they were to provide central government with alternatives with which 
to face secessionist demands from Bougainville; they were to provide the key 
economic support of a separate Papua; they were to provide jobs and oppor­
tunities in a province which had seen almost no economic development in 90 
years . For various reasons the exploitation of Fubilan' s wealth has been 
delayed now for more than eight years . In the course of this delay Waigani , 
Besena and Dam have all had time to reflect , to realise that the Fubilan mine 
could be another Bougainvil le in more senses than one, that the Star 
Mountains are inhabited by people with rights, and that the project will be 
located in the long ignored Kiunga district . Conversely, although annoyed by 
the delay in the opening of the mine, the North Fly people have themselves had 
the opportunity to reflect on the effect the mine's  location could have on their 
status , and on the way their demands might now be heard . The proposals that 
Provincial Governments be funded to the extent of 1 114  OJo of the value of each 
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province's  exports are rather attractive to an area with K8 billion-worth of 
copper at hand, especially when that area has been neglected by Moresby and 
Dam alike for so long. 
Proposals to move the Provincial Headquarters from Daru have long been 
made but not , till now, seriously considered . Today, in the face of growing 
agitation for a separate North Fly Province, it has become an important issue 
even for the Kiwai who would have found it difficult to have entertained such 
a proposal a few years ago. At the end of 1 976 the Kiunga Local Government 
Council voted that North Fly (i .e .  Kiunga District plus Nomad and Lake 
Murray) be declared a separate province. Immediately afterwards, the Fly 
River Area Authority, where North Fly representatives were no longer poor 
relations , actively sought, for the first time, alternatives to Daru. The northern 
representatives were diffident in their response; they did not wish Kiunga to be 
declared PHQ since that would inevitably tie them to the Western Province in 
its present form. Associations of North Fly residents in Daru and Port 
Moresby began at the same time to lobby for secession . A Deputy Provincial 
Commissioner was appointed to Kiunga. Kiunga (and Telefomin) landowners 
were accorded preferential treatment under the terms of the Ok Tedi Mining 
Agreement between the PNG government and BHP' s  subsidiary , Damco. The 
National Executive Council accepted that Kiunga District should receive 
special developmental assistance. Parties of surveyors ,  researchers , investi­
gators and consultants (including the present writer) were despatched to the 
District . 
I n  other words , this election took place at a fairly critical time for the unity 
of Western Province, and a major focus of interest in the election was , not 
which parties but , which individuals would win seats,  and what would be the 
attitudes of these individuals towards the question of North Fly secession from 
Western Province . 
The North Fly Electorate 
Under the Organic Laws of the Constitution, electorates cannot straddle 
provincial boundaries . The copper deposits of the Star Mountains lie in land 
belonging to a people collectively known as the Min. In PNG there are 
approximately 23 ,000 Min, of whom about 5 ,000 live in Western Province and 
the remainder just across the provincial boundary in West Sepik . For several 
years , and especially since the copper discoveries , the Min have made repre­
sentations for an electorate of their own . In this they have had support from 
those who were interested in ensuring that the people who would be most 
affected if mining proceeded should have some political representation . Partly 
as a result of this pressure a new Telefomin electorate was created by the EBC 
but , because of the Organic Laws , it only includes those Min in the West Sepik 
and does not include the Western Province Min nor the proposed mine site . 
The Western Province Min remain in the North Fly Open where they 
constitute about 19% of the electorate. The new Telefomin seat does include 
the Frieda River and some other smaller copper prospects . It is one of the 
smallest electorates in the country with a population of only 21 ,052 but it 
recorded a very high proportional turn-out during voting: 10, 750 votes were 
cast , suggesting a turn-out of over 90% . 
As mentioned above , the southern boundary of the electorate of North Fly 
Open excludes the Lake Murray area which is part of the Middle Fly . There is 
no doubt that Lake Murray people see themselves as part of any future North 
Fly Province. In the Nomad area the electoral boundary is particularly odd . Of 
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the seven Census Divisions in the Nomad District one is unpopulated, three 
were included in the Middle Fly and three in the North Fly . Although some 
division was necessary if both these electorates were to attain minimum 
population sizes , this division had an important bearing on the election result .  
It meant that a group (the Biami) of over 3 ,000 people were included in the 
North Fly having virtually nothing in common with the remainder of the 
electorate. 
The northern quarter of the electorate is of extremely rugged, mountainous 
terrain peopled by the Min taro cultivators . South of the mountains, the 
country drops quickly down to altitudes below 1 ,000' , to the ridges and 
swamps that are the home of the Ningerum, Yungum and Awin (Aekyom) 
peoples . The first two of these groups are split by the international border with 
Indonesia. Perhaps a third of the Yungum and rather more of the Ningerum 
are on the PNG side of the border . Border crossings in both directions are very 
common. Each group forms about 1 5 %  of the electorate . The Awin form the 
largest single group in the electorate with approximately 33 OJo of the total 
population . 
The whole of the electorate is poor. For a dozen or so villages in the south 
around the main centre Kiunga smallholder rubber plots earn cash. At 
Tabubil ,  the mine prospecting camp in the upper reaches of the Ok Tedi , the 
Min have gained good employment, health, and educational opportunities and 
facilities . But elsewhere there are almost no sources of income, no roads, poor 
educational facilities , and severe health problems . Because of lack of funds 
some areas have not even been patrolled for two, three or even four years . 
Consequently administration control is weak .3  
The Candidates 
The question of who did not stand for election is as interesting as who did: 
indeed it helped determine the winner . Given the Biami area' s  isolation and 
lack of common interest with the rest of the electorate , a Biami candidate 
assured of that area's  block vote would have stood a good chance of winning. 
However, there was no Biami candidate. Nor was there a candidate from the 
Min area. Noah Daikimeng, a catechist with the Montfort Catholic Mission 
for many years and a resident of Golgubip village, seriously considered 
standing. However , he was persuaded that if he did stand, and was elected, 
then the vegetable growing projects of the mountain villages might collapse in 
his  absence. Norbert Makmop, a Min from Bolivip, a public servant with the 
Office of Information, and a member of the Ok Tedi Development Company 
board, also considered standing . He spent several weeks at home testing 
conditions, and finalising his bride-price ceremonies . As virtually the only Min 
in public office , Makmop is continually expected and called upon to advise 
virtually all parties on 'what the Min want ' or ' how will the Min feel about 
this ' . In addition he is courted by a variety of organisations - government de­
partments, provincial bodies - all hoping to get him 'on side' . In the end he 
seems to have decided that his present position gives him (a) enough inside 
knowledge of what is being planned by all levels of administration which 
would affect the Min and (b) enough freedom to ensure that in any attempt to 
act on behalf of the Min he would not be over-compromised by any official 
status . In any case, internal divisions amongst the Min meant that he could not 
be sure of their block vote . 
The most interesting of the non-candidates was a kiap of some years experi­
ence in the Western Province, Charles Brillante. A fluent Motu and Pidgin 
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speaker he had never been on good terms with other expatriate kiaps in the 
Province, these people rather resenting his thorough-going self-identification 
with villagers . In becoming a citizen he had localised his name to Sali Birilanti 
and was a familiar sight, clad only in shorts and without footwear, on bush 
tracks in many parts of the Western Province . He was first to nominate for the 
North Fly seat and was out campaigning vigorously by early April .  He was a 
Pangu sympathiser . By the third week in April he had walked from Ningerum 
to Kiunga campaigning in each village as he went; thence he had passed through 
all the north Yungum villages along the border . His campaigning was patient 
and strenuous .  He took no carriers and made a big impression, especially on 
the Yungum. In one village, where our paths crossed, Kungim, he held three 
meetings in twenty four hours, one with each line in the village, but avoided 
completely any contact with the Catholic missionaries nearby, sleeping in the 
barrack house of the village. Wherever we went in the western half of the 
electorate gathering opinions for the development plan, villages would ref er to 
Sali in enthusiastic tones . Unfortunately, Birilanti was not properly qualified 
to stand as a candidate and there were irregularities uncovered in his 
nomination papers . Consequently his nomination was disbarred and an appeal 
against this disqualification was rejected by the courts in Moresby. 
I n  the end then, there were six candidates for the North Fly seat . The sitting 
member, Mr. Krenem Wonhenai , was at first diffident about standing once 
more. He had made virtually no speeches to Parliament during his term, 
handicapped by his ignorance of English . He relied rather heavily on the guid­
ance of Naipuri Maina, the Regional Member . In the 1 972 elections, he had 
been a surprise winner through fifth preferences , although with hindsight it 
was clear that his role as a founder member of Ningerum LGC had helped him 
secure a large batch of the Ningerum and West and North Awin vote. 
Wonhenai is a resident of Ienkenai village in West Awin a few miles south of 
Ningerum Patrol Post . In  the late sixties and early seventies the population of 
West Awin,  previously scattered in small bush hamlets, had moved en masse 
into large consolidated villages on the four-wheel-drive track running from 
Ningerum to Rumginae. In doing so, the West Awins were following the 
example of the South Awins who had made a similar move a few years pre­
viously to the Rumginae-Kiunga road. In the South Awin case, the move had 
been largely successful in forcing DASF to supply the new villages with rubber 
seedlings . The West Awin moved hoping that they too would get a similar sort 
of business . Unfortunately for them, the Ningerum area is much wetter than 
the Kiunga area, indeed with over 7', 500mm rain a year it is one of the wettest 
places in the country. DASF considered that rubber could not be introduced in 
such an environment . Consequently, the West A win found that they had 
uprooted themselves to no avail .  Rubber seedlings were not forthcoming and 
other business was impeded by the abysmal state of the road and the absence of 
a reliable means of crossing the Ok Mart at Rumginae to join up with the much 
better Rumginae/Kiunga road. At the time of the last election, optimism was 
still ascendant . By 1 977, despondency had set in.  At least two of the large 
roadside villages had abandoned hope and had returned to their original bush 
sites . In this atmosphere of gloom, Wonhenai could not be at all sure of local 
support . Eventually he did decide to stand, as the official Pangu candidate. 
Of the remaining five candidates , two were regarded as particularly strong 
contenders . The first , Sam Wingen, was an East Awin who had settled in 
Timindemasuk ,  a South Awin village close to Kiunga, in order to obtain 
adequate medical attention for his child, a polio victim.  Wingen had been a 
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government interpreter in the sixties and had acted as such during the 
negotiations of land purchase by government in connection with the village 
rubber schemes and associated spontaneous resettlement . He had been a 
founder member of the Kiunga LGC in 1966 and had been chairman of it for 
several years . He had worked hard for the development of the area and it is no 
coincidence that the villages of his birth and adoption between them accounted 
for more than half the total rubber production of the Kiunga area in 1975/6. 
He was a reliable source of information to the villagers (insofar as the 
information he received was reliable) on what central government and 
provincial bodies had in mind for the area. He had advised villagers of the 
dangers of having their settlements too close to the Kiunga/Rumginae road if 
mining at Fubilan were to proceed. In the course of our own work, his adopted 
village, Timindemasuk, stood out as being vociferous , well-informed, and 
possessed of clear intentions . In several other villages we found that ideas from 
Wingen had been influential in the formation of village opinions on 
development goals . Well before the elections , Wingen had obtained and 
distributed general publicity posters for Pangu around the villages . 
Furthermore, Wingen was (is) one of the main proponents of the demands 
for a North Fly Province. It was he who persuaded the Kiunga LGC in 
November 1976 to vote in favour of a motion supporting secession from 
Western Province . It was through this agitation that he succeeded in obtaining 
the posting of a Deputy Provincial Commissioner to Kiunga. He consequently 
gained considerable respect for his views from the Fly River Area Authority of 
which he was a member . He was called in by them to work on the constitution 
of and regulations governing the proposed provincial government . The time he 
devoted to this had a detrimental effect on his election chances . Further, when 
the Office of Minerals and Energy organised a major seminar in Port Moresby 
in late June to discuss proposals for the development of Kiunga District , it was 
Wingen who was invited to attend to represent local interests . He has also been 
a leading figure in the successful fight to obtain a High School for Kiunga. 
Lastly, he, together with Kala Swokin (his cousin) who was a candidate for the 
provincial seat , has ancestral ties with the Min being of mixed Awin-Min 
parentage. For many months before the election he had been building up a 
dossier of evidence to back his claim to certain land rights in the Tabubil area. 
In the absence of a Min candidate, many people the present writer included , 
believed he had a good chance of attracting votes from Imigabip (his ancestral 
village) and neighbouring mountain areas . 
The other candidate regarded before the election as a strong contender was 
Warren Dutton . Dutton was the member for the North Fly from 1 968 to 1972 
having previously been a patrol officer at Olsobip and Lake Murray (then part 
of the North Fly electorate) . He had become a PPP organiser in the early days 
of that party, having close ties with John Poe in particular. In the 1972 
elections he was beaten by both Wonhenai and Wingen having failed, despite 
quite an intensive campaign , to get more than a score or so votes from the 
Nomad area and very few from Ningerum. Many people in the area believed 
that Dutton had a valid cause for complaint in this matter, alleging that 
members of the electoral patrol team used undue influence to persuade people 
not to vote for Dutton . However, he took no action . Instead he established a 
transport company at Kiunga (Ningerum Transport Co.) which was, outside 
of retailing , the only business in the area . The aim of the business was to cart 
Ok Tedi Development Co. materials from Kiunga by road to Ningerum under 
contract . Unfortunately the miserable condition of the road rather hindered 
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this venture, which cannot have paid well to date, if at all . Dutton, like 
Wonhenai, was doubtful about standing. I f  Birilanti stood then Dutton could 
not count on the vote of those, still numerous, who believed that a European 
could do a better j ob as an MP for the area than any local . He knew that 
Wing en stood a good chance and that few A win were likely to vote for him 
with three Awin candidates (Wonhenai, Wingen, Simik) to choose from. He 
sounded out opinion in several areas and of several influential councillors , but 
did not get an overly-encouraging response. Some told him to concentrate on 
getting his business firmly established before considering politics again. This 
must have been a rather appealing argument for Dutton. However, when it 
became clear that Birilanti would be disqualified Dutton' s  chances seemed 
brighter, and he nominated only a few days before the deadline. 
The remaining three candidates could not be considered as really serious 
contenders by any but their closest kin. But it was possible that they could 
affect, negatively, the chances of the other candidates in a first-past-the-post 
system . I sidore Kaseng, a schoolteacher from the rubber-growing village of 
Karemgu in Moian CD and a Catholic, was known as a good public speaker .  
But he  had few contacts outside his home area . Yangtem Katie was also a 
schoolteacher. Previously at the Protestant Atkamba school, he had been 
transferred to Debepari Community School in the Pare CD as headmaster in 
January 1977 . He was unknown to most people in Kiunga. It seemed certain 
that he and Kaseng, both Yungums, would sew up that group's  votes between 
them, thus diminishing Wingen's  chances in particular . What was less certain 
was how much influence Katie had managed to acquire during his short stay in 
the eastern part of the electorate. Although the votes of the Pa CD could be 
his , they would make up only 4% of the total vote. Still, it was possible, if 
doubtful, that he had gained support in the much more populous Biami area. 
Simik T�tra, the final candidate, was a government employee, having succeeded 
Wingen as the Awin interpreter for the Kiunga District Office. With a 
European standing, the 'access to masta' factor was hardly operative on 
Simik's  behalf, whilst the far more extensive contacts of Wingen and 
W onhenai seemed to rule out Simik altogether . He had been heavily defeated 
in the 1972 election . Nevertheless, he could have taken a few vital votes away 
from the other two Awin candidates in the event of a close finish. 
In summary then, six candidates fielded . Three were Awin, two Yungum, 
and one a naturalised citizen . Wonhenai stood as the official Pangu candidate 
and Dutton as the official PPP candidate. Of the others , Kaseng was endorsed 
by the United Party but seemingly received no material assistance from them. 
Wingen was no-one' s official candidate but I believe he did receive concrete 
support from Pangu. Katie and Simik were independents . Of the six, four had 
stood in the 1 972 election . 
The Campaign 
The North Fly Electorate covers well over 7 ,500 square miles of swamp, 
difficult ridge country, and extremely rugged, karst mountains. A candidate 
wishing to contact even half the electors would have to travel hundreds of 
miles . Birilanti , who had already done this before his disqualification, was 
exceptional in even attempting to personally contact a majority of the electors . 
Katie did attempt to campaign by means of lengthy foot patrols,  indeed he had 
to do so if he was to stand any chance of winning. Without external finance his 
self-imposed task was a brave and impossible one . Indeed, the first point to be 
made about this campaign must be that , without finance to cover airfares , 
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even the most enthusiastic candidate would have very great difficulty in even 
making himself known to this electorate , let alone winning it . Kaseng, Katie 
and Simik had no chance of doing this ;  even though Simik was at least widely 
known in much of Awin through his work . Wingen , through his work on the 
Council and through contacts made on the Fly River Area Authority already 
had an established network of contacts . Dutton, Wingen , and Wonhenai had , 
relatively speaking, much greater financial resources at their disposal . The 
contrast between Katie - walking from village to village, haversack on back 
and with a young wantok for company - and Dutton and Wingen was almost 
pitiful . Dutton flew in from Port Moresby on a charter flight laden with 
goodies for his campaign and those of other PPP candidates in the Province -
loudhailers, posters, party programmes , T-shirts, enamel badges , and cassette 
recorders complete with taped messages from On High . Pretty tame stuff 
compared with the enormous expenditure which occurred in some Highland 
electorates , but in relative terms a great ajvantage . The eventual first three 
place-getters were all funded candidates . 
The second point , however, is that no candidate had the resources or the 
time to campaign in all areas of the electorate. Consequently each candidate, 
in theory , had to work out which areas would reap maximum returns for a 
minimum expenditure of resources . Assuming that almost all the Yungum and 
Awin votes would go to the five of the candidates who were themselves Awin 
or Yungum, then such a 'cost-benefit' analysis was restricted to four groups : 
the Min, Biami, Ningerum, and Ba. From Dutton' s  point of view these were 
the vital groups, especially since the Awin and Yungum make up about 50% of 
the electors . 
Table 1 Electors by Tribal Group 
Group Population* Estimated Percentage of 
Voters** total votes 
MIN 4,927 2500 1 7 . 9  
BIAMI (& Upper Strickland) 3 ,497 1 820 1 3 .0 
BA 1 ,439 750 5 .4 
NINGERUM 3 ,000 1770 12 .7  
YUNG UM 3 ,056 1 505 10 .8  
AWIN***  10, 8 1 4  5600 40 .2  
Totals 26,733 1 3945 100 
* For all but Biami and Ba (which are taken from the EBC ' s  estimates) all figures refer to 
censm:es taken between 1 973 and 1 97 5 .  
* *  Estimated voters are those censused a s  being 1 8  years and over, except for Biami and B a  
where 5 2 0Jo  o f  the population have been assumed t o  b e  in this age group. A l l  figures are likely 
to be underestimates by 4- lOOJo given likely growth rates since last census .  
* * *  These figures included the populations of Rumginae and Kiunga, many of whom are not 
Awin . Awin probably make up 75-80% of these figures. 
Looking at each of these four groups in turn, I believe it is quite easy to rank 
them according to a priority listing from the candidates' point of view . Given 
Katie' s likely support amongst the Ba and this group's  size and scattered 
nature, none of the other candidates would have been wise to make much 
effort there . The next smallest group, controlling about 1 3 %  of the vote, are 
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the Ningerum. Although not very numerous, they are easily the most 
accessible of the peripheral groups . A foot patrol of seven or eight days would , 
given good weather, be sufficient to visit almost all the Ningerum villages . Of 
the candidates only Dutton tried this , and, although he was hampered by 
flooded rivers, his trip paid dividends. The Biami with a further 1 3 0/o  of the 
votes are important because they too are closely settled ; their area is difficult 
to get into, but once there the candidate has access to a relatively large number 
of voters . The Min, though making up 1 8 0/o  of the voters , live in the most 
difficult country in the electorate. They are difficult of access in the extreme. 
The Murray Valley and Blucher Census Divisions have not been patrolled for 
four years ; no candidate could hope to get there without very great expense , 
and none did. Only the Faiwolmin and the Star Mts . seemed possible targets,  i f  
difficult ones . The first because within one day's  walk of Olsobip airstrip lie 
lmigabip and Golgubip villages containing around 500 electors , and the 
second because many of the Star Mts . people are now semi-permanent 
residents around the Tabubil mine camp, which has its own airstrip. Wingen 
hoped to collect votes amongst the Faiwolmin because of his blood ties . 
Dutton had hopes because Makmop, a non-candidate, and other Min in his 
employ were likely to recommend him to their kin, and also because of his 
period as a patrol officer at Olsobip. Furthermore, given the Min' s extremely 
favourable reactions to 'Company' activities at Ok Tedi , Dutton could expect 
this to rebound in his favour . W onhenai could assume that he would be hard 
put to get any Min votes, since Ningerum LGC, of which he is a member, had 
expelled the Min representatives from its deliberations two years previously. 
For all candidates , on the whole, the Ningerum and Biami areas appeared to 
be the most promising targets,  with the Min holding some hope for Dutton and 
Wingen . 
Dutton had one other major advantage over his opponents in these remoter 
areas where the candidates were not well known . The· North Fly was one of 
those nineteen electorates in which candidates' photographs were shown on 
the ballot papers . There could be no mistaking which candidate was Warren 
Herbert De Courcy Dutton under these circumstances . 
Campaigning was , therefore, a basic matter of letting the voters know you 
were standing and what you looked like. Despite the fact that,  therefore, 
policies played a minor role, they were, nonetheless, interesting. Wonhenai 
issued a poster in which the first plank of his platform was stated to be the 
need for a separate province for the North Fly . Since Wonhenai had not been 
closely associated with this campaign previously, indeed had been closely 
associated with Naipuri Maina whose support for such an idea must be 
minimal, one must assume that this was a device to take the wind out of other 
candidates' (notably Wingen' s) sails . In his description of his achievements as 
a member Wonhenai claimed credit for the decision to build a High School at 
Kiunga, a claim which annoyed those (including Wingen) who had worked for 
several years on this project . Wingen' s  own campaign also emphasised the 
need for a separate province, although it is doubtful if this meant much to the 
key peripheral areas , whilst amongst those for whom secession meant 
something (the Awin and Yungum) votes were more likely to be given 
according to personal and kinship ties . Wingen also stressed the need for a 
road to link Nomad with Kiunga and Lake Murray. This might appear odd 
since neither place is actually in the North Fly electorate; indeed it was 
probably a mistake. But as a statement of intended policy it reflected Wingen 's  
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view o f  the need t o  physically unite his conception o f  the parts o f  the new 
province. He also advocated, as he had for many months , that access to the 
outside world should be via Nomad to a road to Kerema to link up with an 
extended Hiritano Highway. Such a road would obviate, in his view, the 
necessity of having anything to do with the South Fly area; copper 
concentrates could be trucked out to the Gulf. 
Dutton's policies were not very specific, and his generality did him no harm . 
He concentrated on winning votes rather than saying what he would do if 
elected. Posters and policies won few votes . In any case even assuming one 
could distribute posters , who was going to (could) read them? Wingen's  
posters were more prominent in Daru than in Kiunga. Wonhenai 's  was in  
Pidgin - for an area where the lingua franca is Hiri Motu . 
The attitudes of the candidates towards campaigning varied. Dutton tried to 
plan a campaign based on numbers, concentrating on the Ningerum and Biami 
areas personally , whilst sending agents to the Min area and, less hopefully, to 
the Awin and Yungum villages which were relatively accessible . In doing this,  
of course, he knew he was tempting fate; any sort of planning in the Kiunga 
District which relies on efficient transport is automatically doomed . Dutton 
was indeed affected in this way. After spending a couple of days in Biami he 
was then stranded in Nomad for a week finally getting back to Kiunga via Mt. 
Hagen ! Nevertheless , he still managed a shortened patrol in Ningerum. He was 
frustrated there somewhat by bad weather . He had left the Yungum areas till 
last hoping to campaign briefly a day or so in advance of the electoral patrol . 
He had just set off down the Fly to do this when he met the patrol team on its 
way back , having completed the collection of votes in record time. 
Wonhenai had been a diffident candidate to start with and this attitude 
continued into the campaign period. He did some lobbying of Ningerum 
Council members ; this must have made him realise what little chance he stood, 
since all the indications were that the Ningerum were solidly for Dutton and 
had no intention of voting for an Awin such as Wonhenai , even if he did 
happened to be grouped with them for LGC purposes . He then resorted to a 
different tactic : any Ningerum who voted for Dutton would go to jail after the 
election. To balance matters out , some supporters of Dutton at Kungim, a 
Yungum village near the Ningerum area, spread the same rumour but with 
Wonhenai 's  name replacing that of Dutton . 
Wingen was confident of winning the election, or at least , he told many 
people that he would win. He spent much of the campaign period in Daru 
working on the Provincial Government regulations . He did visit the Biami 
briefly, but relied heavily on agents. He was correct in assuming that he would 
have support from the Min, but that support was severely eroded in the 
absence of a personal visit from Wingen and in the presence of one of Dutton' s  
agents - a forceful young lady who had been Dutton's  domestic servant (with 
her husband) for some years . Wingen must also have believed that ·Dutton 
would have some difficulty in co-operating with the PPP provincial candidate. 
This was Kala Swokin, an Awin, and Wingen's  cousin . Swokin's  sympathies 
were thus divided by party allegiance and blood ties . Swokin told us that the 
North Fly seat would be a very close thing . This,  however , was a rather 
interesting remark , since at the time it was made, the end of May , many 
people, including myself, were convinced by Wingen's  own confidence, and 
believed Dutton to be the underdog. As it turned out Swokin, like me, was 
very wrong, and Wingen must have been extremely annoyed at himself. 
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The Results 
Out of an estimated electorate of 14,300* , a total of 9,946 (700Jo) cast their 
votes . In view of the difficulties involved in mounting electoral patrols this is a 
really remarkably high figure and reflects well on the efforts of the election 
staff. Of the votes cast Dutton won nearly 47 % winning easily. In fact he 
polled more than the second (Wingen) , third (Wonhenai) and fourth (Katie) 
candidates put together. An overwhelming win . 
Table 2 The Results 
Candidate Votes received Percentage Index of concentration* 
Isidore Kaseng 493 5 . 0 64 
Simik Tetra 400 4.0 48 
Krenem W onhenai 1665 1 6.7 72 
Sam Wingen 1 822 1 8 . 3  52 
Warren Dutton 4624 46. 5  38  
Yangtem Kati 942 9 .5  46 
* The statistical equivalent of a Lorenz curve . The lower the value the more evenly spread over 
the whole electorate were a candidate's votes . 
Counting was conducted at Kiunga District Office. The first five ballot 
boxes opened were those from the Moian and South Ok Tedi Census 
Divisions , both Yungum areas . As expected almost all these votes were split 
between Kaseng (from Moian) and Katie (South Ok Tedi) . Wingen scored a 
few votes, but Dutton 's scrutineers were dismayed to find only one vote in the 
five boxes for their candidate. The next batch of boxes came from the Awin 
CDs. Wonhenai got nearly 800Jo of the North and West Awin vote (his home 
area) ; whilst Wingen got 970Jo of the valid votes cast by the East Awin (his 
people) . The only minor break in this type of pattern was that Dutton did 
rather well in almost all the villages along the Kiunga-Ningerum road. 
However, when counting stopped on the first night the pattern of voting was 
almost exactly as one would have forecast: local boy makes good, but only 
locally. The really interesting boxes remained, but at this stage Wonhenai led 
narrowly from Wingen with Dutton a long way behind in third place . 
From the remaining boxes , Wonhenai collected barely more than a hundred 
votes . Of the Ningerum vote, Dutton scooped nearly 980Jo ,  an almost 
incredibly high proportion which could barely have been bettered if Dutton 
had had armed men standing over the ballot box. He received more than three­
quarters of the Biami vote, Katie and Wingen picking up the rest , and two­
thirds of the Min vote. Katie did not do well in Pare , Wingen receiving 600Jo of 
the vote . The pattern was crystal clear: Yungum voted for Yungum, Awin for 
Awin , and nearly everybody else voted for Warren Dutton . 
Clearly, Dutton won not just because he is white, and not j ust because the 
peripheral groups had no candidate of their own, but because he was the only 
candidate who really campaigned at a basic level . Had Birilanti stood, then, 
undoubtedly his task would have been difficult,  but, I suspect , the battle 
would still have been between the two Europeans since they both campaigned. 
* The Electoral and Supplementary Rolls listed a total of 1 4 , 508 persons. When voters eligible 
under Section 1 41( 1 )  are included this is increased to 1 5 , 513 I think the Rolls may overestimate 
the actual size of the electorate. 
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Wingen seems to have no-one but himself to blame for his defeat since he was 
not without funds and did start off with a solid political base and social 
contacts .  Wonhenai 's  diffidence on standing at all was justified by the results.  
One wonders why, like so many other sitting memebrs, he did stand; even 
more, one wonders why Pangu should have endorsed him as the official 
candidate. Katie could be reasonably pleased with his result even if it was 
somewhat worse than his campaign efforts deserved. Had he had more time to 
build up a campaign and had more finance, his willingness to go out to the 
people, even to those whom he could hardly expect to support him , would 
have been better rewarded. 
For the country as a whole, two points emerge out of the election in the 
North Fly. No doubt the fact of Karl Kitchens' win over Paul Langro in the 
West Sepik Province will be linked with that of Dutton, and the comment will 
be made that whitey still clings on in the electoral backwoods . I can say 
nothing of Kitchens' win, but Dutton' s  win was not solely a matter of the 
'masta' complex. I n  addition to the point of campaigning, he had also no rival 
who, through ethnic allegiances, would split his vote in his areas of influence . 
In any case the alternative to Dutton would have been a candidate who won 
with a very small proportion of the vote simply because he belonged to the 
largest of several small groups . However , it is certainly true that the activities 
associated with 'masta' at Tabubil and Mt . Fubilan - which, so far , have 
been enthusiastically received by most Kiunga District people - must have 
helped Dutton. The fact that in many of the remoter areas of the electorate the 
only services available to the people are those brought by white missionaries 
must be added to this .  
Secondly, Dutton was, as far as I am aware, no overt secessionist , whilst 
Wingen certainly was and Wonhenai claimed he was . The voting clearly showed 
that secession was , as a political issue , irrelevant for most voters . But then, 
policy issues in general seem to have been irrelevant in this constituency. This is 
not to say that secession from Western Province will remain irrelevant ; indeed 
the failure of secessionist minded leaders to win the seat could well increase both 
the agitation of the movement and the difficulties of placating (buying off, 
incorporating) such agitation . Ironically, although Wingen and W onhenai 
lost , another secessionist , Kala Swokin did win the Provincial seat . Swokin 
appears to have swept up almost all the North Fly votes , the remainder being 
split by the southern candidates . Consequently, the Western Province was 
represented in the new Parliament by a man who wished to see Western 
Province split, or, at the very least, wanted to see a far greater share of the 
Western Province budget going in future to the Kiunga/Lake Murray /Momad 
areas . 
So, for the people of the area which is most likely to be affected by mining, 
should Ok Tedi (and/ or Frieda River) proceed, the political makeup of the 
new Parliament was much more satisfactory than in the old . They now had 
three representatives - Dutton, Swokin, and Iwoksim Wesani (from 
Telefomin) - as opposed to one (W onhenai) previously. Even though one 
might express some dissatisfaction with a regional system of appointing 
cabinet ministers which results in the Ministry of Mines going to none of these 
representatives , there is hardly ground for further complaint from the area of 
inadequate representation . 
Ackno wledgement: I would like to acknowledge here the debt I owe to Budai 
Tapari , Teaching Fellow of the Dept . of Geography, University of Papua New 
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Guinea who was my colleague during our fieldwork February-June 1 977 in the 
collection of data for our Kiunga development study . 
Notes: 
1 .  Report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission , 1976, p. 2 1 . 
2. Kiunga Patrol Reports No. 1 of 1 962/3. 
3 .  For a more detailed description of the difficulties facing Kiunga District see R. 
Jackson, 1 977, Kiunga Development Study, Dept . of Finance. 
Chapter 5 
' THEY WANT TO BE THE 
HIGHEST ALWAYS ' :  
THE ELECTIONS IN SIMBU 
Bill Standish 
75 
The 1 977 campaigns in Simbu differed from those of 1 972 (Kuabaal 1 976, 
Standish 1 976b) because not only had political power been transferred with 
Independence but so too had the paths to great wealth been opened . In the 
colonial dusk of 1 972 young men with few cash resources had struggled to 
travel around the electorates, speaking quietly or shouting to get their 
messages across . But in the post-Independence dawn the noise from the 
electronic amplifiers on their four-wheel-drive vehicles was deafening, and 
their generosity to followers and strangers was breath-taking . In both in­
stances they had to contend with - and sometimes utilise - the parochialism 
of clan and tribal loyalities . In 1 972 they had also tried unsuccessfully to use 
existing institutions such as the churches and local government councils to 
mobilise voters , almost all of whom lived in rural areas . In 1 977 the expected 
rewards were great, so it was an intense campaign, and as one winner nicely 
put it , an ' expensive' one . 
The intensity of the campaign, however , did not necessarily indicate the 
health of the democratic process in Simbu. Being mobilized to vote is not the 
same as being an aware participant in political processes , and the fact of 
political competition does not itself mean that the best men win - or even 
enter - the race. The political culture and social structure , as well as the 
political economy and individual personalities , affected the outcome of the 
campaign. 
This paper• concentrates upon the campaign for the Chimbu Provincial seat , 
because it best illustrates the changes taking place in Simbu, but it also notes 
the linkages between Provincial and Open candidates , and members of the 
Simbu Interim Provincial Government (hereafter SIPG) .2  National politics 
permeates clan politics , and vice versa, so this paper takes the whole of Simbu 
as its arena. It opens with a brief discussion of the Simbu environment and the 
peoples ' political cultures and values, and a description of changes in the 
economy and political institutions since 1 972. It sketches the context of 
political competition in 1 977 , and the activities of parties . The core of the 
paper is a description of the nomination and campaign periods in April-July 
1 977 , and is followed by an analysis of voting patterns and their significance . 
The paper then briefly examines electoral administration and the violent 
aftermath of the elections,  in an attempt to assess the legitmacy of the electoral 
process as a whole . 
The Context 
There are 2 14,000 Simbu people , 1 79,000 of them living on precipitous 
slopes in 5 , 890 sq km of the rugged central highlands . 3  Sweet potato (kau kau) 
is their staple diet, and the pig is central to both their religious system and their 
social exchanges . Some 35 ,000 Simbu people have left their crowded home 
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environment seeking employment opportunities elsewhere in the country, and 
in a few instances have found land for resettlement . Throughout Papua New 
Guinea, Simbu men have acquired an unenviable reputation for belligerence. 
Population pressures within Simbu vary greatly in different ecological zones . 
Only about 1 0,000 people live in the southern half of the province, in the 
500- 1 , 1 00 m attitudinal zone known as the Karimui-Bomai . This is a warmer 
area with twice the rainfall of the northern Simbu; it has only a thin layer of 
topsoil which breaks down quickly. The Karimui-Bomai people have adapted 
to their ecological zone and become shifting cultivators; a few are virtually 
nomadic. Marlaria, malnutrition and leprosy have kept population densities in 
this zone at around 3 per sq km. The people are distinct in their material and 
spiritual cultures from the rest of the Simbu population who live in the 
1 ,200-2,500 m zone, where the population density reaches 200 per sq km . 
Topographical features as much as population concentration have in­
fluenced infrastructure and economic development in Simbu. The Waghi 
River enters the Province in Kerowagi District from the west through a wide 
valley which also forms the route of the Highlands Highway. The Waghi then 
cuts south east to Gumine and Nomane before moving south west through the 
low-lying, barely populated Karimui-Bomai areas (see Map 1 ) .  Because of 
barrier terrain and pressure of population on scarce land, as well as remoteness 
and difficult access from the centres of governmental power, areas to the south 
of Waghi have received relatively few developmental inputs . This is clearly de­
monstrated by the concentration in the north, near the highway, of govern­
ment credit and minor roads (Howlett et al. 1 976, 246, 1 97) . There are ten 
airstrips, but these are vital only to the people in the Karimui-Bomai area 
where there is no road access . The province is crossed by some 5 8  km of the 
main Highlands Highway, and there are 6 1 4  km of roads of standards varying 
from hair-raising to atrocious, which generally require four-wheel drive 
vehicles even during the 'dry' season (which coincided with the 1 977 election 
period) . This network was barely expanded in 1 972-77 , although the Gembogl­
Gumine road on the north-south axis was upgraded considerably, as was also 
the Nambaiyufa ' loop' road during 1 977.  
Roads are the outlet for coffee, which apart from a little cardamom in the 
south is virtually the Simbu area's  sole cash crop. They also provide access for 
government, the churches and commerce , and - during election time -
political campaigners . Most rural people have moved down off the hills and 
live within an hour' s walk of some sort of road, and a few hour's drive from 
provincial headquarters.  Despite its population density , Simbu is not highly 
urbanized. Kundiawa has 3 ,500 people (a rise of 50 per cent on 1 97 1 ) ,  and 
Kerowagi district headquarters about 1 ,000 people only (a slight decline) . 
There are four other main government stations, the district headquarters at 
Chuave on the Highway, to the east , at Gembogl on the Upper Chimbu River 
to the north, at Gumine to the south and at Kamtai (in Sinasina) in the centre, 
with patrol posts at Kilau (Nomane) , at Karimui , and at Kup (south of the 
Waghi in the Kerowagi district) . 
Service industries and government aside, the modern economy consists 
almost exclusively of coffee growing, marketing and processing. There are 
some 40,000 smallholder coffee growers in Simbu (and no 'plantations' worth 
mentioning) and about 1 00 Simbu coffee buyers , each with a picklip vehicle . 
The buyers are loosely attached by credit arrangements to the province's  two 
processing factories, Chimbu Coffee Co-operative Ltd (also known as the 
'Society' and 'Wara Simbu ') which has some 1 5 ,000 shareholders , and the 
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private company Chimbu Developments Ltd . (usually known as 'Wandi 
Coffee') .  4 Since 1970, with one brief gap, the Simbu market has been 
controlled , ostensibly in order to protect the Society from outside competition . 
The protection means that while growers may transport their own coffee to 
factories in the neighbouring Western and Eastern Highlands , it has been 
illegal for them to carry other people' s coffee or for outside traders to cross the 
provincial border with Simbu-grown coffee. The subject of constant political 
contention, the 'coffee border' restrictions were frequently flouted in 1977, 
and this matter did arise during the 1977 election campaign. 
By· entering the world coffee trade the Simbu people lost their economic 
autonomy and entered the peasantry, a class of rural people which by 
definition is subordinate economically and politically. While Simbu produc­
tive effort is largely subsistence oriented, nowadays a surplus is extracted 
through the coffee industry. Cash is needed for certain household essentials, 
clothes, taxes and school fees, but coffee prices and hence incomes are 
dependent upon external market forces . Given the small size of their holdings 
and the sustained low prices , Simbu's  40,000 coffee growers earnt, on average, 
less than K50 each from coffee in the years 1967-75 . Very few Simbu work in 
wage labour within the province: 1 ,649 of a workforce of 2,425 in 1973 
(Howlett el al. 1976, 288) . 
There were wider opportunities for a few wealthier men as the 1 970s pro­
gressed . By 1 978 there were some 1 99 cattle projects,  with an average of about 
ten beasts each. There was no commercial abattoir and the cattle are mostly 
used for ceremonial and ultimately political purposes by their owners , usually 
middle-aged men whom I have here categorized as 'big peasants' . The usual 
road to commercial success in the 1 960s and early 1970s was via a village trade­
store, at which point many older entrepreneurs bogged down. But some stores 
became viable, and a small number of rural people became successful traders, 
that is, capitalists , while keeping up their subsistence and cash-cropping 
activities . In the 1970s coffee-buying and passenger carrying gained popularity 
with younger men. In 1977 picture-show houses (powered from portable 
generators) became a new trend, and after bottled beer sales taverns (called 
'clubs' ) were usually the next step planned by rural capitalists . 
Social and cultural factors impinge upon Simbu politics as much as 
economic ones , although they can only be briefly sketched here . In addition to 
the lingua franca (tok pisin) and English, there are some thirteen languages in 
Simbu. Of these the most widespread, Kuman, is spoken by some 80,000 or 
more people in the north and west of the Province . Large groups of people 
speak the Golin (Gumine) language (26, 700) , Chuave (24,000) , Sinasina 
( 1 9,000), Dom (9,300) and Siane (now offically 'Siani ' ,  8,000), some of which 
are closely related to Kuman (Howlett el al. 1975 , 20) . But these linguistic 
groupings do not generally form political entities . 
The basic political unit in Simbu, for ceremonial exchange and for warfare, 
is the named exogamous clan, of average size around 700 people . Some clans 
are strongly allied with others forming phratries . Frequently several clans trace 
themselves from a common founder, and act together as a named political unit 
best called a tribe, numbering up to 5 ,000 people.  Colonial political decisions,  
such as the selection of village officials on clan and tribal bases and 
subsequently using kinship units for local government elections and also 
administrative processes such as censussing, served to preserve the identity of 
clans and indeed to reinforce their potential role in contemporary institutional 
politics . In large electorates such as those for the Open seats in the National 
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Parliament which cover around 30,000 people, political aspirants must first of 
all attempt to ensure they are the only candidate within their own clan and 
tribal base, and be sure of mobilizing their kinsmen and women to vote as their 
primary catchment of support, before utilising existing alliances with other 
groupings and finally appealing to the electorate at large. 
The desired qualities of !eaders have varied with circumstances, as will be 
illustrated by this paper, but they can be listed briefly . By way of an 
ideological statement , Simbu leaders and ordinary villagers nowadays argue 
that there is an hereditary element in leadership: leaders must be the sons of 
leaders , a principle which is often observed. Yet many are eligible by this 
criterion, and indeed genealogies can be bent and fabricated; in fact the 
strongest sub-clans usually provide the leaders . Early missionary observers 
noted than major clan decisions were often made by a group of older leaders,  
without a single dominant leader . There are recorded cases of despotism by 
clan leaders in pre- and early- colonial times , and it  would be a mistake to see 
Simbu leadership as solely consensual (Standish 1 978) . As elsewhere in the 
highlands (cf. Read 1 959) ,  Simbu. people perceive ' strength' as being the 
attribute and/or characteristic which allowed a man to become prominent , to 
gain influence and ultimately power . 
Before colonial pacification, a tough physique and fearlessness and skill in 
warfare were important elements in making a name for oneself, but usually 
not enough to win a leadership role. Energy and the capacity to work hard 
and produce wealth were necessary to build up the wherewithal for exchange 
relationships which in turn would increase the resources available for further 
exchanges . While a leader extracted resources from members of his group, he 
also had to redistribute some of his wealth and gain a name for generosity. 
This economic aspect of his political activities required great skill in the 
management and manipulation of men and women, and was usually accom­
panied by oratorical skill and a reputation for wisdom. Ambitious men might 
thus take decades to reach the top of their society, although the stresses of 
warfare might facilitate the rise of the more fiery personalities whose bullying 
dominance would be accepted, given the need for unity and discipline in times 
of threat . 
In the colonial era adept men who collaborated with the new rulers often 
gained prominence, cleverly utilizing the power of the kiap (patrol officer) and 
the police as well as the introduced wealth of the white men in entrepreneurial 
ways . Another early avenue for advancement was through the Christian 
missions . The Catholics can now claim some 50 per cent of Simbu people as 
adherents .  Although only two Simbu have been ordained as priests the church 
appeared to this observer in the 1970s to be strengthening its local political 
influence by encouraging lay 'mission leaders ' to take an active role in 
religious and other community affairs in the name of the church . Women and 
men hold prayer sessions and political discussions at night in the men's  houses 
in rural areas. More churches were being built (another manifestation of tribal 
and clan consciousness) , and some of the older , formerly polygamous , big­
men are being baptized. The Lutheran Church, now with most of its expatriate 
clergy replaced by Simbu, has also been an obvious ladder to political 
prominence . But it seemed to me to be losing some of its influence during the 
1970s,  as other avenues for advancement opened , as it reduced the services it 
offered (such as schools) , and as there was a resurgence of traditional practices 
(such as the ceremonial pig-kills) previously discouraged by the church and its 
indigenous evangelists . 
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Skill iji bisnis (business) , and save (knowledge of the new ways) became 
increasingly important with the spread of the cash economy and modern 
education in the 1960s , so that by the early 1970s the most obvious common 
dimension of political conflict was that between generations . Middle-aged, 
non-literate, pidgin-speaking colonial politicians such as councillors and par­
liamentarians , often with essentially peasant economic activities (large coffee 
holdings and pulpers , modern enclosed piggeries and cattle projects and in 
some cases still village trade-stores) , were confronted increasingly by a 
politically ambitious younger generation of English-educated public servants 
and commercial entrepreneurs .  
Change in Simbu 1972-76 
The most dramatic single phenomenon in Simbu life in the 1 970s was the re­
surgence, after a twenty year lull , of tribal or clan warfare . This simple state­
ment covers complex and varied processes . I have argued elsewhere that the 
fighting resulted from stresses on Simbu society, including population increase 
and land pressures arising from cash cropping. One also finds disillusionment 
with the modern economy leading to frustration and boredom . The return of 
fighting coincided with the run-up to Self-government and Independence, a 
time of great uncertainty when fears were held in many parts of the highlands 
that a national government would be unable to maintain public order . Feeling 
insecure, the clans sought to strengthen and assert themselves , by force . With 
their legitimacy undermined in the era of decolonization, and having lost 
operational control of police in most areas along the Highway, the members of 
the colonial field administration relaxed their grip and were impotent, and old 
clan grudges were remembered and new disputes allowed to fester. In the 
context of political confusion in the transitional era, older clan leaders chose 
to revive precolonial forms of fighting with the aims of increasing both clan 
solidarity and their own local political stature (Standish 1973) . 
Competitiveness between clans which had lacked expression through the 
colonial era was revived quite deliberately in these new struggles , many of 
which have lasted several years (Kerpi 1 976) . The old men taught the 
youngsters the ancient war skills and battle tactics, and young men were keen 
to participate because it gave them unassailable rights within their clan to land 
and assistance with collecting their bride-price. While prestige bisnis activities 
were often destroyed so as to hurt one's opponents' pride, some men of bisnis 
actually encouraged warfare . This had the side-effect of distracting the poorer 
memhers of their group resentful of the unequal distribution of nominally 
clan-owned resources such as land . Inter-clan and -tribal conflict thus 
inhibited the development of class consciousness , but did not eliminate the 
inevitable competition between generations in a rapidly changing society. 
In terms of the 'development ' school of political science (Pye 1965) , Simbu 
was a rapidly modernizing society (Deutsch 1961 )  in the 1970s , which partially 
explains the increase in conflict and the heightened ethnic consciousness in 
Simbu, which was noted during modernization elsewhere (Melson and Wolpe, 
1 97 1 ) .  Communication had greatly improved: not only did almost all adult 
men under 50 years speak tok pisin but Radio Kundiawa had started 
broadcasting daily in tok pisin and Kuman in late 1 972 . Transistor radios 
became common especially after the coffee boom started in 1 97 5 :  by 1 977 
there were three in the dozen houses within earshot of my residence in Mintima 
village 8 km west of Kundiawa. The roads have improved, and (although 
accurate figures of motor registrations are unobtainable) Simbu vehicle 
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ownership increased several-fold. But the most striking figures showing the 
change in the society relate to the new generation of young people (still mostly 
men) who received formal education in the decade before the 1 977 elections . In 
1965 , only 20 per cent of the school age population were in school; the 
proportion reached 50 per cent in 1 972 and stayed at that level . Each year in 
the mid- 1 970s over 3 ,000 pupils left school , mostly hoping to enter the job 
market. Post-primary enrolments rose from 1 20 in 1 965 to 1 ,800 in 1977 . In 
1974, some 332 graduated from Simbu high schools with grade 10 certificates 
and expectations of well-paid, powerful and prestigious employment, yet by 
then the main localization phase within the public service has slackened. By 
1977, this first large generation of school leavers was competing in both the 
eocnomic and political arenas in Simbu. 
The young men of Simbu who gained economic prominence in the 1 970s did 
not do so as peasant producers , but as traders . Perhaps using extended family 
(sub-sub-clan) money, their basic resource was thus capital , rather than land, 
and often (in the first instance) the labour of kinsmen. Village trade-stores are 
often run for prestige purposes , are subsidized by coffee earnings , and 
frequently wane at the end of the coffee harvest or ' flush' (April-August) , 
when social pressures for credit and declining cash flows prevent restocking. In 
1 972 some 2,072 store licenses were sold by local government councils , for 
K6.00 a piece, and to my knowledge no-one was declined a licence. The 
number remained fairly steady during the prolonged slump in coffee prices 
1 973-75 , but grew to 2, 565 in 1 977 with the coffee boom (ECL 1 979, 1 9 1) .  
Where businessmen appear to be running trade-stores which are viable on their 
own, rather than using coffee to subsidize the stores , I have classified them in 
this paper as traders rather than peasants � 
There have been very few successful Simbu traders . Wholesaling has 
remained an expatriate dominated preserve. One storekeeper from Gembogl 
expanded his operations with the help of the Development Bank, buying a 
large shop in urban Goroka for K200,000, but his case was unique. Only three 
Simbu businessmen managed to build up and maintain small fleets of large 
trucks on government roadwork contracts,  and only two kept vehicles going in 
long-distance highway haulage . Two started service stations but only one of 
these operations survived . 
Coffee buying seemed an appropriate level for, the managerial skills of the 
budding Simbu businessmen of the 1970s .  This is a ruthless and sometimes cut­
throat trade, requiring a sharp brain and thick hide as buyers and growers try 
to outface and outwit each other (with the price paid dependent on the quality 
of the beans and their weight , the amount of water and even the number of 
pebbles in the bags) , and the buyers attempt to stake out exclusive territory for 
their operations . In  1972 most of the thirty-four licensed Simbu buyers were 
employed by expatriates, or by the two factories . In 1 977 there were about 100 
Simbu buyers, only fifteen employed directly by the factories, with the rest 
operating on informal contracts with the factories which provided cash 
advances (totalling up to KO. Sm at a time) and which sometimes also helped 
finance the vehicles which every buyer needs . Some were buying for Western 
Highlands factories and others acting as 'dummies ' or front men for 
expatriates married to Simbu and Western Highlands women. Basically, 
however, we can say that the Simbu by 1977 had taken over coffee buying, a 
process hastened by 1974 changes to the coffee industry legislation. Only one 
of Simbu's  older generation politician-entrepreneurs survived in this tough 
game, and he always used young drivers , clerks and other hands (boskru) who 
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are effectively bodyguards . In the age of the electronic calculator , coffee 
buying is a young man' s game. 
The world coffee market is extremely volatile, and Papua New Guinea 
roadside buying, processing and exporting so competitive that roadside prices 
for ' parchment' coffee paid to smallholders will rise within twenty-four hours 
of a frost in Brazil. From 1 967 to mid 1 97 5 roadside prices were in a long 
slump, as low as 22t/kg, but they rose steeply from July 1975 to a peak of 
K l .76 in April 1 977 and fell rapidly to about K l . 1 0 in July 1 977.  Buyers ' costs 
for delivery to the factory are about 1 l t/kg, and their profit margin depends 
on their skill and ruthlessness and the competition at the roadhead . Depending 
on managerial skill in making forward contracts , and luck in anticipating 
market trends , the greatest profits are to be made by the processors and 
exporters , as is indicated by the graph in Figure 1 .  But in a rising market all 
stages of the industry can make large profits ,  because buyers return to the 
factories to find the price of parchment coffee has risen in the few days since 
they were given their advance and suggested roadside buying prices . Similarly, 
processors and exporters selling 'green bean' find prices may have risen since 
they placed their orders . I saw hardworking and intelligent buyers build up 
businesses with assets worth tens of thousands of kina in a few months in the 
1975-77 bopm , and the two Simbu factories made annual profits of over 
K500,000 at that time, over 100 per cent of their capital . 
The peak coffee prices , and the 1977 harvest, coincided with the 1977 
elections .  Total Simbu earnings from coffee rose from around K5m annually 
in 1 972-75 to Kl 5m in 1976-77 , and average peasant incomes from K50 to 
K200. The pattern described by Townsend for the Highlands as a whole in 
1 976 was clearly shown in Simbu. He estimates that of about K28m returned to 
highland smallholders, roughly K6m was spent on vehicles , K3 m on savings , 
K2m on council taxes and commercial businesses , K9m on school fees,  air 
travel , clothing, cigarettes , tools and food . 
A massive K8m was spent on beer in the highlands (Townsend 1 977, 168) , 
much of which entered the exchange network , for example as part of marriage 
and funerary payments ,  a phenomenon which in Simbu had started in the 
1960s . The graphs in Figures 1 -3 show that the peak prices for coffee, and the 
coffee flush ,  were matched by massive beer sales in Simbu . Beer is a prestige 
commodity and its formal gift (prestation) boosts the renown of those who 
provide it in a way not dissimilar to the kudos gained by those who make 
prestations of pork in the competitive inter-clan ceremonial exchanges . To 
make this simile explicit , for the first time in 1977 I heard some witty young 
English speakers in Simbu describing beer as ' small pig' . Functionally, the 
purpose of beer prestation may be similar to that of home grown meat, but 
beer brings less status. The productive base is quite different because purchase 
of beer only requires cash, while the production of animals requires land and 
labour. Abundance has brought a slight decline in the value of beer, just as in 
earlier days the shells the whiteman used as trade goods were devalued 
(Strathern 1976; Hughes 1977) , but beer nonetheless is still very much a 
prestige food.  Young traders may raise very few of their own beasts ,  but they 
can outshine all but the most wealthy peasants in their prestations of beer. 
At a higher level of business organization the close links between govern­
ment, politics and business are clearly demonstrated . The Chimbu Coffee Co­
operative started as a heavily government sponsored venture in 1 964, and has 
survived outside competition only with the protection of successive govern­
ments unwilling to lose political face through its collapse . As the largest enter-
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prise in  the province apart from government , it is a potential source of great 
patronage in the form of jobs , credit and vehicles - all immensely useful politi­
cal resources . Its profitability has fluctuated wildly and it has been the subject of 
constant political struggle (which may or may not have been resolved in late 
1 979 when the interim provincial government bought in and took control) . 
Apart from its large factory, buildings and plant , it has small experimental 
plantations at Bomai in southern Simbu . The Lutheran church in 1 972 
expanded its own supply lines into forming a trading arm, Kuman Holdings,  
to fund its operations. It invested in rental housing, stores, a motel and a 
service station in Kundiawa and a clothing factory at Kerowagi , as well as a 
coffee processing factory at Banz in the Western Highlands . As I note below, 
some of these activities required government cooperation in varying the 
purposes of land leases . The Chimbu Area Authority set up a business arm, 
Chimbu Holdings Enterprises , (known at CHE) in 1 976, and initially invested 
in urban real estate, buses , and a service station . In 1 977 it was negotiating to 
buy land for plantations, and seeking shares in Wandi Coffee . Expatriates 
have been heavily involved in managing all three of these enterprises . A fourth 
corporation was formed by the Regional member for Chimbu, lambakey 
Okuk, in 1 974, which I discuss in detail in the next section . 
Chimbu Politics 1972-77 
The main issue separating the candidates in the 1 972 election was that of 
attitudes to Papua New Guinea-wide Self-government and Independence, and 
by implication the governmental and economic roles of foreigners . Although 
with few exceptions Simbu politicians were gradualist concerning constit­
utional change, the matter went beyond Simbu control when the Somare 
National Coalition was formed. Several symbolic protests were staged in 
1 972-73 , including the tearing-down and burning of the new national flag by 
people who feared that the highlands ' late start would prevent people of the 
region gaining sufficient economic development or administrative preferment. 
Self-government came in December 1 973 , Independence came in September 
1 975 , and the public service was largely localized by 1 977 . More importantly 
Figure 2 A nnual cycle, parchment coffee sales, Chimbu * 
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Figure 3 Estimated beer sales, Chimbu Province, 1977: volume and 
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for Chimbu Province, local political control passed to the SIPG in February 
1 977, although it took some time to fully utilize its powers. 
In early 1 973 Simbu leaders spoke to me of the kiaps still ruling them, and 
although they did sometimes mention local government councils both these 
institutions were already waning in importance. The expatriate kiaps saw 
history passing them by, but few indigenous kiaps attained quite the same aura 
of authority, or gained the confidence of their own former school-mates who 
were the first generation nationalist cohort . The local government councils had 
passed through their initial expansionist phase of infrastructure-building and 
now spent most of their budgets on routine maintenance work, just as 
paternalist kiap supervision was withdrawn. Villagers saw reduced council 
works programmes and increased waste and extravagance, and started 
witholding their annual tax payments . 
As council legitimacy declined, a new Simbu-wide political body was set up 
in December 1 972, initially with onJy an advisory role, comprising delegates 
from each of the eight (later nine) councils . The members of this body, the 
Area Authority, were middle-aged colonial politicians,  5 mostly with a rural 
base, many of them failed candidates in the 1 972 national elections . Eventually 
they were delegated some power over the Rural Improvement Programme 
(RIP) . This was a funding system which, until the Village Economic 
Development Fund (VEDF) got properly under way in 1 976, was the allocative 
process which handled most pork-barrel developmental funds . Thus the Area 
Authority also reduced council stature . When the Constitutional Planning 
Committee (CPC) proffered increased powers in the form of 'district [later 
provincial] government' ,  Simbu leaders grabbed at the chance to share in the 
self-government process. In this campaign, they were greatly assisted in 
1975-76 by a former university student and ministerial staff er , a coffee buyer 
who had previously been national secretary to the Niugini National Party, 
Barunke Kaman. Kaman had previously clashed with Iambakey Okuk,  and on 
his return to Simbu was initially humiliated by the Area Authority members 
jealous of their stature . But eventually he formed a symbiotic alliance with his 
illiterate elders , trading his skills , energy and save for an important provincial 
power-base as Provincial Secretary (Standish 1979) . 
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As Simbu's  best known anti-colonialist , the former mechanic lambakey 
Okuk dominated the 1 972 campaign for the Regional seat , and won by a 
narrow margin with 27 per cent of the valid vote, but only 1 7  per cent of the 
total . (62,656} Okuk continued to be central to Simbu involvement in national 
political affairs . With John Kaupa, the young health worker elected in 
Chuave, he swung two other Chimbu members into the National Party away 
from the United Party (UP) , the then expatriate-run 'go-slow' group which 
retained the loyalty of the majority of the highlanders . Kobale Kale, newly 
elected mrmber for Sinasina, stayed with National , but after an alleged death 
threat one other Simbu recruit fell back into the UP, which thus held five of 
Simbu's  seven Open members . Okuk had been assisted with campaign funds 
by Pangu, and joined the Somare coalition as Deputy Leader of the National 
Party and Minister for Agriculture . 
Frightened by this split, the Simbu political elite were intensely hostile to 
what they saw as Okuk 's  betrayal in treating with the feared Pangu devils .  
Okuk , too, was the subject of an alleged death threat by a defeated rival . A 
large public demonstration was organized in May 1 972 against his move into 
the Pangu-led government , but after a rather timorous first day back in 
Kundiawa Okuk, backed by statements from the Acting Chief Minister Guise 
and a strong kiap and police presence, addressed meetings at Miggende 
mission and Mintima village . He is remembered there as having said that he, 
Iambakey, was the boss of Simbu and they had no choice but to go along with 
the changes determined in Port Moresby . He capitalized on visits by Somare 
and UP opposition leader Toliman who said Australia's  departure was 
voluntary and not because of pressure from radical nationalists . But Okuk 
remained unpopular and largely isolated in Simbu, as was shown in 1973 when 
the Area Authority denied him office space in Kundiawa. He rarely visited his 
home district , yet soon became one of the more widely travelled of Somr \;CO 
ministers . Okuk did , however , acquire some land and built a kunai grass 
roofed house at Kundiawa. He paid for this at a massive memorial feast hosted 
by his stepfather , at which were distributed 30 pigs , 100 cartons of beer and 1 3  
cattle carcasses bought through Agriculture Department auspices . Nonetheless 
his political stocks remained low, and to me he expresseci the feeling in 1 973 
that he would probably lose the election then scheduled for 1 976 . 
With the important exceptions of roadworks funding and the coffee 
industry, Okuk barely concerned himself with local Simbu affairs . He played 
pork-barrel politics to the extent of moving expenditure already planned for 
the upgrading of the Gembogl trunk road from that road to the Gumine road 
and he claimed political credit for the roadwork and compensation payments 
involved . He also took credit for K0. 5m voted in the 1 975-76 budget for 
improvements to the Nambaiyufa road in Chuave District . As foreshadowed 
in his 1972 campaign, he engaged in a bitter personal feud with Mike Collins, 
the expatriate manager of Chimbu Coffee Cooperative, who had years before 
sacked Okuk (Standish 1976b) . Under pressure form Okuk ,  the directors 
eventually sacked Collins and paid up his contract , and the Chimbu Coffee 
moved from a profitability to a loss-making phase . The next manager failed 
and was soon removed, to be replaced by George Leahy, a cousin of Collins . 
He returned the Society to profitability but in late 1976 was also sacked in a 
move led by directors who were close to Okuk . Okuk never gained effective 
control of the board, however, and his Simbu nominees for management 
positions were never appointed . The Society directors , with their own power 
base, were seen as rivals by the institutional politicians throughout the decade . 
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As Agriculture Minister, Okuk drafted new laws to exclude expatriates from 
roadside coffee buying, despite advice from the Coffee Marketing Board that 
there was a continuing need for roadside buying cash advances - which would 
provide the means for expatriates to retain control of the industry . Real power 
would remain with the then mostly expatriate-owned factories, and any 
benefits to growers would be marginal . The Board was right , but a number of 
nationals have done very well out of buying. Okuk was never a man to take 
advice once his mind was fixed and he tended to follow the Whitlamesque 
approach of ' crash through, or crash' .  An impulsive and determined man with 
a well-developed capacity to manufacture anger instantly, he rarely achieved 
good working relationships with either his own staff or his departmental 
officers . Nor did he often bother to ' turn on the charm' while in Simbu, where 
he remained embattled. 
Okuk ' s  best organized antagonists within Simbu were the young coffee 
buyers and the staff of Chimbu Coffee, whose political connections had been 
with the UP . While there were no signs that Mike Colins was involved in their 
manoeuvres , these men did use Society facilities in late 1 973 to set up a short­
lived Simbu Pressure Group known as Chimbu Pre-Pol Sinaminga Bung, 
which claimed to be a non-party watchdog over Simbu affairs . One of the 
main organizers, Matthew Numambo Siune, was a kinsman of Okuk' s  who in 
the name of UP had opposed him in 1 972 and organized protests after the 
election . Numambo then worked for Chimbu Coffee but was sacked in 1 974 
and subsequently prosecuted by George Leahy over the loss of some monies , 
and then he moved with his father into Okuk 's  camp. Meanwhile, with other 
coffee buyers in 1 973 Numambo Siune revived his 1 972 tactic of trying to form 
an alliance with older leaders and councillors . The young men in Pre-Pol 
Sinaminga Bung praised the golden days under the village officials and sought 
their wise counsel while offering to help as 'policemen' or 'watchmen' to check 
unwelcome trends in Simbu, and throughout Papua New Guinea. This was an 
explicitly conservative, implicitly anti-Okuk grouping. A few meetings were 
held at the Kundiawa Hotel lounge with six leaders from each of the councils 
who were then driven home in state, each with a carton of beer for his trouble. 
This group soon disappeared in a formal sense, but it set a pattern that was to 
be repeated, that of young businessmen seeking to form alliances with older 
peasant leaders ,  using resources gained from the coffee trade . The personal 
linkages these men revealed became important well before the 1 977 election . 
To help local-level development and also no doubt to recoup his political 
fortunes , in June 1 974 Okuk set up the Kamanegu Corporation, named for his 
tribe. To win over Kamanegu leaders, he appointed five as directors and a 
further nineteen as delegates , with Numambo Siune's  father as chairman . 
(This structure was similar to Chimbu Coffee ' s  board) . Okuk was managing 
director, Numambo Siune treasurer . Okuk never engaged in the lengthy 
educational programme used by John Kaputin in setting up the New Guinea 
Development Corporation, which he took as his model . None of the 
Kamanegu directors was able to give a coherent account of the Corporation' s  
affairs. The Corporation's  formal statement o f  intent was that profits from 
business enterprises would be used for community infrastructural facilities for 
the Kamanegu . Although Okuk told me only 10 per cent of the 3 ,000 people 
who contributed funds were Kamanegu tribesmen, he was criticized for 
favouring his own group and subsequently he changed the body's name to 
Chimbu Yomba Corporation . Yomba, a hardwood tree, symbolizes the 
strength of the clan, and by extension means 'people' . 
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The corporation soon expanded rapidly , tapping reserves of government 
and private credit .  In February 1974, Okuk had become Minister for 
Transport . The corporation's  first ventures were haulage, with a government 
fuel contract and a fuel agency . It held an Air Niugini agency, and used a 
Collins and Leahy owned building for a picture-house and dance-hall which 
incorporated a thriving liquor outlet and a token trade store . The corporation 
bought a K70,000 house for an expatriate manager (who never appeared) , 
Okuk personally providing some of the capital . However, the corporation was 
unprofitable; by early 1 976 it had debts of some K 1 96,00 . Okuk subsequently 
told me he blamed thieving kinsmen for its failure . He himself took over 
ownership of the house when the corporation struck trouble, and in 1 978 he 
listed a corporation truck and the liquor outlet amongst his personal assets, 
saying he was using them to repay the corporation' s debts (Post-Courier 8 
August 1978) . 
Politicians in Papua New Guinea appear to have no trouble in raising 
finance and the shrewder ones have converted this into political credit as well.  
Okuk announced his assets in 1 978, saying 'I have no Swiss bank accounts,  no 
secret investments, or dummy companies . I have nothing to be ashamed of. ' 
He said he owned one third of a small quarry, a K70-80,000 block of flats in 
Port Moresby (bought with a bank loan) , and a hire car business (Post-Courier 
8 and 9 August 1 980) . Late in the 1977 campaign his most obvious business 
activity was building the Tokma Limited coffee processing factory on the 
outskirts of Kundiawa, which he jointly owned with his wife, aided by what he 
told me was a K50,000 loan from the Development Bank .  This factory 
symbolizes his emergence from near penury in 1972 to being Simbu's richest 
man, who controlled the resources and held the position to play both patron 
and broker (cf. Boissevain,  1974) . 
Okuk found employment in the corporation and in the government for both 
political allies and former opponents . He set up a government financed Asian 
' study trip' for a local businessman named Anton Aba, previously an 
opponent , who became a strong political ally. He told me he always gave away 
the flash watches presented to him by visiting Japanese delegations, so no one 
could say he was influenced by these gifts . He complained that his constituents 
were draining him of funds with their constant requests for contributions 
towards death payments , bride wealth and so on, a traditional aspect of the 
big-man's  role. In all this ,  he was creating obligations that must, by custom , be 
repaid; but he did so amongst those who were unable to reciprocate in kind , 
which creates a sense of unease amongst Melanesians .  At once obligated and 
grateful , they were thus drawn into his camp, and many eventually became 
active members of his faction. This process occurs in all political arenas at all 
times : there are no free lunches . 
But all was not smooth ; Okuk 's  ministerial career was the most turbulent in 
the first Somare government . His overseas travel attracted criticism from 
students.  His committal of the government to the purchase of a fleet of 
Mercedes-Benz cars became a major scandal . The Public Accounts Committee 
criticized his department 's unapproved purchase of a large Datsun sedan for 
Okuk 's  use in his own electorate. He put pressure on foreign firms to use 
national owner-drivers as haulage sub-contractors , and his use of the language 
of race inspired fear amongst expatriate businessmen (Nation-Review October 
3 1  - November 6, 1975) . Somare apparently grew tired of protecting him , and 
as more highlanders were recruited into the coalition and as Somare's  
legitimacy grew in their region , the Prime Minister's need for Okuk declined . 
Serious policy conflict between Okuk and Somare became public during the 
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1975 constitutional debates, during which Okuk wanted to restrict the rights to 
compensation for freehold land of expatriates who became citizens ,  and to 
deny them rights to hold political office. This last move would have excluded 
Peoples Progress Party (PPP) leader Julius Chan from office. Okuk, who had 
long associated privately with regionalists such as the Highlands Liberation 
Front (Mel 1 98 1 ,  Standish 198 1 )  while publicly taking a nationalist position 
(Standish 1976a), was party to a planned, but stillborn, move by highlands 
parliamentarians to oust Somare just before Independence. Okuk and Somare 
also clashed in 1975 over Chimbu Coffee Society management and the coffee 
border restrictions. 
In December 1975 Okuk was transferred by Somare from the Transport 
portfolio to Education; a portfolio which, as one National Party staff member 
told me, needed a strong minister, but which ' lacked opportunities' .  Okuk 
agreed with me in late 1977 that he had lost Transport because of his dealings 
with the Boeing Corporation of Seattle. After spending some weeks in 
America with his National Party colleague, Kobale Kale, Okuk had felt that 
Air Niugini should buy Boeing aircraft, but cabinet wanted a leasing 
arrangement and that is what Air Niugini eventually adopted. As Minister for 
Transport , Okuk had brought a Boeing executive to Papua New Guinea, and 
for some years after continued to advocate the purchase of Boeings . 
Okuk ' s  response to this perceived demotion was a clear demonstration of his 
tactical audacity and sheer political will-power . He initially sought to rally 
highlands support to regain his portfolio, and then by a series of joint state­
ments with National Party leader Thomas Kavali (Jimi) he provoked Somare 
to sack them both from the ministry by describing the reshuffle as dictatorial . 
The denouement almost appeared to be scripted in advance . The day Somare 
demanded his resignation, Okuk threw a party in Kundiawa for some 
hundreds of Simbu leaders and some prominent expatriates (whose presence 
served to show his acceptability) . I costed this exercise at Kl ,400 for meat and 
drink alone. His welcoming speech to his guests was brilliant . In sorrow more 
than anger, he explained that he had been removed by 'coastals' who 
dominated cabinet because he had struggled for the highlands people. 
Thereafter on every possible public occasion he distanced himself from the 
'Somare/Chan, Pangu/PPP gavman' and blamed it for Simbu's  lack of 
development .  He bitterly attacked what he called coastal dominance of 
government (especially of the public service) and sought to build up a broad 
regional alliance based on a sense of ' highlands identity' . 
Several of the province's  leading politicians expressed quiet pleasure at 
Okuk's  fall , but almost instantaneously many older, local-level leaders (who 
had felt a Pangu-led coalition was a giaman or ' false' government because of 
its low highlands representation) rallied to his side. With no ministerial 
responsibilities , Okuk was able (as well as forced) to concentrate on his 
electorate for the first time since 1972 . He occasionally with John Kaupa used 
the National Party label , but he mainly set about building up a personal 
following in Simbu rather than a party machine. By the end of 1976 he had 
won over most of the members of the Area Authority (which was later 
subsumed into the SIPG) with his generous hospitality and his ready 
interpretations of national political events based on inside knowledge of 
national politics which far surpassed that of all but one or two fellow Simbu . 
His 1976 reversal was the start of his 1977 comeback . 
To preserve the cabinet ' s  regional balance, Somare chose to replace Okuk 
with the Member for Sinasina, thereby ignoring former CPC member Kaupa 
from Chuave who is another volatile personality with strong regionalist 
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tendencies (Standish 1 976a) . Kobale Kale had told me in mid 1 975 after he 
successfully moved for the deferment of the national elections from 1 976 to 
1 977 that he had been promised the next ministerial vacancy. Kale was an 
unusual politician for Simbu . A conscientous local member with Grade 5 
education, he lacked the usual brash, boasting Simbu leader 's  style, and since 
becoming a Seventh-Day Adventist had not been a drinker. Along with other 
National Party ministers who chose to keep their portfolios rather than follow 
their leaders out of government, he was expelled from that party forthwith .  
Somare arranged for him t o  have as private secretary an ex-seminarian , a 
Pangu man from the East Speik, the Prime Minister's base area . During 1 976 
Kale teamed up with Pangu. 
Once he was a minister, Kale became a new man. He travelled to West 
Africa for a UNESCO conference , and returned to Simbu displaying elephant 
hair bracelets and gold-mounted lion's  claws. Indeed, he seemed to acquire 
some of the strength of an elephant and the courage of a lion . His business 
activities , two tipper trucks on charter to the government , and a block at 
Karimui, were not ostentatious ; in fact he sought to play them down. But more 
than any previous minister he forcefully played pork-barrel politics with 
Education Department resources around the country, and in Simbu in 
particular . He located new high schools where they would best help Pangu, 
converted day schools to boarding ones , and he plucked Simbu education 
officers from obscurity and promoted them rapidly. Furthermore, he loudly 
proclaimed these deeds at every opportunity. 
While Okuk built up a faction based on personal linkages ,6 Kale sought to 
build up a machine using institutional alliances . The two clans in Kale's  Dinga 
tribe had fought each other in 1976, and Kale might well have been challenged 
for Sinasina Open in 1 977 by the new council president, a coffee buyer named 
Clement Poiye , who came from another Dinga clan. Despite his informal 
efforts to resettle kinsmen in Karimui, Kale was unpopular at home and lived 
with his wife's people in the Seventh-Day area at Momma, west of Kerowagi . 
He gladly accepted outside offers of help , which came from James Arba, who 
had attended seminary with Kale' s secretary . A rather freewheeling public 
servant who was then closely tied to the Chief Ombudsman, Ignatius Kilage 
(who had opposed Okuk in 1 972) , Arba worked as organiser of a Simbu-wide 
rural bisnis movement for women, and men, misnamed Kuman Yangpela 
Didiman (Young Agriculturalists) . This essentially elite body, with twenty one 
constituent clubs , was primarily interested in commercial activities and bore 
no resemblance to the Lutheran church inspired movement bearing the same 
tok pisin name. Arba promised Kale to use the movement to deliver a Simbu­
wide vote to Kale, and he became a Pangu activist. Kale was thus in late 1 976 
persuaded to challenge Okuk for the Provincial seat and to leave Sinasina 
Open to Poiye. Although some leading Simbu Lutherans had campaigned for 
Okuk in 1 972, apparently because of rivalries with the Lutheran bisnis arm , 
Kuman Holdings , he had turned against them in 1 976. The Rev. Boniepe 
Agere, President of both the church and Kuman Holdings , had successfully 
lobbied the Prime Minister through Kobale in order to regularise some mission 
leases of land being used for bisnis purposes . In gratitude Rev . Agere set up a 
Pangu Branch in Simbu with himself as President, and he became the endorsed 
Pangu candidate for Kerowagi Open . To complete these linkages , Kale became 
Vice-President of the party branch and of Kuman Holdings . At the end of 
1976 the 1 977 Provincial campaign was shaping up to be a competition 
between Okuk and Kale . 
But a third prominent Simbu , John Nilkare , was also planning to stand . As 
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Chief Liquor Licensing Commissioner, he  had spent little time in the province 
in recent years . Nilkare had been a Churchill Fellow, was well-travelled 
overseas and well-known in political and business circles . He did not formally 
start campaigning until the writs were issued in April, because he was a public 
servant. Australian schooled and university trained, very well dressed and 
westernized in manner , Nilkare was a former magistrate and footballer in 
Simbu, whose father had been Gumine council president and whose wife came 
from a family prominent in Kobale' s  clan. His sister 's  husband was a former 
Chairman of Chimbu Coffee, whose trade-store had a liquor licence , and John 
Nilkare had set up his father as a coffee buyer . He also had his own business 
interest ,  a satellite farm attached to the large expatriate enterprise , Ilimo 
Farm , near Port Moresby . In the year preceding the election numerous liquor 
licenses were awarded by Nilkare' s commission to rural trade-stores in Simbu, 
in the belief that decentralized drinking would reduce the violence and road 
accidents (and subsequent compensation cases and fighting) caused by the 
centralized drinking at Kundiawa township .  Although a former National 
Party member who openly supported Somare, Nilkare was closely linked to 
the UP oriented group of coffee buyers already mentioned. They agreed to 
campaign for him in their home areas, provided he did not stand for Pangu, 
but he had no party organization, or even a large faction, behind him . 
The most visible political party was the UP, which had a full-time organizer 
in Simbu from 1 975 onwards who used the office of Kundiawa MP Joseph 
Tiene Iunga. Initially , this role was filled by Jerry Geri , a smooth and bright 
but volatile young man with an unstable career pattern including work as a 
kiap, businessman and teacher . Geri had acted as Okuk' s  campaign manager 
in 1 972 but broke with him after Okuk failed to take him on to his personal 
staff. He set about identifying and befriending strong potential candidates 
throughout Simbu, an area which had always paid lip-service to UP but which 
till 1 975 had no organization on the ground. Geri was sacked in late 1 976 after 
a row with UP over party monies (Post-Courier 23 November 1 976) . He was 
replaced by one Dick Dee, a former army sergeant who was a kinsman of the 
Member for Kundiawa. Dee told me that Geri had taken the UP records and 
then joined up with Sinake Giregire's  new Country Party, which left the 
politically inexperienced Dee floundering for some time. He said there had 
been thousands of UP members in Simbu who had made cash contributions 
but he had no statistics . The UP' s  potential strength was its old claim to being 
the traditional party of the Highlands , but it needed organization to use that 
advantage when nomination and campaign time arrived . 
Always intensely competitive, politics were virtually the only avenue for 
advancement for Simbu men who had missed out on chances for higher 
training and bureaucratic careers . While most men who had been elected to 
represent Simbu in previous years had had some small-scale bisnis such as 
trade-stores , as parliamentarians all had automatically received incomes many 
times those of their kinsmen, and most also took advantage of their positions 
to utilize public financial credit and government agriculture and business 
extension services to the hilt . Contrary to the popular belief in Papua New 
Guinea that wealthy men enter politics, most Simbu leaders became successful 
businessmen only after their election to office rather than before . Not 
surprisingly , many rivals emerged in the years 1 972-77 with the aim of taking 
their place . 
It is fair generalization that the sitting Open Members in Simbu were 
unpopular throughout most of their various electorates . They had won with a 
low proportion of the vote, and most people from other clans had voted 
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against them. As tensions and clan warfare grew from 1 972 on , they rarely felt 
able to move freely around electorates which comprised (in part) traditional 
enemies . Sometimes they were unfairly criticized: thus the conscientious local 
member Joseph Tiene was accused of failing to visit the Naregu tribe at 
Mintima, when I know he visited at least four times between 1 972 and 1 976. 
Righly or wrongly, the Members were seen by most of their constituents as lazy 
nest-featherers . The Simbu men of ambition were incensed by the decision in 
1975 to defer the elections from 1 976 until 1 977 . 
All Simbu activists were further angered when the Electoral Boundaries 
Commission recommended that on the most recent ( 1 97 1 )  census figures the 
province was entitled to only six (not seven) Open seats .  It proposed new 
electoral boundaries that removed some census divisions from the familiar 
existing administrative district-cum-council areas and put them in with other 
census divisions in the new electorates. Kundiawa District was to be divided up 
between Gumine Open electorate (which took in the Dom people) and Sinasina 
(the Yonggamugl) . The former Mt. Wilhelm electorate (Gembogl District) was 
then amalgamated with the rump of Kundiawa District , Waiye Census 
Division, to form the Kundiawa Open electorate. Years of planning were thus 
frustrated by these changes . Okuk and Siwi Kurondo, the Premier of the 
Interim Provincial Government , gained easy political kudos in November 1 976 
by leading demonstrations against these changes . The national government 
was accused of deliberately and unjustly 'downing' highlanders , of ' greasing' 
and deceiving people, and of (statistically) 'killing' some 9,000 people while 
filling its own pockets.  The rhetoric reached new heights; at the Simbu Interim 
Provincial Government opening in February 1 977 Okuk proclaimed ' If I am a 
man of principle, I must boycott the election' . 
1977 Nominations 
The Provincial contest in 1 977 drew ten candidates . All ,  in their various 
ways , were members of the new elite, aged 26 to 35 years , all married with 
young children, all involved in modern sector employment and all having 
considerable experience outside Simbu. Their average formal education was 1 1  
years . Ko bale Kale was the only one who would not (because of insufficient 
education) have been eligible to stand for the old Chimbu Regional seat in 
1 968 or 1 972.  It is interesting that no other such men were attracted to the 
provincial seat . Kale was well placed to know the changed eligibility rules and 
as a Minister he had considerable resources at his disposal . Several older 
political figures with whom I spoke knew that there were no longer any 
educational barriers to Provincial candidature, and so their abstention was not 
solely for lack of information . Perhaps more important was the sheer energy 
needed to campaign throughout the province, and the advantage given by 
access to a vehicle and the funds needed to keep it on the road . Even more 
important still, as we shall explore in this paper, was the kind of confidence 
and modern savoir faire which education and travel can give a young man who 
does not have strong linkages in traditional exchange networks but hopes to 
swing votes with policy statements and ideological appeals .  
All the Provincial candidates were engaged in  modern activities and none 
were peasants.  Their professed motives for standing varied greatly. Peter 
Kumgi from the Siambuga-Wauga phratry in Kerowagi District had some 
renown as a former footballer , and hoped his six years as Rural Development 
Officer in various parts of Simbu would help him. He had been befriended by 
Sir Tei Ahal during a posting in Enga province,  which assured him of the UP 
endorsement . He said he decided to stand because he saw development by-
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passing the little men, because of laziness , self-interest and corruption 
amongst existing MPs and especially because of what he called the 
opportunism of the National Party. He particularly resented Iambakey Okuk 
for ignoring departmental advice on agricultural matters . 
Another candidate who stood to help block Okuk was Andrew Kombri 
Kondom, a former medical assistant who had worked in the Upper Simbu , 
now a storekeeper and cattle owner and the son of a famous Simbu leader of 
colonial times (Brown 1 967) . Kondom's tribe , the Naregu , abuts Okuk ' s  
Kamanegu, and he  was early on  encouraged to  stand by  some old Kamanegu 
leaders on the strength of their friendship with his father and perhaps also 
resentment of Okuk . (Some of these same men later campaigned strongly for 
Okuk .)  Soon after nominating, Kondom felt that he had little chance of 
winning. He even considered withdrawing, but decided to stay in the ring so as 
to make his name known for later Provincial Assembly elections , and because 
Jerry Geri asked him to stay to try to reduce Okuk's vote amongst Kuman 
speakers;  the Country Party refunded his KlOO deposit . He did not campaign 
vigorously, however . 
'Vote-splitting' motives were attributed to other candidates , too,  most 
notably Kai Bomai and Michael Danga, both pro-UP independents.  People in 
Simbu political circles were shocked by the early nomination of the politically 
unknown Kai Bomai . Youthful (27) , ever-smiling, fast-talking manager of the 
Chimbu Savings and Loan Society, Kai came from the same village as John 
Nilkare , Omkolai in Gumine District . He was not related to the sitting 
Member for Gumine, Ninkama Bomai (UP) . With matrikin in the Salt area 
and in-laws in the Gunanggi (Sinasina) Census Division, Kai was sure to cut 
deeply into Nilkare's  potential vote bank . He had not made known any 
plans to stand and told me he only decided when he started three months' leave 
from work . Although many people knew of Nilkare's desire to stand, he and 
Kai each pleaded ignorance of the other' s intentions.  Kai refused to pull out 
when Nilkare so requested him . Not surprisingly , Kai said that Okuk had 
expressed delight at this turn of events when they had met by chance in 
Goroka . Nilkare did not allege any collusion on their part . Kai ' s  position gave 
him considerable control over several hundred thousand kina on loan to 
Savings and Loan Society members , and he took the golden opportunity to use 
members as his campaigners . While manager he had greatly increased both 
memberships and loans in the Gumine area (ECL 1 979, I I I ,  1 99) whereas 
before his time the Society had little role there (Howlett et al . 1 976, 252-57) . 
The second candidate of whom ' vote-splitting' was alleged was Michael 
Danga, a former international representative footballer and a schools inspec­
tor in Simbu who had resigned from teaching to campaign . He was buying 
coffee and attempting to initiate his own small development corporation to 
run a tavern at Kerowagi , he also set up a 'Simbu Association ' early in 1 977 to 
promote political cooperation amongst Simbu leaders , but that soon died . His 
father had left his natal Kamanegu (Okuk' s tribe) to settle at Kerowagi , where 
he became Simbu's  largest cattle grazier and a perennial losirig candidate at 
national elections . In the year before the election, Danga senior contributed 
nine cattle (worth aroung K3 ,600) to peace-making feasts in widespread 
locations throughout Simbu . This generosity was an extension of customary 
mediatory roles and a spectacular way to win friends politically. This 
investment helped make his son well-known . In 1 977 he stood yet again in the 
Kerowagi Open seat and lost badly, but in so doing he kept up his own claims 
to political as well as business leadership. Kumgi alleged that Michael Danga's  
intended role in the Provincial contest was to reduce Kumgi ' s  vote in the 
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Kerowagi area. Although Danga's campaign effort was less wholehearted, his 
main slogan 'Consider a new leader' painted on his truck was a swipe at Okuk 
and Kobale together. He attacked Okuk at a UP rally and in private talks 
criticized him for pursuing his self-interest . Their policies differed , and no 
links were visible. Indeed, one of Danga' s recurrent themes was that Simbu 
people were incapable of co-operation: 'Olaman Simbu, individual tumas!' 
There were three other minor candidates . Jerry Geri , a cousin of John 
Kaupa's from Aran village in Chuauve, has already been mentioned. His 
maternal family links were towards Sinasina and Kundiawa rather than 
towards Elimbari and Nambaiyufa (Siani) . This left these latter areas without 
a provincial candidate. A political apparatchik rather than a showman, Geri 
spent much of the campaign helping organize the Country Party campaign 
nationally . Iambakey argued that James Maima Yoba, a 27-year-old school­
teacher from Dom Census Division would undermine his vote in that area. The 
Dom is in Kundiawa District , but has its own language . It is part of Gumine 
Open electorate, and Maima Yoba would at that time more likely have taken 
votes form the two Omkolai candidates . (Later, fights broke out between the 
Doms and the Gumine groups .)  An earnest your.g ex-seminarian, Maima Yoba 
lacked the money and resources for a showy campaign . Initially he described 
himself as a Pangu man, but on being ref used Pangu endorsement and funds 
he was recruited by the Country Party . Another somewhat impoverished 
candidate was the Lutheran pastor, Yuke Komba, who until the election had 
worked in Lae.  Despite some overseas travel , Komba appeared somewhat 
naive politically and showed the stylized humility of many western clergy . He 
said he had come back to Simbu of his own accord to help block Okuk , 
because the latter was attacking the church and because Okuk had only helped 
his own group' s  economic advancement . Komba' s own campaign poster was a 
rather bland plea for development and Christian unity for all provinces . His 
home area, Yonggamugl, is Okuk's  mother ' s  natal area, so Yuke was well­
placed to reduce the incumbent' s  vote . 
At the opening of the SIPG in February 1 977 Okuk had stated that 'People 
don't respect leaders : everyone wants to be a leader' ,  a proposition at least 
partly verified in April 1 977 when 95 men (and no women) stood for 
the six Open seats in Simbu, by far the most intense competition in the 
country . Dick Dee from UP had earlier spoken of some 60 intending to 
stand for Sinasina alone, but the final figure there , 2 1 , was a national 
record . Clement Poiye asked 'Why do so many want to be politicians? I think 
it is because they are Sim bu . They want to be the highest always' . Several older 
leaders ,  not candidates , said the competitors were crazy and that the people 
were confused . Some 76 per cent of the candidates were standing for the first 
time, and only 24 per cent were or had been councillors . All were married and 
10 per cent were polygynists (including some young businessmen) . So these 
were not old-time Simbu leaders but ambitious young men. 
Crude data collected by Returning Officers supplemented by my own field 
notes enables me to provide a general picture of Simbu candidates , Open and 
Provincial . (See Table 1) My categories are somewhat arbitrary , because many 
men could fit under more than one heading. Peasants whose economic basis is 
land , businessmen who build upon capital , and salaried workers who sell their 
educational skills may all employ labour . My categorization is thus not an 
attempt to give rigid class labels to men who do not fit single categories . 
Rather , it is a broad brush attempt to show the main economic activities of the 
candidates . I have· attempted to balance out the distortions . To take an 
example: where two candidates have relatively large farms with cattle, as well 
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Table 1 Candidates in Chimbu Elections 1972 and 1977 (a) 
1 972 1 977 
1 . 1  General Data Open Regional Total Open Provincial Total 
Number standing 66 5 7 1  95 1 0  1 05 
A v .  age - candidates 36 25 35  34  3 1  34 
- winners 35 28 34 37 33 36 
Av. education (years) 
- candidates 2 1 1  3 6 1 1  9 
- winners 3 1 0  4 8 10 8 
Tok pisin literacy (b) 20 5 25 65 1 0  75 
l ..L Experience (OJo) (c) 
Village Official 9 0 8 2 0 2 
Councillor 35 0 33 25 1 0  24 
National candidate 45 20 44 24 20 24 
Parliamentarian 8 0 7 7 20 9 
1 . 3 Occupation (OJo) 
Small peasant (d) 12  0 1 1  9 0 9 
Big peasant (e) 2 1  0 20 1 6  0 1 3  
Coffee & trade-store (f) 1 1  0 10  2 0 2 
(Peasant total) (44) (0) (4 1 )  (27) (0) (24) 
Store owner (g) 8 5 7 9 20 1 1  
Coffee buyer (h) 8 5 7 1 7  20 17  
Trucker (i) 2 2 3 3 1 0  3 
(Businessman total) (j) ( 1 8) ( 1 2) ( 1 7) (29) (50) (3 1 )  
Public servants & 
clerks (k) 1 5  20 1 5  2 1  30 22 
Teachers (1) 5 40 7 1 2  1 0  1 1  
Church workers (m) 9 20 1 0  8 1 0  9 
(White-collar total) (29) (80) (32) (41 )  (50) (42) 
Blue-collar (n) 9 20 10 3 0 3 
Notes to Table I: 
(a) Sources : PNG 1 972 and 1 977, corrected in accord with my field data. All percentages are 
rounded . Occupational categories are generally those at the time the writs were issued , and are 
necessarily somewhat arbitrarily placed in the category j udged most significant for that individual 
in the Simbu context. 
(b) Some of the claimed tok pisin literacy is at best marginal. 
(c) Here a candidate may well appear under more than one category. 
(d) Except at the highest altitudes , most rural people in northern Simbu grow coffee, yet they have 
been recorded by Returning Officers as ' subsistence farmers' .  Some so designated were in fact 
teachers, clerks, coffee buyers , et cetera. 'Peasants ' are defined here as people whose main 
economic activity is land-based. 'Small peasants' is a relative term here used where no special 
record is made of the size of coffee holdings or other economic activities . 
(e) ' Big peasants' here include those with very large coffee holdings, and/or cattle and/or 
introduced pig stock (pig susu) . 
(f) The i ncome these men receive from coffee sales usually supports their trade-stores (which are 
almost as seasonal as the coffee crop), and so the basic income source is agrarian. The owners of 
viable stores are broadly classified as businessmen . 
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(g) ' Store owners'  here include proprietors of viable stores and liquor sellers .  
(h)  'Coffee buyers' tend to be younger men with less access to land than their elders, but some also 
grow coffee and run stores. 
(i) The ' trucker' category includes those hiring plant to public works authorities, plus passenger 
and cargo carriers. 
U) Businessmen, as here categorized, are those whose main activities are commercial rather than 
agrarian.  Like some big peasants, and peasant traders, mostly they employ at least some non­
family labour on a wage basis. 
(k) This heading includes some non-literate public servants such as aid post orderlies and 
interpreters, as well as clerks in privately owned enterprises. 
(I) This category includes teachers in mission schools. 
(m) TJ:i.is heading includes non-literate catechists and evangelists as well as tertiary educated 
clergy . 
(n) This includes skilled tradesmen, labourers and drivers .  The last-mentioned group have lost 
much of their prestige as their skills have spread . 
as large and viable stores , one is here classified as a big peasant , the other as a 
store owner. The importance of these categories is that both are men of wealth 
in rural Simbu : neither is a ' little' man. 
The 1 977 Simbu candidates were slighty younger but much less politically 
experienced than those in 1 972, but they had much more formal education and 
there were more of them. Some 105 men stood, an increase of 48 per cent . 
With one fewer seat available , fifteen stood per seat in 1 977 , compared to 
nine in 1 972 . The average age of candidates and winners remained fairly 
static , about 35 years , but taken alone this figure disguises considerable 
changes in the type of man standing, because within the same age-group we 
can see the changes taking place in Simbu society. A few old-style polgynous 
clan leaders and indeed some younger businessmen stood aside to prevent 
splitting their clan or tribe's  vote, but mostly it was the old men who dropped 
out of the race altogether. Former village officials numbered only 2 per cent (8 
per cent in 1 972) , councillors 24 per cent (33 per cent) , and only 24 per cent had 
stood previously in national elections (44 per cent) . In 1 972 Simbu candidates' 
formal education averaged 3 years , and winners' 4 years , whereas in 1 977 the 
figures were 9 and 8 years , respectively. 
More significant , perhaps , is the changed economic base of many of the 
1 977 candidates . Again reflecting the changes in Simbu society, the candidates 
now included much of the resident modernizing Simbu elite. 
The clearest change in 1 977 was that there was almost a doubling in the 
proportion of candidates who were businessmen (3 1 per cent compared to 1 7  
per cent i n  1 972) with 1 1  per cent having stores (as against 7 per cent) and 
buyers ( 1 7  per cent, previously 7 per cent) . The proportion of salaried (mostly 
white collar) workers rose from 32 per cent in 1 972 to 42 per cent , especially 
teachers (7 to 1 1  per cent) and public servants and other clerical workers ( 1 5  to 
22 per cent) . This category includes slightly fewer mission workers (9 as against 
10 per cent) , which perhaps indicates either that ambitious Simbu were in other 
occupations , or that Simbu church workers had increasing faith in their own 
eventual reward . 
More significant , perhaps , is that proportion of men based on the land and 
categorized here as peasants (whether 'big' or ' small' ) fell from 41 per cent of 
candidates in 1 972 to 24 per cent in 1 977 , and men known to be big peasants 
dropped from 20 per cent to 13 per cent of candidates. Also blue collar 
workers (who were relatively prestigious in colonial days) fell from 1 0  per cent 
to 3 per cent. In other words, the 1 977 Simbu candidates were most likely to be 
capitalist entrepreneurs , and/ or members of the salariat (a total of 73 per 
98 Electoral Politics in PNG 
cent) , whereas in 1 972 half (5 1 per crnt) had been peasants or blue collar 
workers . 
National politics was being seen as a game for better educated and more 
affluent men than previously. Coming from the older tradition , the former 
policeman, parliamentarian and now Premier of Simbu , Siwi Kurondo, 
expressed his feelings about the candidates by saying that 'rubbish-men' and 
English educated literates were standing, men who had not proved themselves 
as real workers , and he sourly told me they were motivated by greed . 
The Campaign 
As an overture to the 1 977 campaign the Lutheran Church invited Michael 
Somare to open the Kuman Holdings clothing factory at Kerowagi on 2 1  
January . Foul weather held u p  the Prime Minister' s aircraft,  and some 5 ,000 
people waited as storm clouds built up and eventually washed out the event 
before Somare's  arrival . Excluded from the programme, a tired and emotional 
Okuk pushed through the crowd carrying a child saying the whites and 
missions had fouled the people, and that the rain was a sign of God's  
displeasure at  the occasion. Some 3 ,000 attended the next day when the 
ceremony was held , featuring the Premier , Kale, Mrs Anna Nombri (President 
of Kuman Yangpela Didiman , and wife of a schoolmate of Somare's) ,  Rev . 
Boniepe Agere together with the Prime Minister and the Defence Force Com­
mander , Brigadier-General Ted Diro, as guests . The church spent some K2,000 
on Simbu dance groups , gave K20 to each of the speakers and paid the Defence 
Force bagpiper ' s  motel bills .  Okuk ostentatiously remained on the perimeter 
of the proceedings , nodding sourly when named by some of the speakers (but 
not Somare, who simply referred to 'other Members ' in the crowd) . Later that 
day he repsonded with a statement run by the National Broadcasting 
Commission (NBC) saying that the exercise was a Pangu propaganda show, 
part of the coastal plan for domination of the highlands . 
In February-March 1 977 the con flict was intense. In parliament Okuk 
blamed the Somare government in the Prime Minister' s  presence for the lack 
of development which was the root of highlands fighting, because, as he put it 
at the SIPG opening, 'a  hungry dog barks' . Given that he had been a minister 
for four of the previous five years , his tactical flexibility was breathtaking. 
Somare, in private talks ,  has blamed Okuk for blocking the 1 976 Public Order 
Bill , which he says was designed to meet Simbu requests for tougher 
government action against fighting . Okuk told me he was 'spaking with talk' 
(literally drunk with his own words) in his powerful speech at the SIPG 
opening, but added he was prepared to antagonize some people in public and 
would not tok baksait, slander , in their absence. In the dying twitches of 
the old house the government struggled to sustain a quorum and Okuk led 
several successful moves to block coalition bills . 
Okuk firmly put the question of corruption on the political agenda, not only 
for parliament but also for the election, when on 17 February he moved 
That in view of 
(a) much suspicion and mistrust surrounding the assests [sic] , business connections, 
receipt of gifts, benefits and other services and the awarding of government contracts 
to private business; 
[here followed a list of allegations against the government] 
(g) . . .  this parliament resolves that 
( 1 )  an independent tribunal . . .  investigate and publish information concerning 
matters listed above in the Post-Courier newspaper by June next; and 
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(2) the Ombudsman Commission present to Parliament and subsequently publish in 
the Post-Courier the detailed submissions of the assets, the income, the business 
connections, the directorships , the business transactions , the granting of government 
contracts,  gifts , services, privileges, liabilities and other personal relationships of the 
leaders as defined under the Leadership Code . 7 
Complete information of this kind would indeed be interesting, but Okuk 's 
motion was not debated by the parliament, although his own affairs were to 
become an issue in the Simbu campaign. Perhaps in response to Okuk's  
motion, Pangu backbencher and Party president Tom Koraea asked Somare 
whether Okuk had improperly gained a lease for valuable land in Waigani 
without the required advertisement for tender, a question which the Prime 
Minister said he would investigate . For whatever reason, after a few days of 
digging, all attempts at using political mud from the Waigani swamps ceased . 
Okuk cemented an alliance with various 'young Turk ' UP leaders at 
meetings in different highlands centres in late March, and pushing the need for 
'highlands identity' he won them over to the need for joint action by the 
National Party with UP to gain control of the next government . He had already 
discussed this with Sir Tei Abal , the Opposition Leader, in November 1 976. 
Although never spelt out coherently in his speeches , the ideas were those of the 
defunct Highlands Liberation Front (Mel 1 98 1 ,  Standish 198 1 ) ,  calling for 
increased development in the highlands and for preferment of highlanders to 
remove the regional imbalance in public employment which was considerable 
(Welch 1976) . National Party leader Thomas Kavali announced on the NBC 
that the two parties would work together in the campaign. But he did not visit 
Simbu in the succeeding months and even before the count was finished he told 
people he had privately switched his allegiance to Somare . Indeed the National 
Party as such had no visible party organisation to help its candidates , although 
a kinsman of Okuk's  was made party president and wrote a begging letter to 
businesses . Okuk's  only hope of gaining office was in a broad coalition with a 
larger group, and he played this strategy well . 
In a virulent Saturday rally on 20 March, Okuk told the crowd of shoppers 
and flirting teenagers about his planned coalition, saying he would be the next 
Prime Minister . The NBC journalist in Simbu said his language was ' too hot ' 
to report . By late March Okuk had covered Kundiawa with the first 200 of his 
planned 1 0,000 posters , and he initially refused to remove a cloth banner so 
large that it broke electoral regulations . (He finally moved it , just out of town , 
but pointed out that the anachronistic regulation was not being enforced in 
Lae and other centres .) He was also campaigning early along the Highway and 
at rural food markets . At one incident at Ganigle near Kerowagi he was asked 
by a former council president what he had done while in government .  I was 
told Okuk flared up and insulted the man , and then to cool tempers brought 
three carloads of men to Kundiawa for drinks. 
When the nominations period started the campaign proper opened with a 
crescendo (soon to be a cacophony) of sound . Okuk had bought a new 
Landcruiser and fitted it with a microphone connected to loudspeakers and a 
cassette player . Nominations effectively opened on 12 April, and from 1 p.m.  
to  4 p.m.  he  bombarded Kunidawa township with speeches repeating h i s  name 
over and over . Surrounded by perhaps one hundred (mostly youthful) 
supporters and a few hundred pedestrians , he initially had the streets to 
himself. But the next day, just after noon, an outsider braved his territory . 
Buaki Singeri , the tiny Country Party member for Kabwum in Morobe, 
walked up the main street shouting 'Country Party bai halpim yupe/a' (The 
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Country Party will help you) and then clambered on the bonnet of a battered 
Toyota to speak . Okuk cruised up in his smart new car , the speaker blaring a 
mixture of English and tok pisin . 
0:  Hei spakman yu mekim wanem ? [What are you doing, you drunk?] 
S :  Toktok tasol. [Just talking .]  
0:  Yu spakman. Bladi longlong pik. Kam daun, Kam daun, Kam daun! 
[You drunkard. Bloody crazy pig . Get down! Come down ! ]  
S :  Pikinini! [My child ! ]  I brought the mission here . 
0: Shutup. We don't  want you . I 'm the leader here . You'd like to hold us 
back . You should be ashamed . Pissoff, spakman. You and Sinakes can't  
come here. Piss off! 
S: I helped you often . 
0: You didn't  help. I don't  need your help. I don' t  need bloody Pangu and 
you . 
S :  I helped you . 
0 :  Don't cry now. Go and campaign in your own place . 
Okuk drove off, circling a crowd of 500 people whom he continued to 
harangue through the speakers , his voice cracking, near hysteria: ' O/ man 
bilong giaman long paua. [These men are lying to get power .]  Bloody 
coastals . '  Singeri and his three companions left rather sheepishly, while Okuk 
crowed that despite them quaking no hurt was done. 
Okuk 's continuing tok pisin and Kuman language diatribe included some of 
the themes of his campaign , and is worth quoting at length. 
Kobale Kale is Michael Somare's  manki masta [personal servant] . Before you cut 
rubber and were namki mastas. Now you stand on your own legs with your own 
businesses . It was not just coastals who fought for self-government and 
Independence . I helped Somare but he turned his back on me and Thomas Kavali and 
kicked us out . I 'm for unity . Do you want equality? Papua New Guinea should have 
equality. You should not work for mastas [white rulers] . Who are those who want to 
be black mastas? Somare and Oscar Tammur ! For provincial government they only 
gave K25,000 in February.9 • • .  Chan and Somare are hungry for power. They gris 
[grease, flatter] for Pangu's  sake only. They say we Chimbu are the foulman 
[spoilers] , troublemakers, fighters . This is not so. They had troubles all over Papua 
New Guinea, too . . .  Why do [my rivals] seek power? They can try , but pity if they 
lose . It 's bad if people say we' re cowboys . Singeri is a drunkard. I speak in full public 
view and say Sinake is a real drunk . We are real workers; we made our own roads, 
and now have coffee and cars . . .  [In Kuman language: ]  Whites - without them we 
would have to carry the coffee to the factory. We need them for work, and should 
work together with them. [In tok pisin : ]  They sacked me as a minister but I 'm still the 
Member and am being paid . Do you want someone to replace me? He' ll just grab 
money for himself. [Kuman:]  If you vote for me I ' ll run your business and get money 
here for you and you' ll have lots of money . . .  [tok pisin : ]  The Ministers are all 'yes 
men' . Somare said I could return but I refused. 
I ' ll join with United Party, but I support National to j oin with United in a coalition . 
Miss Abaijah can j oin us in a coalition with United Party. Pangu will be in 
opposition . The government has not run the economy well; it has fouled the 
management of the economy and money. K40 million is missing. 10 Ministers blame 
the public service and public servants blame the ministers . . .  Simbu is not getting its 
share . . .  There' ll be K200 million income from coffee this year: we [highlanders] are 
the strongest in Papua New Guinea. These smart educated people want to run things . 
Our highlands leaders were the real fighters with a warrior tradition, and our leaders 
are those with lots of pigs . We will send our true leaders and speak out . People say 
the Eight Points ' '  are fouled up. No more Pangu here ! [Kuman: ]  Do you agree? Do 
you agree? [A few Kamanegu men in the crowd say 'Yes' , rather slowly while some 
others say hostile things . ]  [ Tok pisin : ]  I ' ll be forming the government with the 
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United Party . . .  Don't forget this :  bisnis and money will come t o  you if you vote for 
me, I ' ll get you these. [Later, in Kuman, he added:]  Don't  listen to the coastal gris . 
They eat snake and should stay at home. Do you hear me? Other districts shouldn' t  
compete with Iambakey Okuk . Don't  waste your money, you other candidates . You 
could lose it - what a pity to waste it ! 
At which point a drunken supporter from Gembogl shouted 'Okuk has won 
already ! '  
On 1 3  April Okuk kept this performance going for two hours until he lost 
the crowd, his efforts helped by the presence of a film crew . He offered the 
micrdphone to prominent leaders from various parts of the province, and 
being greatly flattered they gave the ear-splitting yodel and shouted 
endorsements of Okuk in their vernacular language . Okuk recorded these 
plugs for use in a verbal montage rather like a poster he had made up showing 
recognizable photographs of Simbu leaders apparently supporting him; and he 
replayed the tapes - feedback distortion and all - for the remainder of the 
campaign, interspersed with his own vitriolic comments and the soothing 
sounds of well-chosen pop-songs ( ' I ' m  on top of the world . . .  ' ,  and 'Don't 
forget to remember me' ) .  He would drive throughout the province, speakers 
blaring unintelligibly. Although villagers complained about the noise Okuk 
and other candidates using speakers thereby succeeded in asserting their 
presence . 
As is apparent above, Okuk used the Kuman language for his strongest 
appeals to highlands regionalism. 
Hear me ! We're not the cargo-boys for the coastal people . . .  Don't  listen to the 
coastal people, they'll fool you . . .  We will always be dominated by them . . .  don't  
let i t  happen again. It' s us who are your traditional leaders . Who organised the pig­
killing ceremonies? Tell me! 
We see the fruit on the trees but we' re not allowed to eat . . .  All the businesses are 
being controlled from the coast . . .  we get nothing and we suffer! That ' s  why I broke 
with them and came to help you. Hear me! 1 2 
The initial response from Pangu was mild. On 1 5  April Pangu held a rally 
with all its nine endorsed candidates and about 300 people in Kundiawa. Kale 
had come to town with two cars (one government vehicle) filled with singing 
Sinasina people, a few older councillors , and a less powerful loudspeaker . All 
the candidates spoke, with Kale strongly outlining Pangu' s  achievements 
including the moves by nationals into large businesses , plantations and also 
coffee buying . He stressed his foreign travel and his ministerial role, and said 
he wanted the Provincial seat because he had seen all of Chimbu Province 
being fouled . Rev . Agere concluded the meeting saying 'Pangu is the breast 
that has fed you. It' s no use turning your back on them and throwing sticks . '  
Then rain stopped play . 
These events require an excursis . Okuk's  jibes , especially the anal imagery, 
(which is made publicly but is too contentious to report here) , are of the kind 
used in the past - and still today - to antagonise opponents . In Simbu 
cultural terms, while showing himself to be fearless, Okuk was acting 
somewhat provocatively, and risked involving the Kamanegu in conflict . 
Kamanegu relations with Kale's  Dinga tribe had been tense since 1 975 when 
after a drinking session a Kamanegu school headmaster was murdered in 
Kundiawa beside a Sinasina vehicle . Confrontations over compensation twice 
led to fighting . Although the town is now government land and hence neutral , 
it was essentially under Kamanegu control at the first colonial contact . Okuk 
was by implication flouting the neutrality convention and asserting his 
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dominance over all Simbu , while Kale was re-asserting the convention and 
challenging Okuk at Kamanegu' s front door , saying (in effect) that his modern 
party and his ancestral tribe would not take Okuk's  insults lying down. 
Okuk was out of town, but in a reflex to the Pangu rally, when sunshine 
returned, his close supporters replied by getting the Chimbu Y omba beer truck 
and filled it with Kamanegu tribesmen . They specifically excluded other 
supporters , because if there was trouble they wanted no compensation 
problems. The crowd of 1 ,000 split into two groups on opposite street corners, 
clustered around the two trucks with speakers exchanging abuse. Young 
Kamanegu, drunk, told all other group members to get out of Kundiawa, and 
the tension was deliberately raised further by Nilkare cruising through with a 
siren blaring into a crowd which swelled as the hotel discharged the lunchtime 
drinkers . (Some time later the Nilkare team ostentatiously called for calm .) 
Many Simbu expected a full-scale riot that afternoon. Despite the tension I 
believe there was no riot because few of the spectators were intensely 
mobilized. 
The row continued all that afternoon . Pangu' s  strongest speaker was Delba 
Biri from the Dom area, who was standing for Gumine. A former policeman 
who had been one of Okuk' s  henchmen, he asked what Okuk had done when 
in office , saying he was a mauswara man (politely translated as 'waffler' )  who 
only helped Kamanegu . Okuk eventually heard of this attack , and incensed at 
such tok baksait raced back to Kundiawa with his more powerful speakers . 
Round and round the trucks went , bellowing like angry bulls, halting, 
confronting, backing-off, and chasing each other . Okuk topped his remark to 
one candidate 'You're a driver . Driver's are rubbish ! ' ,  with the hilarious crack 
'Get out of town: I 've met white bastards better than you ! ' .  
For three days these sound battles had continued. Councillor Siune and 
older Kamanegu leaders tried to mute their juniors for fear of full-scale tribal 
warfare . Nilkare senior tried to mediate between the two parliamentarians , 
and the next week the SIPG Assembly sought vainly to bring them together for 
a talking-to. Then , as if by agreement , except for UP rallies the campaign 
teams moved out of town to where the voters lived and so the early crises 
passed . 
Okuk staged a meeting on Saturday 1 6  April to catch a huge crowd in town 
for a demonstration bout by the national boxing champion Martin Beni . In 
this Okuk was aided by the formidable presence of Raphael Doa, the Western 
Highlands member. Doa discussed the K43m of mislaid government funds , 
which were later found again (see note 9) , in terms even more libellous than 
Okuk's .  Both accused the government of lavish , campaign-oriented spending . 
A number of UP sitting members , John Kaupa and other political hopefuls 
spoke, the former all stressing their political save but lacking Okuk's  
passionate intensity . It is hard for an observer to judge the response of a crowd 
from the centre of a meeting where core followers echo their leaders , but as the 
speakers whipped themselves into a frenzy one comment heard at the time, 
which perhaps reflected more detached Simbu villagers ' responses , was the 
eloquent phrase 'mauswara politik' which I translated as ' tricky political 
waffle' . They had come to town to watch another kind of fight . 
Okuk dominated the Simbu campaigns without having any effective party 
organization of his own . He and John Kaupa sometimes used the label 
' National Party' , but only two other candidates were generally thought to be 
National . Okuk had separate relationships with the various individuals who 
sought leadership in UP, men who were rivals amongst themselves . His main 
organizational ally was the Simbu UP branch president Anton Aba, the 
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businessman who Okuk had won over in 1 975 .  Helped by his speaker system, 
and much more than that by his sheer will to power, Okuk's  genius was to 
make himself central to the UP campaign; he was rather like a huge tree which 
overshadowed rivals of its own species but which attracted various hangers-on, 
creepers which competed with each other. So lesser men served to emphasize 
Okuk's pre-eminence. 
Okuk overwhelmed the UP at a rally on 20 April at which party 
endorsements were to be announced. Sitting UP parliamentarians received 
automatic nomination, payment of the K l OO  nomination fee, plus 2,000 
individual posters on a standard format and limited access to Dick Dee's UP 
vehicle . Given the fragmentation of the electorate these candidates did not 
object to multiple nominations; the time for shoring-up their vote bank against 
splitters was already over . At least 60 men sought the party nod,  but when 
Sir Tei Abal arrived endorsements were not decided. While Dee and Abal sat 
in the comfortable Chimbu Lodge to finalize the party tickets ,  Okuk stressed 
his separate National Party identity to the UP hopefuls , and his alliance with 
UP as a good highlander . He challenged Abal' s  alleged weakness for failing to 
topple Somare. 'You are a bullshit organization - useless ! I don't  support 
Tei , but I support UP . Tei wants to be big at the Lodge - I' ll go and get him. '  
Abal came and o n  Dee's advice announced a total o f  1 4  endorsements 
for the six Open seats,  plus the sitting MPs and Kumgi . Dee's local knowledge 
was limited but he had the sense to see the potential of two eventual winners . 
One strong candidate, Clement Poiye, was not endorsed by UP although Abal 
authorized his posters . Dee said that as a businessman Poiye could afford his 
own campaign , but he was free to bargain with anyone after the election -
which Poiye did without success. Peter Kumgi gained the UP endorsement 
ahead of Michael Danga, yet these two with Kai Bomai and Yuke Komba were 
again overshadowed by Okuk. They jokingly took up his mocking taunt of 
manki (young boy) . Abal' s homily about the need for parties and the 
inevitability of Self-government and Independence was well behind the Simbu 
debate, and he was alone in explicitly rejecting Okuk 's regionalism. Forty 
angry candidates who had nominated but been ignored by UP were not 
placated by a party luncheon held at the Chimbu Lodge, and Dee sought to 
deflect their anger onto Abal ' s  staff. Pangu in Port Moresby was asked by five 
of these men for help, but that party stuck with its original nine nominations .  
The Country Party picked up a few, and finally had about six candidates on its 
list . None of the rejects ,  except Poiye who was close to Nilkare and was fence­
sitting, won a seat . 
They were nonetheless a valuable political resource . Okuk shrewdly offered 
to print K200 worth of posters for some 1 5  of these 'UP' rejects who 
gladly accepted and were thus immediately incorporated into Okuk 's faction 
in a series of classic dyadic (two person) instrumental transactions . Okuk 
rarely used the National Party label, although John Kaupa and perhaps two 
other candidates thought of themselves as National Party men. Okuk had 
individual links with these men and with most of the UP candidates who 
travelled on his vehicles and introduced him into their lains (clans and tribes) , 
but he personally distanced himself from the competition between these men in 
their various Open electorates . These men, with others in the SIPG (including 
- late in the piece - the Premier Swii Kurondo) , brought to the Okuk 
campaign their own close henchmen, lesser followers and kin. While UP 
remained a formal , slightly impersonal political party organization, it lacked a 
distinct ideological drive and earnestly sought a national spread of votes . 
Okuk's  factional machine had the single purpose of re-electing him and was 
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buttressed by his appeal to highlands ethnicity . It was based on a series of 
personal transactions he initiated by shrewd use of his massive financial 
resources . Political parties are often riven by internal factionalism . Dick Dee, 
who was not close to Okuk, explained the MP had started apart from UP but 
because he was fighting for that party and helped UP a lot , they had come 
together. So the Okuk faction, starting from outside the UP, virtually 
absorbed that entire party in S imbu, with the exception of Okuk ' s  own direct 
rivals for the Provincial seat . Pre-planned or spontaneous ,  it was brilliant 
political strategy. 
On 4 June the UP held a Saturday rally at Kundiawa in which 23 
vehicles took part, eleven of them from the Western Highlands . Although 
invited , Eastern Highlanders did not appear. Okuk and Raphael Doa 
dominated the rally while the endorsed candidate Kumgi protested that he, 
Peter, was the official candidate . Kumgi niggled Okuk, asking what had been 
done. 'Now power is with the people, who should use it and act? Days pass 
and leaders should change. I ' m  not a political prostitute. I ' m  a learner ! '  At 
which point Okuk interrputed softly in Kuman: 'Shutup ! '  Kumgi finished off: 
'Enough. If Okuk wins he wants to come in with us , but it ' s  up to Tei . '  Using 
Okuk's speaker truck, Tei was cornered into ambivalence: 'Many young men 
are standing' ,  he said. 'Look well , and choose a good man . Peter is UP. 
Iambakey is strong to help us . We want a strong man - Peter or lambakey' . 
Okuk was not only thinking of the elections within Simbu, but the post­
election lobbying . There was a party at his house that night, with K200 of beer 
provided by UP, K200 by Chimbu Yomba and KlOO by Okuk personally . He 
gave whole cartons to sitting MPs and some others from the Western 
Highlands . Longer-term thinking no doubt motivated his travel to four 
highlands provinces , and a special trip with Wagua Goiye (the winning UP 
Kerowagi nominee) all the way to New Ireland in an attempt to block Julius 
Chan's  re-election for Namatanai Open. En route they entered the fray at 
Rabaul ,  where racial issues had arisen . Chan's People's Progress Party barely 
had a toehold in Simbu with one businessman endorsed , in contrast to the real 
effort PPP invested in Southern and Eastern Highlands, Okuk accused 
Nilkare of being a covert PPP candidate. Okuk bracketed Chan and PPP with 
Somare and Pangu, but Dee was more pragmatic . 'We'll get PPP in coalition 
- they' ll share any bed, '  he told me. 
Campaign fever had taken hold in April , and for the next two months the 
travelling political circuses were less visible on the main roads . Nilkare used 
more gimmickry than others, with lapel badges and car stickers , and cowboy 
films shown in villages at night before the soft-sell . He even funded rock bands 
to play for high school dances ; no speeches were made, but his generosity was 
known. He was not just a very modern Nilkare; he said he did not visit 
Mintima because he did not have a friend there to introduce him in the 
customary way.  He simply had not allowed time to create personal exchange 
relationships . Okuk was unable to hire commercial films because of Chimbu 
Yomba's bad debts, but he did show two potently symbolic pictures , one -
Bug/a Yunggu - depicting a huge ceremonial pig feast at Mintima in 1 972 
(from which , ironically, Okuk had allegedly been chased away for offending 
some Naregu) , and another film of himself boldly and resolutely braving the 
evil spirits on Mount Wilhelm (Simbu and Papua New Guinea's  highest 
mountain) , and setting up the new national flag there . Iambakey is the Kuman 
name of the Lesser Bird of Paradise which adorns the flag and national crest, 
and exploiting this symbol he had a picture of this bird beautifully painted 
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onto the door of his vehicle. Kai Bomai used Savings and Loans Society films 
in his campaign.  These clearly political events were sometimes announced on 
the NBC's Radio Kundiawa, which in general did not report the campaign. 
Pangu used no razzamatazz, and its hand-held loud-hailers were insignificant 
in that about 200 of these were sold in the highlands at K60-K90 each during 
the campaign. 
Whatever it signified, the sound and fury did penetrate most of Simbu apart 
from Karimui, including remote Nomane. As in previous elections, most Open 
candidates concentrated on the members of their own lain . Mostly having 
fewer resources than the main Provincial candidates they travelled less,  with 
one reason for this being the deep insecurities of a society racked with clan 
warfare. So it was Provincial candidates who were most visible and most 
audible. Nilkare in particular forced Okuk to keep running after his first 
opening sprint . Okuk lost 16 kg in his bold and resolute drive for power . There 
was one clash between Okuk's  and Kale's followers at Chuave market, Okuk 
somehow lost a tooth during the campaign, and a windscreen was lost in a 
Gumine argument, but the early confrontations had proved useful warnings 
and real violence was avoided during the campaign period before polling. 
These men were over-tired, and a road accident brought death into the 
political arena just as polling opened. At dawn on 17 June Kale overturned his 
vehicle and a young Nimai girl from Koge village was killed . Kale sensibly fled 
for safety to Dinga territory before giving himself up to police, who charged 
him with manslaughter . The politicians of Simbu were shocked, but Okuk 
gloated around Kundiawa that this was God's justice because Kale had 
slandered him . John Kaupa also crowed with glee in a sickening celebration at 
Chimbu Lodge. Most thought that the accident would damage Kale's chances 
irreparably, but when a magistrate (quite properly) allowed bail that afternoon 
Kale's supporters toured the town reasserting his campaign. Such accidents 
often lead to fighting, and in this case the temptations for candidates to 
meddle were great . One Sinasina candidate with some of Nilkare' s group 
clearly raised tensions amongst the girl 's  relatives . On 21 June Kale rejected 
kiap advice and rather foolishly drove through Koge where he met a road­
block, was attacked, and again he was lucky to escape with his life .  He cried for 
revenge and fighting erupted immediately between Dinga and Nimai people . 
Many were injured and Kale's uncle was one of four killed in battles that 
included several neighbouring clans. The fighting lasted a month - despite a 
heavy police riot squad presence - with a short truce for polling teams to 
collect votes . As in a number of Simbu disputes during the election, other 
candidates were keen to act as mediators. At one stage the Premier loudly 
repeated his support of Okuk.  Fears of a compensation claim against Pangu 
probably led to the cancellation of a visit by the Prime Minister on 20 June, 
during which it was planned that he would open the Siani Council - a task 
which Premier Kurondo had performed a year previously ! Kale somehow 
survived the ordeal, and kept on campaigning. Subsequently he was goaled for 
nine months for dangerous driving causing death . 
Campaign Issues 
The most contentious debate in the 1972 campaign had been about 
decolonization, and had centred around Okuk , but in 1977 policies were not 
the real issue and ideological differences were hard to discern . The Simbu 
Pangu Branch had no policy details , but an attempt by a public servant to 
distribute Pangu posters through government offices was intercepted . An 
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Office of Information booklet listing party platforms arrived too late and in 
too few numbers to be distributed . Electoral officials banned the official 
display of another poster from the same source which listed policies of only the 
three major government and opposition parties . To the extent policies 
mattered, local issues were paramount . Most candidates mouthed the maxim 
that promises were worthless , yet all wanted more bisnis, roads, bridges , 
health facilities and schools, as well as the cessation of warfare and specific 
provincial powers to settle land disputes , even the wise man whose poster said 
'Mi gat mausgras - mi no laik promis' ( ' I  have a beard - so I won't  make 
promises' ) .  Land for resettlement was not an issue that came to my attention 
and the coffee border rule was mostly seen as basically a provincial problem. 
The coffee boom became Okuk's greatest electoral asset . I was told 
repeatedly in several parts of the province that villagers , especially older 
people , really believed that Okuk - personally - had raised the prices . One 
of his core supporters , Provincial Assembly member Asuwe Kawage, openly 
proclaimed this , and I heard Okuk reply that what Asuwe said was true . 
Generally, though, Okuk said that he fought for the prices to be raised, a more 
subtle formulation, and he proclaimed that he had gained local control of the 
coffee industry. Despite his opponent ' s  explanations that prices were set 
outside Papua New Guinea following world price fluctuations , the message 
went across that Okuk 's  1 970 by-election promise to raise coffee prices had 
finally come about in August 1 975  ! He was lucky, indeed, that coffee prices 
did not start falling rapidly until the last few days of voting . 
Pangu appealed to the wealthier and more prominent villagers with its stress 
on high schools, village courts and bisnis - limited though entrepreneurial 
opportunities and activities are in Simbu . Somare had pushed similar themes 
in the Eastern Highlands . Okuk, while personally courting businessmen, 
publicly appealed to all levels of Simbu with his coastal dominance rationale 
for Simbu economic stagnation. Highlands regionalism was his main issue, 
and he drew a response with it . Danga was unusual amongst educated Simbu 
with his witty comment on government that 'You need a mixture to make it 
sweet : it is boring just to have kau kau by itself. ' 
Few young men, to my knowledge, mentioned generational conflict , a real 
fissure within Simbu society, although it was often implicit when younger men 
stressed their formal education and modern save, as shown for instance by 
their skilled employment . One very young candidate did condemn older 
generation politicians who could not cope with parliamentary business and so 
drank and slept through meetings , but he was drubbed. In contrast , it was 
· older leaders who felt under some challenge who mocked the youngsters , 
saying they lacked Okuk's  strength , wisdom or experience, or were motivated 
by sheer greed. Two older MPs who were rivals in this election were like a 
comedy duo walking around Kundiawa town , jesting 'We're going bald , but 
we know the ropes , unlike those English-speakers . '  
Ancient rivalry betv1een neighbouring lains was most important in the 
Open electorates; in the Provincial seat it was the tension between different 
geographic sectors of the province . Okuk 's opponents sought to utilize 
resentment against the Kamanegu for allegedly usurping the provincial 
headquarters for themselves , Nilkare generalizing this even further into a so­
called 'bomai alliance' against the 'highway-men' .  As already mentioned, 
most development is near the highway, while to the south (bomai) there is 
little . Bomai is also used to mean 'bush unsophisticate' ,  a typical Simbu pun 
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nicely used by Nilkare . Not only did he speak of modern development but he 
very effectively reminded the Kumai people of Kup that his ancestors had 
sheltered theirs in precolonial times oi warfare. Kai Bomai also used a local 
appeal in saying he would ensure that more of his Society's loans went to 
Gumine, Salt and Nomane people. He had some credibility, in that he was 
already in a position to honour his promise - even though he would lose it 
once elected ! 
The personality, integrity and credibility of candidates was a muted issue . 
Okuk told Joseph Tiene he was a rubbish-man because he lacked a car with 
speakers . He told Kale he was the son of a bad man, not a big man.  In 
discussing Okuk's claim to be the next Prime Minister , a close supporter of 
Kale told me 'A man who is cross like that cannot be Prime Minister, not one 
who attacks people like that' . A very politically aware Simbu public servant 
expressed amazement late in the campaign when he said 'Okuk is so smart . He 
can twist people around his finger . They can't  see how he is operating . They 
can't  see what he is doing . They believe him ' .  There were some who 
disbelieved , however , such as the Provincial Secretary, Barunke Kaman, who 
had a stand up row with Okuk in the main street of Kundiawa in January, 
accusing him of corruption . Four months later , mid-campaign, Okuk 
launched criminal charges (spreading false reports so as to create disaffection 
between people) which is the classic way to silence someone. The matter was 
adjourned to enable Kaman to prepare his defence, and Okuk let the matter 
lapse after the election. It had served its purpose. Pangu supporter� were well 
aware of the laws of libel , too, but quietly raised Okuk's business activities and 
his use of government resources with me and quite possibly others.  
These matters came to a head as the last big issue of the campaign. In  June, 
while Okuk was in New Ireland, the Lutheran churchmen who were directors 
of Kuman Holdings discovered that their Banz coffee factory manager had 
lent Okuk some K22,000 for coffee buying, an amount which was overdue for 
some two months . (Normally a good coffee buyer will ' turn around' his 
buying advance and 'acquit ' it with coffee and take his profit within a week .) 
Incensed, the directors sacked the manager (who started working for Okuk) , 
and attempted to recall the money. On his return to Simbu in mid-June Okuk 
freely admitted the debt (and actually showed me his documents) , but was 
furious . He said the Lutherans took it to mean that he had stolen the money 
because he had had an expensive campaign . Beginning on 13 June his full fury 
was directed at the senior expatriate Lutheran, an American, whom Okuk 
accused of being a U.S .  Central Intelligence Agency operative . He said he 
would have him deported, and called him Namba Tu Satan (Satan' s  Deputy) . 
Those of Okuk's  kin close to the Lutherans at Kundiawa dissociated 
themselves from this attack on the missionary, who had in April told me that ' I  
can't see why people try t o  use u s ,  although we are close t o  the people' . Now 
he asserted that he had 75,000 people behind him and that attacking the church 
was equivalent to criticizing motherhood . A Kamanegu said that Okuk had 
cost his fellow-tribesmen so dearly that if he failed to win the election he would 
die. Characteristically , when told that Lutheran church services in the 
Gembogl area had been used to attack him , Okuk broadcast the allegations of 
theft ,  and he was planning legal action against Kale on the day of the road 
accident . Okuk's  faithful supporter Wagua Goiye defended him publicly at 
Kerowagi , saying that Okuk was not a thief, but rather a rich man , one who 
had cars . The role of wealth in the campaign needs deeper exploration . 
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Gifts and Generosity: 'wokim liklik bribery nabaut' 
Simbu was financially flush during the coffee boom, with few investment 
opportunities apart from social exchange relationships such as marriage and 
death payments and - in 1977 - electioneering . This section discusses 
whether one candidate's  creole phrase quoted above ('doing a little bit of 
bribery around and about') fairly describes the use of money during the 
elections .  In the first instance, there was the straightforward cost of vehicles 
(some were bought on hire purchase and reclaimed after the election) , petrol , 
sound equipment, the printing of posters and (for four candidates) charter 
costs for aircraft used in leaflet droppings . Less readily judged were the large 
payments made to campaign helpers by some candidates , or the over-generous 
prices paid for coffee by Michael Danga and several others . Finally , there were 
gifts . Peter Kumgi gave K300 to several communities for church improve­
ments ,  to good effect .  One non-drinker's  poster warned about those who used 
gris: �01 member bilong beer tasol long hotel na town tasol' (Their electorate 
will be hotel and town, they will only represent beer ! ) .  Dick Dee urged people 
in a public notice played over Radio Kundiawa to vote for the best man and 
not the party, and not to vote for those who were trying to buy votes with beer 
and cash . In a speech discussing Okuk and Kumgi , Sir Tei Abal made the same 
point , adding that people should take the gifts but not to give their votes in 
return . Amongst several who loudly protested their incorruptibility, one 
councillor in the Gumine area happily told me he had taken Okuk 's proffered 
K30, but said he was suggesting to his lain that they voted for Kai Bomai or 
Nilkare, the local men. 
Such statements go against Simbu cultural mores , in which reciprocity is a 
strong value, and a gift incurs an obligation and opens a continuing exchange 
relationship . So I am sure that some of these men protested too much . 
Meanwhile, the local-level leaders made their own harvest in the electoral 
sunshine. 'Custom' is legally defined in Papua New Guinea as what people do, 
and traditions are constantly changing . It was thus possible for all candidates 
to give generously towards major prestations in their home areas as a 
customary gesture, even though thousands of kina changed hands . Yet like 
John Nilkare , who made massive contributions of beer and beasts to death 
payments in certain areas well away from his home base, they regarded this an 
electoral ' investment' . 
Beer had been used as electoral gris in a minor way since the 1 964 House of 
Assembly elections in Simbu (Kuabaal 1 976) , but in 1977 it was the 
outstanding feature of the campaign . Huge parties were heavily subsidized by 
the maj or Provincial candidates in some areas , especially Gunanggi in 
Sinasina. Local leaders were repeatedly given cartons by the more affluent 
candidates, while others (such as Kai Bomai) cleverly stirred up the resentment 
of those voters who missed out . John Kaupa persuaded the brewery supplying 
his local Elimbari Corporation to prepare the tavern at Chuave for opening in 
three days flat, just before voting started . Despite. Chimbu Yomba' s Kl  ,OOO 
contribution many missed out on free beef, pork and 'small pig' at the 
opening . Huge parties were held in many parts of the province. Prompted by a 
follower, Okuk told me he had not given out any beer , but that such parties 
had been laid on for him in several places in spontaneous demonstrations of 
support . 
Cash was also used quite spectacularly, and here I exclude Lutheran leaders 
refunding shareholders in the church company, Namasu . Although it was 
sometimes difficult to distinguish between a gift for electoral purposes and an 
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advance of a few thousand kina to buy coffee (which may or may not be 
delivered), a few cases can be documented. Thus Okuk gave K200 to Asuwe 
Kawage, who then danced across the main street of Kundiawa holding the 
money aloft shouting that he had been given it to support him, and others 
should vote for him too. One winner told me he pressed K2 into the hands of 
women on the roadside if they looked sad, and one loser told me he surrep­
titiously gave cash to clan leaders when they were drunk. Money was given out 
quite freely in several parts of the province by Open and Provincial candidates . 
Some villagers were clearly reluctant to discuss this with strangers , so there was 
some sense of impropriety. Yet Wagua Goiye used Okuk's speaker in 
Kerowagi on 14 June to proclaim 'We' re not greasing you, giving money or 
beer in an underhand way. We're doing it in the public eye . '  
Given the fact o f  the coffee flush,  some candidates had the resources 
to drive each other into increasingly reckless acts of generosity. In this 
competition they were giving to third parties, rather than directly to each other 
as in Massim (Young 197 1 ) .  Probably the candidates themselves kept no 
books, but five Open candidates told me they spent K25 ,000 in total . All lost. 
The following campaign expenditures were freely admitted by Provincial 
canidates : Kumgi , K480; Bomai , K l  ,500; Geri , K6,000; Nilkare, K7 ,OOO; Kale, 
K l l ,000; while Okuk told me on 9 July in front of several people ' I 've spent 
around K2 1 ,000 and I haven't counted yet all that I 've given out' . 1 3 Needless to 
say, most candidates estimated the others' expenditure to be even higher . 
With 105 candidates in Simbu it is not unreasonable to argue that well over 
K1 50,000 or K2 per voter was spent in Simbu on the election. When the 
average cash income in Simbu is well below KlOO per annum , not only is this a 
significant amount of money, but it also shows how all but a very few are 
excluded from entering such a costly race . Few expatriate businessmen in 
Simbu admitted giving cash to candidates who approached them, preferring to 
help in kind (with petrol for instance) , although several Western Highlands 
businessmen regard a K50 present to all-comers as standard practice. Pangu 
headquarters gave Kale K9,000, Geri used K2,000 of Country Party cash. 
Nilkare told me he had been given K2,000 by ' friends ' ,  and although their 
contributions were only in varying degrees voluntary the Simbu coffee 
factories still had almost Kl00,000 unacquitted advances at the end of 1977 ! 1 4 
Assessing all this generosity is complex . Michael Danga said 'The Simbu 
sway like leaves in the breeze . I give you cash you praise me to the skies . I go 
and you kick me under a car . '  Bribery and treating with drink so as to 
influence voting are criminal offences . The National Constitution prohibits 
foreign firms or individuals giving money for political purposes to Papua New 
Guinean political parties or individuals, but the Organic Law which is needed 
to spell out these provisions was conveniently not enacted before the election, 
nor had it been by the 1982 elections . Bribery or the exercise of 'undue influence' 
are sufficient grounds under the electoral law for declaring a poll null and 
void.  A possible defence against some charges might be that gift exchange for 
prestige purposes is a customary practice, with generosity and display being 
intrinsic to the Melanesian way to leadership.  Proving the intent to bribe, let 
alone the efficacy of any gift ,  might well be difficult . Yet gifts to local leaders 
did win support , although the village people may have voted as advised for a 
variety of other reasons , including indifference . The modern-day exchange 
relationship may not necessarily win votes by incurring an obligation, but 
because a candidate is seen as being a good , generous person who has also 
demonstrated the capacity to work one part of the modern system (bisnis) , by 
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extension he or she might then (in a continuation of the relationship) be able to 
deliver the goods from the governmental arena as well . 
Even if voters merely took the presents and voted as they chose, I feel safe in 
predicting that staggering electoral expenditures have become a new Simbu 
tradition until such time as large organisations such as political parties can 
reliably deliver large blocks of votes . 
The Count 
Voting itself was a peaceful process , but the shouting only stopped after a 
three week poll . The count got underway to reveal a slightly higher turnout by 
enrolled voters than in 1 972, 58 per cent (76 , 705 votes) as against 55 per cent 
(62,656 votes) (see Table 2) . The high number ( 1 9 .2 per cent) of voters not 
located on the electoral rolls in 1977 leads to over-estimation of voting 
turnout , as in 1972 (Standish 1976b, 342) . Yet there was a clear increase in 
participation especially the 20 per cent rise in Chuave and Kerowagi (two 
electorates using the old boundaries) which were areas of extravagant 
compaigning. Once again the turnout generally was lowest in the most 
developed areas: Kunidawa, had only 40 per cent . Remote Karimui-Nomane's  
85 per cent vote reflects the fact that people there were lined up to vote by 
kiaps and police in the worst authoritarian 'colonial ' style . But the spread of 
voting was wide, and in particular the Provincial candidates succeeded much 
better in getting out the vote in 1977 . The informal vote was again neglible for 
the Open seats , and for the Provincial seat it dropped from 36. 1 to 6 .2  per cent . 
The informal vote in Karimui-Nomane was still the highest , reflecting poor 
penetration, especially in the remotest areas off the road network , but fell 
from 83 per cent in 1 972 to 25 per cent in 1977. 
The breakdown of votes by ballot-box in Open seats shows most clearly the 
importance of real or implied kinship, the way whole clans and tribes vote 
almost unanimously for a single candidate . This reflects a corporate approach 
to political action, whether or not it resulted from leaders ' suggestions . Most 
often people voted for the man with whose group they had closest continuing 
social relationships . With the exception of Yangpela Didiman President Anna 
Nombri , who for a long time was considered to be a potential candidate, 
women had not taken an active , visible part in the campaign . The female vote 
was as high as the men's .  Although some men jested that they could not gris 
their wives on how to vote, the solidity of voting by ballot box indicates that 
men and women voted the same way in the same places . (Most marriages take 
place between neighbouring clans, however, so commonality of political 
interest is likely .) With the first-past-the-post system being used for the first 
time, the dangers of splitting the votes of a lain were greatly increased. All the 
winners had taken a long time to shore up substantial populations against 
rivals, with one exception . In Kerowagi an eloquent young prison warder 
(Wagua Goiye) attached himself to Okuk and made a generalized appeal in a 
hotly-contested electorate . In four months he managed to overturn the some­
what ineffectual sitting Member - who came from the same clan and the same 
party (UP) . Not one sitting Open member was returned . Deliberate moves to 
set up friends to block rivals succeeded in several instances . John Kaupa had 
said 'This is the dirty politics ' but he was to be beaten at his own game . 
Party allegiance appeared to be quite irrelevant in rural Simbu , where 
modern political institutions are used to play out old clan rivalries . Here I 
disagree with Sir Tei Abal , who at one rally compared party conflict with clan 
warfare . Parties are significant in parliament , but not on the hustings (cf. 
Table 2 
Chimbu Provincial Election, 1977: Interim Count by Open Electorate 
(Candidates' home electorate vote underlined) 
CHIMBU PROVINCIAL 
CHUAVE GUMINE KARIUMI/ KEROWAGI KUNDIAWA SINASINA/ TOTAL PERCENTAGES 
NO MANE YONGGAMUGL 
Peter Kumgi 1 58 1 6 1  248 4 1 38 387 37 5 1 29 6.7 
John Mua Nilkare 2 1 05 4049 680 2475 554 1 609 1 1 472 1 5 .0 
Kobale Kale 4026 449 2238 1 535 992 2787 1 1 962 1 5 . 6 
Andrew K. Kondom 8 4 1 3  1 8  794 1 6  846 1 . 1  
Kai Bomai 52 3889 4700 62 55 1 498 1 0266 1 3 .4 
Michael Danga 21 2 206 1 289* 1 64* 9 1 69 1  2.2 
Jerry K .  Geri 1 985 6 325 9 26 397 2748 3 . 6  
Maima Yoba 5 3935 2 1  639 37 820 5447 7. 1 V} 
Iambakey Okuk 4333 284 1 65 3342 7694 8 1 9  1 6909 22.0 §' c:::s--
Yuke Komba 3 1 5  9 49 72 9 1  4933 547 1 7 . 1  
� 
INFORMAL 946 409 2875 229 1 03 1 94 4756 6.2 
INFORMAL (%) (6.8) (3 . 1 ) (25 .0) ( 1 .  7) (0. 9) ( 1 . 5 )  (6.2) 
TOTAL 1 3954 1 3 1 97 1 1 520 1 3808 1 1 097 1 3 1 1 1  76705 1 00  
Votes cast a s  OJo 
of persons enrolled 76 5 5  8 5  69 40 46 58 
*Note: M ichael Danga is a Kamanegu tribesman born in Kundiawa, but has settled with his father near Kerowagi, outside the Kundiawa 
electorate. 
Source: Adapted from preliminary figures prepared by Chimbu Provincial Returning Officer; the ' Total' column , which comes from his 
statistical return does not quite tally with the sum of the Open Electorate votes . 
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Hegarty 1 979) . The instrumental nature of commitment to parties was shown 
by candidates who, for years had declared their loyalty to one party, changed 
allegiance overnight when denied endorsement and funding. Of endorsed 
candidates , Pangu had three winners and UP two; Poiye went with Okuk when 
he failed to gain a ministry. Within a year all Simbu members j oined Okuk' s  
faction , having broken with Pangu or  UP to  do  so . These men would most 
probably have won on the hustings whatever party embraced them, given the 
potency of local loyalties . The Open winners were relatively young, educated 
and wealthy . 
Broadly sketching the Provincial result, Okuk won with 22 per cent of the 
vote, beating the closely clustered Kale ( 1 5 . 6  per cent) , Nilkare ( 1 5 . 0 per cent) 
and Kai Bomai ( 1 3 .4 per cent) with the other six well behind . The candidates ' 
spread of appeal varied greatly. Looking at their votes by Open electorate, the 
minor candidates gained from 72 to 93 per cent of their votes inside their home 
territory. The major candidates had obviously shown a more general appeal , 
some of which can be attributed to kinship, some to party and factional and 
religious linkages , some to personal friendship, and some to straight gen­
erosity . I do not have complete information on all these factors , and so cannot 
weigh their relative importance . Shortage of time and space preclude detailed 
analysis of the contents of 200 ballot boxes here. 
The 'bomai strategy' (saying Okuk's  re-election would make southerners 
the servants of highway people) was a potential winner, judged by votes 
available, but failed for lack of coordination and cooperation between Nilkare 
and Kai Bomai which led to splitting . Maima Yoba helped divide the 
two southerners , although he also may have hindered Okuk by winning a 
solid block of votes in Dom, his home area . Kai Bomai polled very strongly in 
his base area Gumine, and also in Nomane, where his mother ' s  people come 
from . He has some family ties into the Gunanggi part of Sinasina; he picked 
up almost 1 ,500 votes in that electorate. All this was territory which Nilkare 
(and to a leasser extent Kale) hoped to harvest . Although Kai Bomai and 
Nilkare reduced Okuk' s  vote in Gumine from 2,000 votes in 1 972 to 284 in 
1977, they helped Okuk by destroying each other , and by excluding Kale. 
Nilkare 's  ties with the province' s  young elite of coffee buyers apparently 
helped him a great deal , for example in Chuave where the winning Pangu 
candidate, the coffee-buyer Robert Kaki Yabara, helped Nilkare gain 2, 1 00 
votes . Interestingly, Nilkare collected almost 2,500 votes in Kup census 
division south of the Waghi river . As mentioned this reflects not only his 
modern-day southern appeal but also his recalling of his clan' s  historic debt.  
He won 1 , 500 votes in Kobale's Sinasina area . Again, there was lack of 
cooperation between these near-relatives . Simbu politicians were amazed, im­
mediately after the elections, when Nilkare started mustering successful candi­
dates on behalf of Pangu . Subsequently it emerged that through the campaign 
he had been a member of that party' s National Executive ! 
Given that his accident had cast real doubt on his future, Kale's  unspecta­
cular pork-barrel approach served him very well to take him into second place . 
His share of the vote in Sinasina was low (2 1 per cent) but this was possibly 
only in part because of the fighting under way during the polling . He had been 
a conscientious local member , and he even won votes amongst what were then 
enemy lains. There are signs,  apart from any help from his Lutheran 
connections, that the favourable comments about Kale which I heard from 
Seventh-Day leaders - including expatriates - helped him win votes where 
this church was strong. Conflicts within Yangpela Didiman over money 
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matters and Arba's blatantly political use of that association's  vehicle possibly 
stopped it delivering many · votes to Kale . In addition, many leading 
association members were already tied up with other political factions. If 
Poiye's offer to stand aside for Kale was genuine, the latter had grounds to 
regret abandoning Sinasina. 
Okuk 's vote is harder to explain .  He maintained his high vote in 
Kundiawa, especially in the Chimbu valley where he took credit for road 
improvements .  His attempt to use the Gumine road works failed , if only 
because of the presence of two strong local opponents , although he had done 
well there in 1 972. Despite Kerowagi being Kumgi 's  home area, Okuk polled 
strongly there, in alliance with the Open winner Goiye. Although he lost votes 
in the Kuman language area to Komba, Kumgi , Danga and Kondom, and 
some to Geri in Chuave, their narrow appeal meant they posed no threat . 
Indeed, Okuk's  greatest gain was in Chuave, where identical boundaries 
enable direct comparison with the 1 972 vote. Okuk's  total rose from 1 ,240 to 
4,333 , with almost all this gain located in the Nambaiyufa Census Division . 
Nambaiyufa was the most isolated 'neutral' area - in terms of kinship 
linkages - of any major population centre in the entire province. Here Okuk 
took credit for the roadworks in progress,  and had set up a base camp for his 
coffee buying operation . He had also cultivated very close ties with local 
leaders . They held a big party for him and his generosity was well known . 
Okuk pulled in virtually all the votes from much of Nambaiyufa. If any single 
area influenced the election, I should say it was this census division with its 
own language, a large population, and a quite separate geographic identity. 
Okuk succeeded in Nambaiyufa despite the efforts of a traditional leader -
the former MHA, modern businessman and Provincial assemblyman , Yauwe 
Wauwe - to swing Provincial votes to Kale and Pangu . 
Counting lasted four nights and three days; on the second day Okuk arose 
from his post-campaign depression, proclaimed his coming victory to 
Kundiawa town, and held yet another party for his followers. 
Public Servants and Electoral Administration 
The Simbu count and indeed the whole voting process were complicated 
because Papua New Guinea has had the misfortune to inherit some very 
complex electoral procedures , which are ill-suited to a country with an inexper­
ienced bureaucracy and a largely non-literate population scattered across some 
of the world' s  roughest terrain . In addition, rapid localization of the public 
service meant that few national officials had previous experience in running 
elections. With the rundown of the kiap field service, there was no effective 
census from 1 972 to 1 978 in Simbu, and the electoral rolls - never really 
accurate - were thoroughly obsolete. Private individuals, including one 
Clement Poiye, were paid to help update these rolls . There were ' computer 
foulups' (human errors) locating whole lains in the wrong electorate, or even 
losing them altogether. It was no surprise, then , that the names of 14 ,  703 
voters ( 1 9. 2  per cent) could not be located on the rolls, compared with 4, 1 03 
(6 .5  per cent) in 1 972. 
Returning Officers for all  seats in Simbu criticized the rolls and several re­
commended their abandonment . Aftet" an attempt at dubious practices in 
Kundiawa township was foiled, a master roll (on which all votes taken for the 
electorate were checked off daily) was used in the Kamanegu area. In most 
electorates polling teams were using up to four rolls simultaneously . The possi­
bility thus existed for double - or multiple - voting and some preposterous 
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allegations to that effect were rife. The system of declarations made by those 
whose names are not on the roll is not foolproof. Nor can Voter Identification 
Tribunals comprising local notables (which were tried in the 1 970 Chimbu 
Regional By-election) guarantee propriety . Candidates' scrutineers would be a 
partial check only on false statements by such Tribunals. Heavy voting in 
urban areas always leaves the possibility of doubling-up in rural areas . The 
only system which would prevent this is use of an indelible dye on the hand or 
fingernail that lasts for the polling period - which should be as brief as possible. 
This system was successfully tried in the Eastern Highlands Provincial Govern­
ment election in 1978 . No roll is needed for this system, thus greatly speeding 
the voting procedure and saving the large sums of money now spent preparing 
a roll which is inadequate, as shown by the high number of declaration voters 
all over Papua New Guinea. Some Simbu electoral officials proposed that 
voter cards be issued and then surrendered or punched, but these could well be 
' lost' before the election, and would still pose the same problems of identifica­
tion as does the present roll system , thereby still requiring a system of 
declaration . The United Nations team observing the 1 972 election recomended 
the use of dye, and in my opinion it remains the best available option . 
Although it requires rapid polling with less complex procedures this should be 
possible . 
Starting with the announcement of the 1976 recommendations for boundary 
redistribution, allegations of partisan bias by officials abounded . The Pro­
vincial Returning Officer reported of the 1 976 redistribution (which was 
accepted in 1 977) that 
It may seem a small matter yet its effect in Chimbu was such that the elections and 
electoral officials popularly were held in disrepute well before the start of polling, 
even more so than in previous elections . 1 5 
He believed that this problem in part arose because of poor communication by 
Electoral Commission staff of details of the new Organic Law on Elections . 
Briefing of interested members of the public fell to officials in other 
departments, who were often new to the job and/ or unaware of changes to the 
electoral law . The need for intending candidates to be on the roll for the seat 
where they wanted to stand caused considerable confusion and added to the 
levels of tension and the acrimony in Simbu . 
Former candidates who lost in 1 972 and even winners like Okuk had for 
years alleged that Simbu students acting as poll clerks had ' rigged' the ballot 
while assisting illiterate voters using the 'whisper' system, and so by general 
consensus the 1 977 candidates initially asked the officials to exclude all high­
landers from polling teams. After polling started , perhaps afraid of coastal 
backlash after the regionalist extremes of the campaign, they demanded that 
coastal officers be replaced with Simbu . As a compromise, teams were then 
balanced out with coastal officers and highlanders paired off and voters were 
reminded they each could take a witness into the booth . Some educated youths 
feigned illiteracy so as to check the clerks who were recording their whispered 
vote . Only one claimed his vote had been wrongly recorded , a doubtful 
allegation which was not made until long after the event . Every effort was 
made by those in charge of the electoral organization in Simbu to develop 
public credibility, a difficult task when few people - and certainly not all the 
officials - could follow the procedures . 
After the elections several allegations were made that polling officials had 
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been drinking with certain Open candidates , despite previous dire warnings 
from the Secretary for Provincial Affairs . In two proven instances where 
fraternization involved drinking with a Provincial candidate and giving him a 
lift in a government car16  the public servants involved were transferred out , or 
sacked . One official interpreter campaigned quietly for Okuk, and perhaps 
others had similar loyalties . Delba Biri ' s  workmates in the government 
transport pool tended to support him, as Kumgi 's in the Department of 
Primary Industry . Before the poll Kale's  group reported an alleged conspiracy 
by senior officials who were members of a gambling school to ensure that 
Okuk won. Although no solid evidence was produced, Cabinet was said to 
have believed this wild story. One of the men allegedly involved was 
embarking on furlough for the election period. The complex mechanics of a 
conspiracy involving- seven returning officers and twenty five polling teams 
seem to make this allegation presposterous . The Simbu Premier greatly upset 
coastal officials in warning them publicly not to cheat , a sign of the suspicion 
harboured by illiterate people towards the educated . 
The atmosphere was such , then, that losing candidates had ready-made 
rationalizations for their defeat . Certainly some minor malpractice was 
tolerated, like outsize posters , but I believe there were sufficient checks and 
balances to prevent gross abuses . But the losing candidates had had a lot at 
stake. Either they could not or would not understand the system , no matter 
how often it was explained to them, or they would nod their heads and go 
away repeating their allegations of malpractice, perhaps just to save face . 
There were so many requests for information on how to lodge Disputed 
Return appeals that the Provincial Returning Officer printed and distributed 
in bulk a slip giving the Public Solicitor' s  address . Apart from bribery (which 
no-one alleged in this context) , the vanquished wanted to report slander, 
multiple voting and illegal trucking in of large numbers of ineligible voters . 17 
The first is not a ground for appeal , and the latter must be shown to have 
materially affected the result . On 9 July Okuk told me he had trucked in 2, 800 
Simbu from the Western Highlands who had not been away six months and 
were thus elegible voters . This was not in itself grounds for an appeal , as it 
would not have materially affected the result because his winning margin was 
4,945 . Okuk's  rival ' s  Danga and Nilkare who were initially thinking of 
appealing against the result were unable to muster sufficient evidence, or 
energy, and eventually decided to let the issue lie.  Some, at least, of these 
problems could be avoided by amending the Electoral Act and procedures . 
In the immediate aftermath of the elections, candidates who could not 
tolerate their shame and loss of face tended to take their frustrations out on 
electoral officials .  The reasons are clear enough . Being unable to blame either 
themselves , their own lains (to whom they were mostly deeply obligated , even 
where the lain 's vote had been split) , or neighbouring lains (which would raise 
the chances of fights erupting) , they took the easy road of blaming somewhat 
defenceless and - in Simbu terms - tribally neutral , public servants .  In each 
Open electorate in Simbu there were menacing confrontations involving ugly 
demonstrations at government offices and/or vehicle holdups on roads . Severe 
damage was done by stones thrown at government housing at Sinasina which 
injured the wife of one official . The Acting Provincial Commissioner shrewdly 
replayed over Radio Kundiawa a speech by the Prime Minister , saying that the 
losers had only themselves to blame, and that their kinsmen should not be 
duped into attacking officials . The storm subsided in a few days . However, 
while one outgoing member had previously threatened to blast off with his 
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shotgun if ne lost , it was another who actually did so in a harmless but 
terrifying rampage around a government statjon that terminated in a short 
term of imprisonment . Other failed candidates tightened bows and loosed 
arrows, and there was a very angry brawl at Omkolai village between the two 
losing candidates' families there. Serious fighting erupted in the Laiagam area 
of Enga Province and was threatened elsewhere, so Simbu again was not 
unique in this regard . 
Such 'wild man' behaviour when frustration becomes intolerable is not 
uncommon in the highlands (Clarke 1973) , and people have learnt to live with 
it; but it also clearly raises doubts as to the administration of the electoral 
process .  One immediate result was the demand from all staff at Sinasina 
District Headquaters for immediate transfer out of Simbu, and understand­
able expressions of reluctance by public servants in Simbu to officiate during 
any future elections there . Ultimately, of course , the village people will suffer 
from the resultant decline in services , which will lead to increased frustration , 
in a vicious, descending, spiral . 
Conclusion 
Chimbu is not a happy province; life is harsh and local politics always tense . 
The struggle to climb into the political kingdom is doubly bitter when the 
whole society is under stress . Social turmoil was manifest in the 1 977 
campaign, but was not caused by the elections - although they intensified it. 
Nor were internal problems resolved . Clan fighting continued through into 
1982, with only a temporary lull during the 1979 State of Emergency . After the 
elections Okuk clashed with the SIPG, and a series of demonstrations in 
1978 perhaps showed the low public acceptance of that body. Provincial 
government elections will give a further chance to test the observations made 
and trends identified in this paper . In 1978,  it appeared to me that Okuk had 
kept his faction together in preparation for these elections , and there was some 
continuing party involvement too . Meanwhile, the most significant issues 
discussed here relate to the nature and legitimacy of the electoral process in 
changing Simbu society . In discussing the legitimacy of the election it helps to 
distinguish between the accepted process of campaigning and the actual result , 
the acceptance or otherwise of the winner . 
As usual , an accepted gap between rhetoric and reality is implicit in the 
campaign process.  Candidates made pledges even while denying the validity of 
election promises . The efficacy of gris was denied yet there was a huge flow of 
electorally-motivated giving . Recipients often asserted their autonomy but 
behaved as though obligated, and could not help but be impressed by the 
wealth and generosity of candidates even when they knew its source and 
motivation . There was very clever manipulation of cultural mores , under the 
guise of modern politics , and similarly quite modern political activity was 
dressed up as 'traditional' . It is widely accepted in the social sciences that 
tradition/modernity dichotomy is false (Gusfield 1966) , and certainly in 
Simbu they cannot be separated . Yet while villagers expressed niggling doubts 
as to the morality of the electoral gris, campaigns have become progressively 
more lavish over the years as Simbu people move further into the capitalist 
economy. The coffee-cash-campaigning nexus seems likely to last. There is an 
acceptance of the ritual of the campaign beer party, while making a half­
hearted denial of its effectiveness .  Perhaps only 1 5  per cent of beer 
consumption during the campaign was electoral gris. There is also, at last, 
some understanding of the nature and mechanisms of political parties , highly 
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personalized though these are in Papua New Guinea (cf. Hegarty 1 979, 
Standish 1977) . 
Parliamentarians are expected to fill several roles , all of which affect the 
public acceptance of the result of elections in a society with highly divided, 
particularist local loyalties . Most importantly, a Member is expected to 'bring 
home the bacon' in the form of projects and employment for his electorate 
(Gadbois et al. 1 978), and especially for his own lain . Groups who have 
gambled - which is their concept - on losing candidates thus feel they have 
wasted their effort . A Member is expected to be a delegate, rather than a 
representative with freedom of political judgement . Perhaps most important , 
the elections are contests between the clans and tribes, a poorly sublimated 
manifestation of traditional rivalries . Again,  local kinship loyalties preclude 
the transfer of much trust to the member of a potentially (or actually) hostile 
lian . 
Electoral defeat brings humiliation - just as victory brings pride - not 
just to candidates themselves but to whole lains. The kinship divisions in 
Simbu are real : they are not merely a colonial divide-and-rule ploy, and are 
intensifying with increasing pressure on available resources . With so much at 
stake, it is not surprising that one winner needed a police escort while another 
had to fly to Kundiawa via Goroka in order to avoid roadblocks set up by the 
vanquished . One winner could visit only a tiny proportion of his electorate in 
the following two years because of warfare . 
To a far greater extent than Open Members, the Provincial Member can be 
above such intense parochialism, and thus have a wider legitimacy. But his 
effectiveness as a representative is reduced because he has to cover such a large 
constituency . Having Provincial Members does help smaller provinces in the 
National Parliament. Yet incumbent parliamentarians are unlikely to make the 
necessary constitutional amendments to get rid of the Provincial Member 
system , and so it will no doubt stay . 
The potency of parochialism makes it possible for wealthy leaders to mani­
pulate kinship loyalty. In this case they are dividing the peasantry vertically 
rather than building up horizontal class consciousness and allegiances . The 
'peasantry' is an analytical category only , and Marx's famous simile which 
compared the divided peasantry to a sack of potatoes holds as true for Simbu 
today as it did for France a century ago . There are both ascribed and achieved 
elements in clan and tribal leadership (Standish 1 978) , and broker and patron­
client linkages which open the way to influence for young educated men in key 
positions. Properly played, these advantages can enable young men to gain the 
commitment of their elders and to recruit or neutralize possible opponents in 
that key part of the electoral process, the hidden lobbying before nominations 
even open. 
The candidates were clearly men of some stature or potential within village 
Simbu, and were mostly already members of the rural elite . The winners were 
not a fair cross-section of the range of candidates. Three were businessmen 
(coffee buyer politicians) , and three white-collar workers (one a teacher) , while 
only one was a blue-collar worker (who also sometimes bought coffee) . None 
are peasants,  big or small . The average age of winners was 35 years and their 
education level Grade 9, which compares with the outgoing members' age of 
42 and three years' schooling . Most of these modern young men got few votes 
outside their own la ins, however . So while there was a changing of the guard in 
1 977 , it was performed to the old parochial tune, and the successors were 
amongst the wealthier men in their areas . 
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As elsewhere in Papua New Guinea (Groves et al. 1 97 1 ) and overseas 
(Edelman 1 972) personality , symbolism and political style were important in 
the Provincial race and in some of the Open seats . Parties were unimportant 
except where they became part of personal political factional machines . 
Policies were essentially unimportant , although regionalism - in the nation 
and province - was . Patronage links mattered for some candidates . One 
unusual campaign was that of Wagua Goiye, the young prison warder who 
enmeshed himself with Okuk and whose rhetorical skill was such that an 
opponent said his words were like butter . Goiye collected a sufficiently wide 
spread of votes throughout Kerowagi to defeat the sitting member from his 
own lain . Okuk and the UP provided resources to give him a high profile, and 
he had already won many friends amongst those imprisoned for fighting . 
Kobale lacked Okuk 's  assertive, thrusting personality and so the Pangu team 's  
figurehead throughout the campaign was Michael Somare. By attacking 
Somare, Okuk by implication raised himself to the same level and thereby put 
Kobale down. I have seen profound awe inspired amongst village people by 
Okuk' s  presence and the mention of his absentee protagonist Somare , and also 
servile deference accorded to both from prominent local leaders . Some might 
call this charisma (Willner and Willner 1 965) .  Okuk did not have this before 
gaining high office, and so (following Tucker) I am reluctant to call this 
'charisma' (Tucker 1 968) . Okuk won many votes in the Provincial electorate 
from people who voted for Pangu candidates in the Open seats, and so the 
conflict with Somare did not engender watertight political allegiances . Indeed 
one Simbu graduate told me that his people liked both men and were quite 
happy to watch them locked in continuing conflict . This i s  not just a flip 
comment about a warrior culture, however, as two strong men might provide 
useful checks and balances on government . 
As befits a highlands leader, Okuk was able to draw favourab.Ie responses 
from various levels of the Simbu audience . He vigorously played on a 
provincial scale the old tricks of a clan leader , and as Burridge has said it is real 
big-men who ' transcend the system' (Young 1 97 1 ,  1 1 3) ,  thereby creating new 
rules . He was tough-minded , bold and resolute, combative in public and 
quietly smiling and manipulative in private. He had built up friendships that in 
turn added more and more subsidiary parton-client networks to his pyramidal 
faction .  He voiced reasons for Simbu 's troubles , a regionalist appeal to 
those in urban employment, and he played upon the coffee price issue for the 
rural people . He was able to take credit for a few government projects ,  
although he had not used the pork-barrel well . This was h is  third election 
campaign in seven years , he was the incumbent , and he had been a government 
minister - so his name was by far the best known in the province . As in 1 970 
and 1 972, he was the main target of his opponents and thereby gained even 
further publicity . In 1 977 he increased his vote by 57 per cent compared with 
his 1 972 primary poll ,  yet this time his vote was far less evenly spread 
throughout the province (cf. Standish 1 976b , 344) . He used every gimmick, 
from traditional symbolism to car stickers and printed shirts,  started in front 
and remained the strongest candidate. 
This story leads me to a number of  propositions about political participation 
in Simbu , and elsewhere. Following Parry, I take political participation to 
mean the opportunity to significantly influence policy and the course of events 
(Parry 1 972) . Improved communications and other aspects of modernization , 
especially the increased cash flow, enabled the greatly increased penetration of 
Simbu rural society by members of the political elite, especially in the 
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Provincial contest , which led to the improved mobilization to vote indicated 
by the 79 per cent drop in the informal vote. Parochial ties and personality had 
greater potency than party or policy . Because of the gutter-brawl nature of 
some of the slogans which gained currency amongst rural people, and massive 
political ignorance, I conclude that votes were not made on the basis of 
informed political judgement . The proposition of John Kaputin, Member for 
Rabaul Open , that 'We Tolai have political consciousness;  a few beers are not 
enough to swing votes' is not relevant for Simbu . Yet even during the 
campaign most people gave only passing attention to the political antics 
around them, and although they discussed politics in the men's  houses the 
criteria used in collective decision-making would not impress the founding 
fathers of liberal democracy . 
After the colonial interlude, then, Simbu people probably have less political 
participation in affairs that concern them than before colonial contact . Their 
views are sought even less assiduously than in the colonial era, and they 
certainly were not masters of their destiny then . They now vote , but they do 
not accept the outcome of the poll, whereas in the colonial era the Administra­
tion's  role as arbiter had some legitimacy. Modern politics and government in 
Simbu are in upheaval , expressed as much in inter-clan rivalry as in the local , 
provincial and national arenas . The ground-rules have not been internalized at 
any institutional level , as is exemplified by the resurgence of local warfare, 
which feeds into conflict in the modern institutions.  Thus I echo Huntington in 
saying that there is not much 'political development' (in the sense of institu­
tionalization) , but rather the opposite: Simbu politics is in a state of 'decay' 
(Huntington 1 965) , perhaps 'terminal development ' (Howlett 1 973) .  
Yet it  can be argued that given the range of candidates presenting themselves 
in 1 977 , the Simbu people were not duped . There is a tradition of tolerating the 
extravagant use and display of public resources for the purposes of individual 
and group glorification . Villagers shrug and say �pasin bilong of ' ( 'that is the 
way' of big-men) . The Australian administration merely adapted Simbu 
customs in this regard . There is some grumbling about exploitation , usually 
concerning the leaders of other groups but sometimes - in a very low voice -
about one' s own. If village people have some connection with a leader , 
however tenuous, they may feel also some faint chance of receiving some 
future spinoff in a continuation of the relationship.  So from the point of view 
of the ' fatalistic' peasant minimizing his risks and chosing the limited good 
(Foster 1 965) , it is perfectly rational for him to give his vote and ultimately the 
highest head-dress to the politician he knows rather than to the one he does 
not . This is what happened in Simbu in 1 977 . 
In the villages and hamlets the party is over , and life goes on . 
NOTES 
1. Most of my material is based upon some thirty months of field work 1972-78 
supported by UPNG, ANU and the PNG Institute of Applied Social and Economic 
Research. I am particularly thankful to the politicians and officials in Chimbu for 
their generous help and to those who commented on earlier versions of this paper. 
My greatest debt is to my astute field assistants and to villagers in many parts of 
Sim bu.  
Interviews were in tok pisin or English; Kuman speeches were interpreted into tok 
pisin for me. My research teachniques were (a) personal observation of public 
events, (b) interviews with candidates, (c) gathering the impressions of other non-
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Simbu residents,  and (d) noting comments as they arose in talks with village people 
around Simbu. I did not survey political attitudes or awareness by formal 
questionnaires for three reasons: (a) cost, lack of time to organize, and shortage of 
suitable interviewers; (b) problems of sample selection and the near impossibility in 
Simbu society of speaking in private with single individuals; (c) the danger of 
questions themselves influencing opinion (cf. Edelman 1 972) . The last matter was 
especially important when the level of awareness of the election was itself a subject 
of study. There is also some (healthy) suspicion of outsiders and some tendency to 
provide opinions thought to be acceptable to them. The Gallup traditbn does not 
reach peasant society. 
By the time of the 1 977 election I was quite well known and was often spont­
aneously approached for political discussions by strangers. These generally required 
a passive stance on my part. The research is thus informed by specific inputs from 
hundreds of people from all areas of the province and by observation over time of 
the expressive behaviour of thousands . 
2. The Provincial Electorate for the National Parliament retains the colonial spelling 
' Chimbu' , which in late 1979 remains the proper name of the province, although 
the provincial government uses 'Simbu' . I will use the later name for what I broadly 
call the Simbu culture area, that is most of the province north of the 
Karumui/Bomai section (see Map 1 ) .  
3 .  For general data on Simbu see Howlett et  al. 1 976, ECL 1 979, and for specific 
studies of my base area see Brookfield and Brown 1963 and Brown 1 972. 
4. Sixty-six per cent of shares are owned by Angco, the Goroka-based processor and 
exporter which was bought by the Investment Corporation in 1976, 30 per cent by 
an expatriate (who was in 1977 the Manager) , and the remainder by Simbu Coffee 
buyer-politicians . 
5. For some socio-economic data on this group of politicians see Standish 1 979, 56-60. 
6. For a discussion of the concepts of factionalism and clientelism see Scott 1972 and 
Nicholas 1 977 . 
7. National Parliament, Routine of Business No. 76, 17 February 1 977. 
8. Sinake Giregire , Member for Daulo 1964-77, Country Party Leader. 
9. This was the first half of an 'establishment grant' ;  another grant of K85 ,000 was 
made for the bisnis arm as well as a K l 00,000 interest-free loan. 
10.  In late 1976 the Auditor-General reported that K43m was astray in government 
accounts. This was almost all due to accounting errors and to the computer com­
pounding the same debit items. The government quickly tacked down the 'missing' 
funds and made full explanation . See Post-Courier November-December 1 976. 
1 1 . These are the Somare government's  quasi-ideology, the Eight Aims for National 
Development . 
12 .  Quotation from translated subtitles for O' Rourke and Kildea's  film 'Ileksen: 
Politics in Papua New Guinea 1977' which has extensive sequences showing the 
Simbu campaign. 
1 3 .  While Okuk's total expenditure may have been even higher , the scale of his 
extravagance was not unique: his friend Anton Parao lightly told me that he had 
spent K24,000 in losing the 1 977 Enga Provincial seat . 
14 .  When coffee prices are falling, factories and buyers are likely to lose money unless 
they drop their buying price very quickly indeed , which tactic carries some risk of 
them losing their raw material supply to other factories . So not all the 1977 losses 
were due to electioneering nor to those over-generous or merely naive candidates 
who burnt their fingers by mixing bisnis and politics and bought coffee at inflated 
prices. 
1 5 .  J .C .  Corrigan, 'Report, 1 977 National General Elections,  Chimbu Province' .  
Kundiawa 1978 (Typescript) . After raising imporant problems over identification of 
voters, Corrigan went on to propose a seminar of returning officers to pinpoint 
difficulties in electoral procedure in order to propose appropriate amendments , 
warning of the need to be prepared for snap elections and by-elections. No such 
action was taken by the end of 1 979 and the national legislation has now been re­
plicated for most provincial governments. 
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1 6 .  Unlike 1972, when the use o f  public vehicles was a hot issue, n o  candidate 
challenged Kale or Biri ' s constant use of a government landcruiser. (The Secretary 
for Provincial Affairs had circularized staff saying, inter alia, that it was not for a 
public servant to decide whether a Minister's use of transport was for official pur­
poses or not ! ) .  
17 .  On one occasion a Kamanegu policeman attached to  a polling team warned a merry 
truckload of voters that they were ineligible, having been away more than six 
months . He also told them they would lose their rights to land in the Western High­
lands if they voted in Simbu, so they then left .  A few days later the same group 
turned up at a rural polling booth, saw the same policeman and team on duty, 
turned tail and departed ! For a newspaper letter concerning trucking and treating 
see Wantok, 4 November 1978. 
1 8 .  Hon. John Kaputin ,  MP, at UPNG Seminar July 1 977 . 
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Chapter 6 
COFFEE , CLASS AND POLITICS : 
THE ELECTIONS 
IN THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS 
Mike Donaldson 
and 
Kenneth Good 
Class Formation Nationally and in the Eastern Highlands. 
In seeking to understand the development of any historically determinate 
social formation it is necessary to establish how the modes of production that 
make up that social formation relate to, link with , and affect each other . The 
struggles and alliances of the various classes , class "blocs" ,  strata and frac­
tions of classes within a particular social formation are the stuff of politics and 
history . The struggles between and within the various classes in a social 
formation are fundamentally concerned with which classes or class groups will 
gain _control over productive resources , and which will be denied control . 
In Papua New Guinea, the present struggle for control of productive 
resources has deep roots . 1  Significant social inequalities and embryonic class 
divisions were present in precapitalist PNG, for example, the 'big man' as 
accumulator as well as distributor ; the existence of at least some chiefly 
systems; and the stratification among the Mbowamb of Mt. Hagen and in 
Bougainville-Buka . Colonial capitalism was subsequently established upon 
these inequalities , and utilised important "traditional" institutions, and values 
(such as the ' big man' and the emphasis upon acquisitiveness and profitmak­
ing in certain societies) to form linkages between Melanesian precapitalist 
economies and the global capitalist system . Certain hierarchical tendencies 
evident in the social relations in the pre-capitalist modes of production were 
strengthened in the slow and complex process of linking together pre-capital ist 
and capitalist production systems . With relatively weak and dependent 
Australia as the main colonial power , economic development in PNG has 
occured only in agriculture , commerce , mining, and recently , in very limited 
light manufacturing . Consequential class formation may be broadly charac­
terised , accordingly , in terms of a large peasantry , a small and scattered 
working class, and most recently, by the production of a small educated petty 
bourgeoisie. 
The peasantry in general is defined as comprising village and family-based 
producers of cash crops largely for export in a dependent relationship with the 
market and state. Its formation is most advanced in areas of intense cash crop 
production (copra and cocoa on the Islands , coffee in the Highlands) , leading 
to the creation of class divisions within it. Speci fically , the last two decades 
have seen the emergence of a rich peasant class (and more recently of rural 
capitalists) and, less visibly, of middle and poor peasants . There is no 
"terminal" stage in the formation of a peasantry . 
This process derives out of the old inequalities but is also based upon , 
particularly rapidly since the 1 950s, the development strategies of the state , 
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mainly expressed through DASF extension services and Development Bank 
(and other) loans in support of cash crop production by peasants . The general 
policy has been that of providing material and financial resources to the 
"efficient" producer . The acquisition of legal ownership of land and the 
exploitation of wage labour by the rich rural classes are recent and still rather 
restricted developments .  The control of these resources has developed out of 
individual access to clan land and access to clan labour in varied forms.  Land 
ownership and the use of wage labour are of course related to a certain scale of 
production, but control of land by individuals is also connected with certain 
types of enterprise e .g . ,  the fencing of cattle runs (McKillop , 1 976) . These and 
other developments are greatly modifying "traditional" rights to land in 
several parts of the country . 
The rich rural classes in the Eastern Highlands are in general terms 
characterised by ownership of relatively large coffee farms and numbers of 
coffee trees . In 1 976 43 percent of the country' s plantation coffee and 26 
percent of its small holder coffee came from the Eastern Highlands . It is the 
production of coffee which is the primary mechanism of the integration of 
previously subsistence agriculturalists in the Highlands into world capitalism . 
Some eighty percent of the adults in the Province are engaged in coffee 
growing . Wilson and Evans ( 1 975 :  14) estimate that eighty percent of these 
cultivate less than 0.2.  hectares (less than 500 trees) . This was the average 
holding in the late sixties , and there is evidence to suggest that the size of the 
average holding is decreasing . From 1 972-73 to 1 975-76 the number of growers 
in the province increased by 1 1 5 percent but the hectarage under cultivation 
increased by only 47 percent (personal interview, 1 oe Nietsche, 1 977 and 
Wilson and Evans , 1975 : 1 1 - 1 2) .  The average cultivated presently is about 0 . 1  
hectare (about 250 trees) . I n  addition the percentage of  growers i n  1 973 under 
25 years old was 3 .3 percent in the Eastern Highlands , compared with 34.6 
percent in the Northern Province (Wilson and Evans ,  1 975 :  12) .  This suggests 
that it is becoming increasingly difficult for young men to become large-scale 
coffee growers . More specifically, the rich peasantry would at least be those 
holding in excess of 1 ,000 trees, that is, cultivating more than 0.5  hectares . 
Anderson ( 1 977 : 1 0) estimated that in the Chimbu, Eastern and Western 
Highlands , only 6 percent of the growers held more than 1 ,000 trees . 2 These 
men also tend to be older (over 35) and to be, or be capable of becoming, 
' ' traditional leaders ' ' .  
Not only i s  access t o  land for coffee cultivation important but s o  too is 
access to the necessary means of production. A higher price for coffee can be 
obtained if  the grower sells it as parchment but this necessitates the pulping of 
the coffee berry . In the 1 972-73 coffee season the price of a coffee pulper was 
about equal to the average grower 's  annual income. Accordingly collective 
ownership, often with more than five other growers, is the norm . Anderson 
( 1 975 : 5-6) found that only seven percent of his sample of growers owned their 
own pulpers . The ownership of pulpers is  important also because it is a source 
of additional income, non-owners paying for their use at a flat rate per season 
or at a flat rate per bag . Ownership of pulpers , then, is  a further determinant 
of class position within the peasantry. 3 
As well as ownership of productive resources , employment of  wage labour is 
a primary determinant of class position. As mentioned above the process of 
the linking of pre-capitalist and capitalist production systems is slow and 
complex . The use of " free" or clan labour is still a feature of rich peasant 
production and even occasionally of rural capitalist production ,4 but is 
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decreasingly so with the accelerating reconstruction of social relations . The 
employment of wage labour which characterises the rural capitalists is both a 
cause and a consequence of the size of their holdings . Like the rich peasants, 
the rural capitalists are generally based in coffee production, but they are also 
active in various combinations of the following : tradestores , shops , taverns ,  
real estate, coffee buying, commercial vegetable growing, livestock raising, 
taxis , passenger motor vehicles (P .M. V. ' s) ,  trucks .  
In the 1 960' s Finney's  ( 1 973 :  55) ten selected leading businessmen each 
owned on average some 9,000 trees and gained a gross income including 
trading of more than $4,500 per annum with several enjoying more than 
$ 10,000. Today there are several whose net income is in excess of K20,000. The 
per capita income in Goroka in the late sixties was about $25 per annum 
(Finney, 1 973 : 68) . Over a wider area in 1 973 the average return from coffee 
after expenses was only $ 10. 1 5 . Due to world shortages of  coffee and 
consequent price rises , however, the average peasant' s  income in 1 976/77 was 
about K300. The dramatically more advanced position of the rural capitalists 
is  considered in detail below. But the strength and superiority of the rich 
peasantry vis a vis middle and poor peasants must also be considered in 
relation to such mass phenomena as the conditions of infant malnutrition and 
declining food consumption experienced in the Eastern (and Western) 
Highlands , and with the growing incidence of landlessness in certain areas . 
The very poor position of the mass of the peasantry may also be inferred from , 
among other things , the inchoate class action of coffee stealing directed mainly 
against the bigger growers . 
Over all , therefore, the rich peasantry and rural capitalists (the rich rural 
classes) are solidly based within "traditional" society (possessing or able to 
acquire 'big man' status) as well as within the now well established and 
deepening system of agricultural and trading capitalism. 
The formation of the working class in PNG has a lesser dynamism to it .  It 
has occurred out of and against the limitations presented by the long-lasting 
indentured labour system and the continuing concentration by foreign inves­
tors on agricultural and trading capitalism. The mineral extractive industries 
that have emerged relatively recently have been dependent on the importation 
of capital intensive means of production and highly skilled foreign expertise . 
These factors have encouraged the growth of only a fragmented (some 
' thousand islands' of wage labour) , unskilled, and impermanent work force, 
and when more permanent and skilled workers began to appear following the 
development of the sixties , specific controls were already in the hands of the 
state to contain the new class politically . Some relatively strong unions have 
appeared in the towns, and mining enclaves , but rural workers remain largely 
unorganized . There are urban manual workers ' unions such as the Central 
District Waterside Workers Union and the Bougainville Mining and General 
Workers Union , both of which have reasonable organization and have shown 
a capacity for action in pursuit of basic working class goals , but the former 
also displays a specific enthnic character and is small in size and the role of the 
latter is limited physically to the Panguna mining enclave . Trade unions have 
thus a potentiality for organized action which is ,  however , localized and 
limited, not least by the absence of dynamism within the capitalist economy 
and thus by the static nature of working class formation . 
The production of the educated petty bourgeoisie contrasts with the forma­
tion of both of the other main classes in its newness and rapidity, and in the 
fact that the members of this social category have little or no control over the 
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means of production at present . They have arisen in collaborative relationship 
with the colonial state largely to fulfill the function of controllers of the inde­
pendent state . They are skilled and urban and because of these recently 
acquired attributes and bureaucratic position , they are far more knowledge­
able about the outside world than are the more productive rich rural classes . 
The educated petty bourgeoisie are highly biased towards "Coastals" and 
Islanders in ethnic and regional terms.  The four Highlands Provinces ,5 when 
compared to the other fifteen provinces , ranked last in terms of the percentage 
of the population literate in any language, last in percentage of the population 
who have received or are receiving any education, and last in percentage of the 
populat_ion qualified in any field (Friday and Luton , 1 976 table I I ,  I I I ,  IV) . An 
examination of all the National Scholarship holders, who comprise the vast 
majority of tertiary students, attending the twenty-three tertiary institutions in 
1 977 demonstrates that the Eastern Highlands Province is the most disadvan­
taged province in the country in terms of male students per capita and the 
second most disadvantaged in terms of female students . There are no students 
at all from the Wonenara District (the least developed area) in the Eastern 
Highlands . (See Weeks , 1 977: Appendix I I I  Table la) .  
On political organization in general in  PNG , no Marxism is required to re­
cognise the saliency of the bureaucratic state (see , for example, Tordoff and 
Watts , 1 974) . And there is a similarly wide consensus about the relative unim­
portance of political parties as distinct and autonomous organisations , and 
agreement that they exist rather as convenient devices for assembling candi­
dates at national elections (Hegarty, 1 979) . The organised strength (numbers , 
finances , infrastructure of headquarters and branches) of such unions as the 
Public Service Association and the Teachers Association is therefore 
particularly notable, although their location within the bureaucracy, their 
close links with the state and its largely educated petty bourgeois leadership , 
restricts the likelihood of such unions ' acting as instruments of the working 
class.  
Over all ,  the type of organization which stands in significance closest to that 
of the dominant state , we would like to suggest , is the new and uniquely home­
grown Development Corporation . Whether as the New Guinea Development 
Corporation of the Gazelle Peninsula or more particularly the Bena and the 
Gouna Development Corporations of the Eastern Highlands , it is  these 
organizations which appear to assert a populism and developmentalism most 
comparable to that of the developmental state. These organisations tend to 
express the class interests of the rich peasantry and rural capitalists . Their 
action , we would further suggest , is also an expression of the relations between 
the rich peasantry and rural capitalists in the countryside and the educated 
petty bourgeoisie in the state. It is in fact the dynamic relationship between 
these leading rural and urban classess with appears to lie at the heart of the 
political economy of independent PNG . It is at present a relationship of tacit 
alliance which is expressed and mediated at the regional level through a 
number of cross-cutting institutional linkages - the Local Government 
Councils (LGCs) and Interim Provincial Government ( IPG) at one level in the 
Eastern Highlands, and the Savings and Loans Society and the Chamber of 
Commerce at another . Just as the speci fic classes are not represented by 
particular political parties nor is the all iance formulated by a national polit ical 
party . Adjustments are therefore possible within this ruling class alliance, but 
only in relation to the narrow limits of the established capitali st and bureau­
cratic system, and with regard for the preferences of the industrial bourgeoisie 
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beyond these borders . Perhaps it is ultimately the dominance of the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie over the alliance of the rich rural classes and 
educated petty bourgeoisie which best explains the quiescent nature of these 
domestic social relations . 
The class and political action of the rich peasantry and rural capitalists is 
directed pre-eminently to the growth of the Development Corporations in a 
complex relationship, as will be seen below, with existing expatriate owned 
firms and with the above mentioned organizations . In the Eastern Highlands 
the most important political activity (in terms of numbers involved, and in 
terms of economic and developmental impact) is not carried on by the political 
parties . Action is expressed in efforts to gain still more assistance from the 
state and from influential members of the educated petty bourgeoisie . (In these 
ways intra-class competition ,  too, exists) . Class conflict occurs in efforts to 
gain easier ownership over land, against rural workers particularly with regard 
to wages, and in relation to what has been referred to somewhat inadequately 
as the mass of the peasantry (e .g . , in the demands for tougher action against 
theft and the sort of criminal behaviour which has characterised the action of 
the poor peasantry in many other places) . Over all ,  the superiority of the 
Development Corporations and associated organizations exists because they 
are located within the established system of agricultural and trading capitalism 
and because they largely represent the interests of the leading classes within the 
regional economy. 
Class and Political Action in the Eastern Highlands. 
(a) The Local Government Councils and the Interim Provincial Government 
Local Government Councils (LGC's) were designed specifically to fit into 
local social organisation and to be effective at the village level . They were to be 
built on customary institutions and were to maintain ' ' tribal discipline' ' 
(Simpson 1 976: 1 3 - 14) .  It is not surprising then that those councils without 'big 
man' support in the Eastern Highlands tended to be rather ineffective (for an 
account of the early Bena Bena Council see Langness 1 963 : 1 5 1 - 1 70) , nor that 
rural capitalists and rich peasants firmly based as they were in "traditional 
society" should emerge partly through their control of the LGC's .  Finney' s 
( 1 973 :  1 1 7) study of Gorokan business leaders in the late sixties clearly 
demonstrated this inter-relationship of politics and business . Of the ten men 
studied , five had been local government councillors and seven had contested 
the national elections in 1 968 . This tendency has also been noted by Gerri tsen 
( 1 976: 9- 1 1 ) ,  along with what he considered to be a "rapid decline" of the 
LGC's .  It is not , however, that the LGC's  as institutions are in decline (as long 
as Rural Improvement Funds are channelled through them their future is 
assured) or that they have failed to satisfy expectations, but that some 
members of the rich rural classes have left them precisely because they have 
served an important function : they have been stepping stones to greater 
political-economic power. For some, the Area Authority and then the 
Provincial Government were the next steps along the way . 
In October 1 976 the Interim Provincial Government (IPG) superseded the 
Area Authority in the Eastern Highlands as the main provincial level political 
organisation . At the present , though , its function remains much the same as 
(and the main core of its membership , the 1 7  LGC representatives , is 
practically identical to) that of the old Area Authority . The IPG controls 
substantial resources . At its inception it received an interest- free loan of 
Kl 00,000 from the central government , a first annual per capita grant totalling 
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K 134, 575 , and a Derivation Grant of K62,000 for produce exported from the 
province in 1 974-75 . In addition the IPG controls the allocation of Rural 
Improvement Funds to the various LGC's .  This amounted to K380,000 in 
1 976-77 . There are also significant direct and visible benefits accruing to IPG 
members . Each received in May 1 976 a K7 per day meeting allowance, which 
would annually bring in more than K200, plus where appropriate the following 
annual payments : President , K960, Vice President , K720, executive committee 
�mber, K600, member K480. By February 1 978 the Premier was receiving 
K5278 per annum, the Deputy Premier , K3978, Minister, K3848 , ordinary 
members,  K2496. The K7 per day meeting allowance remains in effect also. 
The IPG allocated K80,000 for its members salaries in 1 978 .  (Post Courier, 23 
February 1 978) .  
Part of the establishment grant from the central government was used to  set 
up a provincial government business wing, Nokondi . Nokondi has K l 6,000 
worth of shares in the expatriate-dominated Eastern Highlands Farmers and 
Settlers Association Co-operative . It also owns and runs Kotuni Trout Farm, 
has a forty percent share in Goroka's  leading hotel , has K40 ,000 invested in 
Paci fic Helicopers Pty Limited, and the same amount invested in the Gouna 
Development Corporation . That the IPG should have a large (but not the 
major) shareholding in a private company is not surprising given its class 
composition. A study of ten of the 17 members referred to above indicated 
that all were either rural capitalists or rich peasants. Like the Area Authority 
earlier and the LGC's ,  the IPG is another mechanism for the advancement of 
the rich rural classes . 
The IPG's  shareholding in Pacific Helicopters is indicative of its general 
orientation towards capitalist development . The Area Authority meeting, in 
December 1 975 passed a resolution (no . 1 1 3175) stating that the Authority 
"does not want politics to interfere with development" .  The Authority , like 
the IPG after it ,  saw its role as promoting "development" by assisting local 
businessmen . In January 1 975 , the Authority rejected a plan for the formation 
of a Highlands bus company to be owned by the Highlands Area Authorities 
"because it could take money away from local businessmen" . In July that 
year, as well as investing money in Pacific Helicopters Pty Limited , the 
Authority passed a resolution stating that it " fully supported the company and 
agreed to write a letter to the Chairman of the Supply and Tenders Board 
asking that he give special consideration to Pacific Helicopters Pty Limited in 
any application for work in or including the Eastern Highlands District" .  
Not surprisingly the ownership and utilisation o f  land has been o f  major 
concern for the Area Authority/IPG.  In 1 974 two resolutions (numbers 9 1  and 
92/74) were passed, one asking the Director of Lands Survey and Mines to 
find ways to speed up and simplify land acquisition and leasing procedures , 
and the other requesting that the Area Authority be given power to initiate 
forfeiture action with respect to undeveloped leases . This was reiterated by 
Premier James Yanepa in December 1 976 soon after the inception of the IPG . 
Yanepa stated that the laws protecting traditional landholders "hinder the 
more active people who wish to get involved in business" .  He also suggested 
that the laws should be amended " to allow different groups of Papua New 
Guineans to buy properties in other areas or provinces" (Post-Courier, 9 
November 1 976: 1 1 ) .  This echoes a complaint made by prominent business 
leader Auwo Ketauwo (see below) some months earlier. Ketauwo had 
complained of the policy which required first option on expatriate lands up for 
sale to go to the "papa bilong graun" ,  the traditional landowners , and that the 
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traditional land-owners' permission had to be sought before it could be leased 
or sold out of the group. He said that the policy was "deterring many Papua 
New Guineans from developing the land" (Post-Courier, 1 2  April 1 976: 4) . 
The IPG has become increasingly concerned about what may be described as 
inchoate class action of the poor peasantry and with the position of the 
working class . Resistance to the rich rural classes has taken a number of forms 
to-date, among them a recrudescence of sorcery and an increase in the 
frequency and magnitude of coffee stealing. The former was discussed at some 
length at two Area Authority meetings in April and June 1 974, and the latter 
was recently ref erred to by Premier Yanepa who firmly declared that the 
' 'police must be tougher and the penalties must be higher' ' (Post-Courier , 27 
April 1 977 : 1 ) .  The Area Authority also acted to prevent rises in the rural 
minimum wage, a sub-committee of the Area Authority appearing before the 
Minimum wages Board in June 1 974 (Area Authority Minutes , June 1 974) . 
So heavy is the preponderance of rich peasants and rural capitalists on the 
IPG that they are occasionally disadvantaged by it . In particular, the educated 
petty bourgeoisie are noticeably absent on the IPG (as in Province as a whole , 
see above) . At the November 1 976 meeting of the IPG , Deputy-Premier Iyape 
Noruka explained the difficulties encountered in drawing up a constitution 
"without having the benefit of one educated Eastern Highlander come to 
influence or help us" (Post-Courier , 9 November 1 976: 1 5) .  The absence of the 
educated petty bourgeoisie in the Eastern Highlands makes itself felt within 
this important organisation that the rich rural classes utilise to advance their 
position . 
(b) The Chamber of Commerce, Savings and Loans, and the Development 
Corporations. 
The interests and action of the Goroka Chamber of Commerce overlap with 
those of the leading rural classes in the province. In the recent period, the 
chamber has formed a secretariat designed to promote businesses in the town 
and has made efforts to assist national businessmen . It too has tried to 
improve law and order in the Eastern Highlands particularly through 
encouraging the police force and agitating on their behalf, and it is involved in 
the land issue . It believes that problems over land ownership are stopping the 
development of Goroka largely because, in the words of a spokesman , "there 
are no clear freehold titles and obtaining land from local people has become a 
very complicated and difficult process" .  It has suggested switching to a 
freehold system , so that new businesses might be started , and it has called on 
the Provincial Government to formulate a new policy on land ownership in 
Goroka (Post-Courier , 10  August 1 977:  10, 1 4) .  Once a totally expatriate 
body, the new President in 1 977,  is Paul lne, significantly a national business­
man and a member of the Interim Provincial Government and an influential 
director of the Gouna Development Corporation . While the Savings and 
Loans Society is  far less active politically , it is  important because of the money 
it controls and through the position of its leading personalities . With savings 
of nearly K l . 7 million , the Eastern Highlands Savings and Loans Society, in 
1977 , was the biggest rural financial group in the country . This success had 
been achieved over four years , and could largely be attributed to the first 
manager of the society, Kumoro Vira, who was also a member of the Goroka 
Local Government Council ,  and who resigned as manager during the year to 
contest the Regional seat in the national elections . Hari Gotoha and Auwo 
Ketauwo of the Gouna Corporation are both Directors of Eastern Highlands 
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Savings and Loans . Finally , the PNG Federation of Savings and Loans 
Societies , at the end of 1 976, controlled assets worth some K l0.4 million , when 
its Chairman of the Board of Directors was Auwo Ketauwo, a leading Eastern 
Highlands' rural capitalist and, specifically, Chairman of Directors of Gouna. 
The outstanding signi ficance of the Development Corporation is that they 
not only mobilize rural savings but also put the money directly to work 
seemingly in the interests of all members of the community . John Kaputin has 
said of the New Guinea Development Corporation, of which he is chairman of 
directors , that ' ' the corporation has done a great deal to develop and promote 
the concept of group participation in economic development through-out the 
country" (Post-Courier, 1 6  June 1 977 : 1 2) .  An anonymous correspondent 
from Goroka ("village boi")  says in addition that 
village-based groups such as the Mataungan Association and the Gouna 
Development Group . . . show more meaning and are more effective (than the 
political parties) when it comes to actual village development . Here the individual is 
moved because he sees the benefits coming and th(i)s stimulates him to contribute his 
efforts and resources to the development initiated at his level (Post-Courier, 17 June 
1 977: 10) .  
But while all of this is  to a large extent true, there are perhaps more important 
aspects to the operations of the Development Corporation. 
The last two years has seen the rise of the Development Corporation in the 
Eastern Highlands . There are today two main ones , the Bena Corporation and 
Gouna Corporation , with the Asaro-Watabung Rural Development 
Corporation as a smaller operation, and the Lowa Investment Corporation as 
the latest and limited expression of an earlier and unsuccessful grouping (for 
consideration of Lowa Corporation see Gerritsen , 1 975 , and Good , 1 977) . A 
conspicuous characteristic of both Bena and Gouna is the extensiveness of 
their involvement within the existing system of agricultural and trading 
capitalism. Both represent the large-scale ownership by Papua New Guineans 
of land , crops , equipment , and many other resources , and the employment of 
wage-labour to a quite significant extent. Thus,  Bena Corporation owns four 
coffee plantations (and is negotiating for a fifth) , with the biggest of these , 
Urona plantation possessing a large processing factory . In 1 976 the 
Corporation processed some 800 tonnes . Bena employed a large permanent 
labour force , and at the height of the season the number of its wage labourers 
rose to more than 1 ,200 (Post Courier, 29 March 1 97 1 :  1 7 ; and personal 
interview, Akepa Miakwe, 4 May 1 977) . Gouna Corporation ' s  acquisitions are 
different only in their diversification and greater involvement in commercial 
and trading activities ; thus , it owns or has shareholdings in a Goroka book and 
sports shop, shopping arcade (in association with Collins and Leahy) , taxi 
company, petrol station, tyre and battery service, softdrink company, and a 
helicopter company. But it also owns some 260 acres of coffee (its largest 
plantation was formerly held by Jim Leahy) , a poultry farm producing, in 
1 977 , some 9,000 birds , and a modern piggery . The value of its total fixed 
assets are at present some K700,000. It is clearly an extensive employer of 
wage-labour. 
Another characteri stic of both corporations, distinguishing them clearly 
from all of the poli tical parties , is their large memberships and the equally 
large investment funds they have mobili sed from among vi llagers . Bena has 
now a membership of approximately 1 5 , 500 people, and from its members of 
two year ' s  earlier it raised K50,000 with which it obtained a government and a 
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bank loan and purchased its plantations and processing works (Post-Courier, 
29 March 1 977 :  1 7) .  Gouna, organized in a slightly different way, has 2-3 ,000 
"shareholders"  which , while mainly based upon village groups , also includes 
Nokondi , the business arm of the Provincial Government . These members 
have contributed about K 1 25 ,000, with another K40,000 coming directly from 
Nokondi (Personal interview, Anders Bergvist , 4 July 1 977) . These figutes are 
impressive in themselves and they also compare favourably with the earlier 
work of the New Guinea Development Corporation where, according to John 
Kaputin ,  K 1 25 ,000 was mobilised in two and-a-half years (Post-Courier , 3 1  
August 1 977 : 1 0) .  The developmentalism and populism expressed by the 
Development Corporations of the Eastern Highlands and the Gazelle has 
obviously had real meaning for and obtained an effective response from the 
people of the area. 
It is less obvious but at least equally important that these large organizations 
were formed and are controlled by the rich rural classes , usually in 
collaboration with expatriate businessmen and managers and members of the 
educated petty bourgeoisie . Thus,  Hari Gotoha set about the formation of 
Gouna, towards the mid-seventies , after think about "how Europeans start 
businesses" (Personal interview , Hari Gotoha, 5 May 1 977) . Gotoha was 
already in possession of property indentifying him as a rural capitalist - near 
the end of the sixties he owned 1 ,400 coffee trees , a trade store , two trucks, 
and 10  cattle (Finney, 1 973 : 85) - but he subsequently acquired ownership of 
Kumul taxis and Goroka tyre and battery service, and became the largest single 
national shareholder in Pacific Helicopters (holding shares worth K l 0,000) . 
Indeed, Gotoha's personal property ownership and that of Gouna 
Corporation now seem closely inter-twined . Thus , ownership of the new 
softdrink company is 30 percent Gotoha personally, 15 percent Gouna, and 
with Nokondi holding a share of the remainder , while in Pacific Helicopters, 
Gotoha, Auwo Ketauwo, Kumoro Vira, and Goroka Tyre and Battery (both a 
Gouna firm and Goto ha' s property) together control more than the largest 
single (expatriate) shareholder . In a process where the expansion of Gotoha's 
assets and the development of  Gouna have, at very least , gone on together, 
Hari Gotoha and his close associates possess a controlling influence within the 
Corporation . Gotoha, Auwo Ketauwo , and Anders Bergvist , the expatriate 
manager , constitute an excutive committee of the board of directors (which 
as noted includes Paul lne) ,  and this small group makes the effective decisions. 
It is also notable that Gotoha and Ketauwo are business partners of long 
standing, and that Gotoha himself (Secretary of the Corporation) personally 
collects the money from villagers investing in Gouna and keeps groups' deposit 
books in his house . (Personal interviews , Hari Gotoha 5 May and 4 July 1 977) . 
Hari Gotoha has thus a strong and complex personal interest , and a 
preponderant influence, in the large and successful Gouna Corporation . He is 
nevertheless, deeply conscious of his own lack of education which renders him 
dependent on certain others for information about the outside world and its 
changing impact on the regional economy in which he operates . The services of 
a paid expatriate manager are one solution to the problem, and another is 
association with a young educated Highlander like Kumoro Vira who advises 
on outside events and is therefore seen by Gotoha as "like a son" (Personal 
interviews , 5 May and 4 July 1 977) . But the lack of education remains as a 
serious weakness of the rich rural classes in the Eastern Highlands . 
Akepa Miakwe, similarly, was virtually the founder of Bena Corporation 
(Post Courier, 29 March 1 977 : 1 7), and today his personal prosperity  is such 
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that he owns among other things 8 ,000 coffee trees , two coffee pulpers , and a 
commercial vegetable garden, and claims an annual income of K30,000 ( 1 977 
Election Study, information on Candidates) . He was and has remained a 
member of the National Parliament.  But Bena management services , under the 
terms of an agreement lasting four years , are supplied by ANGCO which , as 
the company buys and exports the Corporation' s  coffee,  is  possibly in a good 
position to manage Bena in its own interests rather than those of the 
Corporation . 6 This situation was not improved when, March 1 977 ,  ANGCO 
sold out to the government ' s  Investment Corporation rather than to Bena. 
While Bena did not possess sufficient capital to buy ANGCO, it is possible 
that the government could have made the money available through a state 
lending agency. Perhaps , however , the eudcated petty bourgeois controllers of 
the state were not prepared to permit a rich peasant controlled corporation to 
become quite so powerful,  quite so fast ; the resources commanded by 
ANGCO were considerable and, in terms of out put-value it was , in the 
1 973 -74 financial year , the number one company in the country. And it is 
finally to be noted that the economic position of the Secretary-Manager of the 
much smaller Asaro-Watabung Rural Development Corporation, Sailas 
Atopare , is also considerable as the owner of six motor vehicles , with an 
estimated annual income in 1 977 of K20,000 (Personal communication, Carrol 
Poyep, 26 May 1 977) . Unusually Atopare is ,  in addition , a young and 
educated man. 
Relations between Bena and Gouna Development Corporations are ap­
parently cordial . Akepa Miakwe considers that Bena and Gouna have agreed, 
so to speak , to a division of labour; Bena will remain in coffee; Gouna will 
take the rest . Gt;toha accepts the general thrust of the supposed agreement , in 
part because he considers the coffee market too unreliable. At the moment , 
though, the relationship is good; Gotoha is a shareholder in Bena, and Bena 
has lent Gouna K l  10,000 for its purchase of a Jim Leahy plantation . There 
was an earlier suggestion that Bena, Gouna, and Nokondi might merge, but 
this was rejected by the two corporations in favour of the present arrangement 
(Personal interviews , 4 and 5 May 1 977) . 
It has been suggested already that the Interim Provincial Government is a 
political base of the rich peasantry . Relations between the corporations (con­
trolled by the rich rural classes) , on the one hand , and the Interim Provincial 
Government , on the other , are therefore potentially critical . Both Gotoha and 
Kumoro Vira are agreed that the members of the IPG are 'not real 
businessmen' ,  and Miakwe takes this attitude further by saying that the 
people ' s  true leaders are not prepresented to the IPG (Personal interview, 
Kumoro Vira, 28 April 1 977 ; Post-Courier, 9 November 1 976: 1 5) .  Despite the 
fact that Nokondi has invested substantially in Gouna, both corporations be­
lieve that Provincial and local government should keep out of a direct involve­
ment in business; their role should be (and at the moment generally is) to 
facilitate national private enterprise (Personal interviews , 4 and 5 May 1 977) . 
Gouna and Bena have before them the example of the Kainantu LGC, the 
business arm of which has broken the monopoly of expatriate business in 
Kainantu town, and runs among other things four plantations, a coffee buying 
operation and factory, a bulk store and banking service . The Kainantu LGC 
has assets worth more than K600,000, and its wage bill topped K l60,000 in 
1 976 (Personal interview, Kainantu Council official , 27 April 1 977) . 7  Barry 
Holloway's  support for the Kainantu developments (he is  a director of the 
KLGC's  business arm) is well known, as is his advocation that this system of 
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mixed ' local state capitalism' should become more widespread . But Hari 
Gotoha also plans that Gouna should become the biggest capitalist operation 
in the Province, and his strategy aims specifically to eventually buy-up Collins 
and Leahy and so oust them from their leading positions, at the appropriate 
time (Personal interview, 5 May 1 977) . It is clear, over all , that for Gotoha 
(and Ketauwo) politics is a means to better business; in Miakwe's case it is not 
quite so clear . The main organizations in the Province are thus involved in 
serious competition on a number of levels . This is reflected in contests for the 
1 977 national elections and will undoubtedly by seen again in the subsequent 
electibns for the Provincial Government. Given the forces involved, however , 
the success of particular development strategy or organization is unlikely to be 
settled at any ballot box. 
(c) The 1977 National Elections in the Eastern Highlands. 8 
A feature of the election in the Eastern Highlands was the success of the 
Pangu Party which, in a province returning nine members to the House of 
Assembly, increased its representation from two (including, Sasakila Sana as a 
pro-government member) to six. This was achieved at the expense of the 
country party whose representation fell from six (one member, Sunaivi Otio, 
defected to Pangu during the campaign) to zero, with the party leader, Sinake 
Giregire, suffering heavy personal defeat in a seat he had held for 1 3  years . 
The United Party, on the other hand, increased its representation from one to 
three in the final outcome. Akepa Maikwe was returned as member for 
Unggai-Bena, and Sailas Atopare in Goroka, and Billy Hai in Okapa, both of 
whom ran as I ndependent candidates, expressed their allegiance to the United 
Party some time after the declaration of the results . 
Previous election studies have tended to concentrate on "primordial 
politics" ,  the politics of place and line, and on political parties . While these 
are no doubt important, new local political organisations have developed 
whose function as vehicles for the advancement of class interests must be 
considered especially as the process of class formation accelerates . Two of 
these organisations as we have seen are the Local Government Councils and 
the Interim Provincial Government . 
Of the 45 candidates sampled from six of the eight council areas in the 
province, 16 were members of the LGC's .  Their distribution by Council Area 
is outlined below in Table 1 :  
Council 
Area 
Kai nan tu 
Lamari 
Goroka 
Henganofi 
Lu fa 
Oka pa 
Table 1 Councillors in the Elections 
Number of Councillors 
Contesting Elections 
3 
2 
3 
5 
1 
2 
Electorates 
Contested 
Kainantu (2) ; 
Obura-W onenara ( 1 )  
Obura-W onenara 
U nggai-Bena 
Henganofi 
Regional 
Oka pa 
Thirteen of these sixteen were rich peasants or rural capitalists . 65 percent of 
the members of these two classes in the sample were Local Government Coun­
cillors . Of those sampled, the average number of votes received by LGC 
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members contesting the open electorates was higher than that received by non­
LGC members . 
The success of those who were prominent in local political organisations is 
even more striking when the Interim Provincial Government i s  considered . Of 
the 1 7  members of the IPG who held office by virtue of election, seven 
contested the elections . That these seven men were actively involved in 
provincial affairs is clear from the fact that six of them sat on the eleven-man 
committee set up in March 1 975 to establish the Interim Provincial 
Government . Table 2 below details information relevant to the success of the 
seven. The seven IPG members contested five of the nine electorates and 
scored two wins and three seconds . Despite the fc�ct that in two electorates IPG 
members campaigned against each other , the over all outcome is significant in 
itself and in comparison with that of the political parties . 
In the case of the Development Corporations,  Akepa Miakwe of the Bena 
Corporation was returned in Unggai-Bena (he was previously member for 
Goroka) against a number of strong candidates including the Deputy Premier 
of the IPG . While the Gouna Corporation was not directly involved in the 
election in this fashion, Hari Gotoha gave his personal support to Kumoro 
Vira in the Regional electorate, to Bebes Korowaro in Goroka, and to Akepa 
Miakwe. With Vira and Korowaro what was at work was the possibility, 
ref erred to above, of seeing young and educated men with links to Gouna 
elected to the national parliament . In the upshot , Vira was defeated by the 
then Speaker of the Assembly, Barry Holloway, and Korowaro went down to 
Sailas Atopare but this was tempered by Gotoha' s declared readiness to work 
with whoever was in government in Port Moresby, by his general instrumental 
view of politics as a means to better business , and by at least to some extent 
Miakwe's  success. 
As noted directly above, Atopare of the Asaro Watabung Rural Develop­
ment Corporation was the winner in Goroka. The victory of Miakwe and 
Atopare may also stand as a measure of the political failure of Sinake Giregire, 
once the richest of Finney's  ( 1 973 : 85) ten businessmen, but subsequently not 
the leader of any populist development corporation nor noticeably efficient as 
a businessman today. By contrast, a large number of people benefit to a 
varying extent from the work of the Bena Corporation either as members or in 
more indirect ways, and Miakwe drew public attention to the Corporation ' s  
success and endeavoured to  make use of  his position in  the organization to 
ensure his re-election .9 The final result , with both Miakwe and Atopare 
elected , was a significant indication of the position of the Bena and the Asaro­
Watabung Corporations, but the success of the di fferent, 'non-political ' 
strategy of Gouna could only be fully tested in the long-term . 
Finally, some recognition has been given elsewhere to the importance of 
class, one way or another , in elections in the Eastern Highlands . It was 
Finney ' s  ( 1 973 : 1 1 6- 1 1 9) view that "it (was) from the most successful of the 
bisnisman that the leaders of the councils and the members who represent 
Goroka in the House of Assembly were drawn" ,  and he concluded that "the 
House of Assembly elections are, in effect , contests between rival business 
leaders" .  Similarly, on the eve of the 1 977 elections , the country's  national 
newspaper surveyed the situation in the Eastern Highlands under the heading 
"business key to votes" , and noted that " this pre-occupation with business is 
shown by the number of candidates with an economic background" (Post­
Courier, 17 June 1 977 : 4) . Our own sample of 45 candidates showed that , in 
terms of the class criteria discussed above, there were 1 1  rural capitalists; 9 rich 
Electorate 
of IPG 
Candidate 
Henganofi 
Henganofi 
Obura-W onenara 
Obura-W onenara 
U nggai-Bena 
Oka pa 
Kai nan tu 
Table 2 Electoral Success of Interim Provincial Government Members 
Candidate's  Position Number of Percentage Percentage 
Political Won in the Candidates of the Vote of the Vote 
Party Election Contesting Gained by the Gained by the 
Candidate Winner 
Pangu 1 1 2  2 1 .0 2 1 .0 
Pangu 2 1 2  10 .6  2 1 .0 
Pangu 1 1 1  24 .0 24.0 
United 4 1 1  1 2 . 1 24.0 
Pangu 2 6 23 .6  26.0 
United 2 1 2  1 1 .6 22 .6  
Country 6 1 1  7 .2  22.8  
Percentage 
of the Vote 
Gained by the 
Last Runner 
4 .2 
4 .2 
1 .0 
1 .0 
7 . 9  
0 .8  
5 . 3  
� t'3 
� 
� 
� �· 
::S-0 
S" 
:::s 
a. 
-
w 
V'e 
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peasants; 10  educated petty bourgeoisie; 3 middle peasants ; and 1 2  others who 
displayed mixed class characteristics .  No link was , however , shown between 
the class position of candidates and their party affiliation (see Table 3 
below) , suggesting the relative unimportance of party in terms of the key issues 
of the campaign . 
Table 3 Candidates by Class and Political Party Affiliation 
Class United Country PPP Pangu Independent Total 
Rural Capitalist 4 2 0 2 3 1 1  
Rich Peasant 2 3 2 2 2 9 
Educated Petty 
Bourgeoisie 2 2 2 2 2 1 0  
Middle Peasant 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Others 3 4 1 1 3 1 2  
Totals 1 1  1 1  3 8 1 2  45 
On the other hand, a correlation existed between the class position of 
candidates in the eight Open electorates and the percentage of votes each 
received (see Table 4 below) . The candidates of the rich rural classes received 
the most votes and in our sample the four winners were all rural capitalists . 
Table 4 Candidates ' Class Position and Votes Received 
(the eight Open electorates) 
Percentage of Vote Received 
Class 0-40/o 5-90/o 10- 140/o 1 5-200/o 21 + OJo 
Rural Capitalist 1 2 3 4* 
Rich Peasant 1 3 3 1 
Middle Peasant 2 1 
Educated Petty 
Bourgeoisie 3 4 2 
Others 2**  5 ***  2 2 
* These were the four winners of Open seats in the sample. The vote they received ranged from 
2 1  to 27. 3  pecent. 
** Of the three in our sample who ran last, one came from here. 
* * *  Of the three in our sample who ran last, two came from here . 
Seventy-three percent of the rural capitalists in the sample and 50 percent of 
the rich peasants received more than 10  percent of the votes cast in their re­
spective electorates . One hundred percent of the middle peasantry,  78 percent 
of the educated petty bourgeoisie and 64 percent of the " others" category 
received less than 1 0  percent of the vote. 
What the election did not show however was the underlying tensions 
between the two rich rural classes each with their different relations to the 
system of coffee production (the rich peasants confined to the growing and 
pulping stages and the rural capitalists involved in all the domestic stages of 
production) . Nor did the results reflect the importance of the educated petty 
bourgeoisie within the range of political organization, and the absence of this 
category raises many national and international problems for the rich rural 
classes . In the shorter term the election graphically demonstrates the incapacity 
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of the 'educated elite' for independent action . Given that the immediately pro­
fitable option for the educated is political alliance with the rich rural classes , 
the mass of the peasantry are left with no alternative but to continue to 
support their ' traditional' and successful bisnis leaders . 
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NO TES 
1 .  Much of the first third of this paper, the observations on class formation generally, 
are based upon Good ( 1977) . 
2. This is in contrast to Gerritsen ( 1975 : 4) who estimated that 25 percent of the 
peasantry in the province were "big peasants" . Of Gerritsen's  "big peasant" 
sample in the Eastern Highlands, 28 percent possessed more than 1 ,000 trees 
(Gerritsen, 1 975 : Appendix A, 5) . The rather large size of Gerritsen' s  "big 
peasantry' ' and their comparatively weaker control over productive resources such 
as coffee trees , is the result of his choice of class criteria, viz. , primarily membership 
of farmers' clubs. Position within such political organizations is, however best 
regarded as a form of class action rather than a determinant of class position (or 
formation) . What is significant about Gerritsen's  "big peasant" sample is not that 
those who were illfluential in the farmers' clubs had a large number of trees but, 
that those who controlled substantial productive resources (e.g .  coffee trees) had 
taken this particular form of class action at this particular time. 
3. In our sample more than 25 percent of the rich peasants and rural capitalists owned 
two or three pulpers . 
4. Thus Sinake Giregire, when he was· already an established coffee grower, built his 
processing factory (Gire· Coffee Factory) with, as it was reported, $70,000 in money 
"and a lot of friendly labour at no direct cost" (Post-Courier, 1 1  September 
1974: 8) . 
5 .  Enga Province was part of Western Highlands Province until 1973 . 
6. This may be alleviated to a degree by the appointment of Ben Sabumei to a 
managing position in ANGCO. Sabumei was a high ranking official in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs . He resigned his position in April 1978. His father is 
Sabumei Kofikai , leading IPG member, member of the Bena Corporation and 
election candidate for Unggai-Bena. 
7. See Uyassi ( 1978) for a more detailed analysis of the Kainantu LGC. 
8. In April and May 1977 we spent two weeks in the Eastern Highlands Province 
interviewing candidates contesting the national election. This visit was preceded by 
others in November 1976 and February 1977 in which we commenced studying the 
Interim Provincial Government and the Development Corporations, and was 
followed by another in July 1977 . The candidates were interviewed with the help of 
two student research assistants, Zebby Marare and Nang Bapi, and some Assistant 
District Officers in the respective sub-provinces. To check interviewer reliability 
students and A.D.0. ' s  each interviewed the same candidates in seven cases . There 
was no obvious bias. Our sample of candidates numbered 47. A total of 8 1  
candidates finally contested the elections . 
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Table 5 Distribution of Candidate Sample by Electorates 
Electorates 
Regional 
Daulo 
Goroka 
Henganofi 
Kainantuu 
Lu fa 
Obura-Wonenara 
Oka pa 
Unggai-Bena 
Totals 
Number of Intending 
Candidates Interviewed 
(end of April 1 977) 
2 
0 
1 
1 2  
1 2  
0 
7 
6 
7 
47 
Number of Candidates 
Contesting (end of 
May 1 977) 
3 
9 
9 
1 2  
1 1  
8 
1 1  
1 2  
6 
8 1  
O f  candidates interviewed one o f  the Regional candidates was foreign born, and 
insufficient data was collected on one from Okapa. They were excluded from fur­
ther consideration, giving a working sample of 45 . Some of the men who were 
candidates in April 1 977, had withdrawn from the race by the time the elections 
were held . 
9. For example, it was widely rumoured that Miakwe was promising that Bena would 
not pay a dividend unless he was re-elected. The Corporation' s  expatriate manager 
insisted, however, that a dividend would most certainly be paid . 
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Chapter 7 
THE VILLAGE PERSPECTIVE: 
VOTER DECISION-MAKING IN A 
T AIRORA VILLAGE, 
OBURA-WONENARA OPEN 
B .  Goode 
The people of Ko-ae batuka, 1 a Tairora village, voted in the Obura­
W onenara Open and Eastern Highlands Provincial electorates during the 
fourth national elections.  The factors determining their voting behaviour in 
the two electorates differed significantly . I will examine the people's  attitudes 
towards the elections , the criteria they used to assess the desirability of the 
candidates , and their perception of changes in the post-independence period to 
portray the context in which voting decisions were made and to help understand 
the election results . Thus, this paper is concerned with the national elections 
from the perspective of a single village,  though reference will be made to larger 
political units . 
Village Setting 
Ko-ae batuka lies in the Tairora Census Division of the Kainantu District . 
As is true of many areas of the Eastern Highlands Province, grasslands 
dominate the landscape of Ko-ae batuka and rainforests survive at the 
boundaries of the village territory . The terrain is less rugged than other areas 
in the highlands. The cultural landscape is composed of both traditional and 
introduced elements .  The people of Ko-ae batuka exploit several ecological 
zones , employ a form of shifting cultivation with various fallow periods 
depending upon garden site and situation, and plant a variety of crop 
combinations particularly suited to the different areas . The dominant crop, 
sweet potato, is grown not only for human consumption but also to feed the 
ever-hungry pig herd . The typical nucleated settlement pattern of the eastern 
highlands region is evident , with the houses clustered along the unsealed road 
to the nearest town, Kainantu, some 1 5  kilometres away. Central to the 
hamlets is the Eria Komuniti centre with its gaol and courthouse , where the 
village judge adjudicates misdemeanors and breaches of traditional custom. 
People gather at the centre to hear the talks given by government officials on 
various topics of economic , social , and political importance. I t  is also the site 
where polling is conducted . 
Bisnis, or cash-earning activity, is a major preoccupation of the people of 
Ko-ae batuka.  Evidence of cash earning enterprises is ubiquitous. Coffee 
groves are near the hamlets, trade stores are interspersed with the houses , and 
the fences of the several village cattle projects crisscross the land . Participation 
in cash-earning enterprises is stimulated by a preference for a higher standard 
of living, by the prestige associated with conspicuous investments (Finney, 
1 973) , and by the desire to obtain money to increase one's ability to participate 
in exchanges within the village which augment one's  prestige. A respected man 
is one who not only helps his kinsmen, is generous , is a hard worker with many 
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gardens and pigs , and is an adequate provider for his family ; he must also he a 
man of bisnis who is engaged in various cash enterprises . Bisnis activity in and 
of itself is considered good. Not to be involved in such enterprises invites the 
label of rabisman , a man of no worth or consequence and not commanding 
respect . 
Most of the village income is generated by bisnis activities during the height 
of the coffee picking season - from May until August . A considerable portion 
of this is expended on exchanges involving beer and on gambling which is a 
major from of recreation . Both beer drinking and card playing are integral 
parts of Ko-ae batuka social life.  
Traditionally, the village was the autonomous political unit . With the 
imposition of Australian control and the creation of larger political units such 
as the local government council and the more recent Komuniti Eria system, a 
certain measure of autonomy has been lost . Nevertheless , most activities in the 
village are still determined by decisions made by the people of Ko-ae batuka . 
Independent households make most daily decisions concerning subsistence, 
eating, visiting, and cash-cropping. Issues affecting descent groups, resident 
units , and the village as a whole are often determined by consensus , with men 
of prestige moulding and influencing public opinion . The nature of decision­
making has relevance to voting behaviour.  Leininger ( 1964) and Watson ( 1 964) 
stressed the importance of group consensus in determining voting behaviour in 
the 1964 House of Assembly elections in the Kainantu Open electorate . In the 
1 977 national elections, the people of  Ko-ae batuka also attempted to achieve a 
consensus , though this was countered by individual initiative in voter decision­
making . 
The Obura- Wonenara Open Electorate and the Candidates 
The census divisions of Gadsup , Tairora , Iturua, Dogara , and Piora of the 
Kainantu District and all four census divisions of the Wonenara District are 
situated in the Open electorate (see Map 1 ) .  Administratively, the area is 
divided into three regions . The Tairora and Gadsup Census Divisions (together 
with those of the Agarabi and Kamano) are under the direct control of the 
District headquarters in Kai nan tu . The lturua, Dogara , and Piora Census 
Divisions,  though part of the Kainantu District , are administered from the 
patrol post at Obura in the Dogara Census Division ; these three census 
divisions comprise the region generally known also as Obura . The Wonenara 
District is the third political unit , with its headquarters at Marawaka in the 
Yelia Census Division . The boundaries of the Kainantu, Obura, and 
W onenara regions are conterminous with those of the Kai nan tu , Lamari , and 
Yelia Local Government Councils respectively . In addition to administrative 
diversity, there are many language groups within the Open electorate and 
several in each administrative region (see Map 2) . 
Electorate boundaries were redrawn in 1 976 . In the national elections in 
1 972, the people of Ko-ae batuka and other voters in the Tairora Census 
Division were combined with the members of the Gadsup, Kamano, and 
Agarabi Census Divisions to form the Kainantu Open electorate. The people 
who voted in the Kainantu Open in 1 972 shared a common background by 
participating in the same local government council and by being administered 
from the same centre . They are all known as "Kainantu people . "  However , in 
the 1 977 national elections the Tairora were situated in the same electorate 
with people more alien culturally and politically. Some people in the Tairora 
area as well as in other parts of the Kainantu region believe the people further 
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south in the Obura region and especially in the W onenara District are less 
sophisticated , less knowledgeable of the workings of government,  and less 
respectful of the law. With such different groups within the electorate, the 
emergence of regionalism in voting behaviour was to be expected . 
Eleven male candidates from throughout the Open electorate entered the 
1 977 contest . Their current places of residence are indicated in Map 3 .  Table 1 
provides a brief description of the candidates . 
In terms of age , educational and political experience, and occupation there 
was considerable diversity among the candidates . Several men were relatively 
young compared to traditional village leaders who are usually at least 35 or 40 
years old. Three candidates had no formal education, one had a university 
degree, and the rest had received levels of education in between these extremes . 
The extent of their official political experience varied, ranging from the 
village, local government council ,  provincial government, and the national 
government . There were also occupational differences . Two candidates were 
subsistence farmers, several were employed in a variety of government 
positions , and two were Members of Parliament . the successful candidates 
from the Kainantu and Obura Open electorates in 1 972, Sasakila Sana and 
Onamauta Beibi respectively, both competed in the Obura-Wonenara Open 
electorate in 1 977 .  
The Campaign Period 
In early March 1 977 , a local government council official who is highly 
respected in the village came to Ko-ae batuka to deliver the first political 
speech of the campaign. He said it was important that all people in the 
highlands region vote for the United Party, which he called the party of the 
highlands people. The Prime Minister , Michael Somare, is from the coastal 
region, he declared, but it is the highlands people who have the most 
experience and knowledge about running various business enterprises . Upon 
finishing his talk on the contrasting virtues of highland versus coastal 
politicians, he also requested that everyone in the village give up two things -
drinking beer and gambling. Most in attendance nodded politely . However , 
his speech was delivered as an exchange ceremony accompanied by beer 
drinking and card playing was in progress . Given the importance of beer 
drinking and card playing in Ko-ae batuka social life, the speech would have 
tarnished the image of the United Party had political party affiliation been 
important to the villagers . However, party labels are meaningless; the 
people vote for candidates , not political parties . Similarly, the issue of 
coastal/highlands rivalry stimulated little response; for the people of Ko-ae 
batuka it was no issue at all . 
By April ,  a few campaign posters with pictures of the various candidates 
had been put on the sides of houses and trade stores in the village. Some people 
were given the posters in Kainantu , and others received them from the 
candidates or their supporters driving through the village . Although some 
individuals displayed the posters of the candidates that they favoured, others 
simply put them up as a form of decoration. One man in particular was quite 
adamant that he disliked the person whose poster he had placed on the wall of 
his house. 
In the same month , local government council officials visited Ko-oe batuka 
to inform the people about such things as taxes , beer licensing, village 
cleanliness , and the Kainantu hospital . They also discussed the forthcoming 
national election . The officials told the villagers that they must vote for a good 
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man, a man of work, one who would 'talk strong' and help the people . On the 
same day , the first candidate to visit Ko-ae batuka also arrived. After 
explaining his own qualifications and proposals for helping the people, he 
admonished them not to vote for any candidate who tried to curry their favour 
by giving them beer, though no candidate ever did attempt to do so in Ko-ae 
batuka. Subsequently,  seven of the eleven candidates in the Open electorate 
and Kumoro Vira from the Provicincial electorate visited the village to seek 
support . In the Obura-Wonenara contest , only those candidates from the 
Obura region and the Gadsup and Tairora Census Divisions came to 
Ko-ae batuka. Those further south in the more inaccessible area of the 
Wonenara District did not campaign in the village . 
The level of knowledge about the candidates , the election, and the 
procedures in the National Parliament varied greatly among the people of Ko­
ae batuka. Many people supported the Prime Minister but no one realised that 
voting for the Pangu Party candidates would in any way help him to retain his 
position .  Some, such as the elected village officials , knew the names of most of 
the candidates and the party affiliations of some. Many others , however, knew 
the names of only one or two candidates and several knew none . This,  
however, does not imply apathy . The people' s  reaction to the election in the 
Open electorate can be characterised as displaying a 'concerned scepticism ' .  
There was scepticism because many people doubted whether the successful 
Open candidate would provide them with any tangible benefits . Statements by 
two Ko-ae batuka men illustrate this scepticism. One man declared (translated 
from Pidgin) : 
We vote in vain . We vote the candidates their salary. They receive a big salary, buy 
beer, and perhaps even go to prostitutes with the K200 or K300 they earn each 
fortnight .  I 'm tired of this . The candidates promise us everything but they deceive us .  
They don't  work hard ; they earn their money the easy way. We in the village earn 
money too, but we have to work hard for it . 
A second man noted : 
Before, we voted many men to the House of Assembly, but they j ust draw big salaries 
and drink beer . A good person would bring us something . He would bring us the 
knowledge of the white man so we can understand, but no one does this. 
The 'white man's  knowledge' referred to here is the admired ability to run 
government offices with a high level of efficiency and the knowledge of the 
proper procedures for conducting business enterprises which provide the 
expatriates with such large incomes compared with those of the villagers . 
Even though scepticism was evident , concern was also expressed in the 
discussions of the relative merits of the candidates . Initially, many villagers 
claimed that a consensus would first have to be reached within the village and 
then everyone would vote for the candidate so chosen . However , as early as 
April 1 977 a few political pundits in the village were predicting that this would 
not occur and that the village vote would be split between at least two 
candidates in the Open electorate. Nevertheless , men began discussing the 
attributes of the candidates at various informal gatherings formed when 
people played cards, attended parties and exchanges , and visited one another 
at night.  Occasionally,  the night silence was punctuated by the shouts of 
someone expressing his opinion on the election . Such discussions did not 
dominate life in the period just before the voting , but that they were held 
demonstrates a lack of apathy and some concern . 
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A strong consensus to vote for Barry Holloway (see below) in the Pro­
vincial electorate was reached rather early. Consensus in relation to the 
Open electorate was more elusive. By May, many people decided to vote for 
Sasakila, the incumbent Member of Parliament, in order to return a Tairora 
Census Division candidate to the National Parliament . However , soon 
afterwards support for him completely collapsed due to the arguments of 
others that because Sasakila had committed some wrongdoing while in the 
National Parliament he should not receive their support . Although no one 
knew exactly what the nature of the offence was , they felt such conduct was 
inappropriate for a Member of Parliament . 
The desire to achieve a consensus was not only expressed as an intravillage 
concern . The villagers also stated that they would communicate any decision 
reached to other villages, so that the Tairora as a whole could unite and vote 
for one candidate. People knew that if the voting was divided among the 
different Tairora candidates , the chances of winning against candidates 
from elsewhere would be poor. As the election results show, however , such 
intervillage efforts were particularly ineffective in uniting the Tairora behind 
any single candidate . 
The Criteria by which Candidates were Judged - the Obura- Wonenara Open 
Electorate 
To rank the criteria by which candidates were evaluated would give a false 
impression of accuracy. It is more appropriate to list them and note that 
different individuals evaluated candidates differently, some putting stress on 
certain characteristics while others ignored these and based their decisions on 
different criteria. No one person in Ko-ae batuka expressed all the following 
preferences, though some listed several of them. This list is a compilation from 
the statements of different people who did attempt to evaluate the candidates . 
An unknown percentage of the village population followed the advice of 
others , often the influential men . Other criteria, such as party affiliation, 
which may be important in other areas , are not noted here because they were 
not stated by the people of Ko-ae batuka. 
1 .  Linguistic Similarity: Many people in Ko-ae batuka expressed a preference 
for a Tairora-speaking candidate, believing that a politician from one's own 
language group would provide greater assistance than one from another 
language group.  Also , if a candidate from another language group won, they 
reasoned, the people of that group would deride the Tairora and claim that 
they had beaten them and hence could control them. In this election, Tairora­
speaking candidates came from the Tairora, Dogara, and Iturua Census 
Divisions . The villagers recognise major dialect differences between the people 
of the Tairora Census Division and the Tairora-speakers of the Obura area. 
When they spoke of a preference for a Tairora candidate, they usually meant a 
Tairora-speaking candidate from the Tairora Census Division .  However , the 
term 'Tairora-speaking' does not necessarily imply that a person is of Tairora 
descent , but can also refer to an individual of another linguistic group who 
resides in the Tairora area and speaks the language . The villagers felt that 
Bakuta, who currently resides in a Tairora village, was a Tairora candidate 
because he had 'joined the Tairora' even though everyone knew he was born 
and raised in the Agarabi Census Division . 
2. Propinquity: Nearness of place of residence of a candidate is another 
important factor, and though it may operate in conjunction with the desire to 
have a candidate from one's  own linguistic group, it is not quite the same 
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Table 2 Voting in Tairora Census Division (percentages) 
Origin of votes 
Candidates 
Aparima Ampo'o 
Bakuta Billio 
Inkata Nanape 
Onamauta Beibi 
Sasakila Sana 
B. Wesley Mataora 
Other 
Ko-ae batuka 
village 
(estimate) 
40-45 
50 
5- 1 0  
0 
D. = less than one per cent 
Ko-ae batuka 
plus nearby 
villages 
50 
42 
5 
2 
0 
Tairora 
Census 
Division 
34 
28 
2 
1 7  
1 2  
7 
evaluate because the voters to Ko-ae batuka recognised that all of the Tairora 
Census Division candidates and Aparima from the Gadsup Census Division 
had relevant government experience. Thus, even though government experi­
ence was viewed as a prerequisite for national office, because most of the 
candidates had such experience other factors such as propinquity or language 
affiliation became important in choosing among candidates . Aparima's 
university education, for example, helped to differentiate him from these other 
candidates and no doubt was partly responsible for his excellent showing in 
Ko-ae batuka and the nearby villages . 
The Tairora results also illuminate the importance of the criteria of age , kin­
ship links, and honesty in evaluating a candidate. Aparima, the youngest 
candidate, won a plurality in the Tairora Census Division . Although he may 
have lost votes because of his youth, his excellent showing demonstrates that 
the age criterion mentioned by some of the Ko-ae batuka people was not a pre­
dominant factor. Aparima received additional support from the voters of Ko­
ae batuka because of his kinship links. Almost all of Inkata's  support in the 
village came from the patrilineage to which he claimed a kinship relationship.  
Finally , Sasaki la did so poorly in Ko-ae batuka as well as in his own census 
division because of his tarnished reputation, thereby demonstrating the 
importance attached to the criterion of honesty and integrity . 
Within the Tairora Census Division the Gadsup candidate Aparima received 
a plurality of votes, in part because the vote for the Tairora-speaking 
candidates was split . However , the strength of his appeal was demonstrated by 
receiving 50 per cent of the vote from Ko-ae batuka and the nearby villages . 
Given the stress placed by Ko-ae batuka voters on the importance of electing a 
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Tairora-speaking candidate , the results may appear surpnsmg. Aparima's 
appeal in Ko-ae batuka and the Tairora area was broadly based upon several 
factors: his demonstrable kinship links to Tairora people, a university 
education, experience in the National Parliament as a ministerial research 
officer, and a campaign style which included staying overnight in Ko-ae 
batuka and several other Tairora villages in order to communicate more 
effectively with voters . 
To understand Aparima' s appeal in the Tairora area as well as to explain the 
general results of the Open electorate, another factor has to be considered, one 
not mentioned by the people of Ko-ae batuka. That is, a sense of common 
identity based upon the political regions created by both administrative units 
and local government councils is a crucial factor in defining the geograrphical 
range of suitable candidates . Both the Gadsup and Tairora Census Divisions 
are administered from Kainantu and their inhabitants are constituents of the 
Kainantu Local Government Council . The people of both census divisions are 
" Kainantu people" as opposed to those in the Obura and Wonenara regions , 
and they share a sense of unity based upon common participation in these 
imposed political units . The units are imposed because they join together 
people from different linguistic groups who were not a political unit 
traditionally . Ballard ( 1 978) has also stressed the influence of administrative 
centes in creating a sense of common identity among the people served by the 
centres , where no such consciousness existed previously . 
The context for relevant social identity can shift according to place and time, and an 
individual may have a choice of identities depending on the context (ibid:4) . 
In this light , the reason for the number of Tairora people voting for a Gadsup 
candidate becomes clearer . Such a perceived unity can override language 
differences . 
The importance of political regions imposed by the administrative units and 
local government councils is also revealed in the general results of the Open 
electorate (see Table 3)<4> . Candidates received from 84 to 100 per cent of their 
votes from the people within these regions . Aparima, Undapmaina, 
Kuwamba, and Baku ta all demonstrated the ability to draw a large number of 
votes from their own linguistic groups and from members of different 
linguistic groups from within their political regions, but outside these regions 
their ability to do so dropped markedly<5> . The most dramatic example was 
provided by the results of the successful candidate, Undapmaina . He polled 
3506 votes from the people of the Wonenara District ;  his support from all four 
census divisions there was uniform . Outside this political region he polled only 
nine votes ! Wesley and Inkata, however, were able to obtain voter support 
from outside their political regions , though Wesley drew the support from his 
own linguistic group, the Tairora. Their ability to do so probably reflected the 
areal extent of their campaigning, for it is likely that some candidates 
campaigned only within their own political region . Thus, the characteristic of 
drawing most of one's  votes from within one's  political region is as much a 
result of a sense of common identity as of the restricted range of campaigning, 
although this in itself may be a function of the candidate 's  perception of  such 
unity . 
The Eastern Highlands Provincial Electorate 
In the Eastern Highlands Provincial electorate there were only three 
opposing candidates . Roy Opis Erave from the Agarabi Census Division and 
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Kumoro Vira, who lives in Goroka, are both Papua New Guinean nationals .  
The third candidate, Barry Holloway, a Papua New Guinean citizen who was 
born in Australia, is well known in the Kainantu area. In the early 1 960s he 
was a patrol officer in Kainantu . He was the first Member of the House of  
Assembly to be elected from the Kainantu Open electorate in  1 964 and was the 
incumbent Member of Parliament from the Eastern Highlands Province . In 
addition, his name was often heard on the radio in relation to proceedings in 
the National Parliament , of which he was Speaker, and thus voter recognition 
was no problem for him . 
In Ko-ae batuka there was never any doubt that everyone would vote for 
Holloway. Part of the overwhelming support for Holloway can be explained 
by name recognition and the factor of propinquity (he maintains a residence in 
Kainantu) . However , more significant from the Ko-ae batuka perspective is 
their contrasting stereotypes of Papua New Guineans and expatriates<6> which 
have emerged in the post-independence period . Since independence there has 
been an increase in the changeover in government personnel, with many ex­
patriates leaving posts and Papua New Guineans relacing them. The people of 
Ko-ae batuka are alarmed at this change because they feel that the level and 
quality of the services provided to them have declined as a result of the change­
over, and they expect this trend to continue. The villagers claim that the ex­
patriates are better able to provide them with the services they need, especially 
those services related to cash-earning enterprises . They characterise a majority 
of the expatriates as being competent , powerful , helpful , and concerned about 
progess in the village . 
Although examples of the decline in government services provided in general 
were noted , the subject of most concern to the people of Ko-ae batuka was the 
perceived decreasing government input into the village commercial sector . This 
decline in the quality and quantity of the services provided by the government 
is perceived as threatening the potential for bisnis activity within the village. 
By retaining as many expatriates as possible, the people believe that any future 
decline will be halted and perhaps rectified . The voters' concerns were 
expressed in materialistic terms ; one man claimed the villagers voted for 
Holloway because 'we think of money' . Indeed, several men believed that it 
was Holloway's  directive that raised the price of coffee . Others felt that 
Holloway' s  presence in government would assure continued assistance from 
Australia. The reasons stated for voting for Holloway reflected the stereotypes 
just noted . No one suggested that the villagers voted for him because he was a 
' Kainantu man' . 
It is impossible to speculate how much support a different expatriate would 
have received. The distinction between Papua New Guineans and expatriates is 
not applied universally, and the villagers in particular have bitter memories of 
the treatment they received from one expatriate kiap a decade ago .  Never­
theless , people voted in the Provincial electorate in accordance with their 
stereotype of many expatriates as competent , powerful,  and helpful . In the 
villagers' view, Holloway was already associated with improving bisnis activity 
by raising the price of coffee. This demonstrated his power to manipulate the 
government and his desire to help the people. Thus , the voters image of 
Holloway was similar to the stereotype of the desirable expatriate. In addition , 
re-electing him symbolised the continuity of the expatriate presence . A vote for 
Holloway was a vote for improving and restoring the level of services provided 
by the government to the rural sector. Holloway belongs to a category of 
people who , in the villagers' view , can accomplish this most effectively. 
That the people of the Ko-ae batuka reached a high degree of consensus in 
Obura- Worenara 1 57 
the Provincial electorate is evident in the overwhelming vote that Holloway 
received. From the people of Ko-ae batuka and the surrounding villages , he 
received 97 per cent of the vote<7> . 
Holloway ' s  support was not uniform throughout the area of the Open 
electorate. Below is a listing of the total and percentage of votes each 
candidate received in the various census divisions : 
Census Division 
Yelia 
Kuwepu 
Wugamwa 
Aziana 
Wonenara 
Region 
Total 
Piora 
Dogara 
Iturua 
Obura 
Region 
Total 
Tairora 
Gadsup 
Kainantu 
Region 
Total 
TOTAL 
Table 4 Votes Received by Census Division 
Eastern Highlands Provincial Electorate 
Barry 
Holloway 
1 505 (98) 
70 1 (99) 
7 1 3  (99) 
8 1 1 (98) 
3730 (98) 
= = = = 
205 (29) 
494 (56) 
1 790 (93) 
2489 (70) 
= = = = 
2402 (94) 
4252 (93) 
6654 (93) 
= = = = 
1 2873 (89) 
Candidates 
Kumoro 
Vira 
24 (2) 
5 (6) 
7 ( 1 )  
1 6  (2) 
52 ( 1 ) 
5 14 (7 1 )  
209 (23) 
24 ( 1 )  
747 (21)  
- - -
95 (4) 
232 (5) 
327 (5) 
1 126 (8) 
Roy Opis 
Erave 
1 2  (6) 
1 (6) 
2 (6) 
3 (6) 
1 8  (6) 
0 (6) 
1 83 (21 )  
1 2 1  (6) 
304 (9) 
68 (2) 
94 (2) 
1 62 (2) 
484 (3) 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =  
6 = less than one per cent 
Note: Percentage of votes in parenthesis 
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The commitment to Holloway as the favoured candidate in the Tairora and 
Gadsup Census Divisions of the Kainantu District and in all census divisions of 
the Wonenara District is  clear . However, in the Obura region (especially in the 
Piora Census Division) he did not do as well , thus showing the limited 
applicability of the sentiments expressed in Ko-ae batuka . Any speculation 
concerning the contrasting support he received in Wonenara and Obura would 
be unwarranted due to the limited scope of my research concerning the 
election . 
Conclusion 
The Ka-ae batuka response to the Open and Provincial electorates differed 
significantly . In the former , no substantive issue motivated the people, voters 
expressed several criteria for evaluating the desirability of the candidates , and 
the attempt to achieve a consensus in voting was shifting and ephemeral . In the 
latter, alarm at the perceived changes in the post-independence period gave rise 
to the predominance of a single criterion defining the preferred candidate, and 
a strong consensus to support one candidate was achieved early in the 
campaign . 
The people of Ko-ae batuka expressed an ideology of achieving a consensus 
and voting for the candidate so chosen; this was at variance with their split 
vote in the Open. The multiplicity of criteria was a reflection of the difference 
of opinion within the village concerning the most suitable candidate. However, 
the acceptance of various criteria will not necessarily lead to a split vote . 
Voters were influenced by the informal discussions concerning the candidates , 
and during these meetings not one but several positive (or negative) charac­
teristics of a single candidate were stated . Different attributes of the same 
candidate may appeal to different voters . A possible explanation for the split 
vote within the village is that pre-existing factions within the village 
determined the outcome . Overlapping divisions exist within the village based 
on kinship and descent , residence , and the followings of leaders , or 'big-men' . 
However, the village voting pattern was not exclusively determined by these 
divisions ,  though voters were certainly influenced in these contexts . There 
were cases of neighbours , agnates , and at least one instance of a husband and 
wife voting for different candidates . Thus a certain amount of individualism in 
voter behaviour was manifest . Indeed , the nature of voter decision-making in 
the village concerning the Open electorate was a reflection of their society - a 
combination of efforts at group consensus and individual initiatives . 
Nevertheless , the potential for group consensus was demonstrated in the 
unanimous support for Holloway in the Provincial electorate . The different 
results in relation to the degree of consensus in the voting in the two electorates 
can be explained by the perceived benefits in electing the candidates . The 
villagers were convinced that the re-election of Holloway would materially 
benefit them. However , in the case of the Open electorate , people were 
sceptical about the possibility of any candidate helping the village, and this 
militated against any sense of urgency in uniting behind a single candidate . 
Various criteria by which the people in a single Tairora village judged the 
candidates have been examined . In the Open electorate, kinship links , 
linguistic similarity, honesty and integrity, propinquity , education and 
experience, and a shared sense of identity based upon administrative and local 
government council territories were the predominant criteria. In the Provincial 
electorate, the deciding factor was the desire to retain expatriates in the 
country to ensure a continued level of government services to the rural people 
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in the post-independence period . None of the criteria alone can explain the 
pattern of the election results and exceptions to them can be found within the 
electorate. What is certain is  that multiple criteria were consciously employed 
by the voters of a single village. 
The influence of different criteria can produce the same spatial pattern of 
voting within a limited area, and this raises a basic problem in the social 
sciences in general - the difficulty of predicting motives from resultant 
patterns.  Analysing the spatial pattern of voting will not necessarily provide 
the key to understanding the motives of the voters precisely because the 
influence of different criteria can produce the same pattern . Therefore , in 
some instances , it may be inappropriate to conclude that the voting results 
were determined by a single factor such as linguistic affliliation or propinquity 
without inquiring into the motives of the voters . 
Much has changed economically, socially , and politically since the first 
election in 1 964 . Leininger ( 1964) and Watson ( 1 964, 1 965) provide accounts 
of the 1 964 House of Assembly election in the Kainantu Open, and their 
reports contrast markedly with the 1 977 elections . The prominent character­
istics of the events in the 1 964 election can be summarised as follows : all the 
national candidates came from villages close to the expatriate-dominated 
centres of Kainantu and the Highlands Agricultural Experimental Station at 
Aiyura; during the campaign, there were slight overtones of anti-Australian 
sentiments;  village voting patterns were determined by consensus and block 
voting by language groups predominated; participation in the election was 
viewed as potentially dangerous , and magical substances were used to protect 
voters ; and a considerable time elapsed before people in the rural areas knew 
the election results .  
In  1 977 the Open candidates came from many parts o f  the electorate . There 
were certainly no anti-Australian sentiments expressed in the village of Ko-ae 
batuka, though to what extent this was also true in the Obura area where 
Holloway did not receive such a large majority of the votes , I do not know. To 
the voters of Ko-ae batuka, being of Australian origin was a decided 
advantage. The degree to which a consensus was reached in the villages of the 
Open electorate varied . In the Wonenara District ,  one candidate received 9 1  
per cent o f  the vote. I n  the Obura area and the Tairora and Gadsup Census 
Divisions , the vote was split among several candidates . Although linguistic 
affiliations were important , a wider consciousness defined by imposed 
political boundaries also seemed influential in determining the spatial 
patterning of voting . The election process itself was conceived of in purely 
secular terms in Ko-ae batuka and no form of magical protection was used 
when voting in the village . Lastly, by 1 0  July news that Undapmaina had won 
the Open reached the village . 
Many of the changes noted can be attributed to the people' s increased 
mobility, better communication links with the town centre, the spatial expan­
sion of government services throughout the region, experience in local govern­
ment activities , and a better understanding of national political processes 
aided in part by the political education provided by visiting government 
officers . Social and economic changes in the post-independence period were 
also influential in determining voting behaviour . 
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NOTES 
* I would like to thank John Ballard, Stephen Britton, Diana Howlett, Marie Reay and 
Elspeth Young for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, though I alone 
am responsible for any deficiencies in the final product . I am also indebted to the 
District Officer in Kainantu, Craig McConaghey, and to George Westermark for 
facilitating the collection of data on the election. The fieldwork upon which this paper is 
based was made possible by the hospitality and co-operation of the people of Ko-ae 
batuka village. 
1 .  The village is given the fictitious name of Ko-ae batuka to preserve the confiden­
tiality of the voters . 
2. People in rural areas do not vote in the town centres . The government designates 
certain villages as the polling sites for other villages in the vicinity, and the electoral 
patrols composed of government officials travel to the chosen villages to conduct 
the voting. Ko-ae batuka was one such voting centre . 
3 .  Tairora-speakers are not the only inhabitants of the Tairora Census Division. The 
people of Ontenu village speak the Gadsup language and those of Tondona village 
speak both the Auyana and Tairora languages .  Because the results from these 
villages were combined with those from other villages, it was impossible to discover 
whether there was any difference between the pattern of voting in these villages and 
others within the Tairora Census Division . 
4. In both Tables 3 and 4 the election results are presented by census division . 
Unfortunately, in a few cases the same ballot box was used in different census 
divisions . To overcome this problem the candidates' votes were apportioned to the 
census divisions according to the ratio of the number of villages within a census 
division using a ballot box to the total number of villages using it . This had to be 
done for three of the twelve ballot boxes used in the Wonenara region and for two 
of the seven boxes in the Obura region. No such problem occurred in the T�irora 
and Gadsup Census Divisions . No ballot box was used in more than one 
administrative region . 
5 .  Although Sasakila did receive 278 votes from the Gadsup Census Division, 257 of 
those votes came from the box used by the inhabitants of six villages , three of which 
are Tairora-speaking. It is most likely that his support from here came from the 
Tairora-speaking villages, because his wife is a member of one of these Tairora 
villages . Therefore, I have not included Sasakila with those candidates receiving 
support from people outside their language groups . 
6.  Barry Holloway i s  still considered to be an expatriate by the  people of Ko-ae 
batuka. 
7. Barry Holloway was the winner in the Ea.stern Highlands Provincial electorate. 
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Chapter 8 
LOCAL ALLIANCES AND POLITICS: 
KAINANTU OPEN 
George D .  Westermark 
Introiiuction 
In 1 977 what had been the Kainantu Open electorate of the Eastern 
Highlands Province was divided into two separate electorates , one to retain the 
name Kainantu and the second to be called Obura-W onenara. The division 
meant that where there had been an electorate of roughly 55 ,000 population, 
covering 1 ,400 square miles , the Kainantu Open now consisted of the heavily 
populated northern region of the former electorate, and Obura-Wonenara 
would cover the more remote, lightly populated, southern portion. The new 
Kainantu Open would include the Kamano and Agarabi Census Divisions , 
along with Kainantu town, and it is the election in this electorate that this 
paper considers . 2 
Besides the redrawing of electoral boundaries , the 1 977 election presented 
the people of the Kainantu Open, as it did in some ways the entire country, 
with a number of firsts . This would be the first national election since 
Independence in 1 975 ; the first without preferential balloting; the first since 
the establishment of the Eria Komuniti system. The latter is a unique attempt 
in the Kainantu District to bring government one step closer to the grass-roots 
level through the organization of political units based on village alliances . 
With the Village Courts introduced in 1 975 , the Eria Komuniti concept put 
power into the hands of the people, and made the initial move toward the 
realization of true village government in Papua New Guinea . 
These factors also made the 1 977 Kainantu Open particularly interesting for 
research on political development . The new electorate would include the most 
politically and economically sophisticated areas of the former electorate , areas 
which in the intervening years since the last election had experienced several 
innovations in government . These alterations had distributed political respon­
sibility to a wider segment of the electorate' s population, and it was reasonable 
to suppose that these changes would mean an increased awareness and interest 
in the political arena, and in national institutions like the National Parliament 
and the various political parties . In addition, since the electrorate had been 
previously studied at the time of the first election in 1 964 (Watson, 1 965), the 
1 977 election could be contrasted with events in that earlier period and thus 
give some insight into the long term political trends . 
Political Development 
Since the beginning of European movement into the Highlands , the 
Kainantu area has been a door to the remainder of the region, and this has 
made it particularly susceptible to varied agencies of change . The intrusion of 
first missionaries , then miners and finally government officers altered the 
evolution of  Highland' s  societies beginning in the 1 930' s ,  and gave them a 
direction along which they accelerated in the post-World War I I  era .  For the 
sake of simplicity, political development in the area can be divided into six 
stages . 
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Stage 1 covers the pre-European period. Traditional political life reflected 
the continual warfare and associated military preparedness which existed . 
Endemic hostilities resulted in small fluctuating groups with leaders selected 
for their talents in fighting . Defeat in warfare led to the breakup of 
settlements ,  the migration of blocs of refugees in search of friendly territory 
and the consequent restructuring of alliances . Shifts of this kind caused 
imbalances elsewhere in the field of inter-group power relations causing a cycle 
of group strength , defeat and migration . The lack of an extensive system of 
exchange as found in some other areas of the Highlands increased the 
instability of Kainantu political alliances . 3  
Stage 2 began with the migration of Europeans to Kainantu . The Australian 
policy of  establishing law and order quickly halted inter-group fighting, and 
warfare as it had been known was finished . Two consequences of this revolu­
tion in political relations were the freezing of the alliance system and the 
under-mining of the basis for leadership . The process of group fission and re­
combination ceased, and many refugees returned to the sites of former settle­
ments.  Village officials,  the luluais, were appointed by the government , and 
the centralization of authority began . The Highlands first luluai was appointed 
and the first census taken in the Agarabi in 1 933 . 4 
Stage 3 in political development was the introduction of the local 
government council system. This initiated a gradual process of decentralizing 
political authority, the intent of which was to increase the self-reliance of 
village people. The first council in Kainantu was organized in the Agarabi in 
1 960, and was followed by the organization of the Kamano Council in 1 963 , 
just prior to the first election . Councils were begun in the Tairora and Gadsup 
census divisions,  though they later merged to form the Erandora Council , as 
had the Agarabi and Kamano Councils to form the Kainantu Council .  In 1 970 
these two councils combined to form the Kainantu Council of today which 
represents the four census divisions . 
Stage 4 began in 1 964 with the first election for the House of Assembly . The 
group of candidates for this election included five nationals and one 
expatriate, and of the Papua New Guinean candidates, all were experienced in 
some aspect of the new society which emerged in the post-World Wai: II era. 
As was noted at the time: ' 'All the candidates were identified with activities 
developed in the past ten years or so. No candidates standing or qualifications 
for candidacy were based, even in part , on a traditional activity" (Watson 
1 965 : 99) . The sole expatriate was Barry Holloway, a former Patrol Officer 
who had organized the Agarabi and Kamano Councils . Campaigning in the 
election was limited by the national candidates to familiar territory, and voting 
proved equally as parochial with most voters giving their first preferences to 
candidates from their own ethnolinguistic groups . Only Holloway campaigned 
extensively throughout the electorate , and his collection of first and second 
preference votes gave him victory over the national candidates . The implica­
tion of these results was that broader political identities transcending 
traditional loyalties emerged in 1 964 . However transitory, the first national 
election provided a context in which the people of Kainantu could see 
themselves in opposition to adversaries larger and more remote than the 
neighboring village . 
Though we do not have a break down of voting patterns by area in 1 968 as 
we do for 1 964, it is likely that similar processes were at work . The field of 
candidates again consisted of five nationals and one expatriate, and of the 
nationals ,  there were four Councillors and an aid-post orderly. The election was 
Kainantu 1 63 
again won by the expatriate, this time by Mick Casey, a coffee planter who had 
stood for the South Markham Special electorate in 1 964 (Watson, 1 965) .  In 
1 972 there was an entirely national slate of candidates , and two of  these men 
were making a second attempt at the Kainantu Open. The field was again 
dominated by Councillors , and was won by one of them, Moses Sasikila, from 
the Tairora. Moses had the advantage of having lived in a number of areas in 
the District during his service as an aid-post orderly, and this may account for 
his victory . He was appointed a Minister in the coalition government of 
Michael Somare, but his failure to make public his private assets as required of 
Ministers led to his removal from office in 1976, and the calling of a By­
Election . Though Moses ' removal was soon declared illegal and the By­
Election cancelled , this was not before a group of nine candidates had 
nominated and begun their campaigns .  Four of these men would stand for the 
Kainantu Open in 1 977 . 
Stage 6 has occurred in the 1 970s with the inception of Eria Komunitis and 
Village Courts .  Erias began in the District in 1 973 with four established in the 
Agarabi and Kamano. They have since expanded to number thirty- five and 
cover the entire District . An Eria consists of anywhere from two to ten villages 
which feel that they can work effectively together . The Eria collects its own 
taxes and can use them for whatever projects it desires . A president and 
committee of Eria men are elected to guide the work of the Eria, as well as 
Councillors who represent the Eria in the Kainantu Council .  The Eria has 
minor legislative powers , and with the beginning of Village Courts in 1 975 , 
their acts can be enforced. Village Courts do not correspond precisely to Eria 
Komunitis as some Erias are too small in the government ' s  eyes to warrant the 
expense of an individual court . However, with twenty-one courts serving the 
thirty-five Erias and magistrates drawn from all the villages , they can maintain 
close contact with each other . The Eria concept seeks not only to bring 
government closer to the people, but to do so by continuing the process of 
decentralization through placing political responsibilities back in the village . 5  
Candidates 
The unusual fact about the group of candidates for the 1 977 Open was the 
absence of experienced Kainantu political figures . Only Ono Aia and Babanki 
Aburase had served with the Councils in the area, whereas nearly all of the 
candidates in the previous two Open elections had Council experience. A 
number of factors may explain this change in candidate background. The first 
elections for the Eastern Highlands Provincial Assembly were scheduled to be 
held early in 1 978,  6 and it is likely that the creation of this new position 
between the national and local levels influenced the decisions of Councillors . 
Two prominent Councillors told the author that they pref erred to stand in the 
Provincial elections . The electoral process itself eliminated two Council 
leaders from the Kainantu Open: the change in electorate boundaries placed 
the Council President within the Obura-Wonanara Open, 7 and the previous 
Council President , an Open candidate in 1 972, decided to nominate in his 
home region,  the Finschafen Open . Perhaps more significant than these 
considerations is  the fact that of the candidates who did nominate, there were 
a large number of young men, the majority of whom had a good education 
and some of whom had experience in business or government outside 
Kainantu . This contrasts with the background of Councillors who are for the 
most part middle aged men with little , if any, formal education, and may 
indicate that a new generation of political leaders has emerged in Kainantu . 
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Tepi Ya 'ato, of Barapa village in the Bus Kamano Eria, was 29 years old . A 
strong advocate of the work of the churches , he was himself a Seventh-Day 
Adventist . He was educated to Form 4 at the S .D.A.  Kabiufa High School 
near Goroka, and followed this with seven months of employment with the 
Finance Department in Goroka . At the time of the election he owned a vehicle 
and was working as a coffee buyer . A United Party candidate, he had 
nominated for the By-Election in 1 976. He was also an active rugby player , 
and Vice-President of the Kainantu Sports Council . 
Peter Wai, 32, and a Country Party candidate, had ten years experience as a 
driver both for the government and as a privately employed businessman . In  
mid- 1 977 he  was operating h i s  own passenger vehicle and buying coffee . 
Originally from Garufi in the Garufi-Taf esa Eria, he had also lived in the 
northern Kamano in his wife 's  village, and during his employment with the 
government, in Kainantu town . He attended school to the Standard 5 level and 
was a member of the Salvation Army Church. 
Bofeno Mitio was the son of a Lutheran pastor from Bitebe village in the 
Eyevinota Eria Komuniti, and was educated to Form 4 at Asaroka High 
School near Goroka. He also received a Public Service Higher Certificate from 
the Administrative College in Port Moresby which he attended in 1 976. At 3 1  
years o f  age, he had served for six and one-half years in Goroka as a Finance 
Officer . He was a Country Party member . 
Thomas Pasangu , 29, was educated to Form 4 at Goroka High School and 
held a Public Service Highest Certificate from the Administrative College in 
Port Moresby. He joined the public service in 1 97 1 ,  and served in Port 
Moresby, Mt.  Hagen and Goroka with the Electoral Commission , the 
Property and Accomodation Department and the Liquor Licensing 
Commission . He was one of the two independent candidates in the election . 
Siuras Kavani, 27, was the only university graduate and author among the 
eleven candidates (Kavani 1 974, 1 975) . He had spent most of the eight years 
prior to the election in Port Moresby, first at the University of Papua New 
Guinea . Then at the Administrative College, one year on the personal staff of 
the previous Member from Kainantu , Moses Sasikila, a year as Executive 
Assistant with the Division of Sports , and nearly a year as Director of Sports. 
From Tuempinka in the Ramu Eria, he was the sole People's Progress Party 
candidate. 
Bob Tanna, 29, from Doienakenu village in the Yonki Eria, was employed 
as as a hotel manager in Kundiawa prior to the election . He completed Form 4 
at Goroka High School , then worked as a Council Administrative Officer in 
Rabaul for one year . From 1 969- 1 972, he was a radio announcer with Radio 
Goroka, and then moved on to serve as a news reporter with the National 
Broadcasting Commission in Port Moresby during 1 972-73 .  While with the 
NBC,  he attended a one month broadcasting course in Malaysia sponsored 
by UNESCO, and a three months course in communications at the 
International Training Institute, Sydney, sponsored by the Papua New Guinea 
government . In 1 974 he took his first hotel manager position in Goroka for 
one year before transferring to Kundiawa in 1 975 . He was a Country Party 
candidate. 
Ono A ia, 49, and a Country Party member, was the most politically 
experienced of the Open candidates . Beginning in 1 960 as first President of the 
Agarabi Council ,  he served nearly continuously as a Councillor throughout 
the following seventeen years , several times as a President or Vice-President of 
the Kainantu Council .  He was appointed by the Council to the Eastern 
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Highlands District Area Authority when it began in 1 973 , and remained a 
member when the Eastern Highlands Provincial government was initiated . He 
served as President of the Area Authority from 1 973-76, and was Deputy 
Speaker for the Provincial Assembly at the time of the 1 977 election . Besides 
these efforts in Local and Provincial government, he was a candidate for the 
Kainantu Open in 1 964 and 1 972, nominated for the By-Election of 1 976, and 
was a Village Court magistrate . In 1 962 he accompanied Barry Holloway on a 
visit to Australia, and while there took a one month course on polit ical 
education in Canberra. As an Area Authority member , he had toured 
Malaysia in 1 975 to observe appropriate technology. He is from Kainantu 
Village in The Ankuantenu Eria. 
A kilalnivigo, a United Party member , was the only candidate besides Ono 
who had previously stood for an Open election. In 1964, having just completed 
Form 2 at Goroka High School, he stood for the first Kainantu Open. Only 
eighteen then, he had since had thirteen years experience as a Mines Officer for 
the Natural Resources Department . Besides his work for the government , he 
and his five brothers had started the M . M .  Bros.  Company in Kainantu . The 
company' s  interests included a large trade and second-hand clothes store in 
Kainantu town,  two trade stores outside of town, a coffee plantation , a cattle 
ranch and piggery, and several trucks. Akila is from Nomura village in the 
Onapinka Eria. 
Koy Anakime, 33 ,  was a Country party candidate and a member of the 
Seventh Day Adventist church. He worked for twelve years as a heavy 
equipment operator in road construction in several parts of Papua New 
Guinea . From Tirokave in the Sobe Eria, he returned to Kainantu in 1 974 and 
has business interests in a truck and small trade store. 
Yubiti Yu/aki, 33 ,  from Uninufintenu in the Anonantu Eria, was educated 
to Standard 3 in Seventh Day Adventist schools and is a member of that 
church . From 1 960-68 , he worked as a domestic and driver in Bougainville and 
Port Moresby . Returning to Kainantu in 1 969, he worked as a coffee buyer for 
Barry Holloway,  and assisted in the latter' s successful campaign for the 1 972 
Eastern Highlands Regional electorate. After Holloway's election, Yubiti 
began his own coffee buying business which he has since expanded to include 
transport between Goroka and Lae, and a small herd of cattle . 
Babanki A burase, 48, from Kainoa village in the Ankuantenu Eria 
Komuniti , was a Councillor in the Agarabi Council where he served as Vice­
President for six years . He had worked as a carpenter for a number of years 
before being elected a Village Court magistrate in 1 975 . He was a member of 
the Seventh-Day Adventist church, and one of the two independent candidates 
in the Open . 
Campaign 
In the months preceding July, one was hard pressed to find evidence that 
there was an impending election in Kainantu . The only sign of polit ical activity 
was the appearance of the candidates posters which began to materialize in 
early April on the windows of stores and government buildings in town, and at 
the Eria Komuniti centers . Yet, by this time most of the candidates had begun 
their travels around the electorate in search of votes . The style of campaigning 
was generally low-key in the early days of electioneering, the candidates 
concentrating on meeting with small groups of people outside their own 
regions to familiarize them with their names and faces . 8 The extent to which 
they were successful in this effort seemed to correspond to the distance from 
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their home village, though as several of the candidates recognized, with eleven 
candidates competing for votes , a strong vote in one region could provide the 
margin for victory . 9 
The geographic breadth of their campaigning divides the candidates into 
two groups .  The first group includes those who campaigned extensively 
throughout the electorate, not limiting themselves to one region. 10 These 
candidates possessed both transportation and party support , a combination 
which made their far-ranging campaigns possible .  With the efficient system of 
roads in Kainantu, vehicles were an asset which enabled candidates to visit 
several villages a day and search out places where villagers had gathered . The 
Eria Komuniti system schedules monthly meetings for each Eria at which 
Komuniti officers from the Council meet with villagers to discuss problems 
and projects .  Erias also schedule work days where work on community 
projects is performed, and there are also work days at the many primary 
schools in the District where parents gather . The candidates with vehicles at 
their disposal could take advantage of such meetings in their campaigning . The 
second group of candidates includes those whose campaign travels were 
restricted , either because their strategy called for them to ignore one of the 
electorate's regions , or because they were without transport . 1 1  All of these 
candidates but one lacked personal transportation. They include the two 
independent candidates and three of the Country Party candidates . Some of 
these candidates did make brief forays further afield , but they largely stayed 
within their home region. 
Though nine of the eleven candidates established party affiliations , and 
some of them made a point of emphasizing the ideas and programs of their 
parties during their campaigning, it is safe to say that party identity was more 
significant in the minds of the candidates than it was in those of the voters . As 
one of the candidate ' s  put it :  "Only half of the people know the meaning of 
politics and parties . The other half are in confusion . They think a party is a 
social event . "  Despite this lack of familiarity on the part of voters , parties did 
play a part in the support of  their candidates . Parties assisted some by 
supplying vehicles and the money to maintain them . For example, Siuras had 
his car supplied to him by PPP, Yubiti had major repairs to his car paid for 
by Pangu , and Tepi and Akila, though each had his own vehicle , often went 
out in the United Party car campaigning with their Provincial electorate 
candidate. Parties also supplied money to purchase campain posters,  and lent 
some candidates loud-speakers . 
The party candidates had the additional benefit of campaign assistance 
from party leaders and other party candidates . Three national party leaders 
visited Kainantu in support of their candidates prior to the election, 12 and 
the United and Pangu party candidates could avail themselves of aid from 
their Provincial electorate candidates , Kumoro Vila and Barry Holloway 
respectively. As noted above, the United candidates took advantage of the 
United Party car , and were often seen with Kumoro in the last weeks before 
the election. Whether this was of more benefit to Akila and Tepi , or to 
Kumoro, is open to question . Holloway, as an experienced Kainantu 
politician , provided Yubiti with campaign strategy , as well as with logistical 
support from his campaign staff and vehicles . Holloway' s  familiarity with the 
voters may also have won Yubiti some votes . 
Party identities were most clearly defined on those occasions where 
candidates encountered each other campaigning . One such incident was the 
visit to Kainantu of the Prime Minister, Michael Somare. Accompanied by 
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Peter Lus ,  then Minister for Police , Holloway, at the time Speaker of the 
House of Assembly, and Yubiti, Somare visited two meetings arranged for his 
visit at Eria Komuniti centers in the Kamano . Most of the Open candidates 
were present at the meetings , and after listening to the Pangu members recount 
the role they had played in the independence movement and the aspects of 
development Pangu was responsible for in Papua New Guinea, they used the 
opportunity to challenge the Pangu side . They called for them to clarify for the 
people that it was not a Pangu but a coalition government , in which PPP 
and independents participated, and that the Opposition had a role to play as 
watch-dog of the government . This led to some heated exchange between the 
two sides, but probably served most to demonstrate the self-confidence of the 
candidates in the face of the 'big-men' of the government . 
Just as parties were not significant factors in mobilizing voter support for 
the candidates , no dominant issues emerged to divide the candidates in the 
minds of the voters .  At one of the Somare meetings, Ono Aia raised two issues 
of some concern to the District: the closure of the Kainantu air strip and the 
hoped for division of the Eastern Highlands Province into Kainantu and 
Goroka provinces . While the former issue was relevant to people throughout 
the District , and the latter more limited to the desires of Councillors , this was 
one of the few times either was mentioned in the campaign . In any case, the 
attitudes of the candidates would probably have been quite similar toward 
each issue . A general problem which most of the candidates dealt with in their 
campaign talks and in their posters was the question of business development 
in the District . All of the candidates were obviously in favor of development , 
though there were few specific proposals . One plan was made public at the 
April Kainantu Council meeting by Akila Inivgo. He called for the creation of 
what he called the Kainantu Movement Association, an organization which 
would join the resources from the thirty-five Eria Komunitis to finance 
business projects in the District . Akila gave duplicated copies of his proposal 
to each of the Councillors, and to other village leaders, but nothing came of 
his plan, before or after the election. 
Results 
The election was won with a wide margin by· the Pangu candidate, Yubiti . 
The second highest vote-getter was Tepi , over seven hundred votes behind the 
victor . Two other candidates , Peter and Akila, topped the one thousand vote 
mark .  A precise analysis of the voting results is made difficult by the fact that 
votes from different villages , sometimes from widely separated areas , were 
combined in the same ballot box . However , the votes in each box came from 
villages in only one or two Eria Komunitis, and a ballot box breakdown does 
demonstrate several general points (see Table 1 ) . 1 3  
First , it is  clear that the majority of  each candidate' s  votes came from within 
his own ethnolinguistic region, and that the heaviest concentration of these 
votes came from his own Eria Komuniti. Thomas , for instance, had only 36 
votes outside the southern Kamano region though he came fifth with 830 
votes , and Tepi received nearly half his votes from his Bus Kamano Eria . This 
suggests that the ethnic bloc voting noted for the 1 964 election (Watson 
1 965 : 1 14) continues to be a strong force in the voting pattern today . Further , 
with eleven candidates dividing a much smaller electorate than in previous 
elections, the political alliances reflected in the Eria Komuniti system were also 
influential . 
Second, the mobility of the candidates appears to have affected the results . 
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1 29 8 50 
144 1 76 30 
1 39 3 14  
36 541 
265 1 4 
1 080 286 3 12 1916  
5 12 1 
1 3  26 21 
1 5  17  12 
10 
7 76 5 
1 1  1 8 1  9 
2 
6 
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289 
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The group of mobile candidates received the most votes in the election, and 
collected them from the widest range of Eria Komunitis. While their votes 
from many ballot boxes were not significant in number , they show the effect 
of transportation on the election . The candidates with vehicles were also those 
who earned the most votes in town, which again may stem from their greater 
mobility. 
Third , the lack of strong vote-getters in the Agarabi other than Yubiti was a 
critical aspect of the election . If we subtract the votes Ono won in the Kamano 
and in town, no other candidate but Yubiti received 500 Agarabi votes . In 
contrast, there were three candidates in the Kamano - Akila, Peter and 
Thomas - who collected large votes . Tepi is an unusual case because, though 
his village is  from the Agarabi ,  it is  on the border with the Kamano and is 
politically aligned with Kamano villages in the Bus Kamano Eria. Tepi also 
received a sizeable vote in some Agarabi Erias (Boxes 1 1  & 1 2) where he is 
matrilaterally related . Thus, more than any other candidate, he was able to 
earn votes in both the Agarabi and Kamano . 
Fourth , voter turn-out was lower than in previous elections . There was an 
estimated 4 1  per cent voter participation in the Kamano and 57  per cent in the 
Agarabai , or an overall participation of 49 per cent . 14 In 1 964 it was estimated 
that there was a turn-out of 58 per cent in the Kamano and an 80 per cent 
Agarabi turn-out (Watson 1 965 : 1 1 3) .  Though we do not have estimates for the 
1 968 and 1 972 elections , it is likely that this decrease represents a trend rather 
than a radical change since 1964. 1 5  An equal voter participation from both 
Agarabi and Kamano would have meant 1 700 more Kamano votes , a figure 
which could have altered the outcome of the election. 
Conclusion 
When a number of the losing candidates and some political leaders in 
Kainantu were asked to explain Yubiti ' s  victory , they offered one of two 
answers : either he won because,  as a coffee buyer who travelled throughout the 
District in his work,  he was well known in the electorate and had been able to 
do numerous favors for people, or, he won because of his association with 
Barry Holloway and Pangu . Undoubtedly there is an element of the truth in 
both answers . Before the election Yubiti offered a similar response when asked 
by the author why he thought he would win .  
A look at the voting results offers support for at  least one of the two 
explanations for Yubiti ' s  success . The top four vote-getters in the election -
Yubiti , Tepi , Akila and Peter - were all men recognized for their interests in 
business , religious or sporting activities in the District . Three of  these four -
Yubiti , Tepi and Peter - had been resident in their home areas for a number 
of years prior to the election and they had therefore been able to maintain 
themselves within the web of local socio-political relations . These two factors 
- local recognition and social involvement - contrasts them with four of the 
other candidates - Bob , Bofenu , Siuras and Thomas - who, though they 
were respected because of the distinguished positions they held in business and 
government, had not maintained ties at the local level . 
Two other aspects of the election mentioned in the previous section are 
important for analyzing the outcome. First , the large number of candidates 
who nominated for the Open divided the electorate and encouraged voting 
according to local political alliances . In the three previous national elections of 
1 964, 1 968 and 1 972 there had been five, five and seven candidates respect­
ively, and in an electorate at least twice the size of the 1 977 Kainantu Open . It 
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may b e  that the introduction o f  the Eria Komuniti system with its division o f  
the single council into smaller political units encouraged a n  increase i n  the 
number of candidates , though reports from the national newspaper indicate 
that such increases were a general phenomenon in 1 977 . 16 Second, the absence 
of a strong Agarabi opponent for Yubiti meant that he collected strong votes 
from many of the Agarabi Erias. Some political observers in Kainantu 
commented that Ono, the number two Agarabi vote-getter and the most 
politically experienced candidate , suffered in the eyes of voters from his two 
previous defeats in Open elections , as well as from a burden of political 
antagonism built up over the years . 
The victory by Yubiti appears to be attributable to a combination of the 
following factors : ( 1) the support he received from his business associations 
and local involvement , (2) his association with Barry Holloway and Pangu, (3) 
the division of electorate voting by a large number of candidates , and (4) the 
lack of strong competition in the Agarabi . It is difficult to single out any one 
of these as being more significant than another . 
The long-term political trends indicated by the 1 977 Kainantu Open are 
most striking in candidate background and voter alignment . The changes 
which have occurred in candidates can be characterized as the opposition 
between " opening-men" and " drop-outs" .17 "Opening-men" refers to that 
generation of men whose childhood and adulthood have followed the sequence 
of innovations begun in the Highlands in the 1 930s . They have "opened" the 
social , technological and political changes experienced in the last half century . 
In the 1 977 election they were conspicuous for their absence after having 
dominated the previous elections . Instead, in 1 977 a younger generation came 
into prominence . The term " drop-outs" can only be applied to them in a 
relative way though , for the individuals vary in the degree they participate in 
village society. Yet , in a broader sense , they have all "dropped-out" of a 
traditional society radically altered since their birth in the post-World War I I  
era . Whether this represents an immediate trend toward younger men taking 
up leadership positions at all levels in the political hierarchy has yet to be 
seen, but may be clarified in the forthcoming Eastern Highlands Provincial 
elections . 
Though the background of candidates had changed, voters continued to 
align themselves by ethnic areas and political alliances . Rather than suffer a 
decline, this aspect of neo-traditional political relations seems to have been 
boosted by the moves to self-govenment and independence in Papua New 
Guinea, and by the introduction of new, local-level political institutions in 
Kainantu . That local alliances persist as an important element in the village 
scene was demonstrated in the months following the July election when 
Kainantu suffered an outbreak of tribal fighting , the first such fighting of note 
since independence . The pattern of inter-group alliances then, remains a 
significant factor in electoral behaviour , and while other considerations also 
affect the choices made by voters , the influence of local groups shows no signs 
of decreasing in the near future. 
NOTES 
1 .  I would like to acknowledge the assistance in Kainantu of James Taya, Returning 
Officer , Kainantu Open, of Craig McConaghey , District Coordinator, Kainantu,  
and of Henry van Leeuwin, Executive Officer, Kainantu Council . The research 
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upon which this paper is based was made possible by grants from the Bollingen 
Foundation and the Department of Anthropology, University of Washington . 
2. References to "the Kamano" or "the Agarabi" should be understood as applying 
to the two census divisions of those names . The census division boundaries 
correspond to the distribution of the Kamano and Agarabi languages in the 
Kainantu District . 
3 .  See Berndt ( 1 969) and Watson ( 1 967 , 1970) for detailed descriptions of traditional 
socio-political organization in Kainantu . 
4. See Radford ( 1 972) for an account of early post-contact history in Kainantu . 
5 .  For discussions of Eria Komuniti and Village Courts in Kainantu,  see Uyassi ( 1 973) 
and Warren ( 1 976) . 
6. This election had not taken place by mid- 1 978.  
7 .  Where he did not stand because local leaders had given support to his cousin, the 
Pangu candidate . 
8. Photos of the candidates were intended to appear on the ballots alongside their 
names , but due to technical problems the photos were not included . 
9. The author was resident in the Kainantu District for the four months prior to the 
election,  and in informal discussion with villagers from throughout the electorate, 
found that few could identify candidates from outside their own region . In the 
weeks before the election,  a survey of twenty-five heads-of-household was made in 
an Agarabi village of approximately one hundred households . The village borders 
Kainantu town and residents can therefore be presumed to have greater access to 
political information than the residents of most other villages in the District . It was 
found that of those questioned none could identify more than four of the 
candidates, and these four were nearly always Agarabi . 
10 . Siuras , Ono, Tepi , Akila, Peter and Yubiti . 
1 1 .  Bob, Bofeno, Koy, Babanki and Thomas . 
12 .  Julius Chan (PPP), Sinake Giregire (Country) and Michael Somare (Pangu) . 
1 3 .  Table 1 lists the votes received by each candidate from the eighteen ballot boxes 
used in the election . Each box is identified by the name, or names , of the Eria 
Komuniti voting in that box . 
14. The estimate is based on combining a tally of voters from the electoral roll with 
Section voters. It can only be a rough estimate due to the inadequacy of the roll and 
the unknown number of potential Section voters who did not participate . 
1 5 .  See Stone ( 1 976:529) . 
16. Post-Courier May 10, 1977, p. 1 and May 23 , 1 977 , p. I .  
1 7 .  The term "opening-men" is taken from Waston ( 1960), though used in a slightly 
different sense . "Drop-outs" was derived from an autobiographical account by one 
of the Open candidates (Kavani, 1974) . 
REFERENCES 
Berndt, Ronald 
1969 Political Structure in the Eastern Central Highlands of New Guinea. 
A nthropological Forum Vol . 2, No. 3, pp . 327-369. 
Kavani , Siuras 
1974 The Drop-out . In Beir, Ulli (ed.) ,  Niugini Lives.  Jacaranda Press 
1975 City Lights .  Urbanization in Papua New Guinea . Point, No . 1 ,  pp . 14 1 - 147 .  
Radford , Robin 
1972 Missionaries , Miners and Administrators in the Eastern Highlands . Journal of 
the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol . 6, No. 2. 
Stone, David 
1976 The Political Turning Point : The Birth of the National Coalition Government . 
In Stone, D. (ed .) ,  Prelude to Self-Government. 
Canberra: Australian National University Press. 
Kainantu 1 73 
Uyassi, Munare 
1975 Improving Access: the Komuniti Kaunsils . Yagl-Ambu Vol . 2, No . 1 ,  pp . 5 1 -69. 
Waren, Neil 
1976 The Introduction of a Village Court , IASER Discussion Paper No . 2. 
Waston, James B .  
1960 A New Guinea "Opening Man" . In Casagrande , J .B .  (ed.) , In the Company of 
Man . 
1965 The Kainantu Open and South Markham Special Electorates . In Bettison, 
D.G . ,  Hughes , C.A. , and van der Veur, P .W. (eds .) ,  The Papua-New Guinea 
Elections 1964 . Canberra: Australian National University Press .  
1 967 Tairora: The Politics of Despotisim in a Small Society. Anthropological Forum 
Vol . 2, pp . 53- 104. 
1970 Society as Organized Flow: .The Tairora Case . Southwestern Journal of 
Anthoropology Vol . 26, No . 2, pp . 107- 1 24 .  
1 74 
Chapter 9 
SHAPING A POLITICAL ARENA : 
THE ELECTIONS IN THE 
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS .  
J .A.  Ballard 
Society, Economy and Administration 
The rugged topography and remoteness of the Southern Highlands are dis­
tinguishing features which have shaped its recent history and politics . Most of 
the province' s  population of 237 ,OOO is concentrated in highland valleys and 
basins between 5000 and 8000 feet in altitude, very sharply separated from one 
another by limestone ridges running northwest-southeast and by five massive 
volcanic cones . Because of its isolated position the Southern Highlands was 
the last major populated area penetrated by Australian colonial administration 
Apart from limited exploratory patrols and the temporary establishment of a 
base camp at Lake Kutubu in the late 1 930s ,  the Southern Highlands was left 
untouched until 1 949 when exploration recommenced (Sinclair 1 966: 107- 1 77) . 
The Southern Highlands District was created in 1 950-5 1 when a patrol post 
was set up at Mendi and the other district centres were established during the 
following ten years . 
Lack of access by road prior to the late 1 960s meant that the Southern 
Highlands did not share with other Highlands districts in the period of 
expatriate plantation establishment and early cash crop development , and the 
absence of articulate business interests left the Southern Highlands firmly in 
the hands of Australian administrative staff and Christian missions . During 
the 1 960s Australian colonial policy favoured concentration of investment in 
areas of greatest return . The Southern Highlands , with no export crop, served 
as a reservoir of unskilled labour (see figures in Skeldon 1 977) and received 
only limited services . The province today is heir to this colonial policy, ranking 
last or nearly last among provinces in most indices of social and economic 
development . 
Because of production restrictions under an international coffee agreement 
the Southern Highlands was not officially permitted to plant coffee (apart 
from two small expatriate plantations) until 1 972 and thus the province did not 
share in the coffee boom of 1 975-77 . Its estimated production in 1 976 was a 
mere 1 50 tonnes , and not until 1980 will production justify construction of a 
processing factory in the province . There are an estimated 3300 head of cattle 
on projects sponsored by the Department of Primary Industry since 1 968 , 
producing meant for local abattoirs but not for export . Only after protest were 
arrangements made for the province to participate, albeit marginally , in the 
national fresh food procurement and marketing program. Opportunities for 
earning money within the province have remained very limited . 
The retarded position of the province is clearest in the fields of health and 
education. The Southern Highlands ranks highest among all provinces in 
urban and rural child mortality and lowest in urban and rural li fe expectancy . 
Despite this it also ranked last in expenditure per capita on health services in 
1 973-4 and it is next to last in its ratio of health aid posts to population and in 
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accessibility of aid posts . The gap between the Southern Highlands and the 
best developed provinces is greatest in education . At primary, secondary and 
tertiary levels the province has ranked last in attendance (though it was 
overtaken in this honour by neighbouring Enga Province after its creation in 
1 975) . As a result the Southern Highlands has produced the lowest per capita 
number of national public servants , particularly at senior levels (Welch 1976) , 
and so has had a much more limited network of wantok officials in Port 
Moresby than have other provinces . It must rely heavily on initiatives by 
provincial officials and MPs to obtain assistance . 
From 1 972-3 the province began to benefit from the change in development 
approach under the new Papua New Guinea government . The shift in 
priorities from concentration of investment for rapid growth towards a policy 
of geographically balanced development made the Southern Highlands an 
obvious target for special treatment, and national institutions such as the 
Development Bank made special efforts to improve the province' s  access to 
services . But special treatment for the Southern Highlands is not so much the 
result of allocation decisions within the central government as of effective 
mobilisation by the provincial administration to compete for resources . The 
political impact of this mobilisation is dealt with below , but in a survey of  
development of the province an awareness of the special qualities of admini­
stration in the province is essential (see Ballard 1 978) . The remoteness of the 
Southern Highlands and the absence of foreign capital penetration meant that 
most new activities were dominated and co-ordinated by kiaps , and excep­
tionally able District Commissioners reinforced this pattern . There has been a 
firm tradition of coordination among departments ,  resisting pressures from 
Port Moresby departmental headquarters , and a resultant high morale among 
public servants at both the provincial and district level which is rare in Papua 
New Guinea. Kiap domination also meant that authoritarian methods of 
control and the use of free labour for road construction, which were no longer 
acceptable elsewhere, survived in the Southern Highlands until the early 1 970s , 
and in Ni pa as late as 1 977 .  Kiap control had its useful side-effects . At least 
part of the explanation of the fact that the Southern Highlands was not 
seriously troubled in the early 1970s by the problems of law order prevalent in 
other Highland provinces lay in extensive patrolling to maintain close contact 
with settlements ,  and on the kiaps' continued operational control over police . 
By 1977,  however, kiap numbers , morale and patrolling had declined 
seriously , even in this most kiap-oriented of provinces . 
Most of the exceptional strength of Local Government Councils derives 
from the fact that they were organised only a few years after the establishment 
of administrative control , and that departments were consistently encouraged 
to work through them. When the Southern Highlands Area Authority, made 
up of representatives (usually the presidents) of the Local Government 
Councils ,  was established in 1 972, the provincial administration channelled 
most provincial decision-making through it and set up under its auspices the 
most effective system of Rural Improvement Programme management in the 
country . 
In order to compensate for the absence of private enterprise in developing 
major cash crops, the administration set up under the Area Authority in 1974 a 
Southern Highlands Development Authority (the first in PNG) and obtained a 
commitment from Cabinet for a five-year programme to establish coffee and 
tea plantations under Local Government Council ownership. When funds for 
this were allocated through the new Village Economic Development Fund and 
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Table 1 Southern Highlands Results 
* = elected 
Southern Highlands Provincial Kagua-Erave Open 
Agilo Kunini 5 , 1 62 Yano Belo 5, 1 63*  
Dus Mapun 3 ,762 Henry Ae 1 , 1 94 
Peren Mune Dick 1 5 , 1 90 Alphonse Aria 1 65 
Francis Pusal 1 9, 1 22 Jack lpapua 2, 880 
Nelson Humbi Piribu 6,465 Michael Mane 68 
Waya Angoea Tadabe 10,539 Mata Mura 2 ,806 
Gaba Agea Kulembe 2 ,592 Ais Andia 255 
Rarua Pula 5 ,589 Informal 36 
Maya Habia Babe 4,541 Total 1 3 ,567 
Anthony Yarnak Temo 1 1 ,27 1 
Wiwa Korowi 19 ,586* Komo-Margarima Open 
Informal 728 Tia Piwana 47 1 
Total 1 04 ,547 Samson Pul ube 1 ,057 
Mamu Yugili 1 ,053 
Ialibu-Pangia Open Aya Dabuma Dabamu 1 ,927 
Pundia Kange 6,079* Dambali Habe 2, 1 22* 
Rambu Melo 4 1 3  Aliape Pongoli 535  
Karia Wanu 366 Noah Yalon 26 
Iandabia Warawia 704 Kau Lumbi 1 , 1 26 
Undi Nandi 1 ,90 1 Edward Ega 1 ,425 
Pangano Suma 1 ,970 Peter Tangeria Herebe 98 1 
Thomas Laua Nou 330 Wemp Agop 1 ,885 
John Susa Tage 656 Informal 1 9  
Turi Wari 1 50 Total 1 2,627 
Koke ltua 2,263 
Informal 14  Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open 
Total 14 ,832 Andrew W abiria 3 ,0 19  
Paiale Elo 3 , 1 63 * 
Imbonggu Open Timothy Palaki 149 
Tom Tundu Soru 563 Peta Katare 468 
Joseph Yamba 75 1 Paburi Piberale 1 ,961 
Boli Nawi 690 Matiabe Peta 2,433 
Stephen Kasu Rot 625 Aruru Matiabe 2 ,078 
Gapi Moli 2 ,529 Informal 24 
Pawa Kombea 987 Total 1 3 ,295 
Yako Nolibo 1 ,680 
Aloysius Nale 446 Mendi Open 
Pondo Pongo 4 1 5  Momei Pangial 3 ,759 
Glaimi W arena 3 ,274* Jeffrey Tara Nek 458 
Informal 1 0  Posu Ank 5 ,955 *  
Total 1 1 ,970 Homalen Agnes Kongum 37 
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Sonduwei Womp 672 Total 14,680 
Tubiri Wagep 1 ,220 
Tombe Paul 480 Tari Open 
Informal 1 4  Matiabe Yuwi 6,692* 
Total 1 2,58 1 Gambana Henry Gaiyalu 400 
Haralu Mai 3 ,754 
Nipa-Kutubu Open Mule Agua 205 
Kone Iorei 1 ,263 Iragali Harabe 9 1 3  
Homena Kiribu 702 Informal 9 
Paulus Kombo Mong 1 , 1 22 Total 1 1 ,973 
Awakep Ponge 1 , 1 74 
Tombol Unguniabe 1 ,700 1978 Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
Tegi Ebei' al 2 ,386 By-Election 
Kapi Nato 8 1 0  Aruru Matiabe 2, 830 
Elal Bol 1 ,207 Andrew Wabiria 3 ,266 
Wgil Pondip 1 96 Paiele Elo 5 ,003* 
Ibne Kor 2,905* Matiabe Angina Peta 1 , 377 
Tui Tondapen 692 Informal 5 
David Songk 466 Total 1 2,68 1 
Yeki Tidima 57 
Informal 8 Source: Port Courier, July 1 3 ,  1 977 .  
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then were cut off by the Ministry of Finance in the second year, the provincial 
administration and Area Authority maintained the programme through 
allocations from the only funds under their control , those of the Rural 
Improvement Programme. At the time of the 1 977 election provincial officials 
had worked up a proposal for integrated rural development involving further 
coffee and tea development , roads, rural health, and an integrated extension 
and training programme and were awaiting appraisal by the World Bank of 
the feasibility of a loan of $US 22 million for a five-year project . No other 
province had displayed a capacity for planning and a potential for 
implementation on this scale, but because there were very few experienced 
Southern Highlands public servants that capacity remained essentially 
expatriate. 
It would be wrong to give an impression of complete administrative control 
over the provision of services in the Southern Highlands , for the province is 
also exceptional for the number of missions represented ( 1 6) and the 
enthusiasm they evoke from their followers . The inaccessibility of the 
Southern Highlands , the last densely populated " Unevangelised Field" 
opened up after the large missions were firmly established elsewhere, made it 
particularly attractive to very small fundamentalist missions (see Robin 1 98 1 ) .  
Although most missions were based near government stations , others were 
isolated and served as the main focus of contact with western society. The 
missions had their own air transport links,  radio communication and an 
alternative network of supplies which meant that for many people they could 
deliver when the administration could not . Enthusiasm for the various 
missions can , therefore, partly be explained by the fact that the spread of 
government services was thin.  For many people the missions have provided 
substantial services - health centres and aid posts,  schools ,  transport and a 
market for fruit and vegetables , a store and occasionally employment or 
agricultural extension work or technical training - while the the administra­
tion has been an occasional and transient visitor . The missions' presence has 
expanded in recent years as administrative patrolling has been reduced. The 
period of intense mission activity coincided with the first active stage of 
administrative intrusion in many places . Two groups of white men making 
new rules of behaviour were not seen as separate by many people . The mission 
and administration bolstered one another ' s  prestige . It was only later when 
conflict between kiaps and priests or pastors came into the open - for 
example over the burning of cult objects in Pangia - that the two authorities 
began to be seen separately . 
In the Southern Highlands the churches were active in the 1 977 election , as 
they had been in all previous elections .  Pastors spoke for certain candidates at 
church meetings; candidates declared their Christianity or accused their 
opponents of being heathen; others suggested the need for a national Ministry 
of Religion . 
Patterns of Political and Social Identity 
During the pre-contact period political identity seldom extended beyond the 
level of the clan and language group and the world as a whole was largely, but 
not exclusively, enclosed within the limestone walls of a valley or basin . The 
establishment of Local Government Councils provided the first modern arena 
for political action and the administration 's  encouragement of Councils gave 
them considerable authority and prestige . Council boundaries were set largely 
in geographical terms rather than on strictly linguistic and cultural lines , but 
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these appear initially to have been acceptable, e .g . , in lalibu which contains 
both Imbonggu and Kewabe speakers living in the lalibu Basin,  and in Mendi , 
where Imbonggu , Mendi and Kewabe speakers were placed together . Councils 
were reinforced as political arenas by the fact that House of Assembly electoral 
boundaries for 1 968 and 1 972 were drawn on Council lines , with one major 
council per electorate except for the pairing of lalibu and Pangia. After 1 972 
Councils began to serve explicitly political functions in the allocation of Rural 
Improvement Programme funds . 
Consciousness of political identity on the level of the province developed 
first within the Australian administration, organised under a succession of 
able District Commissioners who fostered the notion that the Southern 
Highlands needed to work hard in unified fashion to make up for its retarded 
position as the ' last ' province . This notion affected activity among the 
province' s  political spokesmen . In the first House of Assembly elections , held 
in 1 964, Ron Neville, a kiap who had served in the early patrol period in 
Mendi , Tari and Koroba, won a seat for the special (expatriate) West Papua 
electorate covering the Southern Highlands . He had already joined with 
several other senior kiaps in establishing a business firm, Coecon, which 
developed a leading role in trade, catering and the few plantations in the 
Southern Highlands . Neville became the leading spokesman for the province 
in Port Moresby, in close collaboration with his former patrolling colleague, 
Des Clancy, who was District Commissioner for the Southern Highlands from 
1 966 to 1 973 . Neville served as mentor for the other Southern Highlands 
Members , none of them literate in English ,  from 1964 to 197 1 ,  and they 
worked together as the best unified district bloc in the House of Assembly 
during that period . 
Building on the Local Government Councils, the Southern Highlands 
administration took seriously the nascent consultative institutions at 
provincial level , the District Councils Conference and District Advisory 
Council ,  and in 1 972 it was one of the first to replace these with an Area 
Authority. Clancy assigned one of his ablest kiaps to serve as its executive 
officer and RIP co-ordinator and ensured that all department heads were 
regularly in attendance at Authority meetings . Area Authority proceedings 
were broadcast extensively on Radio Mendi (Nek bilong Muruk) and the 
enthusiasm of the provincial administration for tackling central departments 
on their failures in the province was expressed through the Area Authority . 
After each meeting letters were despatched to ministers in Port Moresby and 
pungent press releases to the Post Courier and National Broadcasting 
Commission decried lack of attention to the exceptional problems of the 
Southern Highlands . Although Local Government Council representatives on 
the Area Authority lacked secondary education and broad experience outside 
their own areas , they quickly picked up a district-level perspective vis-a-vis 
national headquarters . 
A few students were sent from the Southern Highlands for secondary 
schooling to other Highlands provinces and to Western Province, but the lack 
of secondary schools in the province until 1 967 meant that its educated elite 
was both small and dispersed . From 1 972-73 , as numbers at the University of 
Papua New Guinea increased , the few Southern Highlands students ,  like those 
from other provinces , grouped together calling themselves the Amene 
Association . (Amene is a greeting common to most languages in the province .)  
Following student criticism of administration in the province and demands for 
more information officials of the Area Authority invited the students in 1 975 
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to an annual joint seminar with Area Authority members . Much of the student 
antagonism was focused on Neville' s prominent political and economic 
position in the province. 
Other forms of area identity have arisen within the provincial arena . The 
two western districts of Tari and Koroba, predominantly Huli in language and 
culture , were isolated from the rest of the province until the June 1 977 opening 
of the Tari-Margarima road . Distance and lack of road access meant that 
. inevitably the west was the last to obtain services . Although the distribution of 
government staff within the province was exceptionally evenly matched with 
population, capital works and Development Authority expenditure heavily 
favoured other parts of the province and a sense of relative deprivation was 
expressed in recurrent demands for a separate province (e .g. , Wabiria in Post­
Courier, 14  March 1 975) . At the least, this gave the Huli west a sense of  
identity separate from the rest of the province . 
In the east , on the other hand, the relative ease of access for Pangia and 
Kagua, and especially Ialibu , to the better developed economic and 
educational services of the Western Highlands meant that cash crops were 
developed furthest in this area and that it had a slight lead in the number of 
secondary and tertiary students .  Of the eight students from the University of  
Papua New Guinea who had completed a degree by mid- 1 977 five were from 
Ialibu, three from Mendi (cf Weeks 1 976) . 
The political impact of these relatively slight regional differences in access , 
accentuated in the west by Huli unity, has been the development of an 
increasingly explicit three-way division within the province. In  all elections 
within the Area Authority there was a sharing of positions among the west, 
east and centre. For several years prior to the 1 977 elections the two vice­
presidents were the presidents of the Ialibu and Tari Local Government 
Councils ,  while the President , Posu Ank , was from the centre - not from 
Mendi , which is looked upon with some suspicion by the rest of the province , 
but from the 'neutral ' Lai Valley . At the University of Papua New Guinea, 
Ialibu had been predominant within the Amene Association until 1 976 when 
Huli students became the most numerous contingent and won the presidency . 
Incidents between Ialibu and Huli students almost split the association , but 
unity was restored by 1 977 under neutral presidents from the centre . Neville ' s  
identification with the province as  a whole prevented the regional electorate 
from becoming a battleground for areas within the province prior to 1 977 . 
Few associations of political significance have developed outside the official 
framework of councils . Most of those that have emerged are in at least partial 
opposition to the councils and to their close links with the administration . 
During 1 97 1  the intrusion of wage labour into Ialibu with the construction of 
the Highlands Highway brought about considerable dislocation and unrest . 
The first two Ialibu university students , Peter Paypool and Roya Yaki ,  
organised the Ialibu Basin Association to protest against administrative 
measures and to mobilise a successful demand for the location of a sawmill in 
the Ialibu area. Later the Association became more concerned with social 
services and cultural activities , the students gradually withdrew , and by 1 977 
the Association was in the hands of young opponents of the Ialibu Counci l .  As 
the only articulate source of criticism of councils and their domination by 
older, less educated , men, the Amene Association and Ialibu Basin Association 
were viewed by the Area Authority with suspicion and hostility. 
In Tari the Rev . Aya Dabuma, who set up the province's  first Pangu Pati 
branch in 1 974, sponsored what amounted to a local anti-council association . 
He proposed that East and South Tari Basin secede from the Tari Local 
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Government Council , which was dominated by the United Party and 
supporters of the sitting MHA, Matiabe Yuwi . Farmers' associations in 
various districts , organised largely among cattle project owners , have also 
taken anti-council positions , e .g . , in Tari , and a group in Kagua has suggested 
running services outside the framework of the Council .  On the whole, 
however , the Councils have proved too strong to be seriously threatened by 
opposition , and opponents have attacked not the system, but the performance 
of individual councils and councillors . 
The differences between generations of elites reflected in the opposition of 
educated young men of the Amene Association and the lalibu Basin 
Association to the established big men in the councils and the Area Authority 
are more clearly marked than emergent local class distinctions .  The lack of 
opportunities for business activity has prevented substantial accumulation of 
wealth. In lalibu, however, with the first cash cropping and major cattle 
projects in the province, a few men have distinguished themselves by their 
wealth , obtained largely as successful clients of the missions or of agricultural 
extension officers . These men are seen largely as objects of emulation rather 
than jealousy , and the successful 1 977 candidate in Imbonggu was one of the 
best known Ialibu businessmen. Elsewhere opportunities for obtaining wealth 
from outside sources were limited to Presidents of Local Government Councils 
and , especially , MPs . Their political office gave them special access , legitimate 
or otherwise , to council resources such as transport and to national govern­
ment largesse such as VEDF grants. In so far as this special access was publicly 
perceived it was either accepted as the perquisite of a big man and source of 
prestige for his community or resented, particularly by those who sought to 
obtain similar access for themselves . In Kagua where the incumbent MP, a 
minister in the national government , and his perennial rival , the President of 
the Local Government Council ,  had become the two wealthiest businessmen 
through their official connexions, voters sought to persuade the Australian 
kiap to stand as a candidate . 
Recent Political Developments 
The elections to the first House of Assembly in 1 964 preceded the establish­
ment of most Local Government Councils and were for most areas in the 
Southern Highlands the first exercise in voting . In the Special regional 
electorate for non-indigenous voters the Southern Highlands was part of a 
West Papua electorate including also Gulf and Western Provinces , but a 
candidate with a Southern Highlands base was elected when Ron Neville 
defeated Ron Slaughter of Kairuku and then established himself as the leading 
expatriate entrepreneur of the province . In the four open electorates of Ialibu , 
Mendi,  Tari and Kutubu, with nine, five, six and four candidates respectively, 
most candidates had very little if any formal education but those elected had 
had substantial contact with the administration as interpreters or in other 
capacities (see Bettison et al 1 965 : 407-408 re Tari election) . 
In 1 968 Neville was unopposed for the Southern Highlands regional elec­
torate; no expatriate challenged him and no Southern Highlander had the 
educational qualifications required. The six open electorates allocated to the 
Southern Highlands (lalibu, Kagua, Mendi , Nipa, Tari , Koroba) were contest­
ed by an average of eight candidates each, twelve of whom had contested in 
1 964 . Generally younger candidates with some limited education were elected 
and only one of the incumbent MHAs , Momei Pangial of Mendi , was re­
elected . 
None of the Southern Highlanders save Neville left a significant mark on the 
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and investment and felt that the rush to self-government , independence and 
localisation would only perpetuate the province' s retarded position within the 
country. At the same time, despite the increased proportion of government 
expenditure in the province under the new government , the MHAs and Area 
Authority, supported by the provincial administration , felt betrayed by the 
failure to respond further to provincial proposals and to the province' s  
excellent record of  project management . There was particularly vehement 
bitterness in 1 975 when restrictions on government expenditure led to a 
cutback of planned road construction, a reneging on promises to support the 
Development Authority 's  five-year plantation programme, and opposition to 
the Area Authority ' s  purchase of expatriate businesses . In July 1 975 , the 
MHAs of the province threatened to boycott the national Constituent 
Assembly on these grounds . By the end of that year , however , the MHAs were 
under attack in the Area Authority for lack of concerted action to support 
provincial demands and it became increasingly clear that most of the leading 
figures in the Area Authority would again be challenging the incumbent 
MHAs in the next election , then expected in 1976. 
Much of the antagonism of the Area Authority was focussed on Neville, 
whose political and economic dominance came under serious challenge for the 
first time. Although both Neville and Wabiria held positions in the United 
Party' s shadow cabinet , Neville provided the province's  chief link with the 
party . As his position weakened vis-a-vis the other MHAs and the Area 
Authority, and as self-government and independence passed without disaster, 
the links with the United Party grew weaker and were based more on habit 
than on conviction . During 1 974-75 Julius Chan, Minister of Finance and 
leader of the People' s Progress Party, established contact with the Area 
Authority President, Posu Ank , and Posu joined the PPP . As the provincial 
representative on a committee considering expatriate applications for 
citizenship, Posu vehemently opposed Neville' s  application . Only through the 
intervention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did Neville become a citizen 
and retain eligibility for political office . Neville and other United Party MPs in 
turn accused Posu of receiving a personal allocation from the Village 
Economic Development Fund , controlled by Chan's  ministry, to purchase 
four vehicles . (National Parliament Debates 1 ( 1 9) :  253 1 -32, 4 February 1 977) . 
Posu gradually formed a PPP network among Area Authority members who 
intended to challenge the sitting United Party Members . In the elections, four 
Area Authority members stood with the support of PPP ; only one stood for 
the United Party, against Yano Belo who had tacit PPP support . 
In May 1975 , following encouragement from the national government to 
proceed towards the establishment of provincial government , the provincial 
administration took the lead in organising a constituent assembly, composed 
of all 14 Area Authority members , 3 MPs, 3 church and 3 community 
representatives (in all cases , one each from the east , west and centre) , one 
woman and one student . Consultations in 1 975 showed no enthusiasm for the 
devolution of national powers to the province , but late in 1 976 constitutional 
proposals were drawn up by a small committee composed of the Provincial 
Commissioner (then Patrick Gaiyer from the Western Highlands) and a few 
Southern Highlands graduates and diplomates . During tours by assembly 
members at the end of 1 976 to gather opinions from Local Government 
Councils and other groups , it was clear that there was little understanding of 
the meaning of provincial government and considerable doubt, even hosti lity, 
concerning further institutional change. Within the Area Authority, however , 
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1 968-7 1 House , although Andrew Wabiria of Koroba served as an Assistant 
Ministerial Member and Matiabe Yuwi of Tari travelled abroad as a member 
of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development. The Southern 
Highlanders voted consistently as a bloc, following Neville' s leadership, and 
together they joined the United Party in opposition to every initiative taken by 
Pangu . A solid phalanx of Southern Highlands MHAs marched together into 
administration offices in Port Moresby to demand improved allocation of 
services for their district . By 1 972, solidarity behind Neville had begun to 
founder on personal differences between him and some of the other MHAs, 
but all firmly supported the United Party' s  conservative stance on 
constitutional advance . 
In the 1972 elections no other party challenged the United Party's  hold on 
the Southern Highlands and it was not necessary for the party to endorse 
candidates formally . Neville was challenged for the regional seat by three 
educated young Southern Highlanders but he was seen as the chief exponent of 
economic development in the district and captured 75 % of the formal vote . 
The district was allocated a seventh open electorate and this was carved out of 
the south-west as Poroma-Kutubu . In  the other open electorates each of the in­
cumbent MHAs was a candidate and each was challanged by leaders of the 
Local Government Councils,  with an average of almost seven candidates per 
electorate, 1 7  of whom had been candidates in 1 968 . Five of the six incumbent 
MHAs were re-elected , Yano Belo (Kangu-Erave) , Matiabe Yuwi (Tari-Komo) 
and Andrew Wabiria (Koroba-Kopiago) by very comfortable margins,  Turi 
Wari (lalibu-Pangia) (see Paypool 1976) and Momei Pangial (Mendi) only 
after exhausting all preferences . Tegi Ebei 'al ,  MAH Nipa, was defeated by 
lbne Kor , and Awali Ungunaibe was narrowly elected for the new seat of 
Poroma-Kutubu .  When Ungunaibe died early in 1 975 his younger brother , 
Tombol Ungunaibe, was endorsed by the United Party and won a by-election 
against three others on the first count ; although he was probably well below 
the minimum qualifying age no one challenged his election . 
After the 1 972 elections the MHAs from the Southern Highlands lined up 
again with the United Party in opposition to the Coalition government , leaving 
it the only province apart from Manus without representation in the Coalition 
ministry . Yano Belo crossed to the National Party in July 1972 and was 
appointed Minister for Works in August 1 973 ,  giving the Southern Highlands 
a voice within the government . His defection created disagreement among the 
other MHAs and within the Area Authority as to whether the break in party 
unity was worth the potential increase in access to power . Neville firmly 
opposed Belo' s  action while Matiabe Yuwi supported Belo' s  right to change 
party . Matiabe, who served as a member of the Constitutional Planning 
Committee in 1 972-74, was easily the most independent of the province' s  
MHA's and the most respected in  Parliament . During 1 973 ,  a s  the Papua 
Besena movement flowered in Port Moresby, some Southern Highlands 
MHAs fli rted with it, largely in sympathy with claims of Papuan and Southern 
Highlands relative deprivation rather than in support of secession (Post­
Courier, 28 June and 4 September 1 973) .  
The dominant issues for the Southern Highlands were those of constitu­
tional change and the allocation of services and investment to the province. 
The Southern Highlands MHAs and Area Authority, speaking for the great 
majority of articulate people in the province, were firmly opposed to the rapid 
pace of constitutional advance set by the eovernment . They saw their only 
hope for economic and social development in the retention of expatriate skills 
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there was recognition of the fact that provincial government would largely 
serve to strengthen existing arrangements and there was a willingness to move 
cautiously . Andrew Andaijah of Tari , who succeeded Posu Ank as President of 
the Authority, decided against contesting the parliamentary elections in favour 
of standing for the provincial premiership . There was also some indication 
that Neville was considering an active role in the future provincial government . 
Provincial government itself, however , was not an issue in the parliamentary 
election campaigns .  
Electoral Boundaries 
The electoral boundaries for the three earlier House of Assembly elections , 
though they had changed with the increase from four to six to seven open 
electorates in the Southern Highlands, had kept Local Government Council 
units intacf at the expense of equity of representation. While lalibu-Pangia 
and Tari-Komo were among the largest electorates in the country , Poroma­
Kutubu was the very smallest . When the national Electoral Boundaries 
Commission visited Mendi in July 1 976 there were general demands for an 
increase in the number of  electorates in the province. There were also requests 
for specific new electorates (drafted usually by eventual candidates) and par­
ticularly for the creation of a Pangia electorate separate from Ialibu, whose 
candidates had consistently won the lalibu-Pangia seat (Paypool 1 976) . The 
Commission's  provisional proposals rejected the request for an additional 
electorate and left lalibu-Pangia intact as the fourth largest electorate in the 
country . On the other hand it took Komo from Tari and added it to Poroma­
Kutubu to balance size , though the proposed Komo-Kutubu-Poroma 
electorate remained the second smallest in the country . There were strong 
complaints both from Pangia and from Tari , where Matiabe Yuwi and the 
Local Government Councils protested strongly against the removal of Komo, 
which appeared to jeopardise Matiabe 's  chances of re-election . Both Pangia 
and Komo councils threatened that their people would refuse to vote in the 
elections . 
Responding to these protests,  but still refusing an additional electorate, the 
Boundaries Commission proposed in December a complete realignment 
cutting across council boundaries . lalibu was divided between a Pangia­
dominated Ialibu-Pangia and a Mendi-dominated Mendi electorate, Tari­
Komo lost a few peripheral areas to a new Nipa-Kutubu, and other portions of 
Nipa and Mendi containing Margarima and Lai Valley councils were grouped 
together as Margarima electorate.  These were the proposals put to Parliament 
as the Commission's  final report , and in Parliament the United Party 
opposition and other members mustered a majority to reject the report , partly 
on grounds of failure to provide an additional electorate for the Southern 
Highlands . The Commission thereupon conceded an eighth open electorate to 
the Southern Highlands and returned to the drawing board to carve totally 
new electorates . 
The Commission's  initial solution was to combine Komo with Margarima 
and Lai Valley and, by juggling census divisions across council boundaries and 
even by cutting across census divisions , to create an Imbonggu-Kambiri 
electorate snaking from Ialibu to the Nembi Valley . After discussion with the 
Southern Highlands MPs the Commission revised these proposals to keep Huli 
unity within the boundaries of three electorates , eliminating Lai Valley from 
Komo-Margarima, and to establish a clear lalibu dominance within lmbonggu 
electorate. The Southern Highlands had gained its additional electorate at 
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considerable loss to the coherence of established political units but with due 
regard to the interests of the more vocal sitting MPs . The final report of the 
Commission was adopted by Parliament in February 1 977 but there were 
continued complaints by the United Party and the Area Authority about the 
effects of reapportionment in the Southern Highlands . 
One result of the realignment was the absence of incumbent MPs and Area 
Authority leaders in the two ' new' electorates , Komo-Margarima and 
Imbonggu, and their clustering in the remaining electorates , particularly in 
Ialibu-Pangia and Nipa. Another result was the disaffection of census 
divisfons which were severed from their council areas in order to balance 
electorates, particularly Kuare in Kagua (placed in Ialibu-Pangia) and Paru in 
Koroba (placed in Tari) . Both of these threatened to burn bridges connecting 
them to their new electorates and warned that they would refuse to vote, but 
both were fairly rapidly mollified, Kuare by the prospect that candidates from 
Kagua might win two parliamentary seats . Officials were surprised by the 
relative ease with which people accepted the changes , which were publicised 
primarily by the candidates themselves . 
Candidacies and Party Endorsement 
Apart from the sitting MPs and Area Authority members , other Council 
leaders were likely candidates for 1 977 . 20 of the 70 candidates for the eight 
open seats had been candidates in previous elections and most of these were 
established leaders already holding elective office . None of these men had any 
secondary education, but since 1 972 substantial numbers of young men with 
some secondary training had established themselves as public servants ,  council 
clerks and mission pastors. Many of these young men also sought election, 
particularly in the provincial electorate and the two ' new' open electorates 
where there were no established leaders contesting . 
The number of candidates in the eight open electorates ranged from five to 
eleven , with an average of nine (matching the average in other Highland 
provinces except Chimbu, which had 1 5) .  For the provincial electorate all 
eleven candidates were between 26 and 33 years of age. For the open 
electorates the age range was wider , although only 6 candidates were over 40 
and none were over 46 years of age . Few candidates with no education came 
forward apart from those who were established politicians ,  but only 13 OJo of 
open candidates had Form 4 or  higher education. Apart from the 21  
candidates (30%) who were established politicians as  MPs or  Council leaders , 
all of them with business interests ,  there were 5 other businessmen, 25 
government employees , 5 private employees , 8 pastors and catechists , 3 
subsistence farmers,  2 students and 1 housewife (the first female candidate in 
the province and wife of  a Mendi expatriate who did most of her 
campaigning) . 
Among the few students who had completed tertiary education there was 
considerable interest in Ron Neville ' s  provincial seat from as early as 1 973 . 
One of the first two UPNG graduates from the province was Dus Mapun of 
Mendi who returned early in 1 974 as the province's  Community Development 
Officer and made clear his intention of running against Neville . As the 
Southern Highlands representative for the Village Development Task Force 
attached to Somare' s  office , he was seen as pro-Pangu. Wiwa Korowi of 
Ialibu, a diplomate of Goroka Teachers' College, had taught at Mendi High 
School before serving as ministerial secretary to Yano Belo and then j oining 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and serving overseas . From Brussels in 
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1 975 he wrote to Local Government Councils and other groups asking for their 
support and he also sounded out the Ialibu graduates on their intentions . On 
his return to Port Moresby he sought support from the MPs and from 
University students .  
The few others who had completed tertiary education were from Mendi and 
Ialibu and they did not attempt to challenge Dus and Wiwa. During 1 976 
however , Dus began to be suspected of using funds from National Cultural 
Council and National Sports Council grants to purchase a Toyota truck for 
campaign purposes . At the same time it became apparent that Nevi lle would 
probably not stand for re-election . Francis Pusal of Mendi , the first Southern 
Highlander to complete his diploma in agriculture at Vudal , had returned in 
1 974 to serve the Southern Highlands as a didiman in the field and at Mendi , 
where he was acting department head in late 1 976. Having discovered Dus' s  
alleged misappropriation of funds , Pusal decided to  contest the provincial 
seat . 
Yet another Mendi man , a government clerk named Anthony Temo, was 
also planning to stand as candidate . In 1 974 he was active in leading a protest 
demonstration by his clan demanding compensation for land used by the 
administration in Mendi , and from this protest arose Temo' s  own Amene 
Association (not to be confused with the student association of the same 
name) . Temo was posted to Tari , where he organised a branch of his 
association to raise funds for a cultural centre through an agricultural show, 
and he was later posted to Komo. 
In Port Moresby Peren Mune Dick , a police officer from Nipa, decided to 
contest the provincial seat and four young men from Tari all decided to seek 
the support of the Huli bloc for the seat as well : Nelson Humbi , an announcer 
on Radio Mendi ; Angoea Tadabe, a law student at UPNG; and later, Agilo 
Kunini , a teacher at Erave and son of a renowned Huli leader, and Maya 
Habia Babe, a teachers ' college student at Tari . The Tari Local Government 
Council leaders attempted to get the other three candidates to withdraw in 
favour of Angoea but did not succeed . Finally, in the east,  Pula Rama, who 
had been the United Party organiser at Kagua, decided to run and Gaba 
Kulembe, a Ialibu teacher , was put forward by the United Party in Wiwa' s 
home area. All eleven candidates were between the ages of 26 and 33 and all 
had at least Form 4 education . 
The United Party was assumed to have strong support in the province and 
its endorsement was sought by those who felt they might win it . Dus Mapun 
was too clearly identified with radical Pangu groups in Port Moresby to be 
considered, but Wiwa, Pusal , Humbi , Temo and Angoea actively sought 
United Party endorsement . Wiwa had been a founding member of the United 
Party and he attended its convention at Lae in February 1 977 at his own 
expense. However he had crossed swords with Neville over their respective 
interests  in a tea plantation in Wiwa's  home area in Ialibu and , as Neville 
wavered in indecision about his own candidacy, Wiwa turned to Chan and the 
PPP for support . 
United Party endorsement in the province proved to be a confused affair ,  
primarily because of uncertainty about Nevi lle' s plans. Late in February 1 977, 
Sir Tei Abal , the United Party leader, visited Mendi to interview candidates 
for endorsement with Neville and the Mendi MP, Momei Pangial . Sir Tei and 
Nevi lle were dissatisfied with the answers to questions about expatriate 
business given by Pusal , the leading candidate for endorsement, and after 
seeing Humbi and Temo as well the leaders decided against any endorsement 
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at that time . Neville, who had privately promised support to both Humbi and 
Pusal , then reconsidered his own intention to contest the election and rumour 
circulated that he had been offered the prospect of the Ministry of Finance in a 
future United Party government . Pusal , who had submitted his resignation 
from the public service in January , refused to withdraw his candidacy and had 
several angry confrontations with Neville. 
Late in April ,  while nominations were being received , Sir Tei and Wally 
Lussick returned to Mendi for a second endorsement session . The young men 
of the party, led by Pusal and supported by several MPs, made clear their 
strong opposition to Neville ' s  candidacy . Finally, on the counsel of friends 
concerned with the needs of his family and business , as well as the need for 
harmony in the province, Neville announced on 26 April that he would not 
stand. Pusal was formally endorsed, but habits bred by the preferential system 
of 1 968 and 1 972 lingered on and Sir Tei and Lussick later also endorsed 
Humbi and almost endorsed Temo as well . Unlike the PPP the UP endorsed 
several candidates in an electorate if they were considered to stand a chance of 
winning. No one doubted that Neville ' s  traditional support would have 
defeated any opposition had he chosen to stand . 
Once the provincial endorsement was settled there was no problem in 
endorsing loyal incumbent MPs for the open electorates . Momei Pangial , 
Andrew Wabiria, Matiabe Yuwi and Ibne Kor (in preference to Tombol 
Ungunaibe, also contesting Nipa-Kutubu) were endorsed , but Turi Wari was 
passed over for failure to vote regularly with the party in parliament . 
Elsewhere the UP endorsed , largely on the judgement of the endorsed MPs, 
one candidate each for Imbonggu (the lalibu Basin Association president) and 
Ialibu-Pangi , but two each for Kagua-Erave and Komo-Margarima. 
Having endorsed Wiwa Korowi for the provincial seat and Posu Ank for 
Mendi , the PPP relied largely on Posu ' s  advice in endorsing Area Authority 
members in three other open electorates and one other candidate. Glaimi 
Warena of Imbonggu appears to have arranged his own affiliation with the 
PPP during Chan' s visit to Mendi in June 1 977 . 
In addition to the candidates endorsed by the UP and PPP, there were a few 
sponsored by Pangu . Yano Belo, the Minister of  Housing , had moved after 
the 1 975 split in the National Party towards Pangu and was clearly identified 
with the coalition government . No opponents were raised against him by either 
Pangu or PPP in Kagua-Erave but neither party was certain of his loyalty . In 
South Tari , Aya Dabuma, a United Church minister who had run against 
Yuwi in 1 972, had established a Pangu Party branch in 1 974 and his area was 
now located in the new electorate of Komo-Margarima (an arrangement which 
he had proposed to the Electoral Boundaries Commission) . Peren Mune Dick, 
the provincial candidate, was also affiliated with Pangu, having earlier had 
links with Posu Ank and the PPP until Wiwa became clearly favoured for 
PPP endorsement . Dick' s Pangu links were explained as personal support for 
Somare as Prime Minister , as were those of a minor candidate in Ialibu.,. 
Pangia. A few other candidates in open electorates were endorsed by Pangu 
Pati officials who visited the province , but Pangu had clearly left the province 
largely to the PPP and Aya Dabuma was the only Southern Highlander 
depicted in Pangu ' s  national advertisements of its candidates . All but Dabuma 
and Dick proved to be weak candidates who 1.0st their deposits .  Because of the 
long tradition of anti-Pangu propaganda by the United Party , open affiliation 
with Pangu was considered foolhardy, and candidates were slandered by being 
accused as ' secret' Pangu supporters . 
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The Campaign 
During the campaign the provincial candidates , particularly Wiwa and 
Pusal , served as focal points for the coalescence of rival parties in the 
province, largely but not exclusively identified with the PPP and United Party . 
The open electorate candidates endorsed by the UP served as an electoral 
network for Pusal , with the exception of Matiabe Yuwi , who could not afford 
to alienate the support of the four Tari candidates for the provincial seat . But 
large numbers of other candidates, although unendorsed , were UP supporters 
and also aided Pusal. The PPP-based network was much less openly identified 
with that party since it did not wish to alienate traditional UP sympathies 
among the voters by professing support for the coalition government . For this 
reason Wiwa, to the annoyance of PPP national organisers , avoided public 
identification with the party and used his own posters rather than those 
produced for him by the PPP . The PPP linkage was confined to the Area 
Authority network built up by Posu Ank,  which was strongest in the east, and 
it tacitly included Yano Belo, who Wiwa Korowi had served as private 
secretary in Yano' s  first months as a minister . More than half of all open 
electorate candidates were linked formally or informally with either Pusal or 
Wiwa , and none of the other provincial candidates was able to establish a 
comparable network,  though Dick and Temo had a few scattered supporters 
among open candidates . 
Because of the development of rival parties in the province and also because 
of the competitiveness induced by the first-past-the-post system, leaving no 
incentive for collaboration through shared preferences , the campaign in the 
Southern Highlands was much more aggressive than in previous elections. In 
the past it was common for candidates to travel together , since rarely did they 
have access to their own vehicles , and it was also common for them to ask 
people to 'Vote for the best candidate; if you think I am the best,  vote for me, 
but if you think someone else is  best give me your second preference' !  Some 
candidates in 1 977 still conducted their campaign in this style and voters were 
made uncomfortable by the open criticisms candidates made of one another . 
There were frequent , if minor , complaints by candidates to returning officers 
against the abuse which they received, some feeling that instruction by others 
to vote against them was an illegitimate tactic . The campaign was also better 
financed and made much noisier by the omnipresence of loud-hailers . 
Those endorsed by parties had their nomination fees paid and posters 
printed and received a small campaign allowance as well . Independents were 
told by the United Party that their campaign costs would be reimbursed if they 
won election and joined the party, Endorsed provincial candidates received 
some of their petrol free and one Mendi firm made a truck available to the UP 
to allocate among its candidates . This only partly offset the support given 
indirectly to Posu Ank by the PPP through the Village Economic Develop­
ment Fund. Posu 's  application for funds for a trucking business was turned 
down initially by the provincial administration and Development Bank , but 
reconsidered favourably later on instructions from Chan' s  Ministry of 
Finance, and he had four vehicles in 1 977 . Of the provincial candidates , only 
Pusal , Wiwa, Dus , Dick and Temo had their own trucks and could move with 
relative freedom throughout the province. Pusal had bought his land-cruiser 
second-hand from savings ; Wiwa raised funds through a cousin's  business in 
Mt . Hagen which he had helped to start ; Dus had allegedly used part of his 
Sports Council grant to buy a land-cruiser (when it was seized he used a 
motorbike) ; Temo was thought to have raised funds through the Amene 
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Association . Trucks were vital to mobility and also to a candidate's ability to 
carry around with him supporters from bis local committees . Thus Humbi , 
with only a motorbike, was at a substantial disadvantage. In the open 
electorates , the incumbent MPs and Area Authority members almost all had 
their own transport , as did a few other businessmen. The Area Authority 
members also had the advantage of official travel to Authority meetings in 
Mendi . These provided opportunities for campaign alliances and planning and 
for use of the Authority telephone . 
Only five of the provincial candidates , Wiwa, Pusal , Temo, Dick and Dus , 
attempted to campaign throughout the province and then with varying degrees 
of concentration . Dus and Pusal had the advantage of considerable exposure 
through official travel since 1 974 and Temo had used his official postings to 
various centres to organise support . In addition Humbi (and two open 
candidates,  Pundia Kange of Pangia and Paulus Kombo of Nipa-Katubu) 
were known widely as announcers on Radio Mendi . Wiwa, Pusal , Dus and 
Temo planned their campaigns with some care so as to attend Area Authority 
and Local Government Council meetings, singsings , markets and church 
services . Others attempted within local areas to do the same, but only these 
four campaigned extensively, had wide networks of contacts ,  and circulated 
posters throughout the province . By the time nominations closed lalibu and 
Kagua in the east had been largely conceded by other candidates to Wiwa 
because of his own efforts in lalibu and those of Yano Belo in Kagua. Only 
token visits were paid there by the other candidates except for the two local 
United Party spoilers, Gaba Kulembe in lalibu and Pula Rarua in Kagua. On 
the other hand, after a confrontation with Pusal and Andrew Wabiria at 
Mendi in early June, Wiwa wrote off Koroba. Dus was preoccupied with his 
court case , whose committal hearings were conducted during the campaign 
period . Temo concentrated his efforts in the west; Dick in his home district , 
Nipa; and the four Tari candidates made little or no campaign effort outside 
Huli country . 
Neville ' s  participation in the campaign was expected to be a source of 
strength for UP candidates . In  the Huli  areas , where he had captured a large 
majority against a Huli candidate in 1 972,  voters threatened not to vote unless 
Neville' s  name were on the ballot , and older people throughout the province 
waited for his advice on how to vote. But the campaign which Neville 
promised for the last two weeks before voting never materialised , to the 
considerable resentment of UP candidates who blamed Neville if they lost and 
gave him no credit if they won. Neville' s  United Party image was further 
blunted by his accompanying Chan and Somare on their visits to the province 
during the campaign . This could only weaken traditional support for the 
United Party against the government . Somare, Chan, Sir Tei and other 
Highlands leaders also paid brief visits to Mendi during the campaign, 
concerned with negotiation rather than campaigning . It was clear from the 
welcome for Somare that the traditional antagonism of the province towards 
Pangu did not extend personally to him. 
The issues aired in the campaign were primarily those which agitated the 
Area Authority - the need for more investment and services in the Southern 
Highlands and in local areas within the province . The only divisive issues were 
based on an assessment of the record of the coalition government and the 
councils .  UP candidates quickly picked up the line pushed by Raphael Doa in 
the Western Highlands , alleging that the coalition government was responsible 
for the disappearance of K43 - or K64 or K66 - million , figures based on the 
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Auditor General ' s  report and fully explained by Chan in Parliament but not 
adequately in the provinces . Wiwa and others were accused of sharing in the 
responsibility by supporting coalition parties . Various other exaggerated 
versions of the central government and the UP performance in Port Moresby 
were retailed , but it seems certain that local identities and loyalties were of  
much greater impact than wider issues . 
Results 
Voter participation in the Southern Highlands remained higher than in other 
provinces in the 1 977 elections , with 104, 5 1 4  ballots cast in the provincial 
electorate . Morobe Province, despite its larger number of registered voters , 
had a substantially lower turnout . The tradition of electoral participation may 
reflect conformity with official encouragement - comparable to council tax 
payments - rather than enthusiasm. However the fact that voter turnout 
exceeded official registration figures in Nipa suggests that problems of 
registration in remote areas had a bearing on participation statistics . 
In the provincial electorate Wiwa Korowi ' s  margin of victory over Francis 
Pusal , 2 .40Jo , was among the smallest in the country and much smaller than in 
any other provincial electorate . Despite the large number of candidates for the 
provincial seat each of the eleven attracted at least 2500 votes and none was in 
danger of forefeiting his deposit . Candidate support was ,  however , strongly 
localised and only the party support which Wiwa and Pusal received from their 
networks of allies lifted their totals signi ficantly above the ruck . 
The pattern of localised support was not surprising in view of the well 
established tendency throughout PNG to vote for the candidate most likely to 
promote local development because of his local ties , a tendency reinforced by 
the narrowly focused campaigning of most candidates . Thus all four Huli 
candidates received at least 900Jo of their votes from Huli areas . Angoea, who 
had the support of the Tari Council and most educated Huli , did best and he 
and Habia Babe received widespread support throughout Tari and Komo, with 
Angoea winning support in adjacent areas of Koroba and Kutubu as well. 
Agilo ' s  support was limited to his own census division in Western Tari and to 
adjacent areas of Koroba, while Humbi ' s  was concentrated in northern 
Margarima, near his wife 's  home. Dick , having no other local rivals from 
Nipa, captured 920Jo of the very large vote in northern Nipa and southern 
Margarima. 85 OJo of his total vote came from this area and another 1 1  OJo from 
adjacent portions of Mendi . Dus Mapun received 860Jo of his vote from his 
home Mendi council area, and of the two local candidates running against 
Wiwa in the east , Gaba Kulembe received over 900Jo of his support from within 
Ialibu council area and Rama received almost 990Jo of his votes from Kagua 
and neighbouring areas of Pangia. 
The most remarkable result was that achieved by Anthony Temo . The 
spread of his support was matched only by that of the United Party candidate, 
Pusal . He received at least small numbers of votes throughout the province, 
and substantial numbers in his home area of Mendi and his wife 's  home in 
Kagua, as well as wide support in Tari and Komo, where he had served as clerk 
and spread his Amene Association . But 670Jo of his vote came from Koroba­
Lake Kopiago , where he received 570Jo of the vote despite the fact that he had 
no connection with the area before the campaign. He appears to have caught 
the fancy of electors who chanted his name 'Temotemotemotemo' like the 
lyrics of a hit song and who chose to ignore the young Huli candidates from 
Tari who spent relatively little of their time campaigning in Koroba. Pusal , 
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who had expected to win strong support in Koroba, felt that Temo had 
persuaded voters that it was illegal to vote for a 'didiman' (government 
agricultural officer) , the only name by which Pusal was known in the area . 
Temo' s  support among the Huli , who otherwise voted almost exclusively for 
Huli candidates, would seem to merit further study . 
The two serious party candidates , Wiwa and Pusal , also had their home 
support although Dus took about 3000 votes from Pusal in the Mendi area and 
Gaba Kulembe about 2300 from Wiwa in Ialibu . Neither did well in the west 
where there were strong local candidates , although Pusal , who campaigned 
actively in Huli areas , received over 900 votes in Koroba and over 1 000 in 
Nipa. In other areas , much of the support for the two candidates was raised by 
their party allies among the open electorate candidates . Posu Ank was able to 
deliver Lai Valley to Wiwa, and Yano Belo 's  home area in Kagua gave Wiwa 
his strong majority there, while Mata Mura, Yano' s  rival , was able to swing 
only part of his own local support away from Rarua to Pusal . In Ialibu-Pangia 
the United Party open candidate . Pundia Kange, succeeded in mobilising 
Pangia sentiment against Ialibu' s  earlier dominance of the electorate and 
carried Pangia' s votes for Pusal against Wiwa of Ialibu . Wiwa's  winning 
margin was so narrow that no one portion of his support could be said to have 
been more crucial than others . It is clear, however , that if the preferential 
voting system of 1 972 had been in operation Pusal , with wider support 
throughout the province, would have won the election . 
In  the open electorates localisation of support varied with the nature of the 
arenas established by the new electorate boundaries . Tari , with its geo­
graphical and cultural unity, lay at one extreme. As an assiduous Member for 
the area since 1 968 Matiabe Yuwi was well known throughout the electorate ,  
but the fact that he topped the poll in all but two localities and made a 
respectable showing in these as well,  capturing 55 .9% of the formal vote, is 
also a commentary on ease of communication within the Tari Basin . Kagua­
Erave , Mendi , and Koroba-Kopiago , despite some electoral boundary adjust­
ments , were also well established political arenas and their major candidates 
were able to recruit at least some votes outside their home areas . 
In the new electorates , however , localisation of voting was very marked . In 
Imbonggu the major candidates were able to obtain support widely within 
either the lalibu or the Mendi portion of the electorate , but not in both , and 
Ialibu-Pangia saw a similar dichotomy. In the more remote electorates of 
Nipa-Kutubu and Komo-Margarima, with very limited internal communica­
tion and no tradition as arenas , voting was entirely local , with support largely 
limited to the level of census divisions based on valleys . The number of 
candidates contesting was highest in these two electorates and the victor ' s  
share of the votes cast , 19 .8  and 16 . 8  per cent , was among the very lowest in 
the country . 
The maj ority of open electorate contests shaped up eventually as replays of 
the 1 972 battles between leading candidates . This was true for Kagua-Erave 
and Nipa-Kutubu , where Yano Belo and lbne Kor maintained their seats 
against renewed challenges from Mata Mura and Tegi Ebeial , and for Mendi 
and Koroba-Kopiago, where Posu Ank and Paiale Elo finally unseated Momei 
Pangial and Andrew Wabiria . In these electorates , the battles between Area 
Authority leaders and incumbent MPs were fought out as central dramas in 
the core areas ,  despite the intrusion of large numbers of new candidate faces .  
The new faces in Koroba-Kopiago, however , split the Huli vote and made for 
the difference in Wabiria 's  fortunes . 
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In Ialibu-Pungia, where the redrawing of boundaries favoured Pangia 
candidates , an exceptionally large number of previous candidates contested: 
the incumbent MP, Turi Wari , and four of his five leading opponents from 
1 972, including the two council Presidents ,  both of them Area Authority 
members . All of these men were spurned by the United Party for its 
endorsement , which was given to a young NBC announcer from Pangia, 
Pundia Kange, who was the only well educated candidate and who won solid 
backing from Pangia to produce the widest margin of victory in the 
Highlands . Turi Wari was the only Southern Highlands MP to suffer defeat 
ignominiously; collecting only 1 50 votes he forfeited his deposit . In the 'new' 
electorates of Imbonggu and Komo-Margarima new faces were certain to 
emerge,  but in each there was one candidate who had contested and done well 
in 1 972.  Of these Glaimi Warena won Imbonggu while Aya Dabuma came 
second to Dambali Habe in Komo-Margarima. 
Those candidates who held endorsement by the United Party or the PPP 
tended to do better than others . This resulted largely from the fact that 
endorsement had been given to obviously leading candidates in electorates 
where 1 972 patterns of candidate prominence were maintained; thus in Mendi , 
Koroba-Kopiago and Kagua-Erave the two candidates who did best were those 
who represented the UP and PPP . This was also true in the provincial 
electorate and in Ialibu-Pangia where the coincidence of party endorsement 
and voter support was more clearly the result of astute choice in party endorse­
ment . In Tari and Nipa-Kutubu the United Party had a monopoly on leading 
candidates . On the other hand , the ' new' electorates presented selection 
problems for the parties and it was here that endorsed candidates made their 
weakest showing. In Imbonggu the United Party candidate came 4th and the 
PPP candidate 8th out of 1 0, though the two most successful candidates were 
known to have sympathies with the two major parties . In Komo-Margarima, 
where the PPP made no endorsement , the United Party candidate came 4th 
out of 1 1 . Pangu had only one established candidate recognised in its national 
advertisement , Aya Dabuma, who came second in Komo-Margarima. Peren 
Mune Dick , who obtained Pangu endorsement for the provincial electorate 
came 3rd ,  but others who had Pangu support came 7th in Imbonggu and 8th in 
Ialibu-Pangia and lost their deposits.  
A total of 1 7  candidates forfeited their deposits by obtaining less than 10% 
of the winning candidate' s vote; if the same rules had applied in 1 972 only one 
candidate in the open electorates would have lost his deposit . This is  the 
clearest evidence of the ephemeral nature of many of the candidacies attracted 
by the new electoral system and by the opportunities seemingly available to 
young educated men . 
Government Formation 
Immediately after the election results became known in Port Moresby there 
was considerable speculation about the possibility that either the United Party 
or PPP could obtain the support of the entire Southern Highlands delegation 
and thus swing a .bloc of nine votes into a potential government coalition. This 
seemed more feasible for the PPP than for the United Party . Posu Ank and 
Yano Belo had clearly broken their links with the United Party, and Wiwa 
Korowi , Paiale Elo and Glaimi Warena were counted as being at least 
favourable to the PPP, the first two having been endorsed by the party. At the 
same time, the United Party's  most faithful supporters , Andrew Wabiria and 
Momei Pangial , had been defeated, and the position of Matiabe Yuwi , Ibne 
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Kor and Pundia Kange, despite their endorsement by the United Party , was 
considered open to negotiation . Dambali Habe was unendorsed and his 
preferences were unknown . 
The Pangu-PPP coalition had done better than expected throughout the 
country , but the United Party had maintained a strong regional base in the 
Highlands . While Pangu made significant inroads into the Eastern Highlands 
and Chimbu , and the PPP into the Southern Highlands , the Western 
Highlands and Enga looked potentially solid for the United Party, which 
calletj. a meeting of its Highlands supporters at Mt . Hagen during the first 
week after counting of votes began . Matiabe Yuwi brought with him the other 
two western MP,s ,  Paiale Elo and Dambali Habe, and Pundia Kange also 
attended. So did Yano Belo, though only in the role of observer . During the 
feverish negotiations of the following weeks ,  as two potential governing 
coalitions coalesced , the only Southern Highlanders who played leading roles 
were Wiwa Korowi , who served as the PPP' s  Highlands spokesman in Port 
Moresby, and Andrew Wabiria who, though defeated, continued to take an 
active part in United Party affairs . 
Shortly before Parliament assembled on 9 August to elect a Prime Minister , 
the United Party made a last attempt through the Southern Highlands 
graduates to enlist support for a solid front among the province 's  bloc of MPs 
(cf also a letter to the Post-Courier, 5 August 1 977) . The graduates , however , 
and perhaps the MPs themselves , were not displeased with a division that 
ensured the province's  representation in government no matter which coalition 
won. In the vote by which Somare defeated Sir John Guise , the Southern 
Highlands MPs split 5-4 in favour of Somare . lbne Kor crossed from the 
United Party to join Wiwa, Yano , Posu and Glaimi , while the four who had 
attended the United Party' s Mt.  Hagen meeting remained with the opposition . 
The province then did remarkably well in the allocation of offiices,  largely 
because four of its government supporters constituted the whole of the PPP 
representation from the Highlands . With Posu Ank as the senior representa­
tive of this group and a member of the party' s  executive committee, the group 
chose its best educated member , Wiwa Korowi , rather than the ex-minister, 
Yano Belo, for a ministry and Wiwa was allocated the major portfolio of 
Health.  A few days later the number of ministries was expanded from 18 to 21 
so as to give representation to each of the 20 provinces , and the additional 
three ministers were all Pangu men. There was controversy between Pangu and 
PPP concerning the events which led to Yano Belo ' s  being named the 22nd 
minister (he was the only ex-minister in the coalition ranks who had not been 
reappointed) . It is clear that there was pressure both for more Highlands and 
more PPP representation in the Cabinet and that Somare announced Yano 
Belo 's  re-appointment to Works and Supply Before PPP backbenchers had 
been consulted . At the same time eight Parliamentary Secretaries were 
appointed, two from each region, with Posu Ank among them and attached to 
Wiwa' s Ministry of Health . The Southern Highlands ended up as the only 
province with three representatives in the government , a very prominent 
component among the PPP's  ten ministers and parliamentary secretaries and 
among the eight Highlanders in the government . This was a reversal of form 
from 1 972 when the Southern Highlands and tiny Manus were the only 
provinces without ministerial representation . 
In  the opposition' s  shadow ministry , Matiabe Yuwi was named spokesman 
for Environment, Conservation and Human Resources, and Pundia Kange for 
Media, making the Southern Highlands one of three provinces with two 
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representatives on the opposition front benches . Matiabe Yuwi ' s subsequent 
resignation from the United Party, in part on the grounds that he had not been 
consulted on his shadow ministry appointment , but also on the grounds that 
he could not continue to represent the interests of his electorate while in 
opposition to the government , was the first open break in the opposition 
ranks . 
In October 1 977 a new election was ordered in Koroba-Kopiago open 
electorate, one of five in the country whose results were invalidated . The 
defeated incumbent MP , Andrew Wabiria,  had successfully petitioned against 
the election of Paiale Elo on the grounds that he had threatened voters in the 
remote Hewa area with gaol or a fine of K200 if they did not vote for him . In 
the by-election , held in June-July 1978,  Wabiria was confronted with the same 
two strong Huli candidates from his home area in Koroba, while Paiale' s  only 
rival for Duna support in Kopiago, and northern Koroba did not stand again . 
With voting support heavily localised , Paiale obtained almost 40% to win 
easily . 
Aftermath 
The election served to confirm the Southern Highlands Province as a 
political arena for active politicians. The MPs and members of the Area 
Authority had already had several years of interaction at the provincial level , 
but their political ambitions were focused on open electorates . Only with the 
development of rival campaign networks of provincial and open electorate 
candidates did party begin to mean something other than vague links with 
parliamentary groups in Port Moresby, and only then too did the province 
'jel l '  politically. 
It is  important to note , however, that the networks operated primarily in the 
east and centre of the province . The west , already alienated by a sense of 
relative deprivation, was further alienated by the outcome of the election . 
Although the four western open electorates had 49% of the voters they 
contributed only 1 . 3 %  of Wiwa's winning total in the provincial electorate . 
Wiwa was seen as a representative of the east, not of the province as Neville 
had been , and the three Southern Highlanders who took office in the new 
Somare coalition were all men of the east and centre while the westerners sat 
initially on the opposition benches . This situation raised fears that the west 
would fall yet further behind in government investment , and in Tari and 
among Huli students there was a revival of secessionist disucssion . The more 
feasible alternative to secession lay in capturing control over the forthcoming 
provincial governemnt and Andrew Andaijah , the new Huli president of the 
Area Authority, began organising support for the next struggle within the 
provincial arena . 
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Chapter 1 0  
' SIGNS OF DEVELOPMENT? ' :  
NIPA-KUTUBU OPEN 
Paul Sillitoe 
Ibne Kor 1 ,  the sitting Member for the old Nipa-Margarima Open Electorate, 
won the new Nipa-Kutuba seat2 in the 1 977 general elections to the National 
Parliament . But the relatively even distribution of votes between some of the 
candidates (see table 5) shows that his election was a near thing in a closely run 
race, and with only 19 . 80Jo of the votes Ibne cannot say he has the confidence 
of many people in his electorate.  But as this paper argues , the understanding 
which they have of government in this area, and their subsequent voting 
behaviour, precludes any other result . 
The Nipa and Lake Kutubu region 
The geographical , ethnographic and linguistic variety of the area included 
within the electorate, which is the largest in the Southern Highlands both in 
geographical area and size of population, gives a hint of the difficulties faced 
by candidates trying to carry the whole region in an election. Broadly 
speaking, there are two geographical regions within the electorate which , 
because of differences in altitude, have markedly different environments and 
inhabitants who lead very different ways of life .  The north-eastern quarter of 
the region3 lies mostly between 5 ,000 and 6,000 feet above sea level , and the 
people who live here are Highlanders . They are shifting cultivators and their 
staple crop is sweet potato, which they supplement with bananas , pumpkins,  
various greens and other vegetables . They keep large numbers of pigs which, 
along with other things (such as pearl shells) , constitute the wealth they hand 
on to one another in the ceremonial exchanges that characterize all their 
important social events .  Their settlement pattern is scattered, men living in 
separate houses from women, and their social organization is acephalous, with 
a few men achieving some influence through success in ceremonial exchange . 
The people who live in the Nembi valley around Nipa and in the Was valley are 
Wola speakers , and those who live lower down the Nembi valley around 
Poroma are Kewa speakers. 
The south-western three-quarters of  the electorate lies mostly between 3 ,000 
and 4,000 feet , and the people here depend for their livelihood on sago; fish 
and vegetables , which they grow in gardens that are poorly tended in 
comparison to those of their Highland neighbours. They live in long houses 
and their social organization is acephalous , but the considerably lower 
population density here makes the maintenance of social order easier , and this 
possibly explains why the ceremonial exchange of wealth does not figure so 
prominently in their lives . A small population occupying a vast area , these 
people speak five languages . On the slopes of Mount Bosavi they speak Kaluli 
and Sonia, to the east on the Hegigio river they speak Hawalisi and Fasu , and 
to the east again around Lake Kutubu and on the Mubi river they speak Foi ' i  
( in  the forest to  the north of the Lake there are a small number of Huli 
speaking settlements ,  but these colonists from the Tari Basin make up only a 
tiny fraction of the population)4 • 
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The Australian administration found the people living around Lake Kutubu 
in the mid- 1 930s and subjected them to a brief period of control , but they did 
not effectively administer the area until the early 1 950s . They patrolled the 
highland part of the electorate somewhat from Kutubu and Mendi , but they 
did not bring this area under control until the 1 960s when they established 
stations at Nipa and Poroma. 
Although the administration brought them under control over a decade 
before their Highland neighbours , it is probable that the lowland people will 
fall behind them in economic growth . There are pitifully few ways people 
throughout all of the electorate can earn money today; they grow hardly any 
of the cash crops from which those in other areas earn their wealth . But in the 
Highlands , close to Ni pa and Poroma, the Department of Primary Industry, 
in conjunction with the Local Government Council s ,  are planting extensive 
coffee blocks , in an attempt to demonstrate to the people how profitable it 
would be for them to do likewise in their gardens .  Also, since the 1 970s , and 
with work continuing today, the Highland area has a network of tracks which 
are negotiable in four wheel drive vehicles , and the construction of the 
Highlands Highway between Mendi and Nipa will effectively link these with 
the Highlands region as a whole. People are beginning to move beyond their 
home areas as a result of this growth in communications ,  moving from 
reliance on government and mission airstrips to the use of roads , and they are 
returning with ideas from regions which are similar but economically more 
advanced than theirs , particularly the Western Highlands . In the past year or 
so for example, people in the Nipa area have started to show an interest in 
planting coffee and talking about purchasing their own vehicles . 
The people who live in the lowland region on the other hand are not 
receiving the same stimulations to develop because there has been no com­
parable growth in communications in their area, or between it and the High­
lands (because of both the small and scattered population there, and the 
forested , sometimes swampy, and precipitous terrain) . This ,  plus the intrac­
table nature of the country which they occupy making the development of any 
cash crops on a commercial scale difficult , has resulted in a relative stagnation 
to which there are no obvious and simple solutions . 
Issues at stake 
It will come as no surprise , given the backwardness of the electorate , that 
the issue which dominated the thinking of voters was the development of their 
area, and that the Highlands, with a far larger population, dominated the 
election5 • But an appreciation of the way people voted depends not only on an 
awareness of their under-development and demand for better things , but also 
on how they think economic advancement will come to them and the part the 
MP will play in this . 
Although they have elected members of their settlements to Local 
Government Councils ,  and have also participated in two previous general 
elections, the people in the area only had the haziest ideas of what they were 
doing in the election or why they were doing it. When asked what they were 
doing at the election they always replied that they were marking their memba; 
the problems came when asked why they were doing this and what the 
Member' s  task would be when elected . 
When asked the first question, why they were bothering to vote6, people 
invariably replied that the government would imprison them if they did not 
have a good excuse for not coming along, such as illness , or inability because 
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of age , or because they had gone to live elsewhere. They compounded this 
erroneous idea with a rumour circulating prior to the election (a rumour which 
I heard some candidates reinforce by warning people to heed it) that the 
administration would imprison for six months anyone who named two or 
more candidates on the same ballot paper (as in previous preferential 
elections) . The outcome of these fictitious ideas was that the election 
frightened most people, even young and confident men, but the turnout , at 
approximately 10 1 .60Jo of the electorate7 , was very good ! 
When asked the second question, what they thought a member does when 
elected, people' s  replies show that they are not too clear. Table 1 lists the 
replies given by 1 1 8 people (59 men and 59 women) to the question : "What 
do you think a Member of the Parliament does?" The large number who 
replied frankly that they did not know points to the cloudiness of mind with 
which people approached the election. Although, when asked why they 
intended to support the candidate they named as the person who would have 
their vote, some of those who replied that they did not know what a Member 
does revealed that they thought some of the responsibility for encouraging 
development fell on him . They said that they supported the man they named 
because they thought that he would encourage development the best , but as to 
how he would do this they claimed no knowledge8 • Thirty five of the forty nine 
people who replied that they did not know were women (and two others were 
mentally sub-normal male:;) , and this accords with the realities of traditional 
life where women play a small role in the limited politics entailed in the 
acephalous organization of the region and, because their influence is indirect , 
express less interest . 
Over half of those questioned replied that the duty of a Member of the 
Parliament is to go to meetings in Port Moresby to tell those in power 
how they want their region developed and argue strongly so that they give 
them the money and facilities needed to do it (Hagen people think the same -
see Strathern 1 970) . The popularity of this reply shows that the need for 
economic development was the main theme of the election in the minds of the 
electorate , and Table 2 lists the things they specified as necessary for their 
advancement9 • 
The items listed are those found in more developed parts of the Highlands . 
But those who gave this reply revealed their political unawareness when they 
said who they thought was in power . Thirty (46.90Jo) of them said that the 
Member has to approach Europeans to ask for the development Nipa needs , 
and only 2 (3 . 1  OJo) said it was Somare' s clan 10• Three ( 4. 70Jo) said they were not 
sure and twenty nine mentioned no one. 
The third and fourth replies listed in Table 1 also reflect this idea, that 
Europeans still control the country . Indeed the other maj or electoral issue was 
the return of Europeans .  Few people mentioned this as a duty of the Member 
because the idea of independence confuses them and they are not sure that it is 
something which concerns him, but nearly everyone in the area said they want 
him to arrange for European government officers to return if he can . 
Three elderly women gave the fifth , rather eccentric reply,  in the erroneous 
belief that as Europeans make the Australian Dollar there must be far more of 
these than Kina, and so if the country changes back there will be more money 
for everyone . 
This discussion of people' s  ideas shows that the majority think that in an 
election they mark someone to go and promote their interests with the powers 
that be in Port Moresby (the Wola use for this the phrase maemb beray which 
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Table 1 Opinion Survey on the Duties of a Member 
The duties of a Member 
Parliament are: 
1 .  Goes to meetings in Moresby to 
tell those in power what develop­
ment people want in Nipa , and to 
argue strongly so that they give 
them money and facilities for it . 
2. Do not know 
3. Goes to Moresby to argue and 
arrange for return of European 
government officers .  
4 .  Goes t o  Moresby t o  receive 
instructions from Europeans on 
what people at Nipa need to do for 
development . 
5 .  Goes to Moresby to arrange 
for them to change back from the 
Kina to the Australian Dollar . 
Number of people % of respondents 
giving reply: giving reply: 
64 
49 
6 
3 
3 
54 .2 
4 1 . 5  
5 1  
2 .5  
2 . 5  
Table 2 Opinion Survey on  Development 
Items of development specified Number of people % of respondents 
by those giving reply 1. in giving reply: giving reply: 
table 1 :  
1 .  Crops (primarily coffee , some 
mentioned tea & other agricultural 
development).  
2 .  Roads (2 specified the 
Highlands Highway) . 
3 .  Livestock (primarily cows , 
although some mentioned pigs) . 
4. Medical aid posts & hospitals 
5. Schools (1 specified a 
high school) . 
6. Payment for work they are 
obliged to do (e .g.  roadwork) . 
7. The ownership of vehicles . 
8 .  Businesses & companies 
9. Expansion of Nipa station . 
1 3  20. 3 0Jo  
1 3  20.3 0Jo  
9 14 . 1 OJo 
8 1 2 . 5 0Jo  
8 1 2 . 5 0Jo  
7 10.9% 
5 7 . 8 0Jo  
3 4. 70Jo 
1 . 60Jo 
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means to lookout for something belonging to someone else) . The person 
marked goes to meetings to persuade those with the knowledge , resources and 
money to start development projects in their area so that they can earn money 
and in turn spend this to advance their standard of living1 1 ;  they say that he 
goes to inform those in power of the things for which they are hem kayom 
(that is  worried or anxious to have}1 2 •  When explaining what a Member does , 
people often drew an explicit parallel with ceremonial exchange in their own 
life.  In these a man needs to speak out strongly and argue well to secure the 
wealth he wants , so a Member must speak out well and convincingly if he is to 
pull the money and development they need to their region. 
People' s  desire for a strong European presence is related to their often 
voiced concern with their present way of life and the need to change it . They 
fear that educated Papua New Guineans in more developed regions are playing 
some trick on them. These people have reaped some of the benefits of 
European knowledge and are out to stop its spread to backward places like 
theirs by insisting that those who have it leave. They are doing this to keep 
them weak so that they can exploit them in some way (or worst of all , come 
and take away their land when they are strong enough, and develop it for 
themselves) . 
The candidates . 
The ideas which candidates held about the duties of a Member of Parliament 
did not differ much from those of the electorate. There was , for example, a 
lack of understanding of the powers of Government or how it functions (for 
instance only one out of eight candidates interviewed mentioned the legislative 
duties of a Member , or the importance of convincing Ministries to secure 
funds for development projects - and he was a previous MHA) . But this 
unawareness of the potential power which goes with the office for which they 
were competing follows from their upbringing in an acephalous society which 
does not invest power over others in any institution or person (for example, to 
my knowledge the Wola language has no word to convey the idea of exercising 
power over the actions of others, they refer to the power of patrol officers in 
this regard as bosim bay (from the Pidgin bosim , to boss or order) ) .  
I n  keeping with the views o f  the electorate, all eight candidates interviewed 13 
stressed that their job if elected would be to encourage economic development 
in the area . Five of them specified the development of crops (coffee and tea) , 
five of them the construction of roads (three mentioned the Highlands 
Highway) , five of them the building of schools (two referred to a high school, 
one of them said he would insist on a boarding high school , and one referred 
to the need for an agricultural school) , three of them specified the building of 
aid posts and hospitals ,  two of them the introduction of livestock (cows , pigs 
and chickens) , one of them business in general , and one the ownership of 
vehicles (one candidate said he would discourage this until people had been 
taught how to care for them and had adequate roads on which to drive them) . 
Other issues which candidates said would claim their attention were a police 
station in Ni pa, which one man thought necessary . Another said that he would 
fight to have the region linked in to the national electrictiy grid and that he was 
also concerned over the dispute about the international boundary running 
between the Torres Straits I slands (the same person referred to the legislative 
duties of a Member , and was probably, to judge from his comments ,  the most 
politically sophisticated candidate) . 
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While the candidates ' backgrounds vary in detai l ,  they have a number of 
particulars in common . They are youngish men approaching middle age (the 
average age of the eight interviewed is 32 years) and in contrast to older men, 
who are entrenched in their traditional way of li fe, they are a cross section of 
the small and young vanguard which is experimenting with European ways . 
Indeed , by the standards of the region, they represent those most experienced 
in these ways , something which they signal to others by the shirts and shorts 
which they wear 14 •  Although the extent of their experience in different fields 
varies , between them they represent the most educated , the most experienced 
in salaried occupations , the most experienced in Government, and the most 
tried in projects of economic development . 
This experience seems a prerequisite for standing in a national election , not 
only because without it a person would be unlikely to have the nerve to venture 
into such an enterprise, but also because the electorate look to men with it as 
those most likely to cope with the job (see Criper 1 965 : 1 33 and the Stratherns 
1 964:2 10 who say that the Chimbu and Hagen people have the same view) . 
They say they need to mark a man who is not intimidated by Europeans and 
who , by virtue of this ,  will not be afraid to speak out strongly in meetings and 
so win the best for those he represents . What better quali fications they ask ,  
than a proven ability in  European ways . I t  is this line of thinking which 
explains in part why the three former Members of the House of Assembly each 
won more votes than any other candidate - so far as the electorate was 
concerned they had experience of the job and had proven themselves because 
when in office no disaster had fallen on the area 1 5 •  
The question of why so  many men from this backward region nominated 
themselves to stand in the election is difficult to answer . They had all thought 
about nominating sometime before the election because when nominations 
opened at Nipa District Office on the 7th April several of them came forward 
to nominate on that day, and all of them within a few days . Nobody 
mentioned that other people urged them to stand, and this was unlikely given 
their disdain for interference in the lives of others- so far as they were 
concerned it was up to the individual alone whether he nominated or not . 
When asked why they had nominated themselves all candidates replied that it 
was obvious: they wanted to be elected to the House of Assembly. When asked 
further why they wanted to be elected they became evasive ; for example when 
asked if they thought they could do the job better than any of the other 
candidates they said they did not know . 
In the opinion of many people it was the lure of what for the region is an 
astronomical income that prompted candidates to stand for election . The 
money was important , but it would be incorrect to think that was all . The 
candidates were all young men eager to embrace a European Ii fe style and the 
material advantages which they think this will bring , and they all saw the 
election as an unparalleled opportunity to further these ambitions . 
An ambition to win some power did not figure in their deci sion . People in 
this area are unaware of the potential power and opportunities for personal 
advancement which a system of central government places in the hands o f  
elected politicians , and the egalitarian ethos of their acephalous traditional 
society still guides their lives . But , although nobody has realized the power 
associated with elected offices and used the opportunity to rise above others 
and win personal regard 16, it is interesting that at this interface between the old 
and new ways a person may wish for election to use the high income of the 
office in ceremonial exchanges and so win renown in the traditional way (for 
Nipa-Kutubu 203 
example one MHA did this by converting some of his money income into 
pigs and distributing them, something which played a significant part in his 
campaign) . 
The campaign 
In the elections of many other democracies, politicians try to hide their 
distasteful ambitions, try to disguise their egotism and wish for power over the 
actions of others , behind a facade of concern and wish to improve the lives of 
those they represent , but in Nipa, where such motives did not spur on the 
candidates , they had no need to resort to sweet talk and promises to hide them. 
Everyone admitted that the candidates stood for election to further their own 
advancement , not by gaining power over others but by gaining access to 
European ways , and any mincing of words to put an altruistic motive on 
their actions would have struck the electorate as ridiculous . Also , unlike 
democracies elsewhere, the candidates did not try to appeal to certain members 
of the electorate by expressing support for different policies which would 
promote their personal interests over those of others;  there are currently no 
such interest groups , based on such ill-defined criteria as social class,  in the 
Nipa region. 
The need to campaign all but evaporated without these concerns . While all 
the candidates referred to the need for economic development in their region, 
none of them said that they were more able to secure this than their rivals . The 
result was that their campaigns hardly deserved that word to decribe them 17 •  
The candidates travelled around the region prior to  the election to let 
people ,  as they said ,  "see their faces" (na elwil hondokemi in Wola) . If they 
were " happy" (turiy biy in Wola) with what they saw then they would mark 
them in the election . What candidates were saying was that they presented 
themselves to people so they could make some kind of appraisal of their 
character and suitability for the job .  But the election talks which they gave 
when they visited places were notable for the absence of any promises of what 
they would do for the electorate if elected . When tackled about this people 
gave two reasons. They disparaged such electioneering methods because they 
thought that it amounted to trying to pull the wool over electors' eyes . They 
said that to mor borway (a Wola term for trick or fool) or tok gris (a Pidgin 
term for butter up with sweet talk) is  not acceptable election practice because 
how can candidates make promises about improving their area when they do 
not know what those in power in Port Moresby will sanction . The second 
reason they gave was that candidates who pushed themselves forward with big 
talk about what they planned to do would make a poor impression . This 
opinion is rooted in traditional values which consider it unseemly for a 
successful man to shout his praises , of offends against the egalitarian ethic 
which pervades their society .  
The old Member and successful candidate, Ibne , appealed to this egalitarian 
ethic in his election talks by stressing the need for equal shares in the fruits of 
development for all . He said that Pangu pays higher salaries to its Members 
than other MHA's (possibly a confused reference to the higher incomes of 
Ministers) and gives more money to their home areas, but the United Party 
(and by inference himself as a member of it) would reverse this policy of the 
Government and give equal shares to all , which would mean large sums for 
backward areas like Nipa to finance development until they reached the same 
level as the rest of the country . Throughout his tenure of a seat in the House of 
Assembly lbne has lived according to these egalitarian ideas and has 
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distributed his income far and wide . He made a point of this in his election 
talks ,  saying that although he often wore shirts and shorts (as was necessary 
for someone going to Port Moresby) he did not spend money on shoes and 
spectacles (symbols of European affluence in their eyes) , and further that it 
was not unusual to see him in a bark belt with woven apron and cordyline 
leaves . In this way he was pointing out that he has not spent his high income on 
raising the standard of his life with manufactured goods,  but has distributed it ,  
largely through the ceremonial exchange system, to all those within his social 
universe. These people, who only make up a small part of the electorate, 
admire his behaviour and, according to their traditional values , accord him 
high status for it . 
Throughout the region people point to the other previous Member, Tegi , as 
someone who did not behave like this but spent his income on himself 
(investing heavily in a new trade store established in Nipa, building himself a 
large house nearby, and buying himself the first truck in Nipa) . Various 
incidents with him also rankle with them. One, to which several of them 
referred , concerned his efforts as MHA to talk to people in Nipa, he called 
to them from the roof of the then Sub-district offices and attracted their 
attention with the cries ar, anmuw and cher which women use to call in their 
pigs in the evening to feed them. Men voiced their dislike of his efforts to exert 
authority over them by complaining "We are men , not pigs for him to push 
around' ' .  This complaint is an example of how their acephalous values , which 
eschew personal power and inequality, influence their political thinking, and 
Ibne's  approach is interesting in contrast for the way he tries to blend 
traditional requirements with those as an elected member of government . But 
regardless of his more high-handed behaviour, Tegi won many votes and ran 
Ibne a close second place . This indicates that forces other than a consideration 
of the character of candidates guided people when they voted . The pattern of 
voting belies the idea that some appreciated Tegi ' s  political sophistication and 
thought that he would do the job best, while other admired Ibne's  
manipulation of his  position to everyone's  advantage in the exchange system. 
Rather it points to them voting for the candidate who lives nearest to them so 
long as he has the required knowledge of European ways . 
Ibne's  election talks were also interesting for the way in which he tried to 
promote himself. He referred to the developments of the last year or so- the 
new coffee blocks, the Highlands Highway coming, talk of a high school for 
Nipa, and work on a hospital (many of which actually owe little to him) - as 
examples of the equal development that will come with the United Party , and 
by inference with him . He associated himself so closely with the United Party 
that any reference to it included himself, and this was as near as any candidate 
came to talking grease . He had no need to promote the United Party. In fact it 
could have worked against his interests because nearly all the other candidates 
claimed allegiance to it too (although it only authorised , and hence helped 
financially, Ibne and Tegi , but this made no difference to the electorate who 
were unaware of it) . Anyway the United Party did not need selling to the 
electorate who despised Somare's  clan , Pangu , as those who removed 
Europeans and hence their chances of rapid development from those who 
could give it to them . 
But people's understanding of political parties is so poor that any campaign 
along these lines would have been a waste of time . The way the electorate 
voted in the Southern Highlands Provincial Election , and to a lesser extent in 
the Open Election , shows this .  Regardless of their dislike for Somare 's  clan , 
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80. 70Jo of the electorate voted for a Pangu candidate in the Provincial election 
and 7 .60Jo for someone thought by many to be a Pangu man in the Open 
election . Both men , Peren Mune Dick and Paulus Kombo Mong, come from 
the same settlement , on whose land Nipa station stands . They led evasive 
campaigns so that people were not sure where their party allegiance lay , Paulus 
maintaining that he was an Independent candidate, and this may have thrown 
electors off. But Michael Somare himself made a brief visit to Ni pa to promote 
Peren Mune Dick and at the count he openly sported a badge : Vote Pangu. 
Regardless of these and other signals that their sympathies lay with Somare' s  
clan many voted for them and this further demonstrates how they think that it 
is  best to go for the man who lives nearest. This came out clearly in the 
Provincial election, as table 3 shows . Although Peren Mune Dick polled 
hopelessly in all Open Electorates but his home one, he came third overall 
because no one else stood for the Provincial seat from this populous region, so 
he won the larger part of it on the vote-for-the-nearest-man principle . 
Table 3 Provincial Candidates ' Support Within Nipa-Kutubu Open 
Candidates. 
Wewa Korowi 
Francis Pusal 
Peren Mune Dick 
Anthony Yarnak Temo 
Waya Angoea Tadabe 
Nelson Humbi Piribu 
Rarua Pula 
Agilo Kunini 
Maya Habia Babe 
Dus Mapun 
Gaba Agea Kulembe 
Total votes 
won. 
1 9,587 
1 8 ,92 1 
1 3 ,207 
1 1 ,27 1 
10, 539 
6,465 
5 ,588 
5, 1 62 
4,541 
3 ,762 
2,592 
Votes won in 
Nipa-Kutubu Open 
Electorate. 
67 
1 ,076 
1 1 ,05 1 
78 
885 
267 
0 
1 9  
9 
238 
8 
Percentage of 
votes won in 
Nipa-Kutubu Open 
Electorate. 
0.30Jo 
5 .70Jo 
83 . 70Jo 
0 .  70Jo 
8 .40Jo 
4. 1 OJo 
0 
0.40Jo 
0.20Jo 
6.30Jo 
0 . 3 0Jo  
The irrelevance of  political parties was inevitable given the absence of any 
contest in the election between alternative political ideologies (the erroneous 
idea that Pangu threw Europeans out of the country and that their defeat will 
lead to their return hardly ranks as a political issue) . So the electorate had to 
choose between thirteen candidates who, as their posters showed, all stood on 
the same platform. These posters,  produced to different standards (some 
candidates drew up their own by hand and others had theirs printed 
professionally - for example lbne and Tegi spent about three-quarters of the 
K400 they received from the United Party for expenses on them), all referred 
to the same thing - the need for economic development , for roads,  schools,  
cash crops and the l ike. Probably their most important feature in a region 
where nearly everyone is illiterate was a photograph of the candidate to let 
people see their faces and form some opinion about them (but this would only 
serve some purpose if people knew the man, a photograph on a poster alone 
could not win votes) . 
Seeing faces and forming opinions about character were important issues 
because there was little else on which people could base a rational choice in an 
election where all candidates stood on the same platform. And without 
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different views to present and persuade the electorate to support , the 
candidates faced an impossible task if they hoped to carry a considerable 
percentage of the votes in such a large geographical area . The faces of 
candidates were well known in the areas where they lived and a rival would 
have been hard pressed to usurp their votes , especially as people calculated 
that the nearer to their home the Member lives the better for them because any 
distribution of his large income is more likely to reach them, and that he is 
certain to favour his home area in pushing for development projects .  So a brief 
visit to an area was unlikely to make any inroads into the support people gave 
their local candidate, and perhaps the relevant question is not why didn't they 
campaign .more vigorously and competitively? But why did they bother at all? 
The desultory campaigns mounted by candidates suggest they were aware of 
this question, and combined with the di fficulties they faced walking round 
such a large region, it prompted them to concentrate their efforts on their 
home areas and places nearby . The result , strangely enough , was that they 
ignored more remote places with no ties to any candidate, where they could 
have made some impression , and concentrated on places where their support 
was assured by virtue of their residence or , in the case of several candidates 
who lived close to one another around government and mission stations , 
trespassed into one anothers ' strongholds where they had little hope of 
swinging the vote . This latter kind of campaigning could be seen at Nipa 
market over a weekend. The market is near to the homes of five candidates 
and most of the people who attend it are from their settlements ,  so their 
rivalry in shouting out their ideas , which was the nearest they came to openly 
competing, was largely a waste of effort because those present were already 
commited to someone . 
The three Kutubu candidates visited the Highland area a number of times;  
lacking funds they usually walked back and forth from the lake, a journey 
which takes a number of days . They campaigned here because they realised 
that the thin population in their home areas alone would be insufficient to win 
them the election . On the other hand four of the six Highlanders interviewed 
did not bother to visit the lake region because they considered the small 
number of votes they might win not worth the effort . The two who did go 
travelled down by plane , Tegi paying for it from the funds he received from 
the United Party and Awakep selling a pig to raise his fare, but the number of 
votes which they won show their efforts were largely a waste of time, as the 
others thought they would be (especially as Paulus , presumably because of the 
fame he has earned over the waves of Radio Mendi , polled one more vote than 
Awakep and only two less than Tegi , which was less than Awakep deserved for 
his efforts as he spent two weeks walking to the Bosavi area to show his face) . 
The Nembi valley and plateau areas of the Highlands , fielding the most 
candidates and carrying the largest population , were the most thoroughly 
canvassed regions . All the candidates interviewed spent two weeks or more 
walking between Nipa and Poroma. They slept at di fferent places on their 
way and held "meetings" to talk to people . Only two of the candidates 
occasionally had the use of veh ic les ; Tegi sometimes borrowed the truck 
belonging to the store in Nipa, which his mother ' s  brother' s son owns (a man 
from Shumbiy in the Lai valley) , and David Songk sometimes used the truck 
which his settlement , in the more "prosperous" part of the Nembi valley south 
of Nipa, has recent ly purchased . 
The situation in remoter areas was different , as illustrated by Haelaelinja ,  a 
sett lement on the Was river where I live. Throughout the campaign only four 
Nipa-Kutubu 207 
candidates made one apperance each here to let people see their faces , and two 
of these were Kutubu men walking down to the lake and it is  doubtful they 
would have come if the settlement had not been a short detour off their route. 
A number of candidates came about halfway to the place from Nipa but 
beyond this point the dense settlement of the Nembi basin gives way to a wedge 
of . population pushing into the forest along the Was valley and beyond.  
Abutting on to the forest it leads nowhere, and candidates probably thought i t  
a waste of energy to walk in and then have to retrace their footsteps back out 
(although they could have looped back through the forest and visited a few 
other settlements further down the Was valley ,  and then cut across the 
mountains back to the Nembi basin below Nipa) . If they thought that the area 
was sold on one man, as an opinion poll of how people intended to vote 
suggests , then they were mistaken, because although 99 . 1  OJo of the vote went to 
lbne, who was geographically the nearest candidate, he, like all the other 
candidates , had nothing but a few tenuous links with the area and did not 
interact with anyone there . 
Ibne was the last of the four candidates to visit the area, about two weeks 
before polling started, and this played an important part in winning him its 
vote . Some men intended to support him anyway because he lived the nearest , 
but prior to his visit younger men, and also some mature ones whose ideas are 
significant in shaping public opinion, were voicing dissatisfaction with all the 
Highland candidates . This followed the visits of the two candidates from 
Kutubu, which prompted them to ask what the last two MHA's,  both Nipa 
men, have done for the area, and they concluded that they had achieved next 
to nothing because compared to other areas theirs is suw dimb (Wola for 
inferior ground , a backward area) . They reasoned that a Kutubu man , having 
more experience of European ways , might do better , and one of the Kutubu 
candidates bolstered this interest by saying that if he was elected he would push 
for the Government to drive a road through the forest to Kutubu via their 
area. This created some interest because men think that easier access to the 
forest will result in improved exploitation of its resources and that they could 
start up a bisnis exporting cassowaries , marsupials and other forest products 
to areas with limited access to them. 
This swing of opinion to a Kutubu candidate indicates that people were not 
firmly set on supporting anyone and that if candidates had made more 
vigorous efforts they could have split the vote. But Ibne's  timely arrival a little 
before the election tipped the balance and brought everyone behind him . He 
was ,  as he pointed out , a Kaerinj man (that is someone who lives to the west of 
the Nembi valley - although only just) 18 and the nearest candidate to them, 
and although he did not interact directly with them, the wealth which he 
distributed benefited them because some of it reached them second or third 
hand . He also pointed out that prior to his election there was nothing on the 
Was river , now a track ran that way (with two others under construction) and 
there was a mission-founded primary school and medical aid post half way to 
Nipa, and he intimated that these developments resulted from his concern for 
the area . This revived people' s  convictions that a candidate will look after the 
area nearest his home first , and that perhaps a Kutubu man was not such a 
good idea because the developments he would naturally encourage at the lake 
would not benefit them one jot .  
But to clinch their support Ibne promised that if he was elected again he 
would buy two cows to give them to slaughter in one of the stages of a complex 
ceremonial exchange cycle called the ser (which involves a series of dances , and 
Table 4 Nipa-Kutubu Open Results N 
0 00 
Place of 
Candidates residence Bosavi Fasu Foi ' i  Poro ma Numbi Nembi Total 
and/or patrol patrol patrol patrol plateau Basin 
origin patrol patrol 
Ibne Kor Huruwa 0 0 0 8 963 1 ,934 2,905 
Tegi Ebei 'al Imila 0 l 7 14 64 1 1 , 72 1 2, 386* 
Tombol 
Ungunaibe Kum 0 0 1 1 ,494 200 4 1 ,  700* 
Kone Iorei Wasemi 672 1 33 445 6 1 6 1 , 263 tri 
Elal Bol Tegibo 0 1 1 2 1 ,20 1 2 1 , 207 � � 
Awak ep Ponge Det 0 0 5 1 ,  1 6 1 3 5 1 ,  1 74 -c 
Paulus Kombo � -
Mong Puliym 0 0 6 3 1 7  327 47 1 1 ,  1 22* cl' Kapi Nato Wasemi 47 357 396 1 0  0 0 8 10  :::::-: -
Kemena Kirabu Pimaga 3 1  60 604 6 1 0 702 Q. 
Tui Pondapen Mae la 0 0 0 47 1 2 1 6  5 692 5· David Songk Mungtay 0 0 0 1 376 89 466 � Wegil Pondip Komiya 0 0 0 1 0 1 95 1 96 
Yeki Tidima Pomborol 0 2 3 5 1  1 0 57 a 
Totals 750 544 1 ,468 3 , 542 3 ,930 4,430 14,680 
1 *Difference made up from postal votes (a total of 4 cast) . 
2Number of spoilt ballot papers = 1 0  
3Each of the above patrols covered a census division within Nipa District (except for the Bosavi one which covered the Orogo census division of 
Tari District) . 
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cassowary and pig kills) in which people living in the Was valley are currently 
engaged . It is a new fashion to slaughter cows at a pig kill exchange, and one 
which carries a great deal of prestige, but the people living in the Was valley 
lack the resources to secure them and before lbne's  offer they pretended they 
had no interest in them and tried to make something of conducting their ser 
like their ancestors with pigs only . But Ibne's  offer changed opinion over night 
and the idea that they would be the first settlement in the region ever to kill 
cows brought everyone behind him . But he went even further and said that if 
elected, then in two years of so he would help them to purchase a truck,  the 
ownership of which has some over the last year to symbolize a large step 
forward in economic development . 
This was talk everyone understood , signs of development coming at last to 
pull them firmly away from their recent stone age past. They knew that if  
elected Ibne would receive a large salary, and i t  was a share of this that he was 
offering them, not grease talk of development which depended on him 
convincing those Europeans in Port Moresby who they think control the purse 
strings. If he was elected they were certain of these things - or were they? lbne 
had similar commitments nearer to home and would undoubtedly meet them 
first , but at least it was something, a firm offer of things they want , and this 
was more than any other candidate had offered . But these doubts, combined 
with a lack of contact with any of the candidates and a general lack of 
understanding of what the election was about , resulted in them taking little 
interest in the affair .  Whenever I wished to gauge opinion for example,  I 
invariably had to bring the subject up and people showed little interest in 
discussing it when I did so . I rarely heard them talking of the elections amongst 
themselves . 
The election 
Six patrols walked round the electorate to collect ·the vote . Each one composed 
of a presiding officer (usually a patrol officer) , a poll clerk (usually a school 
teacher) , a policeman and an interpreter, and they walked from one census 
point to another, camping at each and conducting the election . The presiding 
officer and clerk sat under a fly-sheet with ballot papers and boxes (separated 
from the crowd by a vine line) , and called people forward from the electoral 
roll and marked their votes . 
Table 4 shows clearly that , as already pointed out , people backed the man who 
lived nearest to them 19• The Kutubu men picked up their votes from the lake 
region (the Bosavi , Fasu and Foi ' i  patrols) , and Kone Iorei won most of the 
Bosavi votes because, in the absence of a candidate from there, he was the best 
known by virtue of his visits over the last twenty years as the interpreter with 
government patrols from the lake . The Poroma men picked up their votes 
from the Poroma region (the Poroma patrol and the southern part of the area 
covered by the Nembi plateau patrol), and the Nipa men from the Nipa region 
(the Nembi basin patrol and the northern part of the area covered by the 
Nembi plateau patrol) . 
An opinion poll conducted in the settlement of Haelaelinja and its 
neighbour at Ungubiy predicted this block-pattern of voting20 with only three 
people out of the three hundred and sixteen21 questioned not supporting Ibne 
- one man said that he intended to vote for Wegil and another for Kone, and 
one woman said she intended to vote for Tegi . Some of them were also asked 
why they supported the candidate they name, and table 5 shows their replies . 
A large percentage of these (68.6% , 1 20 out of 175  - that is replied 1 ) ,  3) ,  4) , 
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6) & 8) ) rest on the idea that the nearest candidate is the best candidate (when 
people gave the first reply for example, and specified the area they had in 
mind , they always thought first of their place , secondly of the Nipa area and 
only thirdly or the electorate as a whole) . 
Table 5 Electors ' Reasons for Supporting Candidates 
Reasons for supporting 
candidate: 
I ) .  He will look out for the interests 
of this area best and bring economic 
development. 
2) . Everyone else is. 
3) .  When M. H.A.  before we 
benefited , and so will again. 
4) . He lives the nearest . 
5) .  He said that he will work to bring 
back European government officers . 
6) . They stand to receive a share of 
his income. 
7) . He will replace the Kina with 
the Australian Dollar . 
8). He gave him some money when 
M.H.A .  before . 
9) . He told the staff of Nipa station 
that they should pay 20 toea for 
everything at the market and not I 0 
toea . 
10) .  He will fight to prevent anyone 
selling beer in the area . 
Number of people 
giving reply: 
75 
38 
23 
I 5  
I I 
5 
3 
2 
2 
% of respondents 
. giving reply: 
63 . 6% 
32.2% 
I 9. 5 0Jo  
I 2 . 70Jo 
9. 3 %  
4 .2% 
2 .5% 
I .  7% 
I .  7 %  
0.9% 
Several people replied frankly that they intended to vote for a candidate 
because everyone else was going to mark him too . Twenty five of the thirty 
eight people who gave this reply also said that they did not know what a 
M . H .A. does once elected (see table I) , which produces the disturbing 
statistic that 2I .20Jo of those questioned admitted to complete ignorance about 
the purpose of the election . Not knowing what it was about they followed the 
opinion of others on the assumption that however they had reached their 
decision to vote for a candidate it must be in their interests to support him too . 
Nobody persuaded them to vote this way, which is hardly surpri sing with the 
candidates themselves not really trying to persuade people to support them 
either . 
Thirteen of those who replied that they intended to vote for a candidate 
because everyone else was were men (2 of them subnormal) and twenty five of 
them were women , which gives the ratio of two ignorant women to every 
ignorant man22 , but it would be wrong to run away with the idea that many 
women mindlessly follow public opinion as. moulded by their menfolk . Some 
of them did, but more were able to give reasons for their actions .  In fact one of 
the three people who intended to vote differently to everyone else was a 
married woman . She named Tegi because contrary to what everyone else was 
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saying she thought that he was better fitted to the job than lbne. She had no 
kin or affinal connections with him , or even ties of friendship, and she based 
her decision on the belief that he was best. 
Only one of the three who intended to vote for a candidate other than Ibne 
gave a reason which echoed the conviction that the best man to support is the 
nearest one . He supported Kone Iorei because he has many relatives living in a 
settlement called Salaenda near the lake Kutubu, and he reasoned that the 
closer connections between the Highland area and the lower regions around 
the lake which would probably come with a Member from down there , 
particularly the idea of a road linking up both areas , would be in his interests24 • 
The other man who voted differently supported Wegil Pondip , and was 
exceptional because he did so for reasons other than those subscribed to by 
everyone else, that the best man was the nearest . Although Wegil lives nearer 
to Haelaelinja than most other candidates , his home is on the other side of the 
Nembi river and he is an Aeron man. The distinction the Wola make between 
people who live on opposite sides of the river, calling them Kaerinj and Aeron , 
follows a dialect difference, but it also groups together and gives an identity to 
many settlements , and they assume an Aeron man will favour his side of the 
valley first in development projects if elected, and a Kaerinj man his side25 • 
Regardless of this man supported Wegil on the basis of their membership of 
the same mission . He is the mission boy for the area and Wegil 's  emphasis on 
doing things God's  way impressed him, as did his recent stand in a council 
meeting against allowing alcohol into the region, something to which the 
mission is also very opposed (although Wegil denied this was part of his 
platform in the election) . 
The small number of vague social connections between the candidates and 
people in the Was valley did not influence the vote, as the following brief run 
down on them shows, and this is further evidence of the strength of the 
conviction that the nearest man is best . Three women married into the area 
come from Tegi ' s  settlement , and are distant relatives of his, but not one of 
them or their children supported him (the woman who did lives in a different 
settlement to those women and is in no way related to them) . Also, several 
generations ago, some people migrated to live in the Was valley from Tegi ' s  
settlement and their descendants still have tenuous links there, but not one of 
the fifteen men and women involved supported him. Four men have distant 
agnatic links with Elal Bol ' s  settlement and a woman married into the area 
comes from here too , but none of these people even hinted at any possible 
support for him . Two women married into the area come from Ibne's  
settlement and are fairly closely related to him (they are members of the same 
small kin group which the Wola call a semgenk) , and one young man living 
here has married one of Ibne's  divorced wives (although he in turn is trying to 
divorce here too) , but although these three people and their relatives supported 
Ibne , the other examples of relatedness with Tegi and Elal show that a 
personal connection with a distant candidate, which might give a small share in 
his personal income as Member, does not swerve people from supporting a 
nearer candidate. But it is probable that someone with a close tie, and a direct 
call on his income, will vote for him even if he lives some way off. This was so 
at Egenda from where one of Ibne's  wives comes . This settlement is just east of 
Nipa, and, sandwiched between lmila and Puliym, the places where Tegi and 
Paulus live , it was split on the vote-for-the-nearest-candidate principle, 
between them, except for lbne's  wife 's  relatives who all voted for him . 
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Conclusions 
Something which comes out in this study is the poor understanding which 
people had of the election . The fate of a little comic strip put out by the 
Electoral Commission and entitled Pasin bilong makim vot . . . .  long vot pepa 
summarizes the efforts make by the administration to educate people about 
the election. Several bundles arrived the day before voting started and 
remained on the floor of the returning officer ' s  office .  While a proper 
understanding will only come slowly as the next generation receive a formal 
education, it is unfortunate that the administration made no effort prior to the 
election to clear away at least some of the grosser misconceptions which the 
people had of its purpose23 • 
Some of the candidates tried to impart some information about the electoral 
process in their campaign talks , but their own lack of knowledge probably 
contributed as much to the misconceptions as it cleared up. But even if the 
electorate had been more aware of what it was doing it is doubtful that it 
would have voted differently . People asked themselves , in the best selfi sh 
democratic tradition, who would help them most , and having no other 
yardstick plumped for the nearest man . In this they followed to some extent 
their traditional acephalous way of doing things where they judge others on 
the basis of personal knowledge . But there is some confusion between this and 
the new democratic way, which expects them to judge unknown people , and 
some people on the Was river showed this when they said (before they heard 
the rumours of jail sentences for not voting) that they would not vote because 
they did not know any of the candidates . How, they asked, could they know 
who was best without knowing those concerned? 
There were no political differences of interest on which they could base their 
decision , and without a knowledge of the governmental process they behaved 
in the only way which made sense to them. Unfortunately this lack of 
knowledge meant that they did not think of the electorate as a whole and the 
candidate who would represent its interests best , which is sad because undue 
concern for a limited area may lead to petty differences which are in nobody's  
interests, as  the following incident shows . On the night they started counting 
the votes some of my friends were concerned to remove me from Nipa station 
because they had heard rumours that some men from the Aeron side of the 
valley were threatening to start a fight if a Kaerinj man was returned again ,  
and although it would not have been serious (because the administration 
prohibited men carrying bows and arrows on the station some years ago) , it 
was a sorry indication of how needless parochialism can work against every­
one 's interests . 
Yet the electorate, like Papua New Guinea as a whole26 , is lucky if it has no 
more serious divisions than one region looking out for its interests over an­
other . In elections people living in an area can take a straightforward approach 
and look for the person who will fight for all their interests , and not a more 
devious one which promotes some of them, with certain personal interests ,  at 
the expense of others . But when several candidates stand in such an election, as 
in the 1 977 Nipa-Kutubu Open , the winner, as pointed out at the beginning of 
this paper, cannot hope to carry much of his electorate, but this is not bad so 
long as he does not overly favour his home area to the detriment of the rest of 
the electorate. 
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NOTES 
1 .  Throughout, this paper spells names as they appeared on the ballot papers, 
although this differs from the orthography used in my other work (for example my 
transcription spells lbne's name as Ibnay Kot) . 
2. The revision of electoral boundaries united Margarima and Komo into one open 
electorate, and Nipa with Poroma, Lake Kutubu and the southern Bosavi area into 
another (the northern part of Bosavi is in the Komo-Margarima electorate) . 
3 .  North-east of a line running parallel with, and between the Was and Mubi rivers. 
4. See Williams 1 940 and Schieffelin 1 976 for further ethnographic information on the 
people living in the lower areas, and Sillitoe 1 975 on the Highlanders. · 
5. The remainder of this paper is written largely from the point of view of the 
Highlanders, with whom I live and work , although most of the comments apply 
equally to the people living at lower altitudes. 
6. Bother is not too strong a word to ref er to the waiting around, six hours or more 
sometimes, which was inevitable with large numbers of illiterate people voting at 
one place . Also a number of people had the bother of a three or four hour walk to 
vote. 
7. The hopelessly incorrect electoral roll compiled prior to the election gives this 
ridiculous statistic because it lists approximately 14 ,454 names, and 1 4,690 people 
voted . But these figures hide the enormity of its errors . 4 1 . 1  % (6040) of those who 
voted where not on the roll at all , so strictly speaking only 59.8% (8,650) of the 
electorate listed on it voted (the mind boggles to think where the 5804 on the roll 
who did not vote have gone, or where the 6040 not on it came from) . At two settle­
ments where I observed voting in detail for example, 55 .  75% (63 out of 1 1 3 voters) 
and 1 2 .38% (25 .out of 202 voters) of the people who voted were not on the roll . At 
the second, larger settlement the poll clerk called 78 names (27 . 86% of all those 
eligible to vote there) but no one came forward . Some of them were dead or away 
elsewhere, but people had never heard many of the names (even after pronouncing 
them in all conceivable ways to overcome errors in transcription and pronoun­
ciation by the poll clerk) . Few people drifted off (for example when the rain came) 
when they saw that the patrol officer had no way of checking if they were fit to vote 
or not, and so would not arrest them (this accords with their fear of the admini­
stration) . Ignoring these absurd figures, it is probable that well over 90% of those 
eligible to vote did so. 
8. It is a moot point in a survey of this kind how far the enquirer should push people 
for a reply ; for example, it is possible, in the light of their replies about why they 
intended to vote for a certain man, that if I had probed for long enough I may have 
forced some of these don't knows to give some reply related to economic develop­
ment, but I have known all those questioned for a number of years and none of 
them would have feigned lack of knowledge out of fear - I pressed some close 
friends (men and women), who said that they did not know what a Member does , 
for a number of minutes without them giving any other answer and I am sure they 
do not know. 
9. Some of those who gave reply 1 )  on table 1 specified nothing, and others specified 
two or three things (I left them to come forward with suggestions of their own 
accord). 
10. People refer to the Government or Pangu as Somare sem (Somare's clan or family) . 
1 1 . I use such phrases as economic development and advances in standard of living with 
tongue in cheek because I think that some of the things which have accompanied 
changes in other parts of the Highlands (such as drunkeness, an apparent break­
down in law and order, and a resurgence of tribal fighting, to mention the obvious) 
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represent a degradation , not an advance, in people's  lives . But those living in the 
Nipa area think that what they specify as developmaen is desireable and that it will 
improve the quality of their lives , and when I use these phrases they �epresent their 
rose-tinted view of future changes, not mine. 
1 2. The lack of terms, or even adaption of Pidgin terms, for concepts related to the 
election reflects the poor development of these ideas in the Ni pa area. They ref er to 
many of the foreign concepts of circumlocutions, for example to vote is obun imbiy 
kay (to say his name) . The election itself they referred to as !aysis (from the Pidgin 
word resis for races) or lekshun (the election) . 
1 3 .  Although I base my comments on candidates on these eight men , they also apply to 
the five I was unable to meet . 
14 .  This experience is probably the result of their close residence to government or 
mission stations, young men in more remote places having not yet had the oppor­
tunities to experience these things . 
1 5 .  The low poll of Yeki Tidima, who is only a subsistence gardener, lends support to 
this point - he failed even to gain the full confidence of his own settlement . 
16 .  It is questionable whether people living to their traditional code would respect an 
indigenous person with such personal power over others , they may come to resent it .  
Although changes along these lines in other regions (for example in Chimbu where 
certain men have secured some power over others by virtue of their ownership of 
capital equipment (such as trucks & coffee processing equipment)) indicate that the 
traditional system and its values lack the power to prevent it and people quietly 
accept the changes , without perhaps respecting those concerned . 
1 7 .  The same has applied in other places . See Reay's  ( 1 97 1 :243-52) comments on the 
1 968 Wahgi Open campaign - particularly Tumun's comments (p.249) -, & 
Strathern's  ( 1 970; 1 976) remarks on the 1 968 and 1 972 Dei Open elections - the 
title of his paper " Seven goodmen" comes from people's  idea that all the 
candidates stood on the same platform . Also Paypool ( 1 976:288) . 
1 8 .  The Kaerinj are those living nearest the inhabitants of the Was valley who call 
themselves Omonol . 
1 9. This voting by regions recurs in the accounts of other elections in the Highlands; see 
for example Paypool 1976:289 on the 1 972 Ialibu-Pangia election , Strathern 1 970 
on the 1 968 Mul-Dei election , and Watson 1 965 on the 1 964 Kainantu and South 
Markham elections . 
20. Although , as pointed out , a more splintered pattern would have been possible . 
21 . 1 1 5 men and 201 women, only one of whom did not vote, but tired of waiting and 
left when the rain came. 
22 . There is no indication that older people are more ignorant ; young, middle-aged and 
old members of both sexes gave this reply . 
23 . On electoral education in Papua New Guinea see Bettison 1 965, Jinks 1 967, and 
May 1976. 
24. But there are three or four other people with similar relationships to this settlement 
and none of them supported a Kutubu candidate.  
25 . The recent development of a coffee block on the Kaerinj side of Nipa near Ibne's 
home, while he was in office, has reinforced these beliefs . 
26 . The electorate is like Papua New Guinea in microcosm, with its regional issues (for 
example more economic development for Papua or some of the islands at the 
expense of New Guinea) , and regional interests in everyday life (exemplified by the 
student groups at the University which represent different parts of the country) . 
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Chapter 1 1  
THE LAE OPEN ELECTORATE : 
' YUNION NA PATI - SENIS 
I NO KAMAP ' 
Bob Adams 
Yunion Na Pati-Senis I No Kamap 
"Senis i kam pinis - Pangu i go long haus pek pek" (the time for change 
has arrived , Pangu will be consigned to the lavatory) , shouted Jonathon Saing 
the Modipe1 /United Party candidate and assistants whilst di stributing election 
material at one of the voting centres on the Saturday morning , the first day of 
voting in the Lae Open Election . Walking over to the truck the wri ter was told 
most emphatically by Saing that ' 'both Sali and Ila are finished - they will be 
out ! " A rapid tour of the voting points during the morning told a di fferent 
story, · a story that repeated in many ways the election five years previously. 
Pangu had by far the best organisation with solid representation at all voting 
points ,  in some cases sole representation , and, despite the initial low turnout , 
strong Pangu support was clearly evident . Pangu ' s ,  with a base built up since 
the late 1 960' s and with strong trade union support , was the dominant political 
organisation in the electorate . Change did not appear imminent . 
Candidates 
Though faces and times had changed , the pattern was very much that of 1972. 
Ila, the incumbent member was the major constant , challenged by new faces 
but facing essentially the same opposition forces as in 1 972. Candidates 
contesting the Lae Open comprised Jonathon Saing, Modipe activist and 
United Party (UP) candidate, Katham Newton , Peoples Progress Party 
(PPP), Wagan Village; Paul Biro , ' Independent' ,  Lae City ; and sitting 
member Toni Ila, Pangu candidate . 
Jonathon Saing, sel f proclaimed ouster of Pangu was one of the two Ahi 
peri-urban village candidates , both this time coming from Wagan . Thirty three 
years of age Saing completed an apprenticeship and served for five years with 
the Defence Force as a keyboard operator . After two years as a salesman and a 
period with the Department of Civil Aviation he returned to Lae in 1975 to 
become a Modipe activist and in August 1 976 president of the Lae United 
Party Branch . In the period 1975-77 he quickly gained regular press coverage 
with extravagant statements and bitter attacks upon Pangu , Sali and Ila, 
particularly the latter . Whilst his emotional and aggressive personality led to 
rather intemperate behaviour at times , he provided a major element of 
dynamism and interest to the elect ion . Simi lari t ies may be drawn between h i s  
role and approach and that of Stephen Ahi , Ila 's  most active opponent during 
the 1 972 election. Stephen Ahi had in fact intended to stand again for the Lae 
seat and considerable animosity was in consequence engendered between the 
two Ahi vil lages2 • However Stephen was persuaded to contest the regional seat 
and differences were papered over . 
Katham Kauc Newton from Wagan provided a further Ahi Vi llage candidate 
and if the 1 972 metaphor is maintained, there is a correspondence with the 
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other former Butibam candidates, Eki Vaki and Luther Karo Ahi particularly 
the former . Thirty seven years old , sixteen years with the Education 
Department as a teacher, Katham Newton represented a more orderly, petty 
bourgeois opposition , and appropriately represented the Peoples Progress 
Party. He had returned to Lae on Jong service leave at the beginning of 1 977 
nurturing an active interest in politics , having previously been elected to the 
Madang Council with PPP support and was subsequently chosen as Madang 
Council Vice President . He is a quietly spoken , sincere , self-effacing man and 
though handicapped by long absences from Lae he appeared to have gained 
firm ·support from within the Ahi Villages . His nomination was encouraged, 
he claims , by village big men opposed to Saing' s candidacy. Such support 
however would have arisen as much from antipathy toward Saing as a 
consequence of indiscretions by that individual and his aggressive, outspoken 
manner , as from any firm conviction that Newton represented a completely 
credible and powerful opponent for Ila. 
Paul  Biro , a fifty eight year old Hungarian sewing machine mechanic, 
completed the array of fresh candidates standing with the sitting member Toni 
Ila. Biro presented something of political oddity, complete with east European 
derived political preoccupations . Servicing and selling sewing machines largely 
to a Papua New Guinean market he lives somewhat on the fringe of the Lae 
expatriate community yet apart from business transactions has no close 
affiliation with any particular segment of the national community . 
Whilst restrained in public pronouncement he exhibited a virulent anti-I la 
posture during the elections and though something of a ' loner ' one suspects 
particular sections of the expatriate business community found his stance and 
convictions a useful conterweight to the· position held by Ila. 
Finally Toni Ila, the sitting member, stood as the endorsed Pangu and Trade 
Union candidate. In 1 972 he was strenuously opposed by expatriate business 
interests , the colonial establishment and representatives of the Ahi village 
landowners . Now in 1 977 he was opposed by representatives from a somewhat 
modified social formation, in keeping with the times, but, in essence, the same 
body of forces .  Born in the Ihu District , Gulf Province, Toni received a 
catholic education first at Yule I sland mission then two years of seminary 
training at Rabaul interrupted by the death of his father . His education was 
resumed at Sogeri High School and a year in Australia during 1 965 , 
encouraged by Justice Prentice , studying Law at Monash University. 
Returning to PNG in 1966 he was recruited in Moresby by Monier Ltd . as a 
trainee manager , though his managerial apprenticeship proved less than fully 
successful .  As a close cousin of Sir Albert Maori Kiki ,  he was much influenced 
by the activities of Kiki in union and Pangu affairs and in consequence 
developed a far greater affinity for the company workers than expatriate 
management and the imperatives of capital . Transfered to Lae at the end of 
1 966 he progressively established himself in Lae union and political affairs , an 
involvement which led to severance of his relationship with Monier in 1 97 1 . A 
move to B . H . P .  - Titan the same year brought similar problems , and early 
termination . Anti-Pangu feeling at this time .. was particularly vehement and 
Toni as an apparent successor to Michael Kaniniba MHA and President of 
Morobe Workers Association drew upon himself the ire of the expatriate 
community. Opposition by the expatriate business sector and colonial admini­
stration at a time of emergent anti-colonial feeling enhanced rather than 
weakened this electoral standing and confirmed I la 's  self chosen, 'worker 
champion ' role. 
2 1 8  Electoral Politics in PNG 
Following his 1 972 election success Toni has established himself as the 
dominant force in the Lae and Morobe Pangu organisation and has been able 
to consolidate his trade union base establishing unquestioned ascendancy over 
the movement in Morobe . In 1 972 he was elected General Secretary of the Lae 
Workers Association (now the Lae Miscellaneous Workers Association) and 
then extended his union involvement beyond Morobe with election in 1 973 as 
President of the Federal Workers Association , the present PNG Trade 
Union Congress . 
Union activities are now centred upon Union House, a modern complex 
comprising bar , offices and meeting hall ,  at Omili on the outskirts of Lae . As 
well as a most active and well publicised industrial relations function , the Ila­
led Lae Miscellaneous Worker ' s  Union provides a wide range of member and 
public services including pre-school education, film nights , housing assistance, 
the services of the clubhouse, general community aid,  worker education, a 
union taxi service and a soon to be completed health clinic at Taraka, a maj or 
Lae low covenant settlement . 
Lae City Council has provided a further power base for Ila. With the 
departure of Voutas and appointment of Boyamo Sali to ministerial rank, he 
has directed and controlled the Pangu organisation which gained control of 
the second council in 1 973 and the current third council .  Toni gained election 
himself in 1 973 after an unsuccessful 197 1  nomination and in 1 974 occupied 
the position of Lord Major,  subsequently resigning this position due to union 
and parliamentary work pressures . The activities of Pangu in Morobe are now 
centred upon Union House and Toni Ila has assumed , to a major degree, the 
mantle of Toni Voutas , the former founder and 'director' of Pangu Morobe. 
Despite non Morobean origins Toni has established,  by dint of hard work,  
conviction and perspicacity, an extremely strong political base with wide 
popular support and recognition of achievement . This achievement has not 
brought significant change in Ila's lifestyle or value system . He has not joined 
the golf club/party set and still retains an overriding commitment to and 
affinity with the union workers and the disadvantaged . Though somewhat 
' radicalised ' by his early experiences and conditioned by his self chosen role 
and the responses of others to this role, he is essentially a pragmatist rather 
than ideologue and whilst a strong nationalist he holds no firm extra-national 
political convictions . Essentially he is a solid union organiser/politician in the 
early Kiki tradition . 
These positive traits and the continued dominance of Pangu in Morobe have 
not won appropriate recognition for Toni from the centre; quite the contrary . 
Toni ' s  less than happy relationship with the post-colonial order helps explain 
something of the nature of the post 1 972 changes and underlying aspects of the 
1 977 election so it is useful to consider this issue a little further . 
The politics of confrontation and subordination which prevailed before 
1 972 have now changed to that of manipulation and accommodation . The 
business community has achieved a workable accommodation with Pangu and 
the Government , and protects its interests and advances its objectives much 
more subtly than previously. Willing compradores and intermed iaries have 
been found , yet an individual such as Ila is seen as a threat by some sections of 
the community. Whilst Toni has developed a pragmatic approach in his 
relations with the business community and is viewed as a positive force by 
some, for others he has exercised too much power and is an obstacle to be 
removed or neutralised . Funds from sections of the Lae Business community 
are sent to Port Moresby with admonitions and advice regarding the activities 
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o f  Ila. Malleable Morobe political figures echo these views and provide 
responsive links to the government in Moresby . 
This antipathy has been reflected by the disdain that successive Provincial 
Commissioners have manifested towards Ila. At the national level he was 
publicly rebuked for supporting the National Pressure Group and being absent 
from the House of Assembly for important votes3 • In 1 976 on the occasion of 
the Lae City Council elections a determined effort was made to engineer I la's  
defeat and thereby undermine his council power-base . In the first instance an 
attempt was made to prevent his automatic re-election in the absence of any 
opposing nomination . A late opposing nomination for his ward was submitted 
but the nominee was found to reside one street outside I la 's  ward . A further 
effort was made by way of protest by Modipe against Ila and against another 
' radical ' John Rodgers4 as not fulfilling the six months residency regulations . 
This move was unsuccessful and following the appointment of the· new 
Council Ila held a closed ' confession' meeting of all the Pangu councillors . 
Under pressure a leading Pangu councillor admitted to having plotted with 
Modipe members to effect Ila' s defeat. 
Further inquiry revealed that this incident went further than personal rivalry 
and stemmed from a conspiracy involving several Lae business and community 
figures and extended to certain individuals in Port Moresby . Additional 
evidence of the anti-Ila pressure can be adduced from the fact that he was one 
of the last Pangu condidates to receive endorsement for the 1 977 election . 
Extraordinarily I la 's  position remained in question until the final stage of 
preselection . The list of preselected Morobe Pangu candidates published prior 
to the March pre-election convention5 most noticeably did not include Ila 's  
name and some doubt was cast upon I la' s position in the initial convention 
debate6 • 
Campaign Background 
Before providing an outline of the formal campaign some further detail is 
given of post 1 972 developments . As emphasised previously considerable 
continuity with the past exists and the election and accompanying campaign 
were but part of an unfolding and continuing process . Rather than a discrete 
event the elections were the culmination of a range of political developments 
since 1 972. Detail has already been provided of some of the efforts to repress 
and control Ila given that individual' s  lack of congruence with the post 
colonial social formation . It is postulated that his leadership of organised 
labour and his alliance with the urban ' lumpen proletariat' and elements of the 
rural ' small peasantry' have prompted this opposition . From this perspective 
attention will now focus upon the Modipe anti-Ila campaign and the 
significance of Modipe's  role before consideration of the more formal 
campaign and election activities . 
Modipe since 1 975 has provided vehement and unremitting opposition to 
Pangu and Ila and, with the return of Jonathon Saing to Lae in that year , the 
personal battle lines were clearly established . Modipe rhetoric espouses 
Morobean political power and control as a necessary vehicle for elimination 
of exploitative foreign domination , and sees Ila as a foreign , that is ,  non­
Morobean, political opportunist and an obstacle to be removed in their efforts 
to establish the new order. Whilst Modipe has unquestionably gained signi­
ficant support from the Morobean 'educated elite' and includes a number of 
idealistic, committed ideologues , cynical observers are inclined to view their 
behaviour primarily as the strivings of an elite strata endeavouring to establish 
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itself in positions of power and status in the post colonial order . In  class terms 
the group may be seen as representative of a post independence bourgeois 
nationalist movement comprised of a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' allied with 
political elites big peasants and national businessmen. The group shelters 
behind a regional ethnicity banner as a means of advancing both personal and 
class interests .  Such a judgement may be premature given the fluidity of 
political relationships and the political values of some of the Modipe activists . 
Toni I la' s position as the 'champion of workers and peasants' is by no means 
unequivocal , he will in fact be exceptional if he resists the pressures of 
incorporation . Pressures to date have been less than subtle, suppressive rather 
than persuasive, but this will not necessarily continue . 
The Modipe/United Party drive for power primarily centred upon 
unremitting efforts to discredit I la/Pangu and to deprive I la of his support 
bases . Loss of support for a discredited and isolated lla/Pangu Party would, 
in the Modipe equation, mean a corresponding gain for Modipe . This 
approach was essentially negative and shortsighted in so far as it inhibited 
efforts that could have been directed towards the development of a more 
positive programme and a strong support base. 
Saing in 1 975 began a series of continuing public attacks upon I la,  trade 
unions and Pangu . In January 1 976 I la was criticised for not looking after his 
constituents and through trade unions , forcing business companies to look 
elsewhere in the establishment of their factories7• This theme was continued by 
Saing in different forms and on different occasions during 1 976 and 1 977 . The 
government was called upon to get rid of unions as they were responsible for 
social disasters in the Morobe Province8 and I la was accused by Saing of 
brainwashing the people with imported union ideologies9 • 
Recognising that I la and Pangu drew much support from their dominance 
of Lae City Council ,  Modipe made a major effort to displace Pangu during the 
April 1 976 Council elections . Despite a solid effort Modipe only gained two 
seats and Pangu was returned with a clear maj ority, securing fifteen of the 
twenty seats. This defeat prompted periodic attacks by Saing on the council 
itself. During November/December 1 976 confrontation with the Council was 
contrived over the Council ' s  nomination of Silas Gawi , a Sepik Council 
member (married to a Morobean and well regarded by Morobeans) to the 
Morobe Area Authority and the continued use by the Council of the Busu 
Road dump, allegedly causing discomfort to nearby Nabak settlers . This was 
followed during December by an allegation that the Council had passed a 
motion to legalise prostitution in Lae and that some councillors may 
themselves have been involved in this activity . These attacks certainly secured 
abundant media coverage but did not improve Saing's  credibility. He was 
forced under threat of Council legal action to unreservedly apologise for his 
prostitution allegations .  
Continuing his  attacks on I la and his  union base , Saing publicly called upon 
I la to account for the expenditure of union fees . It was alleged "that union 
finances were misused, that unions were not looking after members , and such 
was the neglect , the government should set up a dole fund" 10 •  (These public 
attacks were linked with a campaign of denigration based upon I la' s non­
Morobean origins, a Kerema rather than a 'man bilong as pies ' and a person 
only concerned with Union affairs ( 'man bilong yunion tasol ' )  to the detriment 
of the general welfare of the people. 
Whilst these attacks upon I la and Unions were being pursued an attempt 
was made to establish an alternative union , the Bumodipe Stevedoring Union 
Lae 22 1 
(the prefix Bu is used by coastal Yabims to denote water) . Fees were collected 
from 'members' and in return contributors were promised work on the 
wharves . Receipts carried the stamp of the Department of Social Development 
and Home Affairs, a Lae office from whence several Modipe activists 
operated. Saing, when challenged, ,disclaimed any Modipe involvement 1 1 •  
The Saing/Modipe interest i n  trade unions was further developed during 
April '77 on the occasion of the Highlands Highway Drivers Association four 
day strike in protest against lack of police protection for highway drivers. 
Saing threatened that he had one thousand men with trucks to break the strike 
and that he would blow up the striker ' s  checkpoint truck and the nearby 
weighing station if the strikers did not move from the roadside, land he 
claimed that belonged to his family . 
During May and June just prior to the election, the anti-I la attacks were 
taken up by Pangu city councillor Roy Pogat . Echoing Saing's  attacks he 
called upon the government to consider taking some control over trade union 
activities in P .N.G.  'before any unnecessary (and) disastrous strikes occur. 
Trade unionists in Lae, he claimed, had irresponsibility threatened employers 
with repatriation and were " forcing improperly educated members to dig 
deeper into their pockets to benefit only one or two so-called union officials 
who live in luxury , have a car, take pleasure trips and pay their wives wages 
even though the wives do not work" .  He said 'Union members had the right to 
know how their money was being spent and an independent auditor should be 
required to check the union books ' 1 2 •  Pogat ' s  role can be compared with that 
of Brian Bogagu five years previously when that former Pangu member 
performed a similar function publicly attacking I la and waging a campaign 
against him1 3 •  
The Campaign 
The period of  formal campaigning proved somewhat anti-climactic following 
upon the extended period of manoeuvring, confrontation and media attacks. 
Toni Ila personally campaigned actively only in the final few weeks before the 
commencement of voting. He did have, however, the benefit of a strong well 
established support system and very early had developed a well organised 
election programme. Immediately following the opening of nominations 
Pangu 'Komiti ' working with their respective ethnic groups collected several 
thousand signatures from supporters who indicated their intention to vote for 
I la and Pangu. The Trade union structure was similarly activated with regular 
lunch time meetings at factories and other workplaces , with some forty union 
shop delegates working actively to organise support . Ila handbills, badges and 
posters small and large were widely distributed throughout Lae well before 
election day to achieve maximum impact . Two styles of poster were used, one 
stressmg his union affiliation (' 'wokas yunion bos , vot yunion Iida long 
sapotim yu") ,  the other as 'Pangu Man' stressing his Pangu endorsement . 
I n  the final few weeks of personal campaigning Ila was able to visit all the 
major settlements, compounds and workplaces normally receiving a 
favourable response at all meetings and contacts . No single issue or appeal was 
advanced but I la was able to refer to a wide range of achievements secured 
over the five year period since 1 972 and he attempted to give greater emphasis 
to issues and appeals with special relevance to the particular audience. 
Meetings generally were of an informal nature, and usually organised by the 
resident councillor, union delegates or Pangu 'komiti ' s .  Following the pattern 
established in 1 972, one or more leading Pangu figures would introduce I la 
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and speak with him in support of his candidacy. Movie films were shown in the 
settlements on some of these occasions and a low key approach adopted . 
According to the audience, and th€ concerns expressed or questions raised , Ila 
discussed the achievements of the Pangu Government commonly using the 
analogy of a growing tree and its increasing capacity of bear fruit . He stressed 
the help given to unions and workers , particularly in dispute settlement and 
minimum wage increases ; Pangu' s  successful resistance to head tax;  support 
for migrant settlers ; the achievements of the Pangu City Council ; the services 
provided by the Omili Union Club; the establishment of the Taraka Clinic; the 
operation of the Union Taxi Service; and the planned share distribution to 
members . 
As a counter to criticisms raised by Saing/Modipe and Pogat , care was 
taken to explain the disbursement of union fees and I la' s personal financial 
situation, emphasising his limited personal assets,  the status of his bank 
account and the fact that no salary was paid to him by the Union . Questioners 
at meetings generally raised some of the criticisms levelled at I la and Pangu by 
Modipe and other critics , most commonly the ' lost' K43 million, but 
reassurance was given and concerns answered to the apparent sati sfaction of 
the audience . Buko settlers expressed some concern over possible expulsion 
from Butibam land if Saing was to be elected and expressed fear of Stephen 
Ahi who had threatened them on a number of occasions .  
Jonathon Saing whilst having the advantage of a two and a half year run up 
to the election failed to develop a substantial power base and though able to 
secure pockets of voter support he was not able to gain solid support in any of 
the major settlements or population groupings . As outlined previously he 
relied upon a campaign of denigration and attack , adopting a strategy that 
sought the erosion of Ila 's  support by manoeuvre and attack . The standard 
United Party appeals were used, particularly those emphasising the time for 
change . Primary emphasis was given to media publicity and attack upon 
alleged Pangu/Ila shortcomings , attacks that were given extraordinarily wide 
media exposure . Apart from combined United Party meetings no major 
meetings were held by Saing during the campaign and , as with Newton, a 
number of the Pangu dominated settlements were virtually closed to him. As 
President of the United Party in Morobe Saing was actively involved in the 
organisation of the campaigning for other United Party candidates and much 
energy was expended in this area. However one doubts whether devotion of 
greater energy to the Lae campaign would have noticeably altered the result . 
Where Saing was loud and brash , fellow peri-urban villager Katham 
Newton was quite restrained in his campaigning though the difference in 
style was in no way reflected in levels of voter support . Newton spoke at a 
number of village church meetings, two small meetings at Buko, the small 
Omili migrant settlement plus a small meeting at the Papuan Compound and 
Administration Transport Pool . He was well received at the large Boundary 
Road/Bundi Settlement holding three meetings in this area discussing his 
candidacy and local settlement problems . Along with Saing he was 
discouraged from holding meetings in some of the major settlements, all 
Pangu strongholds . 
Newton patiently explained PPP policy in his meetings , emphasising past 
achievements as a Pangu coalition partner and the need for this good work to 
be continued after independence . Emphasis was given to the need to elect a 
capable representative for the new parliament and in this context he outlined 
his personal history, education, employment and political experience . His 
emphasis upon his local origins ("man long as pies tru ") struck a sympathetic 
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chord with some Boundary Road settlers (government land) though this was 
not a viable ploy in other areas where settlers had been threatened and 
harassed by members by the Ahi Association . Generally his sincerity and quiet 
approach favourably impressed but apart from Boundary Road he never really 
penetrated the major settlements and lacked a power base of any significance. 
His Boundary Road impact was later nullified by the Ila compaign meetings . 
With little media exposure and having limited time to establish himself he was 
forced to rely upon the village vote, an inadequate base to challenge such a 
strongly entrenched opponent as Ila.  , 
Paul Biro brought variety to the pre-election campaign period with 
sandwich board displays in the main shopping area, personalised press 
advertisements, a large car-top 'vote Biro' display sign , small policy booklets 
distributed through commercial outlets and public protest against "unfair" 
Pangu campaigning. Pangu people were accused of covering up his election 
posters and contriving through their control of Lae City Council to prohibit a 
proposed aerial leaflet drop over Lae. A major theme in his campaign appeals 
was his independent status,  his desire to serve the people of Lae and the need 
for clean, honest politics. Giving primary emphasis to western style media 
communication rather than personal contact , he was not able to gain foothold 
with any significant community group but depended upon individual support 
secured through media communication . Following the completion of voting , 
he publicly complained of a variety of alleged (Pangu) malpractices . 
The Electoral Response 
Saturday 1 8th June, the first polling day and generally the major voting day, 
proved to be very wet with continuous heavy rain .  Voter turnout in 
consequence was very low, a factor which would appear to have reduced some 
of the advantage held by the much better organised Pangu team . Pangu 
organisation easily eclipsed that of rival teams with five or six people at many 
voting points ,  large Pangu signs and a solid supply of how to vote papers. In 
some cases only Pangu personnel were present at some of the major polling 
centres . The UP /Modipe organisation picked up as the day progressed and a 
United Party truck , complete with loud hailer , toured the settlements and 
voting centres attempting to drum up support . However anything UP did ,  
Pangu did bigger and better . Two Pangu trucks were in service, one 
continuously operating throughout each of the voting days collecting voters 
and broadcasting the Pangu election song and appeals to supporters .  Katham 
Newton was only able to staff several voting points and Biro aides were not 
visible during the poll,  but Biro himself made good use of a loudspeaker 
outside the electoral office booth during the final polling days . 
Voting continued through Monday 20th June to Wednesday 22nd June, the 
Wednesday an additional day to compensate for the wet Saturday . Weekday 
polling saw much better weather and a larger turnout . Six polling centres 
operated on the Monday and Tuesday and on Wednesday the extra day voting 
was restricted to the electoral office centre . The final hours on Wednesday at 
the Electoral Office saw a climax of frenetic activity with candidates and their 
supporters haranguing voters through loud hailers and amplifier systems. 
United Party loudly and continuously recited the full catalogue of Pangu 
failings and misdemeanours , Paul Biro preached the virtues of clean, honest 
government and personal behaviour in a flat , nasal monotone and Pangu , the 
principal target of these criticisms, sought vainly to respond with a recitation 
of Pangu achievements . 
A total of 1 1 , 3 1 6  votes were cast over the four day voting period, an increase 
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on the 1 972 count (8 ,97 1 ) ,  but not a particularly high turnout , somewhat less 
than h alf the voting population . 
The common roll book held 1 5  ,983 registered names but of the 1 1 ,3 1 6 votes 
counted 8, 759 were Section votes compared to the recorded 2,585 ordinary 
votes . This extraordinarily high percentage of Section votes which makes 
accurate voter turnout comparisons extremely difficult must be explained in 
terms of the mobility of a maj or element of the population and the failure of 
the candidates to secure registration of supporters . 
Toni Ila received 74 1 5  votes , 7 1 .7 percent of the 1 0,335 formal votes ; a clear 
and decisive majority over all other candidates and a clear gain on his 1 972 
vote (57 %  ) . 1 4 Whilst little separated the opposing candidates the resulting 
ranking came as something of a surprise . Paul Biro with 10 .8  percent, whilst 
not seriously challenging Ila, narrowly topped the list of opposing candidates . 
Jonathon Saing followed with 9.5 percent and Katham registered the lowest 
vote with 7 . 8  percent. 
Analysis of the vote count by ballot box shows I la topping the poll at all 
voting points with the exception of the Yanga and Wagang Village ballot box 
where no Pangu team operated and where Newton secured the maj ority of the 
village vote. Ila's majority was lower at the University and Lae Technical 
College . Biro scored best at the University and the electoral office, reflecting 
possible support from the better educated, higher income voters with whom 
his media campaign registered with greater effect . Saing secured propor­
tionately higher votes at the University aided by University Modipe/United 
Party supporters , at Haikoast where some United Party support exists and 
where a Modipe activist is moderately well established, and at the electoral 
office location to which some supporters were 'trucked' and where the highly 
vocal United Party team attracted support during the week day polling . 
Newton performed more ably at Lae Technical College reflecting teacher I 
public servant support , at Busu High , at Boundary Road/Bugandi High where 
he made some impact with his forays into the settlements areas and in his home 
village area at Wagang/Yanga where he gained the maj ority of votes . 
Although the outcome of the election appeared to be beyond question , both 
1 onathon Saing and Paul Biro publicly protested against electoral malpractice 
following the counting of the votes . Saing alleged that Pangu trucked people 
from West Taraka (excluded by the redrawn bounday) and that poll officials 
behaved improperly in their administration of counting of votes . Biro in a Lae 
Nius advertisement alleged that 'voters were forced into trucks ,  improperly 
enrolled on voting day, racial discrimination was unfairly practiced , people 
voted a number of times and voters from outside the Lae Electorate were 
brought in to vote' 1 5 •  The following week Biro placed a similar advertisement in 
the Lae Nius signed by himself, Saing and Newton plus Joe Maliaki a 
candidate from the adjoining Huon Electorate. 
Investigation by the electoral office staff failed to find evidence to 
substantiate these claims . It should be noted here that both Saing and Biro 
were remarkably confident prior to the election . A confidence that would 
appear to have been fueled by a favourable press and limited contact with a 
full cross section of the electorate.  Subsequent failure obviously proved a 
bitter pill to swallow. 
Analysis and conclusion 
Continuing attack upon Ila, Pangu and the union movement with which he 
was associated initially raised doubts about the outcome. Yet , coldly 
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considered , an Ila victory was never in jeopardy . Jonathon Saing, despite a 
vigorous and prolonged campaign against Ila, was never able to present 
himself as a credible alternative. His constant attacks , particularly through the 
media, excited attention but not support . Neither he nor UP /Modipe were 
able to secure a significant bridgehead within this political battleground and 
Pangu/Ila pre-eminence, though dented, was not seriously threatened . Rather 
than using the time available and directing energy and resources towards the 
progressive build-up of personal credibility and solid bases of support , he 
chose media headline, personal attack and extravagant claim . 
Paul Biro appears to have gained some advantage from Saing's  constant 
anti-I la attacks , one presumes on the basis of his citizenship status and his 
pleas for ' honest politics ' and ' fair play' . Though polling far better than 
anticipated he would not be able to find much encouragement from his initial 
foray into PNG. politics . 
Katham Kauo Newton the third challenger provided respectable repre­
sentation for the People 's  Progress Party and, whilst doing nothing to tarnish 
that party' s  bourgeois respectability, failed to attract significant support 
beyond his village base and small pockets of public service support . 
Ila the subject of so much attack was able to meet his challengers with quiet 
confidence derived from a knowledge of solid support progressively developed 
and solidly sustained . He had built upon his 1 972 victory with impressive 
effect . The union base has been expanded and he now heads an impressive 
organisation complete with the modern union building and tax service that has 
been able to provide very tangible industrial gains and welfare services to 
members and the public . The Pangu organisation whilst not the same grass 
roots movement of '72 was still unquestionably the dominant political force in 
Lae and Morobe, and Ila, still the central figure in that organisation , was 
able to use his position to good effect . He was able to maintain his credibility 
and support despite attack , in no small part because of his unquestionable 
achievement and his continued commitment to principle as well as power . He 
has learned much since 1 972, developing strong support structures and 
linkages but his position is not unassailable . He is by no means a charismatic 
figure, he suffers from non-Morobean identity at a time of rising Morobean 
consciousness and he faces some basic contradictions given the divergent 
support groups that he has embraced . 
It is useful now to consider some broader aspects of the election and move 
beyond the personal strengths and failings of the candidates . The brief 
comment upon the ballot box voting pattern revealed across-the-board 
support for Ila and only small and localised support for the opposing 
candidates . The opposition was far from strong and neither horizontal nor 
vertical cleavages within the electorate were sufficiently developed for the 
opposing political forces in 1 977 to seriously challenge the dominance of 
Ila/Pangu . The corollary of this of course is  also that I la/Pangu was still able 
to successfully appeal to all maj or sections of the population . Incipient 
divisions do however exist between worker and unemployed, Morobe and non­
Morobean, rural and urban, 'white collar' public servant and 'blue collar' 
worker and between elite strata and the emergent proletariat/peasantry strata. 
Though candidates were unable to successfully exploit the emergent divisions 
to the disadvantage of Pangu , these differences will increase as consciousness 
of particular economic interests grows . 
The threat to I la may well be compounded by the establishment of the 
Morobe Provincial Government and the capture of critical positions within the 
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Secretariat by Modipe activists .  Much will depend upon the status of Pangu 
and its ability to retain a dominant political position in Morobe . Wide powers 
have been gained by a non-elected interim provincial government and the 
appointed secretariat . One would , on the basis of the 1 977 results , expect 
Pangu to sweep the field if a provincial government election was held but the 
election has been pushed forward to the distant future. Modipe thus would 
appear to have gained by appointment what it could not gain by electoral 
process and I la and Pangu' s  position must be weakened to that extent . 
Finally, what of the background forces that opposed Ila by proxy? As 
previously emphasised these forces represent at least in part , a neocolonial 
form of continuity with those anti-Pangu forces of 1 972. Operating now by 
manoeuvre and manipulation they have attempted through intermediaries to 
defeat and limit the power of Ila and the groups with which he is allied . 
Modipe in this context has willingly allowed itself to occupy a proxy role to 
serve interests it saw as coincident with its own . Though Samana, the leading 
Modipe activist (and later to become Premier of Morobe) is able to articulate a 
critique of Morobe 'development' and argue a radical alternative , it is di fficult 
to sustain a high level of optimism for positive change given the milieu of 
opportunism, personal animosity, proto class conflict and administrative 
decay. 
NOTES 
1 .  Modipe - Morobe District Peoples Association .  
This association was established in  1973 by members of the Ahi Association and a 
small number of the young emergent Morobe elite, anxious to secure a place in the 
Moro be political order . Following settlement of differences with Pangu the 
Association was publicly disbanded in September 1974 but was reactivated in 1975 
by student activists . It has subsequently become the principal vehicle for Morobe 
activists opposed to Pangu influence . The group allied itself to the United Party in 
1976 preparatory to the National elections . See Adams R. "Town & Village: The 
Ahi Response" ,  pp21 -26, mimeo 1 975 . 
2. Stephen Ahi is from Butibam Village, one of the closely related peri-urban villages, 
formally tied together under the aegis of the Ahi Association . 
3. Post Courier, Lae Extra p5, 10/6/78. The Lord Mayor T. Pohai indicated that 
Pangu Executives had written to Lae Councillors . 
4. John Rodgers featured in another incident , October 1976 when it was alleged in 
Council that arrangements were made by a senior councillor and senior government 
officer for Rodgers to be transferred out of Lae to a lowly position in the Sepik .  
5 .  Post Courier 1 1 13/77, p3 . 
6. Toni Ila has more recently been given the Labour ministry following the Leadership 
Code debate and the subsequent Pangu - PPP fallout . This promotion was one of 
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8 .  Post Courier 24/ 1 /77 p4, 2 1 / 1 /77 p3 . 
9. Lae Nius 20/5/77 p l . 
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1976. 
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Chapter 1 2  
THE ELECTIONS IN FINSCHHAFEN 
AND KABWUM 
Don Townsend and Metone Wamma 
Democratic elections are ideally an act of free choice, in the sense that freedom 
means an absence of coercion. But if we adopt the wider meaning of freedom, 
as an absence of constraints,  then the choice was not free for the majority of 
rural electors . The first constraint was in the lack of information about 
elections, electorates, government, political parties and candidates ; and the 
second was in the system of primordial ties and obligations . 
Village people understood that the elections were a contest for power , but in 
many cases misunderstood the rules of the primary contest (elections) and the 
subsequent contest (forming a government) . They were cynical of promises , 
but understood that the electoral process required them to " suspend their 
disbelief" . The majority of the rural people could exercise their discretion on 
people , not policies ; on transmitted reputation, not promises ; and on 
parochial issues , not ideology. 
During the campaign , we felt that the kinds of political analysis and 
comment being publicised in the towns, and perhaps reflecting the strategies of 
the political parties , were largely irrelevant to the decisions being made by the 
majority of the rural people. So our research concentrated on ( 1 )  the kinds of 
information village people had about politics , elections , parties and 
candidates; (2) the facts ,  opinions or impressions which the village people used 
in their decision-making for the elections. 
General Conditions of the Electorates 
The two districts of Finschhafen and Kabwum occupy the Huon Peninsula and 
the Siassi islands group (Figure 1 ) .  The registered population is about 95 OOO , 
of whom about 75 OOO (78%) are resident in their electorates . There are twelve 
distinct language groups in the region, and seven of the fourteen census 
divisions are formed by clearly demarcated and isolated interior valleys . The 
barriers of the Saruwaged, Cromwell and Rawlinson Ranges and their 
extensions , impede internal travel and preserve parochialism . Only along a 
thin coastal belt , with 20% of the registered population , could travel be 
considered 'easy' . 
For twenty years in the south, and fifteen years in the north, the populations 
of the interior valleys have been trying to build , or to have built for them, road 
access to the coast. They are dependent on ten small airstrips for coffee 
exports,  tradegoods imports and travel to and from Lae. Their cash economy 
is based almost completely on coffee production, with additions in some cases 
of money and goods sent back by town-employed relatives . The coastal people 
earn income from copra, with coffee in the coastal uplands; in the south-east 
corner, cocoa provides an extra source of income. 
The population of the Huon Peninsula has been dominated, in religious and 
some social matters , by the Lutheran Church . The Peninsula provided much 
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To many of the older people , government is  just another introduced system 
which has failed their expectations - in the same category as missions , 
churches , new language, coffee , 'bisnis ' ,  trade stores, cooperatives and 
schools . That these things "work" in towns but not in their villages , is to them 
a matter of context and not of historical advantage. 
c) The political parties 
People in Finschhafen and Kabwum were strongly impressed by the 
promotional and organisational methods of the Pangu founders; and though 
the 'komiti' system has been crumbling over the years , the feeling is still strong 
that this is Pangu territory . Small pockets of awareness and support for United 
Party remain only because of 'big-man' or ' lain' identification . People had 
heard of the Country Party only because of the rather derisive publicity given 
to the former member for Kabwum, Mr.  Singeri . Most had heard of the 
People's Progress Party through the radio coverage given to the work of Mr. 
Julius Chan; through Mr.  Chan's  recent visit to Finschhafen, and through the 
acceptance by Mr. Zibang Zifuyu, a well-known businessman, of PPP­
endorsement. 
Generally, people were favourable to Pangu because "it is a christian party, 
it has brought us undependence, our own flag and currency, and has stopped 
the white man from bossing us around" . People' s desire for peace and 
stability was served by Pangu - they felt that election of a new party would 
disrupt their lives and bring in more changes . 
Many people were puzzled about the formation of other parties , and what 
role they could have in running the country . From village affairs , people 
certainly know about the forming of factions ; but their understanding of 
government on the national scale did not leave space for a continuing, 
organised opposition . Pangu-minded village leaders have used and encouraged 
this feeling of Pangu as the "natural" party to run this country with stability 
and continuity . A typical comment is: "why plant a new garden ·before 
harvesting the produce from the first one? ' '  
The opportunism o f  some candidates and some parties i n  making party­
endorsements discredited the party system. Some people were confused about 
the identification of the word ' 'party' ' with the ephermeral social activity of 
celebrating, dancing and drinking beer . It would be better for organisers to 
emphasise a new term , such as " lain" , which does indicate some system of 
affiliation , discipline and continuity . 
d) The candidates 
In the week following the closure of nominations , many village people still 
did not know the full number and names of candidates . However, by polling 
day, the names at least were known to the vast majority of people. 
Visiting by candidates is the crucial activity in electioneering. The isolated, 
mis-informed or under-informed rural people greatly appreciate the 
opportunity to make a direct , personal estimation of the candidate. Moreover , 
the fact of a visit to their village raises their self-esteem , makes them feel that 
they are included (however temporary it may be) in the national political 
process. Of close secondary importance is hearing names on the radio or seeing 
newspaper pictures of candidates - the people feel that the man has been 
recognised or adopted by the vague wide system from which the people 
themselves have been so excluded . 
In Finschhafen Open electorate, there were seven candidates five of these 
were from the interior Mongi census division, and included three older men 
who have been longtime rivals in local politics . People were generally critical 
of the earl ier labour supply to plantations of the New Guinea Islands and to 
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the goldfields of Wau and Bulolo. The population was also considerably 
disturbed by the activities of the Japanese war . 
So the combination of these earlier experiences with the introduced 
activities , and the failure to develop any social or economic integration beyond 
a stagnant dependency on coffee, has led to a high degree of migration 
from the Peninsula during the last 25 years . Over 80% of the men aged 25 
years or more have migrated at some stage . Currently, 41 OJo of the adult ( 1 8  
years plus) men and 12% o f  the adult women are absent ; i n  some census 
divisions,  the figures reach 5 1  OJo and 26% respectively . In recent years, the 
male rate has been stabilising, while the female rate has been accelerating, an 
indication of the more acceptable family-living conditions in towns and of the 
abandonment of the rural struggle for achieving " a  better life" . 
One of the results of this high and persistent migration is the lack of social , 
economic and political vitality in the rural villages . Leadership, awareness of 
the wider world and political motivation are not strong - social order and 
direction have come mainly from the Mission organisation . The rural 
population is dominated numerically and socially by older men and by women, 
most of whom have an understandable preference for continuity and stability, 
and an ignorance - even a deliberate ignorance - of the relatively recent and 
apparently complicated national political systems . 
The records of previous political representatives have not encouraged their 
faith or optimism in these systems.  The political and social li fe of the national 
system has overwhelmed, destroyed or distracted three representatives from 
Kabwum Open and two from Finschhafen Open. The people are ambivalent in 
their feelings towards Mr. Boyamo Sali , a resident of Finschhafen and the re­
elected member for Morobe Regional - they derive some satisfaction from his 
status and performance as a minister , but feel that they have been neglected in 
favour of his occupational and social activities at Port Moresby and Lae. 
All these things - the natural environment , the isolation , the out­
migration, the degeneration of rural populations, and the experience of earlier 
representatives - led to a low degree of interest in the election campaign . The 
supply and content of information during the campaign did little to raise 
interest - a conclusion we reached in our own travels through the electorates, 
and since borne out by the low turn-out of voters in most areas . 
Popular Impressions and Ideas 
We shall present in this section some of the impressions and ideas which the 
people expressed during the campaign . Later, we shall look at some measures 
of awareness and information, and then go on to a brief analysis of the results . 
a) Elections. 
The people, in a sample of villages chosen to cover the main physiographic 
divisions of the electorates , were asked about the purpose of elections and 
especially of these elections .  Their responses ranged from excitement to 
negativism . Higher radio-ownership, and recent contacts with town (residents' 
visits to Lae, or migrants' visits back home) were the main factors in the 
positive responses . Some people were excited about the opportunity to remove 
the previous member who had been a positive disgrace or a regrettable 
"passenger" ; some people were genuinely curious ,  in an objective way, about 
the survival of Pangu . 
Those who were indifferent said that elections are "part of our obligations 
to the government . We are not voting in the hope of having someone to fight 
for us;  but because the government said we should vote, and because everyone 
else is voting too' ' .  There have been many movements towards fragmentation 
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of the ' lain' villages encouraged many years ago by the missionaries and the 
administrators - a physical expression of the people' s view of their position in 
the world. These people go about their lives with little concern for national 
affairs, elections or politics - "em i samting bilong ol taun man tasol" .  A few 
villages have boycotted council elections because of dissatisfaction with the 
Councils' work ; and their disappointment over the performance of previous 
national members leads many people to treat all elections as a waste of time 
and energy. 
A minority of people expressed their resentment over elections - that is , the 
results of past elections have discredited the whole system. This may seem to 
outsiders a narrow view but these people believe that if  something (a system) is 
good, then the good will rebound to their advantage . But they feel that past 
members have used the people to gain a personal and private advantage only; 
and , being excluded from the advantage , they despise the system that allows it , 
for example, a synthesis of common anger goes like this :  
"They made us  stand in  the hot sun or  heavy rain,  with our babies on  our backs , to  
give them votes . They told us  that our votes would give us  roads to  the  coasts. 
Nothing has changed , for us specifically, in the five years , so we do not want to stand 
out there again like stupid cattle. We elect men who give nothing but promises . 
Elections force these men to make promises - we are sick of promises and the 
elections that bring them. We are not going to take part , and make ourselves stupid 
again " .  
I n  Kabwum, the fai lure of three previous members damaged the self esteem 
of many people. ' 'Three times we have sent our most popular men to Port 
Moresby, and three times they have been ruined . Does this mean that Kabwum 
people are not good enough for this national election system . We will try once 
more, and if this next man is ruined, we will withdraw from that system".  
b)  The government system 
Very few village people knew that the Government was in fact a coalition of 
Pangu and PPP - most people thought that Pangu was on its own . 
Many people imagine the government to be a paternal figure or institution 
that listens to the requests of all the elected members . The " game" is that 
elected memebers ingratiate themselves with the paternal figure to gain favours 
for the electorates . This misunderstanding was obviously an important factor 
in the chances of United Party candidates - if people felt that non-Pangu or 
non-PPP members had an equal chance in the "game" of obtaining favours , 
then they were less reluctant to vote for a minority-party candidate. 
Few people understood the system of parliament or ministerial government 
- the closest experience they have had of elected systems (the Councils) do not 
have fixed affiliations or delegation of responsibilities . Many could not 
understand the role of an opposition once the elections had been formally 
decided . 
One exercise of government , in the form of education services , added to 
their confusion about the total system. Most rural people are expecting their 
children in school to learn modern skills , but they see the promotion of 
traditional cultural activities in the schools . They cannot see the relevance or 
utility of these activities in the modern way of life.  There is a contradiction 
between what they ultimately expect from government , and what the 
government is providing in its most conspicuous rural service . Many feel that 
government , and political independence, belongs to the towns - and this 
influences their interest and participation in elections . 
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of the candidature of Mr. Meck Singailiongi (MHA in 1 968) and Mr. Simonge 
Kangiong (former president of the Morobe Area Authority) - people felt that 
they were just contesting with each other , and adding confusion to the 
election. Mr. Waliong Bugau's  candidature was also seen as adding confusion , 
though people recognised that Pangu, by supporting him yet again, was 
rewarding his long service as their "komiti" . Mr. Inus Lelenga was well 
knc wn in the interior for his work as the clerk at Pindiu patrol post. Mr.  
Bolang Zuraina was known in only a small area of the interior - he had been 
absent for about 17 years , and was for a long time the council president at 
Kainantu in the Eastern Highlands . 
It was clear to the people of the interior that their votes would be 
fragmented , and that one of the coastal candidates would win . The young 
educated Mr.  Henu Hesingut , an executive officer with the Finschhafen 
Council ,  had the task of overcoming the popular reputation of Mr. Zibang 
Zifuyu Zurenuoc , a local businessman, president of a local development 
association, member of the board of the Development Bank and member of 
the family of the Bishop of the Lutheran Church . Henu had another 
formidable problem of overcoming the conservatism of the people and their 
prejudice against younger representatives . People were flattered and impressed 
by the intensive programme of walking and visiting undertaken by Henu, 
especially compared to Zibang' s  method of sending spokesmen around to only 
the central villages . 
Tewae-Siassi was a new electorate, taking in the Siassi group of islands and 
the coastal division of the former Kabwum Open electorate, as for west as the 
Madang border. None of the seven candidates had a reputation that reached 
across more than two of the four census divisions .  Four of the men were trying 
to use their " name" as councillor to step up to the national level ; one was a 
former district officer , another a teacher in Port Moresby, and another had 
local significance from long experience at the Sialum health centre . None of 
the candidates visited all the areas of the electorate, and many of the people,  in 
the week before the election, did not know the names of  al l  the candidates , nor 
have clear information about their experience or reputation . Some of the 
people of Kalolo census division were not aware of the fact that they had been 
separated from Kabwum Open electorate. 
Mr.  Jonah Kuso nominated for the Kabwum Open, and found himself cut 
off from his home base in Kalolo . Another Kabwum candidate , Mr.  Fosing 
Mulu was also weakened by the division , since he had marriage ties within 
Kalolo. He was one of four candidates campaigning with a tarnished 
reputation - the others were Mr. Franzing Anzawaing, former council 
president and recently associated with a " haus-moni" in his home village; Mr.  
Buaki Singeri,  who had had a discreditable career as an MP; and Mr.  Buori 
Eun ,  a teacher from Madang. In the cases of Buori and Fosing, there was 
strong rumours but no proof of various malpractices . The electoral law 
provides protection for candidates against such rumour, but no formal 
complaints were made to the Returning Officer . 
The two strongest candidates were Mr. Tani Kungo, a long-time Pangu man 
and dominant in the populous Timbe census division; and Mr. Linzon 
Banban, a council executive officer with an impressive personality and useful 
experience, but campaigning under the disadvantage (in this conservative 
electorate) of his youth . 
Most of the people did not know the names of all the candidates , even in the 
week before the election. I mpressions of the candidates' were based on 
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rumours and clan affiliations .  Many people in Komba census division 
expressed the intention of voting for a well-known businessman, unaware of 
the fact that he had failed to nominate. Only Tani and Linzon travelled widely 
in the electorate. The printed advertisements for Jonah Kuso arrived the day 
before polling started . 
In  the Moro be Regional electorate , the name and experience of Mr.  Boyamo 
Sali was well known. Only in the last week did a significant minority of the 
people have anything to say about Mr. Utula Samana. Mr. Stephen Ahi was 
known by a minority in a negative way - as one of the Lae landowners who 
had made life insecure for the town squatters , many of whom come from the 
Huon Peninsula. Mr. Wosi Mangwuka was known in small pockets of the 
Huon Peninsula because of his organising work with a widespread business 
association . 
Generally, the kind of comment on the candidates - where they were 
actually known was simple, local and personal . On the positive side were 
comments like -
- he does not drink beer 
- he is coming back to his home area to help us 
- he has come and sat down to talk with us 
- he has strong family connections 
- he can speak out strongly 
And on the negative side 
- he was one of those cargo cult men 
- he is a businessman, and cannot give time to public affaris 
- he has stayed away too long from the place 
- he is only a bush-man 
- he could not account for the management of money in his other 
activities 
There was a persistent naive belief amongst the people that improvement in 
their lives would come if they could just put the "right" man into the political 
system . Yet there were many contradictions in their minds - between stability 
and change, age-status and youth, local ties and wider experience, need for yet 
suspicion of a clear mandate to any candidate . The one reliable constant in the 
people' s minds was kin ties - only a sustained programme of exposure and 
information could have resolved the contradictions in favour of a particular 
candidate. 
Measures of A wareness and Opinion 
The previous, long section has reported on the kinds of impressions and 
opinions the people have expressed about the system and the candidates . In 
this section , we provide some systematic and objective data in people' s  
awareness and knowledge . 
Ten questions were asked of representative groups of people in twenty 
vil lages throughout the Peninsula, during the two weeks after nominations 
closed . Some villages had been visited by candidates , some were the home 
places of candidates . At the end of the campaign,  people would have received 
more information, such that the scores of awareness would be generally 
higher , and their range narrower . 
What the map shows (Figure 2) is the very uneven information field at a 
particular time, based on questions concerning candidates ' names , origins,  
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past experience , party affiliation, and on questions concerning the national 
party affiliation , and on questions concerning the national party system and 
the national parliament .  Generally,  we can see that the most populous regions 
(interior Kabwum and interior Finschhaf en) had the lowest degrees of 
information or awareness - there are also the areas with the greatest popular 
disaffection towards the election system. The two conditions (lack of 
information and disaffection) reinforce each other . 
A second measure of opinion was taken from eleven candidates who 
responded to our questionnaire . In one of the questions , we asked them to 
comment on the qualities (of other candidates) which they thought would 
influence public opinion . The order of importance is set out in Table 1 ,  as a 
frequency of mention , up to a maximum of ten . 
Table 1: Ranking of characteristics considered to be important to a 
candidates' suitability 
1 0  Previous public work ; effective speaker 
9 Political experience; well-known locally; projecting good ideas 
8 Formal education; church work or affiliation 
7 Council experience; important local man 
6 Important family connection ; an effective campaign 
5 Business experience; political party support 
Many of these characteristics are of course inter-connected and inter­
dependent. It is  interesting, however, that campaigning , business experience 
and party support rank so low on this scale; on the other hand, there is strong 
faith in effective speaking and an accumulated reputation . 
Brief A nalysis of the Results 
In this section we will relate our observations about people' s awareness and 
opinions to the results . 
a) Kabwum Open 
Only 44% of the enrolled population actually voted . But the Kabwum rolls 
were not property up-dated; as if we allow for the migrants included in the 
rolls , then the proportion of actual residents who voted was around 60% (75 % 
of men, 5 5 %  of women) . 
Tani Kungo took almost all the votes from his home census division of 
Timbe , received virtually nothing from Komba, census division . Linzon 
Banban got nothing in Timbe, but was well ahead in the remote west of the 
electorate, and got half the votes in Komba. The votes from eastern Komba, 
which would have given the seat to Linzon , were surprisingly gathered in to 
Buaki Singeri - mainly because of his appeal to the basic kin ties , and to his 
strong words on the issue of timber rights in the easterly section of the 
Cromwell Ranges . Three villages , which recently had a serious fight with 
police and government officers, resulting in the imprisonment of 1 60 men for 
terms up to six months, gave their votes exclusively to the maverick Buaki 
Singeri . 
Selepet was the crucial census division in the election - they had no local 
candidate, and are bitterly anti-Council . Their fierce pre-occupation is about a 
road link to the coast. Linzon took the western half of Selepet , mainly because 
of good campaigning and use of his mother' s  kin ties . Tani took a clear margin 
in central and east Selepet , around Kabwum station, the margin which gave 
him the electorate. The recent visit to the station by Mr.  Michael Somare, and 
Table 1 
Election Results in Finschhaf en, Kabwum and Tewae-siassi Open Electorates 
Kabwum Open 
Jonah Kuso 232 
Bouri Eun 550 
Fosing Mulu 86 
Tani Kungo 2939 (elected) 
Franzing Anzawaung 450 
Buaki Singeri 1 2 1 7  
Linzon Ban Ban 25 1 7  
Finschaf en Open 
Zibang Sifuyu Zurenuoc 37 10 
(elected) 
Waliong Mias Bugau 1 1 39 
Simongi Kangiong 214 
Henu Hesingut 309 1  
Inus Lelenga 1 1 96 
Meck Singailiongi 392 
Bolang Zuraina 560 
Tewae-Siassi Open 
Ziroc Kalung 2352 
Aru Aipoke 2160 
Johnny Onjenga 2655 (elected) 
Tarosi Advent Gai 604 
William Abore 450 
Molo Amimong 758 
Albert Bomo 586 '.:!'.l ::s· 
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his promise of immediate financial support for the road, were the deciding 
factors . 
b) Tewae-Siassi Open 
There was a relatively good turn-out of 75 % of the resident adults - mainly 
because the candidates were drawn from the most populous areas of the 
electorate and thereby raised the general level of interest . 
Aru Aipoke took 70% of the Siassi votes , but virtually none from elsewhere . 
Two other Siassi candidates , who had no chance in the whole electorate, took 
away the "home" votes which would have given the election to Aru . 
The long-serving Health Officer Ziroc Kalung out-polled the youthful 
councillor Onzenga 3 :2 in the Dedua-Kalasa areas . But in the north coast 
census division of Kalolo , added in to form the Tewae-Siassi electorate , 
Onzenga easily won the margin (93 1 to Ziroc ' s  1 9) which gave him the election . 
For Onzenga, a greater effort of campaigning, and the association with the 
Pangu - Somare names , paid off amongst the Kalolo people, many of whom 
were confused by the change in electoral boundaries . 
c) Finschhafen Open 
This was regarded as an interesting contest between the well-established 
businessman Zibang, and the young educated council executive officer Henu . 
Both had important family connections , the advantage in this being with 
Zibang, whose brother is Bishop of the influential Lutheran Church. Henu 
had the advantage of Pangu-endorsement , which was expected to improve his 
chances with the interior population . 
The people of the interior (Pindiu area) split their votes amongst five local 
contenders . Inus Lelenga, the clerk at Pindiu patrol post, outvoted Waliong, a 
long-time Pangu organiser . Perhaps it was a mistake for Pangu to endorse 
both Henu and Waliong - however , it seems from the voting in Pindiu area 
that Waliong supporters would have voted for "place" (lnus) and not "party" 
(Henu) . In the end,  it was the remote and conservative population around 
Mindik and the Bulum valley that voted clearly for Zibang (735 to Henu ' s  204) 
and confirmed the margin which Zibang had from the coastal areas . Though 
Henu campaigned energetically in Mindik-Bulum, and Zibang did not , he 
could not overcome Zibang' s  advantages of age , established reputation and 
Church connections . 
An interesting result from the election, which confirms our earlier 
statements about the lack of awareness or interest amongst the more remote 
areas , is shown in the percentage turn-out of voters . Using 1 975 population 
census, the turn-out in the coastal areas was 97% of resident adults , and 70% 
of registered adults ;  whereas it was 61 OJo and 41 OJo in the interior. If  we take 
just the Mindik-Bulum area - the crucial one for Henu and Zibang - the 
turn-out was down to about 50% and 33 OJo .  Clearly, the older population left 
in these areas of out-migration have very little interest in elections, especially 
where there is  no local candidate to motivate them through kin and clan 
connections , as happened on the coast and in Tewae-Siassi . 
Conclusion 
In the situation of low interest and deficient awareness about government , 
elections, candidates and parties, the influence of kin association in voting 
preference remains quite strong . The cynicism and frustration with 
government in general and previous elected representatives further reduces the 
interest of people who do not have a "local man" . A peculiar feature of the 
Finschhafen and Kabwum Districts is the high degree of long-term migration , 
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which leaves a large proportion of the older, conservative and uninterested 
population to "decide" the outcome of elections .  For party strategists ,  the 
only answer is to find candidates who have long associations with the activities 
which touch on the older people' s everyday lives . However brilliant and 
eloquent, a young man will always have trouble in being accepted in these 
areas . Candidates such as Zibang, Ziroc , Aru and Tani did well in voting 
because of their presence in the electorates over long periods in the past . 
Another lesson for party strategists is to identify the crucial areas of 
voting, especially those which lack a " local" candidate - in these electorates, 
they were Mindik-Bulum, Kalolo and Selepet . The first went to Zibang, 
because of age, established reputation and Church connections ; the second to 
Johnny Onzenga, because of better campaigning and the Pangu-Somare 
name; the third to Tani Kungo, because of age and the timely promise by 
Michael Somare of a contribution to the Selepet ' s  main worry of road access 
to the coast . 
None of the successful candidates is "safe" in the long-term . The ageing of 
the perennial disputants in Pindiu could allow the gathering of the voters 
around a "place" man to topple the coastal representative; a different array of 
nominations in Tewae-Siassi could easily swing the maj ority north from 
Johnny Onzenga' s home base of Dedua; failure to deliver a road to the 
frustrated Kabwum's could finally "down" the Pangu name there . Yet the 
way is clear for members who want to retain their seats - to maintain a 
presence in the electorate ,  and to fill the vacuum of disinterest and un­
awareness with regular news of their more favourable activities . 
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Chapter 1 3  
EAST SEPIK : ISSUES , PARTIES 
AND PERSONALITIES 
Kwasi Nyamekye 
Introduction: 
The East Sepik , with an estimated population of 1 77 ,089, covers an area of 
1 6,900 square miles 1 •  The bulk of the people are subsistence farmers , though 
coffee, copra, rice and some kaukau (sweet potato) are grown commercially . 
Like many other provinces in Papua New Guinea, the East Sepik has 
very diverse sub-cultures . In a political system where political party systems 
are weak and local loyalties and obligations are very strong, the diversity of 
sub-cultures can be expected to have significant impact on outcomes . 
Missionary activity in the East Sepik is well entrenched . The catholic 
mission is the most influential , particularly along the coast and the off-shore 
islands . It runs community schools ,  vocational centres ,  high schools and a 
teachers'  college. Because of its diverse activities , the catholic mission has 
potential influence on East Sepik politics . While no evidence was uncovered to 
indicate that the catholic church openly endorsed any candidates in the 1 977 
elections, knowledgeable people of Sepik politics would readily concede that 
no candidate could afford to antagonize the church . 
In terms of transportation , the East Sepik is reasonably well - served by a 
network of roads .  Communication discontinuities however , exist. Wosera -
Gaui electorate is particularly poorly served by roads. In an electoral system 
where familiarity with local political structures and issues play such a decisive 
role, communication discontinuities inevitably affect election results . 
Candidates without clan or extended family ties in the not - so - easily 
accessible areas stand to lose votes . 
A great number of inequalities exist in the East Sepik Province . Wewak , 
Angoram and Maprik electorates are far ahead of the other electorates in 
terms of social services and economic development . This fact was exploited 
with considerable skill in the campaign of John Jaminan for the Yangoru -
Saussia seat . The existence of such inequalities affected campaign promises 
and strategies of many candidates . Opponents of the Somare Government 
hoped to discredit Somare himself and Pangu Pati by such campaign strategy . 
The Electorates 
East Sepik province has seven seats in the National Parliament : one provincial 
seat and six open electorates (Wewak , Angoram, Maprik ,  Yangoru-Saussia, 
Ambunti-Dreikikir , and Wosera-Gaui) . For the 1 977 National Elections, the 
Electoral Commission recommended slight boundary changes to those used 
for the 1 972 elections2 • Ambunti and Dreikikir were combined into one open 
electorate while the islands of Aua and Wuvulu in the Wewak Open were 
transferred to Manus Province . 
This chapter covers the East Sepik Open electorates of Wewak, Angoram, 
and Ambunti-Dreikikir . The seat of Yangoru-Saussia is examined in chapter 
fourteen by Winnett and May, and Woseri-Gaui is omitted from the study 
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Table 1 East Sepik Results 
(Successful candidates in italics; pady affiliation in brackets) 
EA ST SEPIK PRO VINCIAL 
Jimmy Simbago 3870 (50Jo) 
Joseph Ulaipo 6278 (80Jo) 
Michael Som are 69503 (87 OJo) 
(Pangu) 
AMBUNTI-DREIKIKIR OPEN 
Maranganj i Tamsan Jumbundu 504 
(3 .50Jo) 
Kokomo Ulia 766 (5 0Jo) 
Thomas Aworel 1 001  (70Jo) 
Tromble Kabai 2043 ( 140Jo) 
Tubuguman Hary Weldon 2474 
( 1 70Jo) 
Asimboro Ston 5 1 69 (360Jo) 
(Pangu) 
ANGORAM OPEN 
Gordon Kanaba 325 (20Jo) 
Leo Unumba 4 1 3  (2 .60Jo) 
Jae Maika 445 (2 .80Jo) 
Anton Wopmai 1 1 06 (7 0Jo) 
Sarry Wimban 1 667 ( 10.60Jo) 
Teddy Sane 2652 ( 1 70Jo) 
Sebastian Okm 2827 ( 1 80Jo) 
Eichorn William 6 1 98 ( 400Jo) 
(Pangu) 
MAPRIK OPEN 
David Nailes Melep 522 (2 .80Jo) 
Paul Mawi 554 (3 0Jo) 
Wangiwan Kiami 1 22 1  (6 .60Jo) 
Satigia W asandu 1 642 (90Jo) 
Redman Keni Uranoli 1766 (9.60Jo) 
Tobias Kuelik Sakaran 2822 ( 1 50Jo) 
Pita Lus 9820 (400Jo) (Pangu) 
WE WAK OPEN 
Ernest Beata 1 22 ( l OJo) 
Kambegetua Yurapago 1 1 2 ( 1  OJo) 
Herman Waiki 1 40 ( 1 . 3 0Jo) 
William Harwary 403 (3 . 7 OJo) 
Nelson Kaspar Galo 5 1 5  (4 .80Jo) 
John Parinjo Simen 879 (8  OJo) 
Tony Wobar 1 149 ( 10 .70Jo) 
Jim Paichua 1 1 92 ( 1 1 OJo) 
Laura Martin 1 343 ( 12 . 50Jo) 
Herman Beri 1 792 ( 1 6.70Jo) 
A nthony Luke Bais 3067 (28 . 60Jo) 
(Pangu) 
WOSERA -GA U/ OPEN 
Joseph Anganjouan 1 1 8 (0. 8 0Jo) 
Wangi Walimband 140 ( 1  OJo) 
Jambiambo Gamboram 145 ( 1  OJo) 
Numbuk Joseph 553 (40Jo) 
John Akwi 654 (4.70Jo) 
Patrick Kurapaku Kamban 7 1 5  (5 0Jo) 
Bira Mangalai 709 (5 0Jo) 
David Parangala Nungwi 982 (70Jo) 
Abel Kusso Gangiwan 1474 ( 10.60Jo) 
Ambrose Mautyegumbia 2569 
( 1 8 . 5 0Jo) 
John Matik 2790 (200Jo) 
Yambumbe Matias 3049 (220Jo) 
(Pangu) 
YANGOR U-SA USSIA OPEN 
Beibi Yambande 22 (0.20Jo) 
Linus Hepau 52 (0.40Jo) 
Magandimi Laulimbe 62 (0. 5 OJo) 
Kawi Nimiora 391 (3 . 50Jo) 
Narakama Harau 837 (7 .40Jo) 
Mathias Yaliwan 1 52 1  ( 1 3 . 5 0Jo) 
John Wawia 3349 (29.60Jo) 
John Jaminan 3464 (30. 60Jo) 
(United Party) 
Peter Rony 15 88 ( 140Jo) 
because of difficulties in travelling to that part of the province. The Provincial 
seat and Maprik Open are not surveyed for the simple reason that the 
outcomes were never in doubt. (See Table I for all East Sepik results .)  
The Prime Minister, Michael Somare, won the East Sepik Provincial seat 
collecting a massive 87 per cent of the votes cast . With 69,503 of the 79,65 1 
valid votes cast he overwhelmed his two opponents,  Ulaipo and Simbogo, who 
polled 6,278 (80Jo) and 3 , 870 (50Jo) respectively. Somare is immensely popular 
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in his home province . He was always mobbed by people as he toured, and 
school children easily identified him. It is generally assumed that much of the 
recent development projects in the province is attributable to his personal 
influence and this fact was strongly stressed by Pangu official candidates . 
In  spite of the heavy demands of his office, Somare maintains close contact 
with his home province and his visits are well publicized by the Wewak party 
branch organization and provincial administrative officers.  He toured the 
province extensively during the campaign, particularly in the closing stages of 
it , giving support to Pangu-endorsed candidates and defending his record of 
stable and efficient government3 • His opponents were relatively young and less 
well-known outside the provincial capital of Wewak and their extended 
family. For these reasons ,  Somare was expected to win handsomely. What was 
of greater interest was the extent to which this personal popularity would 
affect the outcomes of the Pangu-endorsed candidate. The results seem to 
indicate that with the exception of Angoram electorate , the Prime Minister' s  
personal popularity was just one of the factors affecting the electoral 
outcomes. This is not saying that Somare does not after all enjoy popular 
appeal in East Sepik politics . Rather, the suggestion here is that local factors 
such as candidate popularity, clan ties, and extensive campaigning play greater 
roles in the open electorates . 
Pita Lus also won the Maprik Open seat confortably. An incumbent and 
outspoken member of the Somare Government , Lus is generally popular in his 
electorate because of his record of achievements for the area . He keeps 
regular contact with the voters and has developed a "Lus Development 
Corporation" with substantial village membership . In spite of all these 
advantages , Lus campaigned actively,  di stributing Pangu T-Shirts and small 
items like cigarettes , lollies , chewing gums,  all of which seemed to please 
voters . 
1 .  Wewak Open 
(a) Candidates 
Wewak Open electorate encompasses But-Boiken , Wewak Islands,  Wewak 
local , and Terebu census divisions .  Eleven candidates nominated for the seat : 
Anthony Bais , Laura Martin,  Tony Wobar, John Parinjo Simen, Herman 
Beri , Jim Paichua, Herman Waiki,  Nelson Kaspar Gabo, William Hewary, 
Ernest Beata and Kambegetua Yurapago . 
Tony Bais ,  33 , married with three chi ldren comes from Toanambu on the 
Sepik highway between W ewak and Yangoru . His father had been an 
unsuccessful candidate in the 1 964 and 1 972 elections . Bais contested the 1 973 
Yangoru-Saussia by-election but polled only 454 votes . In the intervening 
period he had become better known in Wewak and throughout the province . 
After his unsuccessful entry into electoral politics , Bais accepted the position 
of principal private secretary to the Chief Minister, Somare . In March 1 974 
he was appointed provincial Commissioner for the East Sepik4 • By profession 
Bais is a social worker , having obtained a B.A.  from the University of Papua 
New Guinea . 
Mrs . Laura Martin, 55 ,  married with three children , is a naturalized citizen . 
She first came to the country in 1 949 and worked as a school teacher . She 
moved to Wewak in 1 952 with her husband, Frank Martin ,  the member for 
Madang-Sepik special electorate in the first House of Assembly in 1 964 . Mrs . 
Martin is a well-known business woman in Wewak and has been active in 
women' s  groups in the area. She is close to the Somare family and would 
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support Somare loyally in Parliament. She stood as an independent candidate 
and received a good wishes call from Somare the night before polling started . 
Tony Wobar, 38,  married with seven children, comes from Koil island off 
the coast at Terebu. Educated to high school form 3 ,  Wobar has been a teacher 
and administrative officer within the Province. He has visited Australia and 
Irian Jaya . He was the representative of the Wewak Islands on the Interim 
Provincial Government . Although Secretary of the East Sepik Pangu Pati 
Branch, he ran as an independent Pangu5 • 
John Parinjo Simen, 37,  comes from the Boiken area of the But-Boiken 
census division . He holds a Public Service High School Certificate from the 
Administrative College and a Diploma of Education . He taught in several 
schools in East and West Sepik provinces until 1 974 when he was appointed a 
Provincial Liaison Officer for the East Sepik . Simen has visit Australia, 
American Samoa and Fij i .  He was an unsuccessful candidate for the Wewak 
seat in the 1 972 elections . Simen contested the 1 977 elections as an independent 
candidate.  
Herman Beri , 38 ,  married with 5 children, comes from Urip village in the 
But-Boiken census division . Educated to standard five, Beri entered local 
government politics in 1 960. Until he resigned to contest the Wewak seat , he 
had been the President of Wewak-But local government council for 12 years . 
Jim Paichua, 35 , married with 3 children comes from Yangiba Village in the 
Tereba census division . He completed form 3 at Lae Technical college and 
worked in the Departments of Native Affairs and Provincial Affairs for 1 5  
years . H e  was later employed a s  Private Secretary to the Minister for 
Corrective Institutions and Liquor Licensing, Mr .  Pita Lus .  A Pangu 
Member, Paichua contested the Wewak seat as an independent candidate. 
Herman Waiki ,  43 , from Meni village, married with seven children has had 
no formal education . He joined the Navy in 1 949 but returned to his village in 
1 959.  He has been working as a driver at the PNG motors in Wewak . Waiki , a 
staunch supporter of the Seven Association , an arm of the Peli Association , 
was endorsed by the Country Party. 
Nelson Kaspar Balo, 37,  married with six children, comes from Parom 
village in the But-Boiken census division . He finished form 4 and took a 
diploma course in radiography.  He was employed as a radiographer by the 
Health Department and has worked in Port Moresby, Goroka, Wewak and 
Kavieng . Before he nominated for the seat , he was the secretary of the East 
Sepik Public Service Association . 
William Hawary, 3 5 ,  comes from Koikin village in Wewak . A local 
businessman, he completed Form 2 at St . Xaviers High School and then went to 
the Papua Medical College from where he obtained his diploma. An activist 
with labour union movement in Wewak, Hawary is a member of the Wewak 
Town Planning Committee and the Interim Provincial Government for the East 
Sepik .  In 1 970, the Australian Labour Party sponsored him to visit Australia 
to study trade unions.  he became the organizer of the National Labour Party 
upon his return . 
Kambegetua Yurapago , 45 , married with seven children , comes from 
Nambatui village in Wewak . Between 1 952-58 ,  he was a soldier with Pacific 
Islands Regiment . He resigned and returned home to start subsistence 
farming . He also owns approximately 400 coconut trees , 500 cocoa trees and 
1 ,000 coffee trees . He contested the election as an independent candidate . 
Ernest Beata, 3 5 ,  is a non-Sepik from Waima village in the Kairuku area of 
the Central Province . He completed Form 3 and joined the Pacific Islands 
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Regiment in 1 96 1 . In 1964, he joined the Electricity Commission . 
(b) Campaigns 
There was a certain uniformity about the campaign for the Wewak Open 
seat . All the candidates talked about issues of local importance, particularly 
more aid posts,  bridges , roads , schools , and promotion of more businesses . All 
promised to be responsive to the needs of the electorates and to keep in close 
touch with them. With the exception of Bais,  Beri and Martin, most of the 
candidates limited their campaign to the areas where they expected to get more 
of their votes . Most of the candidates had their own election leaflets and 
photographs .  These leaflets outlined the policy concerns of the candidates . 
Radio Wewak was used by most of the candidates to reach the voters.  The 
campaign speeches were generally dull,  with candidates trying to avoid 
introducing controversial policies which might alienate voters . The 
campaigning sparked off little public discussion or activity. It was carried out 
in a calm and non-abusive manner . Tony Bais ,  however, had to take out a 
KS0,000 writ against the United Party candidate for Yangoru-Saussia, John 
Jaminan, because of the latter' s  accusation that Bais misappropriated 
Government funds while a Provincial Commissioner . None of the candidates 
recognized the importance of explaining to voters the mechanics of the voting . 
Little wonder that so many voters were confused about the procedures . 
The most important candidates during the campaign were clearly Tony Bais, 
Mrs . Martin and Herman Beri . As was indicated earlier, all three candidates 
were widely known in the electorate . Either because of their official positions, 
for example, Bais and Beri , or business activities , for example, Mrs . Martin, 
all three were capable of reaching important segments of the voters . All three 
were, therefore, expected to campaign actively and to do well . Their names 
were mentioned more often by respondents during interviews . It is not known 
how much each of the three candidates spent, but Bais '  campaign expenditures 
would be over KS,000. 
Bais , the Pangu-sponsored candidate , stressed the achievements of the 
Somare Government . While endorsing Pangu 's  achievements , he was careful 
to stress his own achievements as a Provincial Commissioner. In places , he 
reminded the voters that his candidacy was an example of dedication to the 
interests of the people. He had resigned from an important j ob in order to 
contest the election . In keeping with his stand against expatriate business 
exploitation, Bais '  views on business activities of expatriates was very radical . 
He accused expatriate businessmen of using nationals as mere fronts . He was 
critical of their dominance in the business sector and their habit of expatriating 
large profits . During his term of office, Bais wanted expatriate businessmen to 
accept nationals into their shareholdings . He reserved tourist bus operations 
for nationals . Thus his critical stand on these issues during the campaign was 
not an election ploy but was in keeping with his economic philosophy. On the 
issue of drunkenness , Bais advocated unrestricted drinking as the only way to 
stop black-marketing . Interestingly, it was largely Bais'  critical attitudes 
towards expatriate businesses which led Mrs .  Martin to nominate for the seat . 
Bais '  campaign was well-organized . He toured the electorate extensively. As 
well,  he used Radio Wewak more extensively than any other candidate. His 
campaign posters were widely distributed . Mr. Somare also campaigned with 
him at several stages of the campaign . In addition to direct appeals to the 
voters, Bais sought the support of councils and councillors . Relying on 
Councils and Councillors to relay one's  message to the voters is an important 
aspect of electoral politics in Papua New Guinea. Councillors were invited 
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home by Bais to discuss issues and campaign strategies . Undoubtedly, his 
strong bid for the support of councillors was partly a response to the candidacy 
of Herman Beri , the President of Wewak-But Local Government Council . In 
order to reduce Beri ' s  advantages as Council president , Bais  needed influential 
councillors to commit their followers to his candidacy . 
Mrs . Martin' s  campaign was also extensive . She travelled widely and her 
campaign posters could be found in several villages and Wewak town. Unlike 
Bais ,  Mrs . Martin had no campaign organization . She contested the election 
largely from a sense of rage about Tony Bais' attacks on expatriate business 
activities . She strongly believed that she and other expatriate businessmen and 
women had made important contributions to Wewak and the province at 
large . Evidently she did not want Bais to win the Wewak seat . 
Campaigning on the slogan "vote Laura Martin for Action" she made 
drunkenness and female participation in policy-making her major concerns. 
Mrs.  Martin 's  tough stand on drunkenness was initially supported by tht? 
Wewak-But Local Government Council .  By the middle of the campaign the 
Council had, however , withdrawn its support for strict drinking laws and 
adopted Bais'  advocacy of 24-hour drinking as the only sensible way to stop 
black marketing. How much of this withdrawal of support is attibutable to the 
behind-the-scenes lobbying to Tony Bais is difficult to determine . One 
suspects, though ,  that Bais might have had a hand in it . After all ,  he was also 
wooing the Councillors . Mrs . Martin ' s  racial background could easily be 
played upon in order to discredit her view on drunkenness . In fact , John 
Jaminan and Joseph Ulaipo alluded to her racial background during the 
campaign . 
Mrs . Martin deliberately injected the issue of female participation in politics 
into the campaign and hoped to capture the female vote through this strategy . 
She visited and spoke to several women ' s  groups . She appeared to have been 
promised support by these groups . Judged by the heavy turn-out of female 
voters , had the promise of support materialized , the outcome of the elections 
would have been much closer. As it turned out, Mrs. Martin's  expectations 
were not met . On election day, many women turned up at voting booths in 
Pangu T-shirts . Admittedly, wearing a Pangu T-Shirt does not necessarily 
imply an intention to vote for that Party but in a largely illiterate electorate 
such symbolic identification opens up opportunities for pressures by Pangu 
scrutineers . It is entirely possible, too, that women voters had been pressured 
by their husbands to vote for their favoured candidates . 
Herman Beri , the former President of Wewak-But Local Council ,  and 
endorsed by the People' s  Progress Party (PPP) also ran a reasonably 
impressive campaign . He travelled extensively in the electorate. Like Tony 
Bais ,  he emphasized developmental issues in his campaign . Beri ' s  campaign 
had a big burst in Wewak early in the campaign when the PPP leader, Julius 
Chan, came to introduce him . However , that momentum could not be 
sustained when Chan left . By and large the PPP organization was counting on 
Beri ' s  long tenure as Council President to carry him to victory . There was no 
PPP machinery in the rural areas to carry on Beri ' s  campaign . Unlike Bais ,  
Beri did not use Radio Wewak . I t  would seem that he expected his  Council 
colleagues to support his candidacy and to sell his views and virtues to the 
voters . His campaign posters were, however , widely distributed. 
(c) Results 
Tony Bais won the Wewak seat as was widely expected . The advantage of 
office, the superiority of  his campaign organization over those of Beri and 
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Mrs.  Martin (for example , Pangu scrutineers were found in most of the polling 
stations) , the use of trucks to bring in voters , all seemed to have rewarded Bais 
handsomely . However , his margin of victory was surprising. On the basis of 
available figures , Herman Beri and Mrs .  Laura Martin did not do as well as 
they expected . The only place where Beri outpolled Bais was in his native But­
Boiken census division. In fact more than two-thirds of Beri ' s  total votes came 
from But-Boiken and Wewak Local census divisions . Obviously, primodial 
sentiments better explain the voter preferences . Unfortunately for Beri , his 
chances of increasing his lead over Tony Bais in his home base were reduced 
because of the candidacy of another home boy, John Parinjo Simen . Had 
Simen not run , Beri might have collected most of the 407 votes that he polled 
in the But-Boiken census division . I do not believe that Pangu Pati put Simen , 
who stood as an Independent Pangu , in the race to split Beri ' s  votes . His 
candidacy could be regarded as consistent with his interest in electoral politics . 
He had been a candidate in the 1 972 General Election . 
Herman Beri might also have lost some votes in his home area because of an 
unfortunate car accident . A group of people from his own village are claiming 
between K2,000-3000 compensation from him for the accident . It is fair to 
assume that a certain amount of anti-Beri felling existed which was translated 
into an anti-Beri vote. It might be revealing if it were possible to find out those 
who voted for Simen and those who gave Bais his 337 votes in the But-Boiken 
Census division . 
Another reason accounting for Bais' margin of victory was the poor per­
formance of Beri and Mrs . Martin in Wewak town and the surrounding 
villages . Advantage of publicity and the use of trucks certainly helped Bais who 
collected 1 802 of the total 4672 votes . Beri and Mrs . Martin polled only 383 and 
554 respectively . Mrs . Martin ' s  performance here is  more surprising than 
Beri ' s .  She made a strong bid for the female vote and although there was a 
heavy turn-out of female voters , she evidently did not get all of them. As well, 
in spite of appeals by expatriate businessmen to their workers to vote for Mrs . 
Martin, most of them did not . 
Finally, one must mention the important role played by the Pangu Pati 
organization in Bais '  victory. Although party politics does not play a decisive 
role in electoral politics in Papua New Guinea, the Pangu Pati machinery 
helped Bais to carry his candidacy to some of the voters . He emphasized 
Pangu ' s  achievements and appealed to voters to support the Party' s endorsed 
candidate . Indeed , this was Pangu' s  national campaign strategy. As well , local 
Pangu supporters freely gave Bais their trucks to help bring in voters . 
2. Angoram Open 
(a) Candidates 
Eight candidates nominated for the seat of Angoram: Sebastian Okm, Leo 
Unumba, Joe Maike, Sarry Wimban, Teddy Sane, Gordon Kanaba , Anton 
Wopmai and William Eichorn . 
Okm, 37 ,  from Porapora is married with three children . He had been a 
primary school teacher wi th the Education Department for 13 years . Before he 
nominated for the seat of Angoram, he was the Headmaster of Angoram 
Community School. Because of his teaching career, he is reasonably well­
known in the electorate. Although not endorsed by the Pangu Pati , Okm 
contested the election as an independent Pangu and received K250 campaign 
contribution from the Pangu East Sepik Branch . 
Leo Unumba , 26, married with no children , is a trained commercial pilot . 
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He is from Branda Village. He was formerly a clerk with the Sepik Brothers 
Development Group. Unumba completed Form 4 and went on to matriculate 
at the University of Papua New Guinea . He had been in the electorate for 
more than 2 years when he nominated for the seat of Angoram. Reputed to be 
a playboy and capable of hard-drinking, he contested. the election as an 
independent candidate. 
Joe Maika, 37 ,  married with nine children, is from Moim village in the 
Angoram district . Educated to Form 3, Maika worked with the Local 
Government Council for 15 years at Binat , Goroka and Angoram. During his 
term of office as Council Clerk , he worked hard to improve roads in and 
around Angoram town . He was influential in the construction of market 
houses at Angoram. An admirer of the Prime Minister , Mr. Somare, and 
supporter of Pangu, Maika contested the election as an Independent 
candidate . 
Sarry Wimban, 36, from Mindinbit village, is married with three children. 
He completed Form 4 at Kambubu High School, Rabaul. Wimban worked 
with Health Department for twelve years as Health Extension Officer. Before 
nominating for the Angoram seat , he was the Provincial Health Extension 
Officer at Wewak General Hospital . Because of the nature of his job,  Wimban 
is very well known in the province . Most knowledgeable people of Angoram 
politics expected him to be the strongest challenger to the incumbent candi­
date, William Eichorn . A United Party supporter , Wimban was the party's  
endorsed candidate . 
Teddy Sane , 26, married with no children, is from Koragopa village . After 
completing Form four at Brandi Provincial High School , he attended 
Napanapa Nautical Studies as cadet officer . He worked as a merchant navy 
for 2 years , serving in various merchant ships in Australia, Japan , Paci fic 
I slands and PNG ports . Self employed as a subsistence farmer at the time of 
nominating for the seat, Sane was endorsed by PPP . Well-liked by his people 
because he gave up a good job to come home and live with the villagers, Sane 
expected widespread support from his people in his campaign . 
Gordon Kanaba, 38 ,  from Murik Lakes , is married with two children . 
Educated to standard 4 at S .D .A. Mission School , Goroka, Kanaba was 
employed at the Department of Public Health for 19 years in various aid posts . 
A Pangu Pati supporter , he contested the election as an independent 
candidate . Kanaba received no campaign contribution from the party. 
Anton Wopmai , 35 , married with four children, comes from Kabriman 
village , Amboin sub-district . Before he nominated for the seat of Angoram, he 
had been a school teacher for ten years . Headmaster of the Chambri 
Community School before nomination, Wopmai completed Form 4 at 
Wewak . He took the Headmaster ' s  course at Port Moresby Teachers College 
for two years . 
William Eichron , 43 , married with nine children, is mixed race with an 
Australian father and Angoram mother . Born in Koragopa village, he 
completed secondary school in Australia at Marist ·Brothers College, 
Ashgrove. After two years of teaching, he went to Bulolo where he obtained a 
second class engineering certificate. He went to work with his father at his 
Angoram Sawmill . He took to trading and has been dealing in crocodile skins 
and timber . He also has PMV s and a cattle project . He was elected councillor 
for Koragopa ward in 1966-68 . The sitting member of Angoram open, Eichorn 
was Pangu' s  endorsed candidate and received K55 in campaign contribution 
from Pangu East Sepik Branch . 
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(b) Campaigns. 
As in the Wewak Open campaign , all the candidates for the Angoram seat 
talked pretty much about the same issues ; upgrading the Wewak/ Angoram 
road, enlargement of the Gavien settlement scheme, completion of 
Timbunke/Wewak and Timboli/Wewak roads , creation of more local 
businesses , and aid posts . The three party candidates also introduced their 
repective party platforms to the voters . Sarry Wimban and William Eichorn 
estolled the leadership qualities of their Pangu party leaders , with Eichorn 
stressing the achievements of the Somare Government . In an electorate where 
the name Somare is a household word, the emphasis on his leadership qualities 
was bound to enhance Eichorn' s  appeal . 
Most of the candidates campaigned extensively within the electorate. 
However , in recognition of the role of local factors in electoral behaviour in 
PNG, some candidates focused attention on their home base. A few of them, 
especially Eichorn, Sane, Okm and Wimban campaigned actively in the more 
densely populated areas . All candidates distributed campaign posters 
throughout the electorate . The format of the posters was similar . Each 
candidate had his portrait on the poster and below it were his campaign 
promises . All candidates spoke pidgin in their campaign speeches , with those 
familiar with local dialects using them to underscore their close connections to 
the area. In a very fragmented .Polity, such campaign tactics can enhance a 
candidate' s appeal considerably. 
As in the Wewak Open campaign,  the candidates for the Angoram Open 
were polite to one another . Although William Eichorn , the incumbent , was 
criticized by the other candidates for not doing much for the electorate and for 
isolating himself from the voters, the manner in which the criticism was made 
was non-abusive . In fact the candidates behaved so gentlemanly that voters 
without strong identifications with particular candidates must have had a hard 
time deciding on how to vote . 
Another peculiarity of the campaign was the non-confident manner in which 
the candidates attempted to sell themselves and their objectives to the voters . 
Unlike Tony Bais in the Wewak campaign, none of the candidates for the 
Angoram Open seemed to think he had an edge over his opponents . The absence 
of confidence may explain the cautiousness of the campaign tactics used. It 
may also explain ,  at least in part , the reason why several interviewees did not 
seem interested in the campaign . 
The key candidates during the campaign were William Eichorn, Teddy Sane, 
Sebastian Okm, and Sarry Wimban . All four are very well-known in the 
electorate . They campaigned actively and extensively . Sane ' s  youthfulness 
bothered some older voters . Several older voters claimed that while he was a 
fine man, he was too young for the job .  
Eichorn' s  campaign was well-financed. His  posters could be found 
everywhere. Because of comparative affluence, he was able to provide beer to 
influential individuals in the areas he campaigned . Although he was criticized 
for being unimpressive in Parliament and for ignoring the voters of his 
electorate, Eichorn insisted that he had done much for the electorate. He 
claimed that a hospital had been built in Angoram, houses had been provided 
for public servants , and the Gavien Settlement Scheme, financed by the Asian 
Development Bank, was providing jobs for hundreds of families . Eichorn's  
claims offended his  opponents who insisted that the developments in  Angoram 
had taken place not because of the efforts of Eichorn, but because of the 
Prime Minister ' s  influence. There is a great deal of truth in the arguments of 
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Eichorn's  opponents .  Clearly, Eichorn was attempting to ride on the Prime 
Minister ' s  coat tail .  He was able to do this because the Prime Minister 
supported his candidacy and actively campaigned on his behalf. Sane, Okm 
and Wimban were not so fortunate in this respect . Neither the PPP leader 
Julius Chan nor the United Party leader , Sir Tei Abal, campaigned on behalf 
of their candidates . It is fair to assume that neither leader wanted to embarrass 
the Prime Minister in his home electorate . 
(c) Results 
William Eichorn retained his seat by polling 6 1 98 of the total 1 5 ,633 valid 
votes cast (39.60/o) . His opponents'  claim that he was an ineffective 
representative did not deny him the support he needed to retain his seat . Of all 
the factors accounting for Eichorn's  victory, the support he received from the 
Prime Minister, particularly during the closing stages of the campaign, was the 
most decisive. The Angoram campaign was distinctive for the non-confident 
way in which candidates sold themselves to the voters . By receiving the Prime 
Minister' s  enthusiastic support, particularly in the more populous Grass 
census division ,  Eichorn' s  chances of doing well were considerably increased . 
The Prime Minister , in a real sense, made Eichorn' s  victory a test of his own 
popularity in the Angoram district . This may explain the last minute strong 
campaigning for Eichorn . By pointing to the developments that had taken 
place in Angoram, the Prime Minister, in effect , called on the voters to 
support a candidate that he personally endorsed. 
Comparative affluence also enabled Eichorn to travel widely to dispel some 
of the doubts cast on his effectiveness by his opponents . His active 
campaigning in his own area and the fact that he was the only candidate from 
that area secured for him most of the votes of the area. With most of his 
opponents from villages close to one another down the Sepik River expected to 
split their votes , Eichorn 's  chances of victory seemed to have been increased. 
But the single most important factor in the outcome of the Angoram electorate 
was the support Eichorn received from the Prime Minister . If any individual 
was capable of winning that seat for any of the candidates, it was Michael 
Somare. 
3 .  Ambunti-Dreikikir Open 
As was pointed out earlier , Ambunti-Dreikikir Open electorate is the result 
of changes in the electoral boundaries recommended by the Electoral 
Commission . Previously , Dreikikir was a separate Open electorate while 
Ambunti was formerly Upper Sepik Open electorate. The merging of  the two 
electorates into a single electorate affected the elections not only because it 
pitted two sitting memebrs against each other but because it heightened the 
importance of population distribution between the two halves of the 
electorate. 
(a) Candidates 
Seven candidates nominated for the Ambunti-Dreikikir seat : Tromble 
Kabai , Kokomo Ulia, Tubuguman Harry Weldon, Thomas Aworel ,  Anskar 
Karmel , Maranganji Tamson Jumbundu and Asimboro Ston. 
Tromble Kabai , about 35  years old, married with seven children, comes 
from Bongos village in Dreikikir .  With little or no formal education, Kabai 
was the former member for Dreikikir Open. Formerly a village court 
magistrate in Dreikikir , he has a trade store, a coffee plantation and a few 
PMV's .  A Pangu supporter, he is well-known for having helped a lot of people 
to start and run their own coffee plantation . Kabai is well known in the 
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Dreikikir area because of his concerns for the area's economic development . 
During his term of office , he maintained a good channel of communication 
with his constituents . 
Kokomo Ulia, about 5 8 ,  married with 3 wives and eleven children, comes 
from Emul village in the Dreikikir area . A village court magistrate and 
businessman , Ulia has no formal education. He worked for 29 years in the 
Wau goldmines . He joined the PNG constabulary and served for 9 years . He 
was elected first President for Dreikikir Local Government Council in 1965 . 
Ulia was a former MHA. Well-known in the area, Ulia contested the Ambunti­
Dreikikir seat as an independent candidate. 
Tubuguman Harry Weldon, 35, married with six children, comes from 
Bangwis village in Ambunti . Manager of the Sepik Producers Cooperatives 
Association (SPCA) branch in Ambunti , Weldon is also a member of the 
Board of Directors of SPCA branch in Maprik .  He is also the President of the 
Ambunti Community School Board of Management . Educated to Form 2 
through correspondence school , Weldon completed his ministerial training in 
1964. He had been working for the S .D.A.  Mission since 1 97 1 .  Actively 
involved in economic development activities , Weldon contested the election as 
an independent candidate . He had unsuccessfully contested the Upper Sepik 
seat in 1 972. 
Thomas Aworel , 3 1 ,  married with two children, comes from Komala village 
in Dreikikir . Educated to Form 2, he taught at Bongos Community School for 
4 years and at Dreikikir for 3 years . Because of the brevity of his teaching 
career , Aworel is not very well-known in his area. Quiet and unassuming, he 
does not believe in party politics . Accordingly, Aworel contested the election 
as an independent candidate. 
Anskar Karmel , 35 ,  married with two children , comes from Kaminimbit 
village in the Angoram district . A successful businessman by local standards,  
Karmel has been living in Ambunti since 1957 . Endorsed by Pangu Pati , he 
was the sitting member for Upper Sepik Open . Karmel is very well-known in 
the Ambunti district and also further down the Sepik River because he used to 
buy crocodile skin from the people. It was from his trade that he got enough 
money to start his trade store business . He has two trade stores and a liquor 
licence to sell beer and spirits .  A number of interviewees were criticial of 
Karmel ' s  candidacy because they felt he had failed to maintain contacts with 
his electorate since he was voted into Parliament in 1 972. 
Maranganju Tamsan Jumbundu , 36, married with four children , comes 
from Avatip village in the Ambunti di strict . President of Ambunti Local 
Government Council since 1 968 , Jumbundu resigned to contest the seat of 
Ambunti-Dreikikir when nominations were called . Living in the Ambunti area 
all his life, he is well-known there largely because of his term of office in the 
Council . A subsistence farmer, Jumbundu contested the election as a United 
Party candidate . 
Asimboro Ston, 42, married with six children , comes from Asiling village 
in the Dreikikir district . Educated to standard 3 at Borom Central School , 
Ston has had several jobs - messenger in the District Office, Wewak , Switch 
board operator and aid post orderly. After completing an aid post supervisor 's  
course in 1 966, he was promoted to hospital orderly in 1 969. Elected President 
of the Dreikikir Council in 1965 , St on was an unsuccessful candidate for the 
seat of Dreikikir Open in 1 972. Well-known because of his job as a hospital 
orderly,  Ston in generally popular with the people of both Dreikikir and 
Ambunti . He contested the election as lndependent-Pangu and received K60 
campaign contribution from Pangu East Sepik Branch . 
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(b) Campaigns 
As in the Angoram Open campaign, the Ambunti-Drekikir campaign was 
conducted peacefully. With the exception of the sitting member for formerly 
Upper Sepik,  Anskar Karmel , who is from Angoram, all the candidates were 
either from Dreikikir or Ambunti . All the candidates discussed issues of local 
concern ; roads,  bridges , health centres , education and more local businesses . 
Specificially, candidates promised to ensure the completion of the 
Ambunti/Maprik road so that people can transport their coffee to Maprik ,  
upgrade the Dreikikir/Maprik road s o  a s  t o  encourage PMV business,  
establish a rural health centre for the electorate instead of the present aid posts 
in Ambunti and Dreikikir, and to find a solution to the school drop-out 
problem in the area . All candidates used campaign posters to reach the voters . 
The party endorsed candidates , Askar Karmel (Pangu) , and Jumbundu 
(United Party) , also endeavoured to stress what their parties stood for ,  with 
Karmel dwelling upon the achievements of the Pangu Pati . 
The merging of Ambunti and Dreikikir into one electorate affected the 
campaign strategy of most the candidates . Generally, popular attitude towards 
the merger was critical . Most interviewees felt that the two areas were not 
contiguous:  Ambunti is near the Sepik River while Dreikikir is up on the 
mountains . People felt that their customs were not even close enough to 
warrant the merger . Accordingly, most candidates tended to concentrate their 
campaign on their own areas of support . Of the seven candidates , three were 
from Ambunti (Tubuguman Harry Weldon, Auskar Karmel, and Jumbundu) 
and four from Dreikikir (Tromble Kabai , Asimboro Ston , Kokomo Ulia, and 
Thomas Aworel) . With population distribution favouring Dreikikir, the more 
popular of the Dreikikir candidates and particularly the one from the more 
densely populated group of villages , would seem to have an edge over the other 
candidates . 
The key candidates in the campaign were Kabai (Dreikikir) ,  Ulia (Dreikikir) ,  
Weldon (Ambunti) , Karmel (Ambunti) and Ston (Dreikikir) . Of the five, only 
Ulia began his campaign late. All were reasonably well-known in their 
respective areas . With the exception of Ulia, they campaigned actively and 
reasonably extensively . Given the spread of the electorate, campaigning clearly 
made heavy demands on candidates' time and resources . Their campaign 
strategies varied from distribution of printed leaflets to friendly chats with 
village elders . In the Dreikikir area, Kabai made much of his close contacts 
with the electorate during his terms of office as their Member of House of 
Assembly . However , because of  the general feeling that he accomplished very 
little for the Dreikikir electorate, his appeal reached only a limited audience . 
Kokomo Ulia's  campaign was limited in scope and badly organized he did 
very little campaigning either because he felt he was well-known, particularly 
in the Dreikikir area, or because he did not take his candidacy serious enough . 
His age may also have been a factor , given the nature of the geographical 
terrain .  Respondents did not react too favourably to his campaign because 
they felt he did little for the area when he was their member in the 1968 House 
of Assembly. 
Weldon waged a determined campaign . Having lost to Karmel in the 1 972 
elections for the seat of Upper Sepik ,  he seemed to understand the 
requirements of electoral success . His campaign posters were widely 
distributed and he campaigned hard in his native Ambunti area . He spoke 
about his concern to promote local businesses in the area. In many villages 
especially further up the Sepik river from Ambunti , Weldon 's campaign 
promises won ethusiastic support . Although he received polite attention from 
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voters in the Dreikikir area, voter responses to his campaign were rather 
lukewarm. 
Anskar Karmel , the sitting Pangu member for Upper Sepik and the Party' s  
endorsed candidate , pinned his electoral hopes o n  winning large support i n  the 
Ambunti area , although he campaigned in the Dreikikir area, too . Rather dull 
in his campaign speeches , Karmel tried to focus voters' attention on the 
achievements of the Somare Government . His own record as a Parliamen­
tarian , however, became an issue in the campaign . Weldon and Jumbundu 
attacked him for accomplishing nothing for the area and for failing to visit his 
electorate more often . Karmel ' s stronghold was in the villages of Malu and 
Yanahai . Significantly, his crocodile farm is a joint venture with these two 
villages . 
Ston was an unsuccessful candidate for the seat of Dreikikir in the 1 972 
elections. Involved in a lot of community organizations, he is reputed to be a 
helpful man in the Dreikikir area . He travelled extensively in the Dreikikir area 
during the campaign emphasizing local developmental issues . His posters were 
widely distributed in the Ambunti area . He was widely tipped to win the seat 
not so much because of his campaign promises but because of his popularity in 
the Dreikikir area, the more densely - populated half of the electorate of 
Ambunti-Dreikikir. 
(c) Results 
As was widely expected , Asimboro Ston won the seat by polling 5 1 69 of the 
total 14,400 valid votes cast . His closest rival , Tubuguman Harry Weldon, 
polled 2,474 votes . 
Two factors seem to account for Ston' s  victory; ethnic factors coupled with 
geography and popularity . He comes from Asiling village between Maprik and 
Dreikikir . The villages around the area are densely populated . Ston expected 
to get most of his votes from these areas . In view of the fact that he was the 
only candidate from these areas , it can be assumed that most of the voters 
there voted for him . As well,  Dreikikir has a denser population than Ambunti . 
Secondly, because of his work as a hospital orderly, a lot of people know him 
in the Dreikikir area as a whole . His work involved considerable travelling and 
all this helped him not only in the campaign but during the voting . 
In addition to these two factors , one must also mention a subsidiary factor; 
the widespread belief that the two incumbent Parliamentarians (Kabai­
Dreikikir Open, and Karmel-Upper Sepik Open) had not done much for the 
now combined electorate of Ambunti-Dreikikir. With both candidates 
unlikely to poll heavily outside their immediate group of villages , Ston' s  
chances , a s  a result of  the two factors mentioned earlier, were accordingly 
enhanced . 
Concluding Observations 
Firm generalizations about electoral behaviour in PNG are difficult to 
make. Were party politics the key explanatory variable in voter preferences in 
PNG elections , one would have little difficulty explaining the outcomes in the 
East Sepik elections . Pangu Pati candidates and one independent Pangu won 
six of the seven seats of the Province. Pangu candidate, Wauwia, lost the 
Yangoru-Saussia seat by only 1 1 5 votes . Although Pangu Pati is well known 
throughout the province because of Michael Somare and a few other Sepik 
political elites such as Pita Lus , the successes of Pangu candidates are due 
more to local and candidate factors than to party politics . As is evident in this 
report , Pangu itself recognized the secondary role of party politics and 
therefore encouraged the candidacy of bright and attractive individuals for the 
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same seat . This was the case for all the East Sepik seats except the Provincial 
and Maprik seats . Parties seem to look for candidates who are strong because 
of either ethnic factors or business successes or official roles (for example, 
councillor, government official , traditional big man) . For these reasons,  
scholars'  ability to predict electoral outcomes in PNG depends very much 
upon elaborate knowledge and familiarity with the local scene. Of course, 
party identifications are important to the extent that parties are well organized 
and capable of spreading a candidate' s  message to remote villages . If such an 
organization exists , then parties can enhance a candidate' s  chances in a 
supportive role . This seems to have been the case especially with Tony Bais'  
campaign in the Wewak Open electorate . 
Generally, the conclusion that emerges from this report is that voter 
preferences are influenced by clan-ties by reputation and by the extent to 
which candidates are personally known to voters . This requirement of 
electoral success in PNG places tremendous pressure on candidates to move 
around , to talk to people and to show sympathy for what they have to say . In 
Y angoru-Saussia electorate, an otherwise relatively young and unknown 
candidate recognized these obligations and waged a highly intelligent , if 
aggressive , successful campaign . 
Certain minimal conditions also need to be fulfilled by candidates . Voters' 
understanding of the mechanics of voting is crucial for aspiring candidates . In 
the East Sepik elections with the exception of the Provincial seat , no candidate 
pictures were printed on the ballot papers . This created some confusion in the 
minds of many voters . Most of the candidates made no attempt to explain to 
voters the voting procedures with the result that some voters assumed that they 
were only expected to mark the Provincial ballot paper which happened to 
show candidates ' photographs .  Finally, there was a marked absence of 
concern about larger national issues and Papua New Guinea's  place in relation 
to the external world.  Most of the issues discussed were of parochial concern . 
Although a few of the East Sepik candidates had travelled abroad , none 
discussed foreign policy issues . Admittedly, foreign policy issues have seldom 
played a decisive role even in largely literate societies . However , given the 
country' s  heavy dependence on the external world and its often difficult 
relations with Indonesia, the voters were entitled to know the constraints 
within elected representatives would be expected to work. 
NOTES 
1 .  1 97 1  National Census figure. These figures were recommended to Parliament by the 
Electoral Boundaries Commission as the basis for the 1 977 elections.  
2. PNG Electoral Boundaries Commission: Report and New Recommendations, 1977 
(Port Moresby: Government Printer 1 975) , p. 5 .  
3 .  The Prime Minister was expected t o  campaign i n  the Chimbu and Enga Province 
during the closing stages of the campaign but the threat of possible attack on his 
person forced him to cancel his trip. 
4. Tony Bais was appointed Provincial Commissioner for New Ireland in 1 976. He 
held his post before his resignation to contest the seat of Wewak Open . 
5 .  Pangu East Sepik Branch made a cash contribution of K350.00 to Wobar's 
campaign . Rather interestingly, the Party' s endorsed candidate also got K350.00.  
Chapter 1 4  
YANGORU - SAUSSIA OPEN : 
THE DISAPPEARANCE 
OF AN 83 PER CENT MAJORITY 
Bob Winnett and R . J .  May 
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In a recent brief comment on the volume of papers recording the 1 972 
national elections in Papua New Guinea (Stone 1 976) , Henry Mayer ( 1 978 :6 1 )  
described the  study as  'an endless series of little snippety-snappety election 
studies' and bewailed the absence of a framework giving some coherence to 
the collection. The charge is of course valid (and one which might be levelled at 
a number of similar collections) . At the same time, national elections in a 
rapidly changing polity like that of Papua New Guinea provide the oppor­
tunity not only for taking a snapshot of political activity in the nation as a 
whole (and thus of considering the various electorates within an overall frame­
work) but for seeing , in high relief, some of the particular factors which 
govern political relationships in a number of local (snippety-snappety) 
situations , not all of which can be easily accommodated within a satisfactory 
model of electoral politics at the national level . 
Thus,  from a broad perspective, one might regard the election in Yangoru­
Saussia within the context of a general - though by no means universal -
trend in which young, educated, urban-based men and women returned to 
their home areas to wrest parliamentary power from the more traditionally 
based elders , exploiting their capacity to act as brokers between the modern 
state and the village . Such an approach has much to commend it: the two 
leading candidates were just such young men (though without a proven 
capacity as brokers) . But it would seriously underrate the unusual features of 
the Yangoru-Saussia situation. In the 1 972 elections Yangoru-Saussia 
attracted national attention as the centre of a semi-mystical mass movement, 
whose leader was swept to office with a massive majority . In 1 977 the situation 
had clearly changed but the experience of 1 972, and a degree of lingering 
uncertainty , lent the campaign a vicarious interest . In the following account 
we have attempted to capture some of this interest . But we confess that this is 
essentially a snippety-snappety study; if it has something general to say about 
political behaviour, that relates more to the general process of social change in 
relatively deprived areas than to a model of electoral politics . 
The electorate 
The Yangoru-Saussia electorate is roughly in the centre of the East Sepik 
Province . It stretches some 70 km from the Nagam river in the east to Wingei 
in the west and about 45 km from the Prince Alexander range in the north to 
the Sepik plains in the south . The electorate is bounded by the Wewak Open 
electorate to the north, Angoram to the south , Wosera-Gaui to the southwest 
and Maprik to the west. Estimated population of Yangoru-Saussia in 1 97 1  was 
23 ,645 , most of whom were concentrated along the Sepik highway which links 
Wewak to Maprik and the West Sepik .  There are small government stations at 
Yangoru and Kubalia . The electorate covers eight census divisions (see map l ) ;  
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in four of these (accounting for 73 per cent of the population) the predominant 
language is Boiken , although there are a few Sawos speaking people to the 
south; in the northwest of the electorate Arapesh ,  or Pukia, is the 
predominant language in two divisions , and in two others , in the centre-west 
of the electorate there is a high proportion of Abelam speakers . Ritual-yam 
displays and pig exchanges and a limited amount of trade still provide 
occasions for interaction between villages (especially in the northern part of 
the electorate) but traditional social and political units are typically small . 
There has been little development in the area . The bulk of the people are 
subsistence farmers though there is a limited amount of cash cropping , mostly 
coffee , cocoa and copra . Income is low, and there is  a high incidence of 
malnutrition . 1  
The electorate was created as a result o f  the electoral redistribution o f  1 97 1 .  
Prior to this Yangoru-Saussia had been split between the Wewak and 
Ambunti-Yangoru electorates . In the 1 968 elections the voters of Ambunti­
Yangoru returned a man from near Ambunti , in what is  now the Wosera-Guia 
electorate, while Beibi Yambanda, a retired police sergeant from Toanambu, 
now in Yangoru-Saussia, became the MHA for Wewak Open. 
In  1 972 the House of Assembly elections roughly coincided in the Sepik with 
the peak of activity of a cult movement which was described by a government 
official at the time as 'one of the biggest and most potentially explosive cults 
in the Territory' s history' . The cult , centred on the scared moutain of Hurun 
(Mt . Tum) , which dominates the Yangoru patrol post , had quickly spread 
throughout the East and West Sepik Provinces . 2  In the Yangoru-Saussia 
electorate cult leader Matias Yaliwan stood against six other candidates and 
was elected with 83 per cent of the total votes cast (7684 first preference votes 
to his nearest opponent' s 474) . Support for Yaliwan also disrupted voting in 
the surrounding Wewak , Maprik and Dreikikir electorates3 ; moreover had he 
not been precluded, on grounds of education, from contesting the regional 
electorate, he may well have unseated the sitting regional member , Michael 
Somare. 
The third House of Assembly was opened in April 1 972. In  a very brief 
maiden speech Yaliwan declared himself to be the Leader of Papua New 
Guinea and demanded immediate self-government and independence . Two 
months later , in response to a statement by the MHA for Maprik Open, Pita 
Lus , which called on the government to take action against the cult led by 
Yaliwan, Yaliwan told the House that he had resigned from the movement and 
had nothing whatsoever to do with it and that his name must not be associated 
with it any longer . In October 1 972 Yaliwan announced that he was resigning 
from the House of Assembly (though his formal resignation was not received 
until June 1 973) . 
In the by-election which resulted from Yaliwan' s  resignation in 1 973 there 
were eight candidates : Lainus Hepau , who had become Yaliwan' s  secretary in 
1 973 ,  another Yaliwan supporter , three Pangu Pati candidates (one endorsed 
and two independent) , and three others . Hepau led all the way in a fairly 
closely contested election, defeating the endorsed Pangu candidate, John 
Wauwia, on the sixth distribution of preferences . 
Hepau, who described himself as a subsistence farmer and prayer leader , 
was born in Saure village , Wewak around 1938 and had worked there for most 
of his life .  He became a Peli supporter in 1 97 1  and joined Yaliwan first at 
Marambanj a and later at Wamoin .  In a speech to the House of Assembly in 
March 1 97 4 Hepau told members that the people did not want the government 
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to establish any project on Hurun and that it was now time for all the countries 
of the world to come together as one big country; he complained that no one 
had explained to his people the meaning of self-government and independence 
except Matias Yaliwan and, he said , quoting a biblical reference in support, he 
believed Yaliwan . Otherwise Hepau was an inconspicuous member of the 
House, both in Port Moresby and at home in his electorate . 
The rise and decline of the Peli movement4 
The Hurun cult seems to date back to about 1 969 when two men, Matias 
Yaliwan and Daniel Hawina, became convinced that a number of cement 
survey markers placed on top of Hurun were preventing material benefits from 
flowing to the people. In December 1 969 Yaliwan, Hawina and some others 
removed one of the markers; they were arrested and sentenced to short terms 
in gaol . On their release they returned to their preoccupation with the markers 
and began enlisting support . They visited a number of villages in the area and 
in the early months of 1 97 1  addressed mass meetings around W ewak . A large 
sum of money was collected . 
The removal of the markers was set down for the seventh day of the seventh 
month. As this day approached thousands of people converged on Hurun 
from all over the East and West Sepik Provinces . The government , though 
obviously concerned and anxious about these developments, recognised that 
strong opposition to the cult might only strengthen belief in it and adopted 
what it generally described as a ' low profile approach' of discouraging support 
for the movement but avoiding confrontation with it. In the event the markers 
were removed and placed outside the Yangoru patrol post without incident ; 
people gradually returned to their houses and the government took no action 
against the cultists . Asked what he intended to do with the money which had 
been collected , Yaliwan told reporters that it would be used to set up an 
association to bring together people from all over the world . 
In July 197 1  the formation of the Peli Association was announced . Hawina 
was named as president ; Yaliwan, though acknowledged as ' leader' of the 
Association, did not take office . Membership of the Association was open and 
a membership fee was set at 70t (this was distinct from 'contributions' of K 1 2  
o r  so, which had been collected before July 1 97 1  and continued t o  be 
collected) . Committee members (komiti) were appointed for each village or 
group of villages in which there was support for the Association and between 
late 1 97 1  and 1 973 these journeyed frequently between their own villages and 
the Association' s  headquarters at Marambanj a to hold discussions with and 
receive instructions from Yaliwan and Hawina. Beneath the komiti there were 
usually representatives (bosboi) at roughly clan or hamlet level and these in 
turn were assisted by a large number of young men ( 'workers') and girls 
(' flowers ' ) ,  generally chosen by komiti. 
The objectives of the Peli Association were never clearly stated . At its first 
public meeting prominence was given to the aims of economic development in 
the Sepik and control of the funds collected by the cult . Subsequently the 
Association purchased several trucks which , it was said,  would be used for 
transporting Peli members and carrying copra and coffee bought by the 
Association . In fact, however , the trucks were used solely for the private 
transport of members and they had a short li fe.  The Association never did 
become involved in copra and coffee buying. Towards the end of 1 974 the 
Association purchased a European owned tradestore at Yangoru and acquired 
the liquor licence that went with it . The liquor licence was subsequently 
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cancelled and the store sold , at a loss , to Hawina' s brother . In its attitude 
towards both government and missions the Association was generally 
antipathetic .  Although the movement avoided overt confrontation with 
government it fed upon a sense of dissatisfaction with government generally 
and local government specifically : in 1 972 Peli members were directed not to 
pay council taxes and some members were prosecuted . 
There is little doubt , however, that what attracted the great mass of the 
Association ' s  following was the hope of 'cargo' . Some believed that Yaliwan 
and Hawina had discovered the secret of creating money; others , while not 
really believing, joined the Association just in case; others succumbed to social 
pressures to conform. Yaliwan staunchly denied that Peli was a cargo cult but 
both he and Hawina undoubtedly played on people' s expectations with a blend 
of mysticism and ambiguous half-promises . Rituals designed to increase 
money became a focus of Peli Association activities . 'Power houses ' were set 
up in which 'workers' and ' flowers ' 'washed money' or ' fought the dishes' in 
order to increase the money collected from Peli members . By November 1972 
there were about 50 of these and plans to build 600 . Graveyards , or 'memorial 
gardens ' ,  were established in which members planted suitcases and waited for 
their money to increase . In July 1 972 it was announced that 800 memorial 
plots had been sold at Marambanja at a cost of K I O  each . 
From mid 1 97 1  until well into 1 973 support for the Peli Association 
continued to grow. In March 1 972 Yaliwan claimed a membership of over 
62,000 and subscriptions amounting to about K l 00,000. Estimates of the 
Association ' s  membership at the peak of its activity in 1 973 range between 
1 00,000 and 200,000 and funds collected probably exceeded K200,000. 
Thus when Yaliwan contested the House of Assembly election in 1 972 he 
was the acknowledged leader of a massive popular movement with a 
formidable, i f  vaguely defined , organizational structure . Assisted by Hawina 
and a Papuan secretary, Yaliwan conducted an extensive campaign travelling 
from village to village preaching the Peli philosophy, promising an end to 
council taxes and workdays and cessation of malaria spraying , and calling for 
national unity and early independence . 
Support for the Peli Association continued to grow after Yaliwan' s  election 
to the House . But from the early months of 1 972 some reaction appears to 
have set in. In May 1 972 Peli supporters organized a public meeting in 
Yangoru, from which Yaliwan walked out and told Hawina that Yaliwan had 
until the third session of the House to fulfill his promises . If he had not done 
so by then , the people said,  they would call for a by-election . Soon after there 
were reports that Peli Association members threatened to destroy all the 
buildings in Yangoru patrol post if the money they had paid was not returned . 
And there were other incidents . 
Also, Yaliwan began to have misgivings about his role . In retrospect , there 
was probably always tension in the relation between Yaliwan and Hawina. 
Yaliwan was the spiritual leader of the Peli movement but Hawina provided 
the main organizational force and appealed most directly to people' s cult­
nurtured hopes of monetary gains, exploiting Yaliwan 's  reputation for having 
supernatural powers . In June 1972 Yaliwan resigned from Peli , ostensibly 
because Hawina refused to enforce his orders that Peli members leave 
Marambanja to return to their villages and that they support their local 
government councils . In September Yaliwan told the press that there were 
many things about Peli which disturbed him and the following month when he 
announced his intention of resigning from the House he said that the Peli 
Association had employed sorcerers to make him sick in the head . Yaliwan 
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subsequently withdrew to a hamlet near Wamoin ,  on the Sepik highway about 
35 km to the southeast of Yangoru, where he and some of his followers 
established a large , fenced compound. 
With the resignation of Yaliwan, Hawina took control of Peli , and, it 
seems, most of  the Association ' s  assets . Shortly after, however, Hawina and 
the Peli vice-president and five other Peli members were arrested as the result 
of a hotel brawl and sentenced to gaol terms of up to ten months. During their 
absence there was a pronounced decentralization of Peli activity and with this 
decentralization came eventual decline . 
Meanwhile , towards the end of 1 972 Yaliwan announced the formation of 
the Mt. Hurun Christian Democratic Association, later renamed the Seven 
Association . As had been the case with the Peli Association, the aims of the 
Seven Association were somewhat obscure, the sole objective, according to 
Yaliwan , being to establish the law of God . On Yaliwan's  account , the Seven 
Association had nothing to do with the Peli Association or with power houses 
or memorial gardens,  and had no interest in business or politics ; he did , 
however , invite Peli members to join by paying a 70t membership fee . Hawina, 
on the other hand, refused to acknowledge that the Peli and Seven Associations 
had different objectives and when asked in 1 975 if Peli would contest the next 
national elections replied that Peli would support whoever Yaliwan decided to 
nominate . As for the mass of village people, apart from those directly involved 
in the dispute between Yaliwan and Hawina few seem to have had any 
awareness of the split and tended to identify Peli with Yaliwan . 
By early 1 974 active mass support for the Peli and Seven Associations seems 
to have largely disappeared and most power houses and memorial gardens had 
been abandoned . Patrol reports in late 1 973 and early 1 974 reported frequent 
threats of violence against Peli officials; yet considering that the movement 
was generally acknowledged to have failed and that in the process a large 
number of village people had lost sizeable amounts of money, there was 
surprisingly little bittereness and though Hawina and his associates appear to 
have been fairly thoroughly discredited there remained a good deal of vague 
sympathy towards the movement and a widespread belief that Yaliwan 
possessed ' special powers ' .  
I n  1 975 the government seems t o  have abandoned its earlier ' low profile' 
approach to the movement and towards the end of the year two hundred 
komiti (but not including Yaliwan or Hawina) were charged variously with 
illegally collecting taxes and spreading false reports . One hundred and fifty 
were sentenced to five to six months imprisonment with hard labour and fifty 
were fined and released . This change in policy seems to have coincided with the 
appointment as provincial commissioner of Tony Bais ,  who had been one of 
the unsuccessful Pangu candidates in the 1 973 by-election . 
Summarizing the situation at the end of 1 976, May5 commented in 1 977 that 
. . .  there were still pockets of active Peli-Seven supporters and probably a substantial 
base of potential support which could be activated by strong leadership, given 
effective organizational support , Yaliwan is probably still capable of assuming this 
leadership . . . .  
Others appeared to be more confident about the demise of Peli and of Yaliwan 
but an uncertainty lingered in people' s minds as the election appraoched . 
Pre-election politics 
In the latter part of 1 976 May visited a number of vi llages in the Yangoru­
Saussia area and in the course of a wideranging discussion raised the subject of 
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the approaching national election . With only one or two exceptions villagers 
were unaware that there was to be an election . Having informed them that this 
was the case May sought opinions as to who might stand . There was little 
response to this question. Of those who recognized that Hepau was the sitting 
member few thought he would be successful again.  Many people, however, felt 
that should Yaliwan stand he would probably be returned . 
But while the prospect of a national election did not excite the mass of rural 
villagers , among a small group of the politically aware there was , to mix 
metaphors , much sniffing of the air and j ockeying for positions. 
In the 1973 by-election there had been three Pangu candidates . The 
endorsed candidate was John W auwia. W auwia, aged 40 in 1 977 , from 
Waramuru village at the foot of Hurun, was a former primary school teacher, 
radio announcer and parliamentary interpreter . Early in 1 973 he had gained 
some local prominence as an opponent of the Peli Association. At a meeting at 
Yangoru in January 1 973 ,  attended by a number of students home on 
vacation, Wauwia informed the people that it had been decided to combat cult 
activities in the area through the Yangoru Youth Club, a club associated with 
the Roman Catholic Young Workers' Association . At a later stage, he said ,  
the club would undertake village development, with the cooperation of the 
village people, and encourage people to help themselves . When first preference 
votes were counted in 1 973 Wauwia was third of the eight candidates , behind 
Hepau and Peter Rony, but when preferences had been allocated he was in 
second place with 1 839 votes to Hepau's  245 1 .  Subsequently he returned to 
Port Moresby where he became private secretary to the minister for police 
(Pita Lus) and later an assistant at the UN Information Centre . The Yangoru 
Youth Club appears to have languished . In the latter part of 1 976 Wauwia 
visited his home area but he gave no indication as to whether he intended to 
contest the seat , a fact which created some uncertainty among other 
prospective Pangu candidates . 
Peter Rony, as we have seen , gained the second largest proportion of first 
preference votes in 1 973 but was eventually beaten by both Hepau and 
Wauwia. Rony, aged 30 in 1 977 , comes from Numboruon village a few 
kilometres to the west of Yangoru patrol post . In 1 973 Rony had recently 
returned to the Sepik to take up the position of council clerk (subsequently 
retitled executive officer) of the greater Maprik Council , to the west of 
Yangoru . He also became a local secretary of the Pangu Pati and a member of 
the Board of the Bank of Papua New Guinea . For a young man who had spent 
much of his life away from home Rony polled well in 1 973 , though most of the 
vote was concentrated in his home area. In 1 976, however, he was probably 
better known in the Maprik area than in his native Yangoru and there were 
suggestions from influential figures within the Maprik electorate that he stand 
there against the sitting member Pita Lus . Lus had recently antagonized some 
people in the Maprik area by his opposition to the Maprik based Sepik 
Producers' Cooperative Association (SPCA), of whose commercial success 
local villagers were justly proud . Rony, however , had few illusions that he 
could topple Lus - a Member since 1 964, cabinet minister and close coleague 
of prime minister Somare - and eventually he nominated again for Yangoru­
Saussia. 
The third Pangu candidate in 1 973 was Tony Bais . Bais ,  32 in 1 977 , comes 
from Toanambu, a large collection of hamlets on the Sepik highway between 
Yangoru and Wewak . His father had contested the 1 964 elections and stood 
again as a Pangu candidate against Yaliwan in 1 972. In 1 973 Tony Bais had 
just completed a B.A.  (Social Work) at the University of Papua New Guinea , 
Yangoru-Saussia 261 
having broken his course there to spend some time as community development 
officer in W ewak. He scored a mere 454 votes and was the first of the eight 
candidates to be eliminated. After the election Bais accepted the position of 
principal private secretary to the chief minister and then in March 1 974 he 
became provincial commissioner in the East Sepik ,  one of several 'political ' 
appointments (i . e . ,  appointments from outside the kiap career service) made 
by the Somare government . Bais proved to be an individualistic and often 
controversial provincial commissioner and although most rural vi llagers seem 
to have admired his style he antagonized some groups.  Within his home area 
he seems , on balance, to have gained support for his strong action against Peli 
supporters and he was an active supporter of a self-help, business oriented 
organization in Toanambu. In 1 976 few observers in the East Sepik had much 
doubt that Bais would contest the coming national elections (though Bais 
himself said he was undecided) ; the question was , in which electorate. There 
were rumours that he would contest the regional seat against the sitting 
member , prime minister Somare, but Bais must have realized that this would 
be political suicide. With this option closed the alternatives were Yangoru­
Saussia, his home area but where he had polled so disappointingly in 1 973 , and 
Wewak . In 1 972 the Wewak Open electorate had been won by an expatriate 
who was not a candidate in 1 977 and it was something of a Pangu stronghold ; 
but the likely support for Bais was an unknown quantity and there was little 
secret that most of the few remaining expatriate businessmen in Wewak would 
lend their weight to oppose him . In the event Bais opted for Wewak and won . 
(See chapter 1 3) .  
Another person whose presence was felt in the electorate during 1 976 was 
Bernard Narakobi . Narakobi , an Australian-educated barrister , consultant to 
the Constitutional Planning Committee, chairman of the Law Reform 
Commission and of the National Cultural Council ,  and frequent contributor 
to the Post-Courier, spent several weeks in his natal Arapesh speaking village 
of Watugik in the Kaboibus area . At the time it was widely rumoured that he 
intended to contest the 1 977 elections in opposition to the coalition 
government in either the regional or the Wewak Open electorate . In the event 
Narakobi did not nominate but his outspoken criticism of the Somare govern­
ment may have eased the way for the eventual winner of the Yangoru-Saussia 
contest , whose village is  not far from Watugik .  
While this manouvering was going on, in August 1 976 Peli-Seven supporters 
organized a ceremony on Hurun to dedicate a memorial to Papua New 
Guinea's  independence in the previous year . About five hundred people were 
addressed by Yaliwan (who seems to have initated the project) , Hawina and 
Hepau, all of whom expressed their gratitude to tbe government for bringing 
the people to independence , and a pig and a case of beer were presented to the 
officer-in-charge of the Yangoru sub-district. The ceremony was a quiet affair 
but, those with an eye on the coming elections asked themselves , did it presage 
a revival of the Peli-Seven movement? By early 1977 there had been no further 
rallies and the answer appeared to be negative . 
The candidates and the campaign. 
When nominations closed in Yangoru-Saussia there were nine candidates : 
Narakama Harau, Lainus Hepau, John Jaminan, Nagandimi Laulimbe, Kawi 
Nimiora, Peter Rony, John Wauwia, Beibe Yambanda and, to the surprise of 
most, Matias Yaliwan. (The home villages of candidates are shown on Map 1 ,  
which also shows census divisions and 1 97 1  populations.) 
Hepau, Rony, Wauwai , Yaliwan and Yambanda have already been in-
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traduced . Of the others , the most serious candidates appeared to be Jaminan 
and Harau . 
Jaminan, 34, from the Arapesh speaking village of Nimbihu in the north of 
the electorate was educated in the Eas� Sepik ,  in Queensland and at the 
University of Papua New Guinea . While at UPNG he had adopted the name 
Vivaldo (after a character in James Baldwin ' s  A nother Country) Winen, and 
became a familiar sunglassed figure on the periphery of various student 
political gatherings . In 1 977 Jaminan had been a public servant for eleven 
years , notably from 1 972-75 in the security intelligence branch of the (then) 
Chief Minister' s  Department (of which branch he became head) and had 
travelled extensively outside Papua New Guinea . In 1 976 he was the first to 
receive a Development Fellowship under a scheme which enable public 
servants to return to their home areas for extended periods , on half pay, to 
work on local community projects .  It was a condition of such fellowships that 
successful applicants refrain from political activity during the fellowship and 
for two years after . In 1 977 Jaminan stood as a United Party candidate. 
Harau , 44, is from Paparam near the eastern boundary of the electorate . As 
a young man he was employed by the government in W ewak and worked on a 
coastal vessel . Subsequently he entered local politics and became president of 
the Saussia Local Government Council and a member of the East Sepik 
Interim Provincial Government . He has a trade store and small holdings of 
cattle, coffee and cocoa. Harau contested the 1 973 by-election, gaining the 
second lowest proportion of first preference , votes , but was apparently little 
known around Yangoru or in the west of the electorate. In 1 977 he stood as a 
PPP candidate . 
The other three candidates all had reasonable qualifications as candidates 
but appeared to have little chance against the better known personalities . 
Laulimbe, about 40 , a farmer from Yumungu near Kubalia, was a former 
president of the Saussia Council .  He stood as an independant Pangu candidate 
but seemed to have little following outside his immediate home area. Nimiora, 
33 ,  lives at Hagama village where he owns a trade store . He went to school in 
Rabaul and spent five years at the Bainyik (Maprik) Agricultural Centre , 
subsequently becoming president of the Yeeker Rural Progress Society, a 
director of the SPCA and a member of the Coffee Marketing Board . As we 
have already noted , Yambanda, about 67 in 1 977 , was MHA for Wewak Open 
in 1 968-72 . He was caught up in the Hurun cult in 1 97 1  but the following year , 
standing against Yaliwan , had received only 73 votes . 
Although in 1 977 government officials were reasonably sanguine that the 
Peli-Seven movement was moribund , and that on his record as local member 
there was no chance of Hepau 's  reelection, with the nomination of Yaliwan 
(who said God had told him to stand) some entertained fears of a revival of the 
movement. In the event their fears proved unwarranted. In 1 972 Yaliwan, 
using the Peli Association network , had conducted an extensive and effective 
campaign but in 1 977 he did not venture far from Wamoin and made no 
attempt to reactivate the Peli-Seven organization. He appears at different 
times to have described himself as a United Party and as a Country Party 
candidate (in 1968 and after his election in 1 972 he identi fied himself with the 
Sepik based Christian Democratic Party) . And Hepau , who dissociated 
himself from Peli and described himself as a Country Party Candidate, made 
little attempt to locate his earlier supporters . 
Nor did Harau , Laulimbe, Nimiora or Yambanda conduct an active 
campaign , though there was some local canvassing for votes . 
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Of the remammg three candidates the most active was Jaminan . He 
campaigned alone, on foot , addressing meetings with a small loudspeaker and 
staying to talk with people in villages, and achieved the not inconsiderable task 
of visiting every village in the electorate. Although keeping to a strict schedule 
in order to cover the electorate , he managed to give the impression of never 
hurrying or being too busy to listen or speak to anyone; in some vil lages he 
stayed for two or three days. Jaminan was generally well received and as he 
went from village to village he attracted many bigmen who were prepared to 
give him support . Jaminan stood as a Unity Party candidate and he spoke 
about the party' s  platform; but he concentrated his campaign on an attack of 
the Somare government , accusing it of weaknesses , omissions and excesses . He 
spoke, in particular , of weakness in the enforcement of law and order ; of 
excessive spending by ministers, especially on overseas trips ; of lack of 
discipline and laxity among public servants ,  especially the police; of 
drunkenness and absenteeism in government departments; of abuse of access 
to government vehicles , and of a complete lack of development in the 
Yangoru-Saussia electorate. Jaminan effectively contrasted the lack of 
development in Y angoru-Saussia with the progress achieved in the Angoram 
and Maprik electorates and he suggested that Somare had denied development 
in Yangoru-Saussia lest Yaliwan and Peli get the credit for it. He accused the 
government of being out of touch with the needs and interests of village 
people, suggesting that if elected he would fight for the people and would not 
lose touch with the electorate . Jaminan had little to say about the minor 
candidates and though he campaigned aggressively he concentrated his attacks 
on the Pangu Pati rather than Wauwia or Rony personally . Though 
recognizing Somare's  strong personal appeal in the Province he did not 
hesitate to criticize the prime minister , accusing Somare of 'playing dirty 
politics ' and saying that although people thought of Somare as a good leader 
he was a big businessman and could be seeking personal gain.  
As in 1 973 , it was Wauwia who received the Pangu Pati endorsement . With 
assistance from the Pangu coordinating team based in Wewak (including a 
campaign contribution of over K2000) , he conducted an extensive campaign , 
going from village to village and attracting support from a good number of 
village big men and councillors . Wauwia compaigned very much as a Pangu 
candidate : he distributed Pangu Pati leaflets and T-shirts and in his speeches 
he emphasized the benefits - notably the achievement of self-government and 
independence - which the government had brought to the country during the 
life of one parliament ; his campaign poster urged people to vote for him to 
ensure the continuation of Michael Somare as prime minister . The softly­
spoken Wauwia did not himself emerge as a strong personality, however, and 
in this respect he probably lost ground to Jaminan . During the campaign 
Somare made a brief visit to the East Sepik electorates , speaking in Wosera, 
Maprik and Yangoru on the same day, but his visit to Yangoru was late (about 
6 .30 p .m. )  and brief and since many villagers were disappointed at the brevity 
of it , it is difficult to say whether on balance the impact of Somare 's  visit on 
Wauwia' s campaign was positive or negative . 
Peter Rony, also, conducted a fairly active campaign , identifying himself 
with Pangu and promising to work for the development of the electorate. But 
his campaign does not seem to have had much impact in the eastern part of the 
electorate. 
Interpreting the vote 
When votes had been counted the results were as follows :6 
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Candidate 
Jaminan 
Wauwia 
Rony 
Yaliwan 
Harau 
Nimiora 
Laulimbe 
Hepau 
Yambanda 
Informal 
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Table 1 Results 
Number of votes 
3 ,464 
3 , 349 
1 ,588 
1 , 52 1 
837 
391  
62 
52 
22 
47 
1 1 ,333 
Percentage of votes 
30.6  
29.6  
1 4.0 
1 3 .4 
7 .4  
3 . 5  
0 . 5  
0 . 5  
0 . 2  
0.4 
1 00.0 
Wauwia called for a recount of votes , but, after checking , the result was 
confirmed . 
From a historical viewpoint , the most noteworthy aspect of the voting was 
the eclipse of the Peli-Seven movement . In 1 972 Yaliwan had received 83 per 
cent of the vote and in 1 973 his little known lieutenant , Hepau, had scored 28 
per cent of first preferences. The fact that Hepau, the sitting member, could 
manage a mere 52 votes in 1 977 was a devastating indictment both of his 
personal performance as local member and of his role as Peli-Seven 
representative. On the other hand, considering the fact that he had resigned 
soon after his election in 1 972 , and that he had not conducted a campaign, 
Yaliwan' s  13 per cent of the vote was impressive, lending some credibility to 
the cautious judgment of  May, quoted above, that he still carried some 
weight in the area. 
Of the other minor candidates , Harau polled quite well in the eastern part of 
the electorate and Nimiora attracted some local support ; Laulimbe p·olled 
predictably poorly and as for the aging Yambanda, as Winnett said when he 
saw the figure of 22 votes , 'A chap of that age would have an extended family 
much larger than that ' . 
Peter Rony polled strongly in his home area, which is fairly densely 
populated , and his work as council clerk in the Abelam speaking Maprik area 
(in the Maprik Open electorate) probably helped him to gain votes among the 
Abelam speaking villages in the central-west of the electorate . But he did 
poorly elsewhere . In contrast to the situation in 1 973 , he gained fewer than 
half the votes received by Wauwia. 
Jaminan and Wauwia between them took over 60 per cent of the vote. As 
the endorsed Pangu candidate, and as such able to associate his candidature 
with Somare, Wauwia probably received a significant ' party' vote from 
throughout the electorate but it is impossible to gauge how many votes this was 
worth; given the apparently generally low level of political awareness in 
Yangoru-Saussia, the limited nature of the Pangu campaign , and a general 
feeling that the government had neglected the area, it may not have been worth 
many. In any case Wauwia's  vote, like that of other candidates , was 
concentrated around his home area . 
Jaminan, on the other hand , seems to have received little assistance from the 
United Party and though one might be tempted to interpret support for him at 
least in part as a conscious vote against the government , any such vote must be 
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regarded more as the result of an effective personal campaign than as evidence 
of general support for the United Party . It must be borne in mind that every 
other open electorate in the East Sepik province returned a Pangu candidate 
and that in the regional electorate the people of Yangoru-Saussia voted 
overwhelmingly for Somare. It has been suggested that as the only candidate 
from the Arapesh speaking section of the electorate J aminan benefitted by not 
having his vote split. But though it is true that Jaminan received the vast 
majority of the votes from the Arapesh speaking villages, this alone cannot 
explain his success .  The Arapesh are concentrated in the northwest of the 
electorate in the Kaboibus and Kumun census divisions (see map 1 ) .  In 1 97 1  
the population of Kaboibus and Kumum census divisions (men, women and 
children - and not all Arapesh) was 3 ,495 , compared to 20, 1 50 in the other 
seven census divisions,  which are predominantly Boiken speaking. In 1 977 
Jaminan gained 3 ,464 votes out of the 1 1 ,333 cast , indicating extensive 
support in other parts of the electorate .  There can be little doubt that the 
reason for this support was the extensive and effective campaign which 
J aminan had been waging for some months before other candidates had 
announced their intention of standing . I n  terms of its physical coverage and 
the time spent with village people, Jaminan's  campaign must rank amongst the 
most extensive ever conducted in a Papua New Guinea election and it seems 
to have been pitched at a level , and to have touched on issues, which drew an 
immediate response from village people. 
In  retrospect , considering the closeness of the vote, it is tempting to 
speculate on what the outcome of the election might have been had Rony -
the other Pangu man and the candidate geographically closest to Wauwia -
not stood . One might also wonder how Yaliwan 's  candidature effected the 
vote; although Wauwia was known to be a staunch opponent of Peli , and 
therefore perhaps unlikely to receive votes from Peli sympathizers , he was the 
local man from the original heart of Peli support and it is quite likely that had 
Yaliwan not stood, parochialism · would have prevailed over principle and 
Wauwia would have collected a good proportion of the votes which in the 
event went to Yaliwan. Finally there is  an unanswered question concerning 
what happened to the votes of those who even in 1 973 supported Peli ;  by 
themselves the 1 977 figures give no reason for suggesting that one candidate 
benefitted more than another . 
Conclusion 
We have suggested that the most important single factor in Jaminan' s  
success was the thoroughness of his campaign . This may seem a rather bland 
conclusion (even · conceding that it was a rather bland contest) . Yet it might 
say a lot about the nature of national elections in places like Yangoru-Saussia. 
In the analysis of elections in developed western-style political systems it is 
common to seek explanations primarily in the context of an established 
political party system: parties provide a framework within which to consider 
such variables as ideological issues and effects of social , economic and 
demographic change , and the results of elections may be interpreted in terms 
of fluctuating party support and changing coalitions .  Such an approach, 
however, has little explanatory value where, as in much of Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific,  there is not a well developed national party system and where local 
loyalties and obligations are seen to outweigh the importance of national 
issues . In such situations elections may be better analysed in terms of primarily 
local political structures and complexes of patron-client relations . 
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But in Yangoru-Saussia even this sort of  model seems inappropriate . 
Yangoru-Saussia has its 'big men ' , and ritual yam displays and exchanges still 
provide a means of competition for status , but (the leaders of  the Peli-Seven 
movement excluded) reputations appear to be quite narrowly localized . The 
electorate has no remarkably successful businessmen , nor (Peli-Seven again 
excluded) has it produced any very notable political figures at national or even 
local level ; its only MHAs up to 1 977 being Hepau , Yaliwan and Yambanda. 
Compared with other electorates covered in this volume, there was no real 
confrontation between the competing candidates , little if any outlay of pork or 
beer and not even much talk , and apparently little interest on the part of the 
voters . 
Under such circumstances - and there are many electorates like Yangoru­
Saussia in this respect - electors are probably most likely to vote for a fellow 
clansman or a known local figure if  there is one, producing geographical 
clusterings of votes . Beyond this ,  people probably vote for someone they 
know, by sight or by reputation, even if they have only a vague knowledge of 
the person or of what he stands for (unless of course what is known is 
damning) . Simply being known, in other words, is probably more important 
than being known to support a particular party or policy, hence the 
importance of getting around the electorate even if it is just to talk to people 
and listen to what they have to say.7  At this level of politicization a candidate' s 
platform is probably of only marginal relevance, though in an area where there 
is clear evidence of a sense of relative deprivation there are likely to be more 
votes in criticizing government, and by implication promising something 
better, than in standing by its past record . 
In the Yangoru-Saussia case , it is only with such a model (if it can be called 
that) that one can explain the victory of a candidate who was little known 
before 1 976 and who campaigned against the government in an area which , in 
the contest for the provincial electorate, gave such strong support to the prime 
minister . 
Epilogue 
Within the first few days of the National Parliament Jaminan had establish­
ed himself on the opposition front bench as shadow minister for finance and 
he has been an outspoken critic of the government on a variety of issues.  
Jaminan was also actively associated with moves to replace Sir Tei Abal as 
leader of the Opposition, giving his support to Iambakey Okuk and leaving the 
United Party to join Okuk 's  People' s United Front when Okuk became Op­
position leader . In November 1 978 Jaminan broke with the Front over a dis­
pute with Okuk as to who should lead the attack on the coalition government ' s  
budget . In Yangoru-Saussia people seem proud to  have a member of such 
obvious significance who has , incidentally, given the Yangoru-Saussia electorate 
a new respectability . 
NOTES 
1 .  For a more detailed description of the area see May ( 1 975) . 
2. For a history and analysis of the Hurun cult see May ( 1 975) . 
3 .  Allen ( 1 976) described the struggle between Pangu and Peli in the Dreikikir Open 
electorate in 1 972. 
4. The following account is condensed from May ( 1 975) . 
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5. In a revised and updated version of May ( 1 975) , to be publised in May (ed) , 
Micronationalism in Melanesia (forthcoming) . 
6. Unfortunately a breakdown of voting by polling booths is not available. The 
following comments on the regional distribution of votes are by Winnett who was 
present as an observer when votes were being tallied . 
7 .  Compare Voutas's account of his successful election campaigns in 1966 and 1968 
(Voutas 1970) . 
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Chapter 1 5  
KAVIENG OPEN : 
W ANTOK AND ASSOCIATIONS 
Ngen Isana 
Background 
Kavieng Open Electorate is  one of the two electorates in the New Ireland 
Province. It embraces the islands of New Hanover , Nurua, Tench, Djaul and 
the Tgak group, and on the main island (New Ireland) the electorate extends as 
far as Bol village on the East coast and Namasalang village on the West coast . 
The electorate has a population of about 20,000, of which 14 ,  750 people 
were eligible voters at the time of the elections .  The population is dominated 
by New Irelanders , although there are some non-New Irelanders in 
plantations, the township of Kavieng, and other areas where they were 
brought in to work on such projects as timber and fishing . Kavieng is the main 
centre of the electorate as well as the province, and it is also the business 
centre , especially for big shops and the main wharf. I t  is the headquarters for 
all government departments in the province. The general hospital is also found 
there . Business is the town is mostly owned by Chinese, although indigeneous 
ownership is growing . One large shop is owned by the TIA (Tutukl Isukal 
Association) . It was bought from a Chinese . 
The area of the electorate was under European control from German times 
to Independence, especially mainland New Ireland, where the people were 
involved in the building of the East coast road , now known as the Boluminski 
Highway. There was also mission influence . In the electorate as a whole the 
Catholics , United Church followers and the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) are 
strong, but there are also smaller missions , such as Jehovah' s  Witnesses and 
Bahai . All missions are actively involved in helping the people develop 
politically, economically and educationally . The Catholic mission is behind 
TIA, which is a big force in New Hanover politics . The TIA grew up from the 
so-called Johnson Cult , named after President Lyndon Johnson . The Johnson 
Cult grew out of US "cargo" influence on New Hanover during World War 
I I .  The Cult crystallized among the Catholic faithful of New Hanover when an 
American priest , Father Miller , began to advocate grassroots development . 
The TIA is a farmers' association concerned with village development -
especially cash cropping, reliable sea transport and trade stores . An offshoot 
of TIA on the mainland and in the outer islands is the TFA (Tutukl Farmers' 
Association) , which is also Catholic and accepts TIA leadership despite 
language differences. Kavieng has several industries set up within its 
boundaries . The fishing industry benefits people through bait royalties and 
also employment opportunities . The timber industry is another source of 
royalties and employment . Nearly the whole population is involved in copra 
cash cropping . Besides individuals owning plots or plantation, there are also 
large scale plantations owned by big names like Burns Philp and other 
expatriate interests . Second to copra is cocoa production, which is widespread 
through the electorate, but there are few large plantations . 
The infrastructure of the electorate makes the population accessible . The 
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East coast road and the West coast road connect most of the electorate's 
population and give access to the main shopping area, Kavieng. As for the 
islands ,  the main form of transport is boats . Most of the islands close to 
Kavieng depend on outboard motors,  which are sometimes privately owned. 
The outer islands like Mussau have airstrips where small planes can land, but 
they also have bigger boats which carry their produce to Kavieng. 
Candidates and their Campaigns 
In 1 977 the Kavieng Open Electorate was contested by seven candidates . 
They were E .  Tito , T. Lapan, C .  Mitrap, L. Maris ,  G .  Sigulogo, W.  Gukguk 
and P. Kwan, the sitting member . Six of them were from New I reland by 
custom and traditional rights; the other candidate was a mixed race Chinese 
who considered himself a New lrelander , and was successful in the 1 972 
elections. 
Epel Tito . Aged about 30 at the time of the election , he came originally from 
a village out of Kavieng, Omo. He reached Senior Cambridge University 
Entrance in Fij i in 1 959, and was a clerk from 1 962-67 . He was a Savings and 
Loans Officer from 1 969-7 1 . At the time of the election he was staying in his 
home village . 
Epel Tito nominated as an independent candidate but openly claimed that 
he was a Pangu supporter or sympathizer and foundation member of the 
party. He campaigned independently , driving up the East Coast Road in his 
small utility and stopping at each village to talk to the people. 
Taviri Lapan . A former Defence Force Officer , aged about 35 years , he was 
married with three children . He did most of his officer training in Australia 
and gained an Australian Army Certificate 1 st class in 1 970. After that he 
worked as an instructor of cadets . Besides being awarded an MBE in 1 970, he 
has also been president of the PNG Amateur Swimming Union. 
Taviri comes from the island of Mussau between New Ireland and Manus .  
He was the only candidate who was a member of the SDA mission . He 
nominated as an independent candidate and sympathizer of PPP, but later 
became a serious PPP candidate when he teamed up with the endorsed PPP 
candidate for the provincial seat , N. Levi , during the campaigning period . 
They were seen together on their campaign tours of the electorate .  J .  Chan ' s  
campaign manager dealt with their organizational problems. In h i s  campaign 
Taviri emphasised the welfare of the town people as well as the villagers . His 
approach was very simple and open . .  
PPP backing was a plus for Taviri , but he had only come to the electorate 
for the elections ; otherwise he was in Moresby, and he was not even known to 
most of the voters until he nominated for the seat . 
Cunibert Mitrap . A fairly well educated person of about 44, Cunibert comes 
from Lagagon village on the East-Coast of the electorate .  Besides being a 
teacher , he has involved himself with the affairs of his village and is chairman 
of his village cocoa society . Until he nominated to contest the Kavieng Open 
Electorate, he was a community school teacher in several areas of the 
electorate . 
Although he nominated as an independent Cunibert leaned to PPP , and 
used the PPP platform in his campaigns . As a candidate he was very 
independent ; that is, he would not go around with a big group of supporters . 
In his campaign he stressed the needs of the people and that he would pursue 
these needs if he was elected . However the people I contacted seemed to treat 
him as a not very serious candidat� simply for the reason that he was never 
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involved in the politics of the province and therefore not very well known . 
Lawrence Mari s .  At the age of 50, this was his second attempt to win the 
seat , for he had been a candidate in the 1 972 election. He comes from 
Panachais village on the West Coast of the electorate and has been involved 
with the people for many years through being a carpenter , catechist , 
intepreter , teacher , and councillor. He was formerly a member of the United 
Party Branch in the electorate set up in the 1 972 election , and indicated that if 
he won he would join up with the United Party, although he nominated as an 
independent. His campaign emphasis was on rural problems, and what he had 
done for the area . 
Gerard Sigulogo . Gerard was a former student of the University of PNG, 
who later became the public relations officer of the TIA in New Hanover . 
Whilst with the TIA he represented them in the Area Authority and also 
helped the association to acquire some plantations around the island of New 
Hanover . Besides he also helped the TIA buy its shop in Kavieng, the first to 
be owned by an indigenous organization in town. He was also chairman of the 
New Ireland Steering Committee which laid the foundations for the formation 
of the provincial government , and he was the member for South Lovageri in 
the provincial government. 
Whilst campaigning he stressed that his policy was for the people, because 
previous politicians had been promising things without fulfilling their 
promises . He also believed that people should have their own businesses and 
should control their own economy, for they were the owners of land . He 
stressed that he believed in a strong, stable government . 
Although Gerard nominated as an independent candidate, Pangu indicated 
that they were giving him moral support . Helping out with his campaigns was 
a group of educated people who attempted to get the support of the young 
generation . In fact this group accompanied him almost everywhere . His main 
problem was how to win back the TIA supporters . He had been asked to resign 
his post in the association . 
Walla Gukguk . Walla was the oldest (55) of all the candidates , and was 
serving as the president of TIA. Walla became prominent in New Hanover 
politics when he started his career as a councillor from Meteran vi llage during 
the period of the Johnson Cult . Walla nominated as United Party candidate. 
He had support in New Hanover through TIA influence . The TIA met his 
expenses , and made sure that nearly every TIA supporter voted for him . 
Perry Kwan . The sitting member was aged about 37.  Well educated he can 
speak English, Pidgin and Chinese and had previously been a commercial 
artist and photographer . Perry hardly campaigned at all . He was a very 
unpopular candidate, and was given little chance of retaining his seat . He 
completely lost contact with the bulk of the electorate' s population during his 
five years as member . What is more, some of the promises he made to the 
people were never fulfilled . Some people said that he never investigated any 
development in the electorate or the province for that matter . 
Result 
Walla Guguk won the seat comfortably with 3 1 1 8  votes out of 1 0, 1 73 cast -
about 30 per cent of the total . His nearest rival , Gerard Sigulogo , polled less 
than 20 per cent . 
As far as the voting in the electorate was concerned, language linkage meant 
a lot to the people. Thus if a candidate was a 'wantok ' or spoke the same 
language as the voters , there was a good chance that he was going to get votes 
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from his language group . This is illustrated below in the table of vote distri­
bution . For instance L. Lapan comes from Mussau language group . Being the 
only person from that language group who was a candidate he was able to win 
a maj ority of the votes from his area. 
Where two candidates come from the same language group - for instance 
G. Sigulogo and W. Gukguk were both from New Hanover - the voters were 
faced with two 'wantok' candidates . In this case Walla secured most of his 
votes from the TIA supporters, whilst Sigulogo secured most of his votes from 
the non-TIA areas , or from other small associations around his language area . 
The people also looked at the past performance of each candidate and voted 
for candidates who had been involved with the electorate' s development and 
had been working among the people for some time. 
A candidate such as T. Lapan, who had not been in the electorate for 
more than a few months benefited most from his church affiliation . He was 
the only SDA candidate, and propably captured most of his votes from this 
group. Although his being a PPP man did not play a major role, I feel it 
helped to secure votes from those who were not his wantoks or SDA, but 
believed in the PPP platform or J. Chan . 
All in all the major determinant of voting in the electorate was language. 
When the language factor was reutralised it was likely that common 
membership in an association came into play . This was especially true with 
TIA and members, who were closely linked although from different language 
groups . Most votes in the TIA/TKA areas , went to Walla and won him the 
election . The TIA was the best organised group in the electorate that made 
sure that almost every TIA and TKA member voted for Walla, their president . 
Table 1 Results: Kavieng Open Electorate 
(Common Roll Approx. 1 4,000) 
Polling 
Teams:  
E . Tito T. Lapan C . Mitrap L.Maris G .Sigulogo W . Gukguk P. Kwan 
1 (Town) 49 1 3 5 5  230 54 522* 482 
1 (Town) 347 279 472 *  2 1 2  3 8 2  226 
2 1 4 1  1 32 36 53 1 60 3 1 8* 
3 3 3 3  9 470 1 607* 
4 28 96 1 0  9 354 480* 
5 & 6 3 1  1 080* 5 1 5  5 
1 04 1  1 975 754 337 1 903 3 1 1 8  
Informal = 1 87 ( l . 8 %) Turnout = 1 0 1 73 (72%) 
KEY: 
TEAM 1 :  - Kavieng town, East Coast Road and part of West Coast Road . 
TEAM 2: - Tigak Islands and part of West Coast Road 
TEAM 3: - South Coast of New Hanover 
TEAM 4:  - North Coast of New Hanover 
TEAM 5: - Mussau Island 
TEAM 6:  - Enura Island 
* = polled highest in respective team . 
2 1 9  
369 
1 64 
24 
47 
3 5  
858 
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The table clearly shows how Walla won the elections . He polled highest in 
three teams. 66% of his votes were New Hanover votes , compared to 
G. Sigulogo's 26% . The only area where Sigulogo did well was in the town of 
Kavieng . He came second in three of the remaining five teams . 
The table shows that Walla polled the hig)lest in team 2 ,  which covered the 
Tigak and West Coast , and is the area where TFA has a lot of influence. It also 
shows the influence that TIA has over the TFA area, Walla being the president 
of TIA had no problems in securing support in that area . 
Conclusion 
The central determinant of votes in the Kavieng electorate was language, 
followed by common membership in an association. Party politics was never a 
serious issue in the election or in determing how the people voted . The missions 
in the area played a minor role. Walla won because he was associated with 
both a big language group and a well known and highly supported association, 
the TIA, which had links to the TFA on the mainland. 
Chapter 1 6  
ISLAND POLITICS :  
THE ELECTIONS IN MANUS 
Wes Rooney 
Introduction 
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The Manus Province, which has the smallest population and smallest total 
land area of any province in Papua New Guinea, is spread out over a very large 
area of ocean which stretches from 1 °S of the Equator to 3 ° S  (approximately 
250km) and from 1 44°E to 1 48° 30 ' E (approximately 450km) . 
350km west of the Provincial centre of Lorengau are the scattered and 
sparsely populated Ninigo and Hermit Islands , while lOOkm East of Lorengau 
is the outpost Nauna Island. Along the North Coast and to the west is  a string 
of small low-lying coral islands , while to the South and South East, as well as 
small flat coral islands and atolls ,  there are larger islands of volcanic origin, 
namely Baluan, Lou, Rambutso and M'Buke . These larger South Islands are 
the most fertile areas of the Province . The Main Island of Manus is approxi­
mately 90km long and 30km at its widest point. The population is unevenly 
distributed over the island, with the larger villages being found along the 
North and South Coasts . Inland groups concentrate at the Western and 
Eastern ends of the island. The more mountainous central limestone area is 
virtually unpopulated . 
The 1 97 1  census gave the Manus population as 24, 866. With growth 
estimated at 30Jo p.a .  it is reasonable to assume a population in 1 977 of about 
29,000, 500Jo of which would have been under 1 8  years . Thus a very rough 
estimate of the total number of possible voters would be about 14 ,500 .  This 
population voted for one Open and one Provincial seat . 
The population of Manus is by no means homogenous.  It is difficult to say 
exactly how many distinct language groups are present as the languages are all 
closely related and the various dialects shade into one another. However most 
people group the dialects into approximately eight languages, and these in fact 
appear to form the basis of traditional political groupings. In this election, 
particularly in the Open electorate, a candidate' s  ability to secure his own 
language area as his base made a definite difference to the final result . 
As well as language differences there are quite striking social and economic 
differences between various groups of Manus society . The most obvious 
dichotomy is between the sea-farers and the land-based people . On the North 
Coast the seafarers are represented by the people of the island chain fringing 
the North and West coasts while on the South coast the sea-farers are known 
as the Manus and are scattered in coastal lagoon locations and on the smaller 
Southern and Eastern Islands . Traditionally the sea farers have been fishermen 
and traders and have lived, not always peacefully, in a state of mutual 
dependence with the land-owning gardening people of the large Islands and 
Manus mainland. The state of tension between the sea-farers and gardeners is 
a major political force in the province even to-day, and had its effect on the 
elections , even though the more modern dichotomy between North coast and 
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South coast appeared to be more significant . This North-South division may 
have existed traditionally , but its modern significance is derived from the 
events of the second world war and the immediate post war years . 
Political History 
During the Pacific War Manus was a major U .S .  military base and in 1944 the 
Manus people witnessed a truly enormous build up of troops, shipping and 
infrastructure as over one million foreigners passed through or were stationed 
in the area . All of these events occurred on Los Negros , the North Coast and 
the North Coast Islands while the South Coast people, apart from incon­
venient relocations while the Americans bombed the Japanese , were relatively 
passive observers . 
Following the War the Australians and the Missions who were also based on 
the North Coast attempted to re-establish pre-war control . However local 
pressure for change was considerable, especially in the South , where Paliau 
Maloat , a former policeman, emerged as a leader capable of unifying the 
widely disparate Inland , Island and Manus groups into a single political entity 
which then pressured for education , health and other government services and 
changes in the taxation system . Initially this movement was strongly 
suppressed . Paliau and several other leaders were gaoled for up to twelve 
months on quite trivial charges . The Catholic Church was strongly opposed to 
the movement and was finally rejected by the South Coast which , under the 
influence of Paliau , created an independent Christian Church which has been 
an integral part of the movement up to the present . Eventually the movement 
was recognized and indirectly supported by the government . A council was 
established on Baluan Island and schools and aid posts were introduced into 
many villages in the fifties . 
Because of the differing war-time experiences of North and South , and 
because the Administration and Missions were more fi rmly entrenched on the 
North Coast, the movement was ,  with one or two exceptions,  restricted to 
the Southern villages and Islands. This rift was further accentuated by the fact 
that for many years the North coast was not included in a Local Government 
Council area. It  was not until 1 964, despite strong opposition from the North , 
that a council incorporating all villages of Manus and absorbing the South 
coast council ,  was established in Lorengau . 
This made Manus unique in PNG in that the entire Province was served by a 
single elected council of 33 members.  This unique political experience has, in 
spite of the traditional divi sions and the North-South division , fostered a sense 
of unity and identity which had a noticeable effect on the 1 977 elections . This 
sense of Manus Identity is  also enhanced by the relative isolation of Manus 
from the rest of PNG and the extremely high number of educated Manus 
people working outside their own province . 
Although Paliau Maloat is still a respected and influential leader the 
movement has waned somewhat , especially since his defeat by Michael 
Pondros in the 1 972 National elections. As the Movement has decli ned , a third 
area has emerged as being significant , namely the West Coast (including Malai 
Bay, Kali Bay, the West Coast Islands and the remote Western Islands .)  For a 
long time this area was neglected and of little impact ; however with the advent 
of motorized canoes and the increasing mobility of government extension 
officers this area is emerging as the third distinct political division in Manus . 
Thus for convenience we can identify the following political and geographic 
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divisions in the Manus Province, which were important in the 1 977 elections. 
1 .  South Coast 
2 .  North Coast 
3 .  West Coast 
4. Urban Areas 
The 1977 Elections 
a.  
b .  
c .  
a. 
b .  
a .  
b .  
a .  
b .  
Islands 
Mainland 
Manus 
Islands 
Mainland 
Islands 
Mainland 
Lorengau 
Lombrum 
Manus was well prepared for an election . The voters were well informed about 
the issues involved and understood the democratic process , and potential 
candidates had been making preliminary plans for months beforehand . 
In 1 976 it was rumoured that there would be an early election and in 
response to that rumour several out-of-Manus residents returned to assess the 
political climate. The period of waiting between June 1 976 and June 1 977 was 
one of intense speculation as the contenders tentatively weighed their chances . 
However except for a few people, such as the sitting members , a convention of 
secrecy was maintained which permeated the relationships between public 
servants,  local government officers , councillors and other prominent citizens .  
The suspicion that one might be  a candidate for election was ever present . 
After the writs had been issued, the issue gradually changed to which 
electorate a particular candidate would nominate for . 
The anomalous and unique situation on Manus is that the open and pro­
vincial electorates are identical and consequently intending candidates could 
choose to contest either seat . When the nominations finally closed there were 
ten candidates for the Open electorate and six for the Provincial . Although the 
two electorates were theoretically identical they gave rise to two very di fferent 
contests.  
The Candidates 
(a) Origin and Place of Residence 
On this criterion we see the most striking difference between the two 
electorates . In the Open electorate the candidates were drawn from all of the 
above mentioned politico-geographic areas of Manus , with the exception of 
the sub-grouping of South Coast - Manus, whereas for the Provincial 
electorate five out of six candidates could be classed as South Coast and the 
sixth came from a North Coast peri-urban village which has close affiliations 
with the South Coast - Inland sub-group. 
In the Open electorate there were double nominations from Pak Island , 
Salien and Derimbat/So-uh. In  the Provincial electorate some candidates 
came from the same language group or village , but, in fact , all except one was 
a well-established urban resident , and the evidence is that this adversely 
affected home base support for some of these candidates . In the Open 
electorate by contrast most of the candidates were village residents, and it is 
also reasonable to infer that the two urban-based candidates in the Open 
electorate maintained more effective links with their home village than did the 
urban-based provincial candidates . 
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(b) Age, Education and Experience 
The difference between the electorates can be seen in the wide range of ages , 
education and experience of the Open electorate candidates compared with the 
more uniform qualities of the Provincial candidates . The Open candidates 
ranged in aged from 25-30 to over 60 years old . The education range was from 
no formal education to a university degree . Work experience ranged from 
middle level to executive level public service . 
The Provincial candidates were all ,  with one exception, between 30-40 years 
old , educated to secondary level , and in paid employment . There were two 
members of Parliament , two clerks , one building contractor and one sub­
sistence villager among them. 
( c) Party Affiliations 
The contrast between the electorates continues . Pangu , United and People's 
Progress parties fielded one candidate each in the Open electorate, but only 
Pangu and United gave any significant assistance to their candidates . The 
remaining seven were non-party candidates, and some even opposed the 
concept of party politics in the elections.  The party influence amongst the 
Provincial candidates was much stronger . Pangu , United and Country parties 
funded and endorsed one candidate each , while two other candidates 
campaigned as unofficial Pangu candidates . (The endorsed candidate publicly 
objected to this . )  The remaining independent candidate also had the appear­
ance of a party candidate in that he was anti-government and appeared to be 
pro-United Party. 
( d) Campaigns and Plat/ or ms 
Provincial candidates campaigned more extensively and vigorously than 
their Open electorate counterparts . Even Joel Maiah, the only village-based 
Provincial candidate and the least vigorous campaigner , was more vigorous 
than contenders with similar experience, standing and background in the Open 
electorate .  The non-Party Open electorate candidates , especially, tended to 
concentrate on their own home areas . 
The impact of what the candidates said during their campaigns is difficult to 
assess . The party-endorsed candidates stuck quite rigidly to their national 
platforms, and on the rare occasions when they digressed into local issues the 
result was somewhat confusing - for instance the United Party candidates 
promised to establish a Rural Improvement Programme headquarters in 
Manus to control the distribution of the R . I .P .  funds . 
The independent candidates confined their promises to fairly realistic if 
somewhat mundane objectives such as the straightening out of the finances of 
the former co-operative movement , the acquisition of a province barge , more 
high school places, and the up-grading of copra markering facilities . There 
were few overt attempts by candidates to denigrate their opponents or to gain 
favour by extravagant promises . Rhetoric was at a minimum and the emphasis 
was on personality and past achievements rather than promises and party . 
In the Provincial contest two sitting members (Pondros and Kasau) were 
competing , and comparison of their past performances was inevitable. The 
stronger influence of the parties led to direct confrontation between the 
endorsed Pangu candidate, Pikah Kasau , and two candidates who claimed 
Pangu affiliation . Two other candidates had longstanding personal differences 
which became part of the campaign and eventually led to an unsuccessful court 
appeal against the legi timacy of Michael Pondros' election . However, 
compared to other provinces , the atmosphere between candidates was one of 
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cordiality and lack of animosity . This atmosphere was to a great extent created 
by the expectations of the general public. 
Although there were no official restrictions , most candidates showed a 
marked reluctance to campaign publicly until they had formally nominated. 
Once all candidates had nominated, it was generally expected by the public 
that they should travel , talk and hold meetings . The public acted as if they had 
an obligation to give each of the sixteen candidates a hearing. These basic 
ground rules may have emerged as a result of a misconceptions as to what was 
officially expected, or they may indicate a tolerant attitude and a wish to avoid 
"impolite" tensions - traditional in Manus politics . Manus enjoyed an 
institutionalized and civilized "political season" which affected the whole 
province , aided by Radio Manus , right up to the declaration of the polls . 
Sixteen travelling politicians could have been very disruptive in a province as 
small as Manus .  
The high level of involvement of  the public also tended to deter candidates 
from personally attacking their opponents .  Public declarations of sympathy 
with any one party or point of view by the general public were rare and there 
were no vital issues debated which could polarize the voters and so lead to 
conflict within the community . The atmosphere was one of strict public 
neutrality, with each candidate being given a fair hearing and assessed on his 
or her performance. 
The atmosphere was enlivend by joking comparison of the candidates with 
one of the less successful religious sects famed for canvassing on the streets . 
Occasions when three or four candidates arrived in one village simultaneously, 
or when one candidate circled an island in his canoe while he waited for other 
candidates to leave , became the stuff of humourous anecdotes . There were 
incidents of opposing candidates exchanging T-Shirts and badges , and even 
travelling on the same transport together, during the campaigning . Convi­
viality continued without interruption right up to the counting night when 
seven of the ·Candidates combined resources to put on a muu-muu for close 
supporters at a location which was only a convenient 200 meters from the tally 
room ! 
The Results 
Michael Pondros won the Provincial seat with 2343 votes out of 8590 cast . 
Nahau Rooney won the Open with 2 1 37 out of an identical total . 
The results as analysed from data made available by the electoral office tend 
to obscure certain aspects of the elections . There were several ballot boxes 
which contained votes from more than one of the politico-geographic 
divisions identified above, and although the tables have attempted to analyse 
support from various areas , this has proved difficult . However tables do show 
some general trends . 
a .  The least successful candidates received a greater percentage of their votes 
from their home areas than the more successful candidates . 
b.  In most cases where a village (home area) had an identified candidate, the 
village enthusiasically supported that candidate . In most cases the degree 
of support was in excess of 300Jo of the vote from that vi llage and in some 
cases in excess of 600Jo of the possible vote. 
c .  The percentage of each candidate' s  votes that was derived from the home 
areas was much higher for the Open electorate candidates (range from 
2 1  OJo to 570Jo) than for the Provincial candidates (30Jo to 260Jo) . I take this 
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to be a reflection of the wider geographical dispersal of the Open 
candidates . It could also mean that parochial issues were more prominent 
in the Open electorate.  
d.  Candidates ' education level was clearly important . The Open electorate 
results show an almost linear relationship between level of education and 
the degree of success, while the provincial results confirm that the 
candidate with no formal education did poorly among candidates who had 
attended school. 
e. Although party politics were much more evident in the selection of 
candidates and campaigning in the Provincial seat than the Open seat , the 
results indicate that party candidates in the Open electorate scored better 
than non-party candidates , while in the provincial electorate the 
candidates of the two major parties polled poorly . This was more a 
reflection on who the candidates were and how they campaigned rather 
than on any positive effect of the various party policies . In the open 
electorate the party candidates were better educated and campaigned more 
vigorously than the non-party candidates ; but in the provincial electorate 
there was no such distinction between party and non-party candidates . 
Table 1. 1 Manus Open - Candidate Characteristics 
Candidate Loa jam Joh an Propor James Sapau Nahau Michael Pondala Kuluah Stephen 
Lomoi Sapak Harol Sisosor Simeon Rooney Kakul Pohai Silwau Meta 
Village Pak Island Salien Pak Island Salien Pityliuh Lahan Sou-uh Sabon Derimbat Metaweri 
Broad A rea South Coast West Coast South Coast West Coast North Coast South Coast North Coast North Coast North Coast South Coast 
(Island) (Island) (Island) (Inland) (Inland) 
Effective Split Split Split Split Not Not Split Not Split Not 
Home Base (Harol) (Sisosor) (Lomoi) (Sapak) split split (Silwau) split (Kabul) split 
Education No Formal Up to No Formal B. Ac . No Formal B . A .  UPNG Unknown Secondary No Formal Secondary 
Secondary UOT P . H . D .  
Educator 
Age 40 30-35 40 30-35 40 30-35 30-35 40 40 30 
Residence Village Village Village Lorengau Village Lorengau Village Rabaul Village Pt. Moresby � (Lorengau 
1 975-76) � 
� 
Experience Ex Councillor Councillor Councillor Executive Councillor Prov. Govt. Previously Health Councillor, Professional 
out of Officer Planning, worked as Education Member 
Village (finance), Dist . Officer. Ass . Mana- Officer Area Auth . San Miguel 
Councillor & Previously ger with Brewery 
member, Research Japanese 
Area Officer for timber mill 
Authority. Prime 
Previously Minister 
Bank of 
PNG 
Party No-Party No-Party Pali au Pangu No-Party Independent. Not known P . P . P . No-Party U . P .  
Movement Recognised 
as Pangu 
(not 
endorsed) N ......J 
"° 
Campaign Negligible Some South Very North At time of North Effectively North Very 
(i. e. campaigning, Coast vigorous Coast elections Coast covered Coast vigorous 
travelling circumnavi- except negligible much of and I nland over all 
and public gated Manus S . E .  Is province province 
speaking 
Table 1 .2 Manus Open - Distribution of Votes by Location 
PLACE Loa jam Jonah Pro par James Sa pan Nahau Michael Pondala Kulvah Meta Informal Total Comment 
Lomoi Sapak Harol Sisosor Simeon Rooney Kukul Pohai Silwau Stephen 
LORENGAU/ 50 56 36 282 30 343 56 99 94 1 1 5 64 1 225 N 
LOMBROM 00 0 
M 'BUKE, 42 9 1  1 1 6 27 6 1 87 5 1 1 8 3 256 32 883 
BALUAN 
PANISELO , LOU 
MO UK LEN 1 97 1 276 9 3 88 5 24 1 9 1 3  636 Lomoi, 
NAEUA Harol -
LOAMAT, home 
TONG , PAK island, 
Pak 
HUS, SOUH , 1 2  5 1 0  1 03 9 98 1 1 2 24 2 1 2  9 22 728 Kakul,  � 
DERIMBAT , Silwau - � 
LOWA Home ...... c 
area � 
-
MALABANG, 7 4 9 96 1 08 30 8 1 1 8 1 2 40 1 8  450 Simeon- cl' 
PITYLU, home -- . ...... 
NBRILOU island, -· � 
Pitylu; -· 
Pohai- ;:s 
home � adjacent 
mainland � 
LUGOS, ROSSUN 4 4 5 1 1  4 89 1 9  1 96 5 1 5  2 1  374 Pohai-
LUNDRET, home 
BOWAH area 
LOS NEGROS 24 25 1 0  49 1 4  1 73 4 74 3 1  53 20 477 
NORTHCOAST 36 19 3 1  1 5 1  2 22 1 67 1 1  67 1 8  1 0  587 Kakul-
(WEST) ANDRA, home 
PO NAM , area 
BOND RALIS , 
TULO N'DREHET 
WEST COAST 68 1 86 1 4  60 1  5 30 27 1 5  1 36 7 990 Sapak , 
SOR!, NY ADA, Sisosor -
HORNYAN , home 
LESSAU , BIPI , village, 
KALI ,  SALIEN Sa lien 
MALAI BAY, 3 1 78 3 20 200 2 1 0  9 29 4 459 
LOI 
TIMOENAI 4 26 6 1 0  8 5  1 2  1 63 1 8  6 23 1 
PELIPAHUAI 
PELI POHUAI 2 6 26 2 97 2 8 67 6 2 1 6  Meta-
METAWAREI home 
village, 
Melawerei 
PERE, M'BUNAI 1 1  8 24 8 1 229 3 2 9 7 302 Rooney - � 
home ::s 
base, � 
M' Bunai 
M'BUNAI, 8 6 1 4  22 1 460 22 36 277 5 1  1 2  909 Rooney 
N' DROIA - inland 
EAST/SOUTH village 
COAST I NLAND 
WESTERN 29 44 1 38 3 4 3 3 2 1 52 1 280 
ISLAND 
POSTAL 4 2 3 
TOTA L S  479 659 555 1457 1 88 2 1 37 446 733 785 908 243 8590 
N 00 
Table 1 .3  Man.us Open - Percentage of Votes Derived from Home/Urban Areas 
N 00 
OJo of Total Votes OJo of Home Area OJo of Candidates OJo of Urban Votes Home Area N 
Derived From Votes Cast in Votes Derived Cast in Favour Comment 
Home Favour Home Ex-Urban of Candidate 
Candidate 
Loajam Lomoi 39.4% 28 . 7% 10 .4% 4 .3% Pak Island 
Jonah Sapak 28 .20Jo 1 8 .9% 8 . 5 0Jo  4 .80Jo Salien Village 
West Coast 
� 
Parpar Harol 49. 70Jo 44. 3 %  6 . 5 %  3 . 1 %  Pak Island � (") -c 
Ja mes Sisosor 41 .40Jo 61 . 1  OJo 1 9 . 5% 2�. 3 0Jo  Salien Village � --0 West Coast c 
::::-: -
Sapan Simeon 57 .40Jo 25 0Jo 1 6.00Jo 2.6% Pitylu Island �· 
�· 
Nahau Rooney 2 1 . 5 0Jo  5 1 . 3 0Jo  16 .00Jo 29. 5 0Jo  Lahan Village � East Inland a 
Michael Kakul 25 . 1  OJo 1 5 . 9% 12 .6% 4 .8% Souh Vil lage 
Pondala P ohai 26. 70Jo 55 . 5 0Jo  1 3 . 5 0Jo  8 . 5% Lugos/Rossou 
Ex-Slban Vil lage 
Kuluah Silwan 27 .OOJo 30.00Jo 1 2 .00Jo 8 . 1 %  Derimbat Village 
Meta Stephen 7 .4% 3 1 .9% 12.  7% 9 .9% Metawarei Village 
Candidate P ikah Kasau 
Village Worei (Pau) 
Broad A rea South Coast 
(Mainland) 
Home Base Not split 
Education P ost Secondary 
Age 30 
Residence L orengau 
Experience out of M . P .  Manus 
Village P rovincial . Pre-
viously Rural 
Development 
Officer 
Party Pangu 
Campaign Extensive 
Table 2. 1 Manus Provincial - Candidate Characteristics 
Michael Pondros Polomon Posawan John Paliau Joel Maiah 
Pelipohuai Sabon Baluan Loniu 
South Coast North Coast South Coast South Coast 
(Mainland) (Mainland) ( Island) (Los Negros) 
Not split Not split Not split Not split 
Secondary Secondary Post Secondary No Formal 
30-40 30-40 30-40 40 
Lorengau Port Moresby Po.rt Moresby Village 
M . P .  Manus Clerk Ok Tedi Clerk U . P . N .G .  Ex-councillor 
Open. Previously Development Co. Ex-council 
Public Servant President Manus 
H.S. P & C 
president 
Country Independent United Recognised Pangu 
Extensive Extensive Extensive Not very extensive 
but more than 
many open 
candidates 
Arnold Masipal 
Nauna 
South Coast 
( Island) 
Not split 
Secondary 
30-40 
Lorengau 
Building 
Contractor 
Recognised Pangu 
Very vigorous 
and extensive 
� 
::s 
� 
N 00 w 
Table 2.2 Manus Provincial - Distribution of Votes by Location N 00 
� 
PLACE Pikah Kusau Michael Polomon John Paliau Joel Maiah Arnold Informal Total Comment 
Pondros Posa wan Masi pal 
LORENGAU-LOMBRUM 275 463 75 1 22 35 1 93 62 1 225 
M'BUKE-BAL WAN 1 6  60 1 303 6 88 3 477 J .  Paliau -
home island,  
Pal wan 
LOU-PANISELU 1 8  66 1 50 60 44 57 1 1  406 
MOUKLE N ,  NAUNG 1 2  28 1 1 8 33 4 2 1 0  6 4 1 1 A. Masipal - t:1 � PAK h/is . Nauna � -
c 
PAK ISLAND 7 27 70 73 5 33 1 0  225 a -
'"o 
LOS NEGROS 53 1 42 25 38 1 85 1 7  1 7  477 J .  Maiah - c 
h/is . ,  Los ::::: -
Negros �-
-· 
;:s 
NORTH COAST 1 45 4 1 4  224 1 74 355 256 41 1 600 � ISLANDS & MAINLAND EXCHANGE NORTH - C) 
EAST MAINLAND 
LUGOS, RO SSUN 29 1 3 5 1 47 1 4  20 1 1  24 374 P. Posawan -
LUNDRET, BOWAT ISL. h/village, 
Saban 
WEST COAST 383 2 1 7  206 48 1 7  1 04 1 5  990 
MALAI BAY & LOI 38 254 86 1 0  
TIMOENAI 5 79 5 22 
PELIPOHUAI 
PELI POHUAI 97 12 1 5 
METAWAREI 
PERE, M ' BUNAI, 1 8  1 1 7 1 5  58 
M ' DROIA 
EASTERN ISLAND 1 03 287 40 3 1  
WESTERN ISLANDS 5 1  47 8 1 5 5 
POSTAL 5 1 1 0 
TO TA L  1 25 5  2343 1 1 72 1 146 
3 64 3 
1 1 1 7 3 
2 98 1 
1 7  275 8 
1 57 72 1 8  
1 0  9 0 
2 
840 1 6 1 3  209 
358 
23 1 
2 1 6  
503 
708 
280 
8590 
M . Pondros 
- Pelipohuai; 
A.Masipal -
inlaws ex 
Pelipohuai 
P. Kasan-
Metawarei; 
A .Masipal -
inlaws ex 
Pelipohuai 
� 
:::s 
� 
N 00 v. 
Pikah Kasau 
Michael Pondros 
Polomon Posawan 
--
John Paliau 
Joel Maiah 
Arnold Mas i pal 
Table 2. 3 Manus Provincial - Percentage of Votes Derived from Home/Urban Areas 
OJo of Candidates ' Votes OJo of Home Area V otes OJo of Candidates Votes OJo of Urban Votes Home Areas 
Deri ved Ex- H ome Cast i n  Favour o f  Derived Ex-Urban Cast i n  Favour of 
Home Candidate 
7 . 8 %  45 % 22 % 24% Metawarei 
3 . 4% 34.6% 1 9 . 8 %  3 9 . 7 %  Pelipohuai 
--------
1 2 .6% 42 % 6.4% 6.4% Sabon 
26 .4% 63 .9% 1 0.6% 1 0 . 5 %  Baluan 
---- -----
22 % 40. 2 %  4 . 2 %  3 . 0% Los Negros 
--- -
1 3 . 00Jo 5 1 . 9 %  1 2 .00Jo 1 6. 6 %  Nauna Adopted 
7 . 3 %  5 1 . 3 %  Base - Inlaws . 
Pelipohuai 
N 
00 
°' 
t?:i � � 
-c 
� 
-
� c 
:::-: 
-
�· 
s· 
� C') 
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